KazInform, Kazakhstan
June 2 2006
Kazakh and Armenian FM met in Astana
ASTANA. June 2, 2006. KAZINFORM. On June 1 Foreign Minister of
Kazakhstan Kassymzhomart Tokayev held a meeting with his Armenian
counterpart Vartan Askanyan, who pays an official visit to
Kazakhstan.
The sides debated urgent issues of foreign affairs and a wide range
of matters concerning bilateral cooperation in various domains,
Kazakhstan MFA’s press service reports.
As stated there, transport and energy collaboration may become
priority one.
According to Askanyan Armenia considers Kazakhstan as the Central
Asian leader. He underlined a need for deepening further bilateral as
well as multilateral interaction.
Kazakhstan and Armenia established diplomatic links back to 1992. The
fundamental documents regulating bilateral relations are Treaty on
principles of relationship and Treaty on friendship and cooperation.
Mutual striving for widening mutual benefit trade and economic
cooperation was highlighted during the first official visit of
Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev to Armenia May 2001. A
great deal of agreements were signed then.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

New Jersey Jewish Standard, NJ
June 2 2006
Course teaches lessons in genocide prevention

Josh Lipowsky

View all articles by Josh Lipowsky A group of scholars has been
dissecting the root-causes of genocide so that future violence
against whole peoples, like the current slaughter in the Sudan, might
be avoided.
In February, two professors and an activist incorporated the
International Academy for Genocide Prevention, building on a
graduate-level course at Columbia University’s Center for
International Conflict Resolution, the City College of New York, and
a slew of European universities.
The course, which will be taught for the third time in the spring of
2007, teaches students how to recognize genocide rather than
superficially studying genocides.
“The focus of our organization is to act before there’s violence,”
said Henry Huttenbach, a participating distinguished professor at the
CCNY and one of the IACGP founders and directors. “When there’s
[already] violence, you don’t prevent. The best you can do is stop,
and [then] it becomes too late.”
The academy was the brainchild of Huttenbach, Andrea Bartoli, the
director of Columbia’s Center for International Conflict Resolution,
and Wayne resident Eric Mayer, a social activist with a history of
championing human rights. While it is housed at Columbia, it is a
collaboration that goes beyond the campus. Mayer had been working on
the project for three years, meeting with high-level international
leaders, including Mikail Gorbachev, the former president of Poland,
and representatives of the Vatican. Then he met Bartoli and
Huttenbach. They designed the graduate course as a way to reach the
most people.
“The credit must go to Bartoli and Huttenbach,” said Mayer, a
Holocaust survivor. “It’s a way to repay a debt for the gentile
people who at the risk of their lives, saved mine during World War
II.”
But the Holocaust will not be the focus of the course or the
academy’s mission. Hitler’s rise to power and the Holocaust will
certainly be used as examples but within the context of
deconstructing how a genocide can occur.
“Hitler didn’t have the masses [in the beginning],” Mayer said. “He
started one at a time and then got the masses. The only vaccination
is education.”
In Germany, Mayer said, it became acceptable to be anti-Semitic. So
the first goal of the academy is “to immunize people against
prejudice.” People need to understand that there are other societies
with different views, cultures, and religions, Mayer said.
The next step will be to increase the interaction between people of
different backgrounds who can put aside their differences. This is
not to take away from ethnic pride, Mayer stressed, but to increase
pride in our common connection as human beings.
The course uses four genocides as its base: the Holocaust, the
Armenian genocide, Rwanda, and Cambodia. The more the students
understand the background, the better position they will be in to
prevent a crisis, Huttenbach said.
Bartoli likened genocide prevention to fire prevention. There did not
used to be fire brigades and fire prevention regimens, but these have
helped to save lives. He hopes the academy’s genocide education will
have the same effect.
In November, the academy will sponsor a symposium at Columbia for
state representatives and other government officials. Genocide,
Bartoli said, is not possible without “the collusion or the active
participation” of government, so the conference will aim to create an
effective collective response within government, and will feature
speakers from across the globe, including, Mayer hopes, the president
of Rwanda.
“We have to learn many lessons from the past,” Bartoli said. “It is,
unfortunately, way too easy for a relatively small number of people
to kill an extraordinarily large number of people. The possibility of
genocide increases when bystanders do not feel responsible for what
happens in the system.”
A German corporation, which Mayer would not identify, has also
approached the academy about teaching its course to the international
staffs of corporations.
“The seed of genocide is economic,” Mayer said. “It is very
significant because they’re willing to take the lead in this.”
Mayer recalled a memory from his boyhood in Germany. In 1937, his
father, who fought in the German cavalry in World War I, went to a
veterans meeting where he told his compatriots to get rid of “that
clown,” Hitler. Mayer’s father, who was arrested three times and
later killed in one of the camps, is the inspiration for his work in
teaching about genocide and the dangers of hate.
“It is important to [teach] rather than to build memorials,” he said.
“My father would be happy if [donors] spent money on teaching people
rather than putting up another stone.”
For more information on the academy, its class, or the upcoming
symposium, visit

