“Five Days In Yerevan”- One Day At The National Assembly
National Assembly of RA, Armenia
June 26 2006
The US Agency of International Development carries out the “Five days
in Yerevan” program which aims to give the possibility to the young
people of regions to get familiar with the state governance system
in the capital. On June 25 the young people visited the National
Assembly. The first meeting was with the President of the Parliament.
Greeting the young people the NA President Tigran Torosyan told about
the activity, purposes and problems of the Parliament and particularly
about the process of creating laws. The NA President highlighted
the importance of correctly confronting the laws with the mentality,
customs and traditions of the people, the respect and responsibility
towards the implementation of laws. Mr. Torosyan noted that one and
a half decade is a long period in the life of a person, but it is a
short period in the life of a state, so there are a lot of things to
do for the full realization of the state governance system, resolution
of social-economic and cultural problems. The President highlighted
the importance of the Constitution as a document which regulates
the public and state life, defines laws, obligations and right and
from which deriv the rest of laws. Touching upon the USSR decades
Mr. Torosyan highlighted the soviet achievements in educational,
social and economic spheres, noting that the knowledge given by the
USSR educational system in the sphere of social life were different
from that of the rest of the world being separated with an iron
curtain. In consequence, becoming independent states the post-soviet
countries appeared in a situation when they had to learn and act
simultaneously. The NA President highlighted the difficulties that
have been overcome after the establishment of independence, touched
upon the mistakes and defects, the successes and tasks.
The President of the Parliament highlighted the importance of obtaining
full knowledge and the responsibility towards the country and the state
in the sense of achieving lasting successes and highlighted that the
successors of today’s young people will live in much easier times,
but it will require a good work form all of us and the creation of
life conditions that our successors deserve.
The President of the National Assembly answered the questions of
the young people which concerned the external and internal policy of
the country. Particularly in answer to the questions concerning the
solvability of the Nagorno Karabakh issue andthe announcements made
by the Azerbaijani side about increasing the military budget and the
probability of war Mr. Torosyan highlighted that the 90s of the 20th
century and the beginning of the 21st century are different from each
other and there are international life rules and principles which have
to be considered. The Azerbaijani have had occasions to get convinced
that the money or the quantity of weapons do not decide the result of
the war. At the beginning of 90s Azerbaijan had an armoury exceeding
in quantity and quality, but when the person fights for the defense
of his home and freedom, he is much stronger and spiritually more
powerful. The Azerbaijani talk about the war very often, because
they don’t have the courage to recognize the Republic of Nagorno
Karabakh. However, they understand that restarting the war with the
RNK does not have any base and perspective. Mr. Torosyan highlighted
the circumstance, that during the last one and a half and two years
the international public has started to recognize the right of
self-determination of the RNK for which 17 years were needed. The
developments show that there are slow but positive movements. The
NA President highlighted that the people of Nagorno Karabakh have
declared its freedom and independence totally in compliance with the
USSR laws and are unbending to continue the struggle for its freedom
and independence having all the historical, legal and moral bases.
At the end of the meeting the NA President Tigran Torosyan wished
successes and happiness to the young people highlighting that
knowledge, diligence and dedication are at the base of real success.

Azerbaijani wrestler becomes European champion defeating Armenian
Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
June 26 2006
European teenage wrestling championship started in the Turkish city
of Istanbul (APA).
500 sportsmen from 35 countries are competing in the championship.
Azerbaijani team succeeded in the very first day. Our wrestler Khurshid
Babayev (42 kg) reached the final. He won the golden medal of the
European Cup by defeating Armenian Karapet Sarkisyan. Our wrestler
Orkhan Ahmadov (50 kg) won silver medal. He was defeated by Russian
Rasul Bekuha in the final meeting./APA/

The Sleazy Life and Nasty Death of Russia’s Spam King
Wired News
June 26 2006
He withheld pay from employees, boasted of his sexual adventures,
enraged government officials, and flooded Russia with 25 million emails
a day. Then one morning, Vardan Kushnir’s mother found his bloodied
body on the bathroom floor, skull bashed in. By Brett ForrestPage 1
of 3 next ”
Summer comes late to Moscow, and then barely at all. Windows fling
open as the city breaks winter’s half-year clamp. Locals burst from
dank living quarters, and crushing darkness gives way to high-latitude
sunshine that extends well into the evening. Vardan Kushnir returned
to his third-floor apartment in central Moscow on such a summer night
last July, his head lightened by several rounds of top-shelf booze
at a dark cliche of a club where female patrons often danced topless
on the bar. It was time for a last drink or two in the company of
several young women, one of them reportedly 15 years old. In the life
of Russia’s most despised Internet figure, this was just another night.
Although he never came to love his -adopted city, Kushnir had created
a comfortable existence for himself here. His business, the American
Language Center (ALC), which taught English to Russian nationals, was
thriving on the back of a relentless spamming campaign. Twenty-five
million emails a day generated enough new clients to subsidize
Kushnir’s heroic bouts of clubbing and sex, indulging himself in a
way that was remarkable even in a city known for its profound lack
of shame.
Kushnir dreamed of becoming a famous software developer – “like Bill
Gates” – but instead took a more inglorious path. His endless spam
and boastful escapades made him a source of irritation throughout
Moscow. He battled government officials and exasperated- everyone else,
especially his own employees. But his faith in Scientology gave him
a peculiar calm. Even as his cash-and-carry lifestyle plunged him
into chaos, he never raised his voice, never appeared to anger. All
the loathing only amused Kushnir, as he managed to keep his enemies
at distant remove.