eaches-lessons-in-genocide-prevention

St Petersburg Times, Russia
June 2 2006
Survival of the fittest
By Katherine Shonk
Special to St. Petersburg Times

In DBC Pierre’s latest novel, newly unconjoined twins in London and a
young woman fleeing the war-torn Caucasus find themselves similarly
unversed in the ways of the world.
A pair of newly unconjoined twins, set loose in London, must decide
whether to embrace freedom or remain within their safe, familiar
cocoon.
A young woman from a war-torn republic in the Caucasus leaves home in
search of a better future for herself and her family.
These are the two storylines that DBC Pierre launches in alternating
and eventually intersecting chapters in his second novel, `Ludmila’s
Broken English.’ (His first, `Vernon God Little,’ won Britain’s
prestigious Man Booker Prize in 2003.) Though they inhabit very
different corners of the globe, twin brothers Blair and Gordon
`Bunny’ Heath and Ludmila Derev face a similar challenge – the need
to adapt to an alien environment – and are similarly ill-equipped to
face the adventures that will befall them.
Blair and Bunny, born attached at the trunk, are lifelong wards of
Britain, sequestered in the Albion House Institution, a
`centuries-old jumble of menacing architectures crouched deep in the
northern countryside.’ Acting on the theory that Bunny has become
Blair’s parasite, the British health service, `newly privatised’ in
the novel’s slightly futuristic setting, arranges for the brothers to
be surgically extricated from each other at the age of 33. Once they
have recovered, they are dispatched for four weeks’ community leave
in the bustling capital.
Meanwhile, in the fictitious post-Soviet backwater of Ublilsk
Administrative District Forty-One, Ludmila and the rest of her family
find themselves similarly cut adrift by a formerly paternalistic
state. Farcically, the Soviet Union abdicated its responsibility for
the Derevs’ well-being to the drunken, incestuous head of the
household. Just pages into the novel, Ludmila’s grandfather attacks
her, leaving her with a sobering choice. `The equation was suddenly
this: if Aleksandr sodomised her, he would more quickly be persuaded
to sign his pension voucher, and bread would appear on the family
table that night. … And if she wet the air with lusty squeaks,
there might even be orange Fanta.’ Soon after accidentally killing
Grandpa by stuffing a glove in his mouth, the young heroine confronts
another crude Catch-22: Her grandmother advises her to make up for
the deceased’s pension by choosing between prostitution and work in
the munitions plant. Ludmila lucks out only when the family realizes
that the sale of their tractor might temporarily stave off the wolves
at the door.
So the novel’s three protagonists set forth on what might have been a
collision course, if only it didn’t take such a very long time for
their paths to cross. Blair leaves the institution without looking
back, eager to plunge into the sex, hedonism and sheer normality he
has been denied. Asexual Bunny would just as soon cower through the
month of freedom, eating bacon and sipping gin. Ludmila, after
killing a second man (the tractor’s buyer) for untoward advances, has
the most ambitious plan. She heads to neighboring Kuzhnisk to meet up
with boyfriend Misha, a deserting soldier from the local conflict.
Together they intend to travel overseas and join the ranks of those
who `wouldn’t tolerate the inconvenience of war in the place where
they lived.’
`Ludmila’s Broken English’ begins boldly, perhaps too boldly; played
for laughs, the passage in which Ludmila kills her lustful
grandfather is liable to lose a few faint-hearted readers. Subsequent
chapters, in which Blair and Bunny quibble endlessly over the
possibilities afforded by their liberation, are more likely to turn
off even more, due to tedium and, for non-Brits at least, an excess
of slang and inside jokes. This is a shame because, after this uneven
start, passages of brilliance lie nestled within the novel’s dense,
darkly comedic middle.
Most successful is Pierre’s cutting portrayal of Ublilsk, a
civilization in rapid decline. The novelist researched this portion
of his book by visiting Armenia and frequenting Russian-bride web
sites, and he fixes a keen eye on the degradation and desperation