Until that hot night. Kushnir shared an apartment on Sadovaya-Karetnaya
Street with his mother, Olga, and the alley cats he always seemed
to be taking in. As she always did when her son brought girls home,
Olga had agreed to sleep in a nearby studio. The next morning, she
returned to the apartment to find his bloody corpse on the bathroom
floor. Police soon followed. Even a year later, they still won’t
disclose the exact course of events. According to news reports, the
35-year-old entrepreneur returned home in the early morning with three
young women, one of whom he had encountered at the Hungry Duck, a club
on the unsubtle end of Moscow’s meet and greet. Cocktails were poured,
and the girls slipped a tranquilizer into his drink. Soon enough,
Kushnir was out cold. But the dose didn’t keep him down long. When
he came to, the young women struck him on the head.
Kushnir was in trouble, and it was about to get worse. Several males –
friends of the girls – arrived. One newspaper describes them scaling
the drainpipe and entering through an apartment window. The group
now numbered at least five, and some of them began to beat Kushnir
savagely, smashing his skull and leaving him immobile on the floor,
blood silently flooding the tiles.
When Kushnir’s mother discovered the body in the morning, it was
already chill to the touch. “There was so much blood,” she says.
After the cops had come and gone and the corpse was on a slab at the
morgue, one of Moscow’s yellow journals headlined the episode with
triumphant cynicism: “THE SPAMMER HAD IT COMING.”
Vardan Kushnir grew up in Armenia. His father skipped out early
on, and his mother raised him alone. As a teenager, he excelled-
in math and physics, winning an invitation to study at the Moscow
Technological Institute of Light Industry. After graduation, he spent
a year in Los Angeles and returned to Moscow speaking English- with
almost no accent. In 1994, he opened the ALC, tapping US expats to
teach English to Russians.
Russia in the mid-’90s was plagued by open gang warfare and unchecked
theft of state assets. Getting rich – billionaire rich – had less to
do with working diligently or coming up with ideas than it did with
brute force. The overt signs of privilege were the black Mercedes and
impudent swagger of an oil baron. It was in this era of conspicuous
wealth that Kushnir launched a new company he hoped would make him
a ton of money.
Kushnir diverted his attention to Sophim, a US-based company he
founded with a partner in Florida. They developed an application,
Edifact Prime, based on a pre-Internet, business-to-business ordering
standard. But after several years and many trips to Florida, Kushnir
saw his seed money chewed up by costly trade shows. By 2001, the
venture was all but shelved, and Kushnir returned his focus to the
ALC, which had been providing enough income to support him and his
mother while he worked on Sophim.
This time, though, he had a new weapon in his arsenal: spam. He
had used bulk email to sell shares of Sophim (until the state of
Kansas told him he needed a brokerage license). Now he launched
into his Russian spam operation with the frenetic energy typical
of a post-Soviet entrepreneur. “He would change his thoughts and
decisions every couple of hours,” a longtime ALC office manager
says. “He had too many ideas. He wanted to do everything all at once,
as fast as possible.”
After bouncing between servers in Russia and Germany, Kushnir hooked
into the Chinese market, where $1,000 pays a month’s rent on a server
that can send 7 million emails a day. While administering the ALC’s
daily operations, he obsessed over beating spam filters, locating new
servers, buying email lists, and anything else that would widen his
web. It worked. By 2003, a year into the onslaught, company revenue
had doubled. The ALC had more than 110 students, and it was clearing
as much as $13,000 a month. With minuscule rent and overhead, Kushnir
bagged the lion’s share. It was hardly a fortune by US standards,
but in Moscow, where the average salary is about $2,600 a year,
it vaulted him into the minor aristocracy.
Igor Vishnevsky removes a metallic Bluetooth nugget from his ear
before sliding onto a leather couch in Le Gâteau, a poor imitation of a
French cafe. He casts an eye through the window and onto the movements
of Tverskaya, Moscow’s glossy main avenue, a blur of billboards and
hot lights. Almost a year after Kushnir’s death, Vishnevsky, a spam
engineer Kushnir recruited from Belarus- to run the ALC’s technical
opera-tions, has no regrets about how they found new customers. “If a
person says he hates spam,” Vishnevsky says, blowing on his espresso,
“then he means he hates advertising, which he sees everywhere.”
The ALC’s spam operation was crude, but effective: Vishnevsky would
send spider software to crawl the Net, collecting email addresses and
adding them to the rolls several hundred thousand at a time. He also
worked with suppliers – paying a few hundred dollars for a million
addresses. To fool spam filters, Kushnir would insert random spaces
between words in the subject line, or turn the body into a GIF or
JPEG. At its peak, the operation was generating an average of 15
interested would-be ALC students every day.
But the system was as buggy as it was crude, sometimes sending emails
to the same people more than 50 times a day. Complaints streamed in.
People swore, threatened, raged – anything to eradicate the nuisance.
“They used the word fuck much more often than other words,” Vishnevsky
says.
Kushnir shrugged off the grievances, often finding solace in one of
the Scientology books scattered around the office, muttering that
opinions mattered little in the face of financial growth. For him,
spam was effective; everything else was wasted chatter. “We spammed
everyone five days per week,” Vishnevsky says. “We gave them a break
on holidays.”
As the months wore on, protest groups – one was called the
Anti-American Language Center – sprang up on Russian-language Web
sites. Kushnir had become widely despised, but his resolve only
stiffened into a schoolboy’s smugness. “It was classic Soviet linear
thinking,” says Mike McAtavey, a former ALC instructor. “I get 250
customers and a billion nuisance calls. If I triple my input, I’ll
get 750 customers.” And, of course, 3 billion nuisance calls.
Spam was so cheap that Kushnir began using it simply to attract
attention to the ALC – even in places where he couldn’t hope to
generate business. He spammed far-off countries like Israel, Spain,
France, and the US. “There was no concern for being liked,” says Rick
Farouni, who worked at the ALC for two years.
Then Kushnir began attracting the wrong kind of attention. In 2003,
his spam reached Andrey Korotkov, then Russia’s deputy minister of
communications. Soon Korotkov was getting 10 ALC emails a day. When
he tried to unsubscribe, the messages doubled and started arriving
addressed to him by name. “I took it as a joke,” Korotkov says,
“to show me that there was nothing I could do to stop them.”
In 2004, Korotkov raised the issue at an Internet symposium held in
Moscow’s Central Telegraph building and attended by influential ISP
reps, advertising executives, journalists, and government officials.
Russia has no laws against spam, so Korotkov canvassed the panel,
asking what could be done to stop Kushnir. The only solution anyone
could offer smacked of the ALC’s own tactics – revenge by inundation.
The following morning, the ALC was flooded with 1,000 prerecorded
calls featuring Korotkov’s booming voice: “I want to warn you that if
you continue your illegal activity, then the necessary measures will
be taken, not just by me.” It was only a scare tactic, and Kushnir
knew it. “We just laughed at him,” Vishnevsky says, noting that the
episode prompted Kushnir to boast that no spam operation had ever
generated such negative response.
Kushnir acknowledged the counterattack by toying with Korotkov,
sending still more emails to the minister’s inbox, but with a new
theme. “You very badly need Viagra,” they read. “And we have girls
here waiting to serve you. We are going to give you a special test
to check your sexual potential. You must buy one ton of Viagra.”
A defeated Korotkov merely deleted the messages. “What else could I
do?” he says, likening himself to a caged animal. “You can make faces
to a bear in the zoo, and he will never reach you. He will just spoil
the air.” Kushnir reveled in the trouble he was causing. “Vardan sent
me a link about the conflict between him and the deputy communications
minister,” says Mikhail Urubkov, a Russian programmer who worked
on Edifact Prime. “He said, ‘See how famous I am.’ It was a game to
him.” And not the only game he liked to play.
The night might begin at Mio, a club not far from the ALC office,
where impressing the insecure teens behind Fendi sunglasses was as
easy as explaining to them the contents of the California rolls
they just ordered. Against this backdrop, a successful Internet-
entrepreneur would be king.
At 35, Kushnir’s blond hair had receded in a wide scoop across
his scalp, sticking up in wisps that he did little to contain,
and his face wore the evidence of many late nights. But as a man of
inscrutable international experience who never ran low on ruble notes,
Kushnir didn’t have to work hard in places like Mio to attract young
women. He would glide around, introducing himself as the director of
the American Language Center, until he found a taker. “Most of the
girls had heard about his spamming,” Vishnevsky says. “They found him
fascinating.” If that wasn’t enough, he’d tell stories about how he
owned a big house in America, where he was a man of great consequence.
But Kushnir soon grew bored and began looking beyond the usual club
scene. Former employees say he slipped into a dark void of orgies,
prostitution, and whatever happened to be past the edge. He relied
on a network of whore joints that ring the city. Sometimes he’d head
to a gambling boat moored on a canal along Moscow’s back side. There
he would strip naked and lie prone as two women licked him from head
to toe.
Kushnir would often arrive at work on Monday morning wearing a smirk,
recounting another tale of strange accomplishment. One afternoon he
exclaimed, “Finally, I found it,” and summoned an employee to his desk,
where he pointed to an online ad for a mother-daughter sex team.
Employees were put off by Kushnir’s behavior, but they were far
-angrier about the fact that he withheld their salaries. Many of his
workers were expat thrill-seekers, Moscow short-timers who eventually
figured out the situation and quit the ALC with a lesson in the ways of
Russian labor. When an employee did confront him, Kushnir grew oddly
pacific. “Why are you putting all this pressure on me?” he asked,
adopting the even tone of a superior conscience. “Why are you getting
so angry? You should read some L. Ron Hubbard.” He then offered a
volume on Scientology from his bookshelf.
The nobility of such gestures was lost on most. “His only authority
was L. Ron Hubbard,” Vishnevsky says. “He didn’t consider other people
as friends. He considered himself above them.”
While those around Kushnir fumed at his sanctimony, he remained
oblivious, descending into ever-stranger behavior. “He was spending all
he earned,” McAtavey says, explaining how Kushnir, between headlong
binges on sex and spam, would comb the city for odd flourishes of
fashion that would make him stand out in a crowd of wealthy suitors. “I
came in one day and he was wearing an expensive silver silk ascot,”
McAtavey says. “That’s what I remember – the silk ascot and not
getting paid.” “When Kushnir died, there were some people around
here who were not disappointed,” adds another former employee. “He
had enemies. There’s no question about it.”