that can exist in forgotten pockets of the world. The description of
the region’s bread delivery echoes the matter-of-fact bleakness of
Alexander Solzhenitsyn:
`As keeper of the bread depot, the last registered business of any
kind in the district, Lubov’s power was absolute. The depot was a
mildewed cockpit from which she piloted the destinies of the
district’s last mollusc-like inhabitants. Every week, a forlorn
box-car was uncoupled from a train on the main line, and pushed on to
a disused siding that ran to within four kilometres of Ublilsk. …
Oafish young men met the wagon each week, carrying metal bars and
sharpened chains for security. Rumour had it they now also carried a
gun. They were Lubov’s retarded son and nephew – for the stigma of
feeble blood twice stained her – and they would heave and pull the
wagon as far as the track would allow, then unload the bread into
sacks, and carry it over their backs to the depot. … The town had
several simple faces rumoured to be the cost of a dirty loaf.’
Even more vivid is Ubli, the tongue Pierre gives his characters,
`said to be the language most exquisitely tailored to the expression
of disdain.’ The Ublis’ dialogue is presented as word-for-word
translation, a technique that at first feels stilted. But once the
reader acclimates to common Ubli turns of phrase such as `gather your
cuckoos,’ `don’t toss gas,’ `cut your hatch,’ and the ubiquitous
`Hoh!’ it becomes delightfully daffy, as does the natives’ constant
pushing of their chins at anyone who gets the slightest bit on their
nerves. In Ublilsk, contempt is the local currency; beyond the
district’s borders, its expression is the only source of power.
`Imagine!’ Ludmila scolds a sweet young woman who attempts to
befriend her in Kuzhnisk. `A new and important visitor and you waste
the crucial first hour, the golden hour, with squeakings about
yourself!’
Ludmila’s unwavering crabbiness lends the story some inspired humor;
unfortunately, it stands in the way of her development as a fully
rounded character. When a crooked Kuzhnisk biznesmen signs her up on
an `Internet introduction service,’ it’s clearly time to start
worrying, but the girl’s tough exterior impenetrably lacquers over
her underlying pathos and naivete. The story of what happens when
conjoined twins are separated and cut loose in society should also
set the stage for compelling drama, but the brothers remain too
rigidly defined – Blair is the wild one, Bunny the priss – to retain
much interest. And Pierre’s failure to recount the specifics of their
separation – we are told that they `shared certain organs,’ but not
how they are divided up on the operating table, or how the twins are
(or are not) physically altered by the procedure – seems an odd
oversight for an otherwise scatological writer.
When the twins do finally meet up with Ludmila (yes, the introduction
web site plays a role), the results are unsatisfyingly brief. Nearly
all of the novel’s major characters converge in Ublilsk for a
gruesome finale that seems to want to be chilling, but instead comes
off feeling flat, even predictable.
Still, those who like their literature in the grotesque vein of
William Faulkner and Flannery O’Connor will appreciate Pierre’s
transplantation of the tradition to a very different southern clime.
The Caucasus is unexplored territory in contemporary English-language
fiction, and in many sections of `Ludmila’s Broken English,’ Pierre
does an admirable job of introducing a new audience to the horror and
black humor to be found there.
Katherine Shonk is the author of `The Red Passport,’ a collection of
short stories set in contemporary Russia.

The Times, UK
June 2 2006
Calls for freedom make the jigsaw of Europe more complicated than
ever
By Jeremy Page and Richard Beeston, Diplomatic Editor

MOST people would struggle to point out Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya
Respublika on a map, let alone pronounce it.
Those who can, know it as a hotbed of smuggling, the site of a vast
Soviet-era weapons dump, or perhaps the home of Sheriff Tiraspol
football club.

But this tiny sliver of land, known in English as Transdniestr, is
the latest European enclave to make a bid for independence following
Montenegro’s decision to declare statehood last month.
Igor Smirnov, Transdniestr’s `President’, has announced that its
550,000 people will vote in