The tallest Lenin statue in Moscow stands in October Square. Lenin
strides with his chin up, greatcoat trailing behind him, caught up
in the rushing wind of what was supposed to have been progress. A
short walk from the statue, the American Language Center occupies
a third-floor office in a redbrick schoolhouse. It’s a rec room of
Americana. A poster of the Brooklyn Bridge hangs beside an American
flag and a topographical map of the US. The ALC still operates today,
albeit with reduced fanfare. There are far fewer students, no spam
campaigns, and the occasional phone call handled by whoever’s around.
Kushnir’s mother runs the business now. She’s a lonely figure deep in
middle age, sharing photos of her son and memories of his last evening.
The night of the murder, his assailants reportedly swiped a few
items from the apartment, including a laptop, which led the Moscow
prosecutor’s office to suggest the event may have been a botched
robbery. His mother doesn’t believe it. “There were three or four
of them,” she says. “If they wanted to rob him, they could have tied
him up, locked him in the bathroom. They came to kill him.”
Part sanctimonious sexual adventurer, part ruthless spammer, Kushnir
left a wake of displeasure as he waded through life. In a well-ordered
world, he would have been a social outcast. But Moscow has its own
kind of order, and it’s easy to imagine how Kushnir’s brash gestures
could have pushed the wrong person too far. There may be little shame
in this town, but there are certainly consequences. By crossing the
line from entrepreneurial hustler to remorseless nuisance, Kushnir
made himself vulnerable.
Not long before his death, even Kushnir began to ache over his
own excesses. He told one employee that he wanted to restrain his
desires, that he needed some self-control to become, in his words,
“a strong man.”
In August 2005, Moscow authorities detained four people in connection
with the Kushnir murder. No names have been released, no trial
date set. Russian police officials and prosecutors have officially
embargoed- all information about the case. And so, a year later,
everything is playing out behind closed doors. Or not playing out at
all. As time goes on, the killing only recedes deeper into memory.
After all, dozens of people meet a violent end every week in Moscow.
Kushnir was buried a half hour’s drive outside of town, amid tall
grasses and unregimented tombstones. After a quiet ceremony, a bus
carried mourners to the American Language Center. The people ate
and drank and said not much of anything, understanding that Vardan
Kushnir had become too much even for Russia to bear.
Brett Forrest () is a Moscow-based writer.
–Boundary_(ID_tnBNsTm84ROwN4LOaiMmHQ)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

90% of Armenian school-children are sure, their educational system is corrupt
TREND Information, Azerbaijan
June 26 2006
(REGNUM) – 90% of school-children believe; corruption still exists
in Armenian educational system. Science Ministry General Education
Department Head Naira Hovhannisyan stated during a news conference,
devoted to results of monitoring, conducted by the National Center
of Liberalization Processes Monitoring (NCLPM) NGO.
As a REGNUM correspondent informs, according to her, 70% of pupils
are being trained in accordance with new teaching system. According to
NCLPM President Lusine Margaryan, the pupils evaluated accessibility
of general education program in 7.11 points (according to ten-point
scale). Unsatisfactory attendance of elder grades is caused by their
assurance of general education program’s insufficiency for entering
universities. 44% of respondents have such opinion, reports Trend.
The poll, in which 130 respondents took part, was conducted on May 1 –
June 15, 2006 by NCLPM NGO among elder grades’ pupils of four schools,
subordinated to the Armenian Ministry of Science and Education, in
the framework of public monitoring of educational system’s transparent
functioning with assistance of OSCE Yerevan office.

Iran bans Da Vinci Code after Christians complain
Reuters India, India
June 26 2006
TEHRAN (Reuters) – Iran has banned the best-selling novel “The Da
Vinci Code” after protests from the country’s Christian clergy, the
culture ministry said on Wednesday, but the Persian translation is
already in its eighth edition.
Iranian publishing thresholds have relaxed considerably in recent
years and Tehran booksellers have noted an increased appetite for
new age and spiritual titles.
“Based on the request of three Christian clerics, yesterday we decided
to ban its republication,” said an official at the Ministry of Culture
and Islamic Guidance who declined to be named.
Most of Iran’s Christians belong to the Armenian church and number
some 100,000. Although a small minority in a country of 69 million
Muslims, the Armenians have two seats reserved for them in the
290-seat parliament.
The tiny Assyrian Christian community also has its own parliamentarian.
Many Christians have condemned Dan Brown’s page-turner, saying the
plot is offensive for arguing Jesus Christ married Mary Magdalene
and that their descendants are alive today.
The Da Vinci Code has sold more than 40 million copies worldwide and
has been turned into a Hollywood film starring Tom Hanks. Although
the film has not had a box office release in Iran, the pirated DVD
is widely available.
Copies of the book were still on sale in Iran and will not be
taken off bookshelves, but a ninth edition will not be printed,
the official said.

Crew responsible for Armenian A320 crash near Sochi – Levitin
Interfax, Russia
June 26 2006
MOSCOW. July 26 (Interfax) – The crash of an Airbus A320 passenger
jet belonging to the Armavia airline near Sochi on May 3 happened due
to the fault of the crew, Transportation Minister and head of an ad
hoc government commission investigating the crash Igor Levitin said
at a press conference in Moscow on Wednesday.
“The human factor played its role in difficult weather conditions,”
Levitin said.

Prayers sent out to end the conflict
Toronto Sun, Canada
June 26 2006
By BRIAN GRAY, TORONTO SUN
Toronto’s Armenian community — many with family members living in
Lebanon and around the Middle East — prayed for peace last night in
a North York church.
“My sister and my brothers are in Beirut and I pray everyday for
their safety, but it feels good to get together with everyone and
pray as one,” Talar Harkidian said. “We don’t choose sides we only
choose peace.”
Harkidian was one of several hundred from different denominations —
including Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Orthodox and Catholic churches
and Lebanese Maronites — invited to St. Mary’s Apostolic Armenian
Church near Victoria Park and Sheppard Ave. E.
“We are here on this occasion for a mass for peace,” said Pastor
Meyhrig Parikian, who led the prayers and said the congregation wasn’t
choosing sides. “We pray for peace all over the world.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

System dazzles Ozz
Toronto Star, Ontario
June 26 2006
It’s hard to believe that when Ozzfest first stormed onto the summer
touring circuit 11 years ago it was perceived as a something of a
last bastion for heavy-metal diehards.
The travelling festival – conceived by iconic hellspawn-turned-TV-dad
Ozzy Osbourne, and his business-minded wife Sharon – may have
originally marked a circling of the wagons by the metal faithful
against the dominance of the original Lollapalooza and Lilith Fair,
but it’s now one of the standards for packaged tours.
Ozzfest has only made it to Toronto once before, when Ozzy and the
reunited Black Sabbath headlined a 13-hour endurance test on the
pavement outside the Docks in 2001. And its return to Toronto at
the Molson Amphitheatre last night counted as a bit of a gamble in
a summer crowded with metal tours.
Ozzfest 2006 nevertheless lured around 14,000 souls to the Amphitheatre
last night, despite the rather disappointing absence of Osbourne (he’s
been playing the second stage on some U.S. dates but took a miss on
this one) and a lineup cut from nearly 20 acts to nine. There’s no
disputing the greatness of headliners System of a Down, but the rest
of the Toronto bill – which included fearsome hardcore unit Hatebreed,
dodgy nu-metal scowlers Disturbed, intriguing Italian unit Lacuna Coil
and the Sunset Strip-meets-Helloween stylings of Avenged Sevenfold –
didn’t present a hugely convincing reason to take the afternoon off
and head down to the lakeshore.
Luckily, System justified its placement at the top of the heap with
a smashing sequel to its last Toronto date in September.
System of a Down’s precision pummelling was fascinatingly unique,
blending galloping thrash, operatic Armenian folk, twisted ska and
synth-powered post-punk savagery in a frantic, no-fat set. The set
list had both of last year’s superb discs Mesmerize and Hypnotize to
draw from, so new(ish) numbers like the monstrous “Attack” and the
arcane power ballad “Lonely Day” were mixed seamlessly with such
crowd favourites as “Violent Pornography” and “Chop Suey!” – the
latter defying its cripplingly complex structure to become perhaps
the summer’s strangest mass singalong.

TURKEY: Little progress on religious freedom
Forum 18, Norway
June 26 2006
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
<; Despite hopes, there has been little progress in achieving true religious freedom in Turkey, argues Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio en/themen/menschenrechte. Delays in changing the Foundations Law; declining official interest in acting on EU and Council of Europe advice; the lack of concrete impact of limited changes in the way the state records individual religious affiliation; "massive nationalistic indoctrination" in schools; and continuing systematic discrimination against Muslim and non-Muslim minorities contribute to Turkey's religious freedom deficit. In this personal commentary for Forum 18 News Service , Dr Oehring maintains that the Turkish government no longer seems willing to improve the religious freedom and human rights situation. Many think that EU accession negotiations may fail, and he suggests that this is likely to end any progress towards religious freedom. The Turkish parliament has now departed for the holidays - without approving the new Law on Foundations as it had been expected to do. The proposed Law would regulate how "community foundations" - the organisations allowed to some non-Muslim ethnic/religious communities - own and recover property. Parliament said it would come back early from holiday and reconvene in September, rather than October, to consider this proposed law and other laws aimed to bring Turkish laws into line with European Union (EU) norms. The aim is, reportedly, to approve at least the Foundations Law before the EU reports again on accession in early October. Although politicians and the EU are concentrating now on the Foundations Law, this focuses only on one fairly narrow issue: what to do with buildings and other property taken from religious communities by the government and sold to third parties (see F18News 13 December 2005 ) . The government cannot now give these properties back, so it will have to offer compensation. However, it is not willing to do so and parliamentary deputies think Turkey should not offer such compensation. As the European Commission is telling the Turkish government it must do so, the issue is deadlocked. Despite the urging of the European Commission's Enlargement Directorate-General that Turkey should use the good offices of the Council of Europe, both to help it understand what needs to be done in the area of religious freedom and to help draw up laws on religious freedom and the status of religious communities, the Turks are reluctant. In April 2006, the Turkish government contacted the European Commission to ask for specialists who could advise on these issues. The EU was willing to send three experts, two from the Council of Europe as well as a French expert on "laicism". But to the astonishment of those involved, the day before the experts were due to travel the Turkish government informed them there was "no need" to come. The involvement of the Council of Europe in helping Turkey's transformation is very tricky. Its Venice Commission - which advises on how constitutions and other fundamental laws could conform to European democratic standards - could help Turkey on religious freedom, but can only get involved if Turkey invites it to do so. But Turkey is not interested. Official religious affiliation records One small step has been taken in the way the state records individuals' religious affiliation. A new Personal Status Law approved on 25 April gives citizens for the first time the possibility to ask the authorities to remove information about their religious affiliation (or presumed religious affiliation) from their official records. However, the law is contradictory: while Article 35 paragraph 2 allows individuals to ask for their religious affiliation to be removed from their records or amended, Article 7 paragraph 1(e) specifies that citizens have to provide such information. Yet despite discussion for at least the past decade, Identity Cards still carry a section giving the holder's religion. One of the major contributors to the debate was Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who is now Turkey's President, in his former capacity as Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court. A committed secularist, he argued that, in a secular state, an individual's religion should not be mentioned in official documents. Changing religious affiliation on an individual's personal records was possible before, but required an individual to do this through the courts. Fear of social ostracism or hostility meant that few did this. Although the new Personal Status Law appears to be a positive step, this is not the case. In practice, individuals trying to change their religious affiliation in their official records could still face problems. For a start, they would have to tell officials - who could just record that the individual had requested to change their religious affiliation without actually changing it. At least this Law offers the possibility to remove any religious affiliation from individuals' Identity Card, but if this does not become common any official or police officer would then ask an individual why no religion was given. Giving no religion would be tantamount to an admission that the individual is possibly a Christian or a Jew - the only faiths apart from Islam allowed to be listed. It remains unclear how many people have asked to change the affiliation on their official records since the new law came in. In the past, individuals did of course change their religion, but were not always prepared to do so publicly through the courts. The authorities have given conflicting numbers of such converts. In February 2005 the Interior Ministry's Directorate-General for Administration of the Provinces told parliament that 344 people had converted from Islam to Christianity between 1997 and 2004, while six had converted from Islam to Judaism. No converts to other faiths were mentioned. However, Minister of State Mehmet Aydin, quoting figures from the government's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) (see F18News 12 October 2005 ) , said 368 people had converted "under the influence of missionary activities". There is much hostility to the peaceful sharing of non-Islamic beliefs, which may have been a factor in the murder of Fr Andrea Santoro (see F18News 9 February 2006 =724). The way officials record religion on personal records is predictable. Children born to parents who are recorded as Muslims are automatically recorded as Muslim. De facto, only three religions are permitted in the records: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Atheist or non-believer are not in practice allowed as options. Nor are Baha'i or Jehovah's Witness, to take two other examples. It remains unclear whether this has now changed, though in practice the whims of the official are likely to override any official decision. And if an individual asks to change the religion on their identity card, there is no guarantee officials will also change it on their personal record on the national register. And when you need any official document, the first place officials look is on the register. Islam, Islamic Minorities and Citizenship In the Muslim world, there is a tradition that the nationality is Islam: the nation is the umma, the body of Muslim believers. The concept of citizenship separate from religion is not known in Islamic law and tradition. Despite the government's insistence that it is "secular", Turkey remains a deeply Islamic society so these views have a strong hold on the population. For almost a quarter of a century, Alevi Muslims have been pushing for recognition as a distinct community able to organise themselves in accordance with their own beliefs. But in May, Professor Ali Bardakoglu, the head of the government's Diyanet - which controls all official Muslim life in Turkey, despite the claimed secularism of the state - declared once again that Alevis are de facto Sunni Muslims. This is like saying that all Protestants are Catholics. Predictably, Alevis were unhappy over this statement, which means that in practice, the government does not recognise that Alevis and Sunnis are different. The government maintains that Cem Houses, where Alevis worship, are not considered places of worship but cultural centres. "We're not against Cem Houses, but they're no alternative to mosques," is the government message. The Alevis are divided as to how to respond to the government's attitude - some groups are broadly pro-government, some anti-government and some pro-Kurdish. The Republican Education Foundation, which is under Alevi control, is regarded as more ready to work with the government. It says it does not want to see a separate government body to handle Alevi affairs, but argues that taxes from Alevis are being used (or misused) solely on Sunni mosques and imams. It insists that as Alevis are Turkish citizens and taxpayers it wants to see their taxes used to support Alevi structures. Islamic groups that do not regard themselves as being under government control - such as the Islamic brotherhoods (the Sunni Nakchibendis, Mevlevis and others as well as the Shi'ite Bektashis) or new Islamic movements (such as the Nurcus and Suleymancis) - are in practice left alone. Yet there is no chance that the government will recognise Muslim differences, even though Turkey has Sunnis, Alevis and a small Shia minority. This indicates that the government is not just Muslim, but specifically Sunni Muslim, despite its proclaimed secular nature. Nationalism in Education Discussion continues over changing the school curriculum to treat all faiths in Turkey in a new way. The Alevis - like other religious minorities - complain that no progress has been reached for their teachings to be mentioned in school curricula. Further, Alevis have warned that if the government does not introduce separate religious education for Alevi children, they will lodge a case against it at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg - to which Turkey is subject, as a member of the Council of Europe. Education remains very nationalistic (see F18News 12 October 2005 =670). Some officials of the EU and of EU member states have complained of what one privately described as "massive nationalistic indoctrination" in schools. So it is highly unfortunate that the Education and Culture chapter (Chapter 26) in the EU accession negotiations was opened and closed on the same day, without addressing this central point. Without change in the curriculum and teaching, there can be no progress in a society whose nationalism has a noticeable impact on social attitudes (see F18News 19 January 2006 ) . Non-Muslim Minorities Meanwhile, tensions for religious minorities remain high, as evidenced by the murder of one Catholic priest and attacks on other priests this year. Speculation persists that the "deep state" - the nationalist circles in the army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police and state administration which regard themselves as the custodians of the Ataturkist ideology - might have been behind the murder in February of Italian priest Fr Andrea Santoro in his church in the Black Sea port of Trabzon, an area well known as a nationalist stronghold. Other factors behind the murder are also suggested (see F18News 9 February 2006 =724). Such attacks on priests could spread to other nationalist areas. Some Catholic leaders still have police outside their residences, though how an unarmed, plainclothes police officer could offer any protection remains unclear. Some wonder whether they are there more to listen to what those leaders are saying than to protect them. Of course, all religious minority leaders remain under government surveillance, forcing them to be very cautious in everything they say - or to be willing to pay the price for their frankness. They know their telephones are occasionally tapped and mail is sometimes opened before it is delivered. "Walls have ears," religious minority leaders say. Secretive officials occasionally come to visit them to ask questions - people speculate that they are from the MIT secret police. In what is seen by Turkish Christians as a continuing humiliation, all Christian Churches - whether their leaders and members are Turkish citizens or not - are regarded as foreign. This attitude persists, even though Christian communities were present on the territory of what is now Turkey many centuries before the Turkish state, its ancestor the Ottoman Empire, and Islam. Discussions between Christian Churches and the state are normally handled by the Foreign Ministry, or sometimes by another state authority chosen by the government. This humiliation is clearly deliberate. Nothing has happened about plans for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to be able to reopen its seminary on the island of Heybeliada (Halki in Greek) in the Sea of Marmara, once famed for its scholarship throughout the Orthodox world. Closed in 1971, Turkey has grudgingly promised to reopen it under US and EU pressure, but that now seems further off than ever. Discussion has now fizzled out, though Patriarch Bartholomew always tries to raise the issue whenever he can. The Armenians saw their Holy Cross seminary in Istanbul closed at the same time, but have given up any hope to be allowed to reopen it as a separate institution. Armenian Patriarch Mesrop has instead proposed inaugurating a chair of Armenian Studies at one of Istanbul's state universities - so far with no result. Pope Benedict's Planned Visit The planned visit of Pope Benedict XVI, due in November 2006, could also raise tensions. Benedict is scheduled to meet the Turkish President and government in Ankara, and address a selected public in the capital. Presumably, the Pope will want to talk about relations between the Christian and Islamic worlds and seek to overcome ideas about the "clash of civilisations". The Turkish public is unlikely to be present. Any views they might have of the speech will be formed by how the local media covers it. In Istanbul, Benedict will meet the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch and other local religious leaders, as well as the Catholic community. Most Turks either do not want the Pope to visit, or are indifferent to his visit. Some Western-oriented Turks welcome it, as they think it could help Turkish society better understand both the Catholic Church and western views of Islam. Some of these Turks also hope that the visit will help Turkey understand the progress it needs to make on religious freedom. But nationalists who strongly oppose Europe and accession to the EU - who are growing more influential - could cause headaches for the police during Benedict's visit. The government too will be closely scrutinising the Pope's words for any hint of anything that could be interpreted as anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic. As soon as any comments are linked to Turks as a people and a society, problems will arise. The Pope will doubtless be very delicate. The row stirred up by remarks about the Armenian genocide in the final years of the Ottoman Empire made by the Armenian Catholicos, Karekin II, on a visit in June is ostensibly related to a historical ethnic conflict dating back ninety years. But it is relevant to a discussion on religious freedom, especially as the Istanbul prosecutor's office decided to investigate the remarks for a possible prosecution of the Catholicos for "anti-Turkish remarks". The very prospect of a criminal case over these remarks shows the lack of freedom of speech. But whenever religious leaders are prosecuted there is a knock-on effect on the rights of the religious community. The Armenian Apostolic community - the largest of Turkey's Christian communities by far - was embarrassed by Karekin's remarks, knowing they will make their already precarious existence more difficult. What Prospects for the Future? The prospect of Turkey's EU accession seems to be the only thing capable of driving change in the area of religious freedom and human rights more widely. Yet the government is now not willing to enact change. Indeed, it is becoming ever more nationalist - even if this might simply reflect the AKP's need for votes from the nationalist constituency. It is careful not to show too openly that it is Islamist, as this would cause problems with the President and the military. All this could change after the next parliamentary elections (due in late 2006 or early 2007) and the presidential election (due next year), if the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins. If the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan - or a puppet - succeeds in becoming President, the Ataturk legacy could be changed. There will then not be a President willing to veto laws that contradict this legacy. This would definitely lead to a worsening climate for religious freedom. The position for Sunni Muslims would improve, while for Alevis the situation would remain as restrictive as it is now. Despite the religious differences with the majority population, the Sunnis are still seen as Turks. For other minorities - especially Christians - the situation would be worse. Government officials sympathetic to the ideal of secularism - and secularists more widely - are growing increasingly concerned. They fear that, if the AKP substantially increases its vote at the next election, it would be strong enough to change the Constitution - even against the wishes of the opposition. It could also install a President from its ranks, who would not then veto laws deemed to be part of an Islamist agenda, as the current President has done. Secularists in particular are afraid for the future. Turkish diplomats - who are already concerned over the changing mood among state officials as an increasing number of AKP supporters fill official positions - are very afraid of a fundamental change in the country's course. Many believe any sweeping AKP victory in the next national elections would speed up the replacement of state officials with AKP loyalists. The old establishment is seeking to build up political forces attractive to the electorate, in a last-ditch bid to head off the AKP challenge. However, it remains unclear if the electorate will back them. Voters threw out the old establishment in disgust at its corruption and ineffectiveness. The AKP has been careful to be on its best behaviour during its current period in office. Although there is much talk of a military coup in the event of such fundamental changes, no-one knows if the majority of army officers still support Ataturk-defined secularism - or if they would be prepared to back such an anti-Islamist coup. Prospects for EU Accession The level of optimism or pessimism over the future depends on who you talk to. Western-oriented Turks still hope EU accession negotiations will continue and that Turkey will eventually join the EU. They hope desperately that the process will generate its own momentum that would force the government, the administration and the army to look forward and support reforms. This could happen, but it looks unlikely. As the general election looms, the government is doing nothing that could be seen as a positive step towards the reforms the EU would welcome. Many observers are not optimistic. They do not believe the Turkish side - whether the current AKP government or the "deep state" - is interested in seeing such reforms. Many Turks have not even understood what religious freedom - for example as defined in the rights set out in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) - actually means (see F18News 13 December e_id=704). Or they understand it - but reject it. Turkey ratified the ECHR in 1954, but over 50 years later has yet to abide by it. Ataturkists fear that granting religious freedom as outlined in the Convention would give power to the Islamists. Yet Paragraph 2 of the ECHR's Article 9 prevents the abuse of religious freedom by freedom's enemies. This states that "freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Indeed, Article 9 would safeguard a real separation of religion and the state, as the Ataturkists claim to want. This fear is also felt on the EU side, which means that it too is increasingly reluctant to clearly advocate religious freedom along the lines of the ECHR. EU governments also fear such rights would open the doors to Turkey's Islamist groups. Although EU officials involved in the accession process are interested in seeing religious freedom promoted properly - indeed, they regard it as the second most important issue after recognition of Cyprus - they seem to know that this is seen as a political issue which is over their heads. Many believe the accession negotiations will fail this autumn, not over democratisation and human rights, but over the Turkish government's refusal to recognise the government of Cyprus in Nicosia. Many Turks would not be unhappy at this. Yet if the EU suspends the accession negotiations, the Turks will feel insulted and spurned by Europe. Some believe the European Commission is therefore trying to manoeuvre to find a way for Turkey itself to suspend the negotiations. Possible Impact on Religious Freedom Yet any suspension will have a very negative impact on religious freedom - indeed, the position for religious minorities could end up being worse than when the negotiations started. Suspension would incite nationalist feelings and many Turks would openly say that the negotiations and even membership of the EU itself would not benefit Turkey. Then a hunt would begin for those who had caused the mess. Most Turks would not point to their own government but to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Armenian Patriarchate, the Catholic Church, the Protestants, and other obvious symbols of the outside world. The only hope many can see for progress towards religious freedom is that the EU accession negotiations continue. If EU negotiations stop completely, no hope for religious freedom will remain. Yet even if the negotiations stagger on, it is doubtful that the majority of the population is prepared to change its attitude to nationalism and religion, and even consider accepting Alevis and non-Muslim Turks as full Turkish citizens. The only other possible hope is that the reform process will gather its own momentum independent of the EU. However, at present, there is little sign of this happening. (END) - Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio en/themen/menschenrechte, a Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18. For further overviews by Dr Oehring of religious freedom in Turkey, and of the need for fundamental reform of the Constitution, see For commentaries by the Anglican Chaplain in Istanbul on the roots of Turkey's attitude to religious freedom see 716, and on Turkish society's reaction to the murder of Roman Catholic priest Fr Andrea Santoro, see For a personal commentary on religious freedom under Islam, see 227 For a personal commentary assessing western European "headscarf laws", see A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at las/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turkey Adobe Acrobat PDF and printer-friendly views of this article are available at Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio <;, contributed this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

Expert: Russia may deploy its air-defense systems in Armenia
Regnum, Russia
June 26 2006
“If Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts escalate, it will
reflect in the whole Southern and Northern Caucasus,” Director of the
Center for Military and Political Forecasting Anatoly Tsyganok stated
on July 25, 2006 during ‘Russia and Georgia: Variants of Way out from
Deadlock’ press conference in Moscow, a REGNUM correspondent informs.
“Even if presidents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkariya, and
other Caucasian republics call on their people not to participate in
these conflicts, it does not mean that some representatives of these
peoples will not participate in them,” Mr. Tsyganok believes. “It is
Caucasus – they have relatives everywhere,” he added.
According to Mr. Tsyganok, Russia does not wish these conflicts’
escalation. “If Russia fails to agree with Georgia, it will deploy
its air-defense systems in the Armenian territory, strengthening and
securing its borders in such way,” he believes.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress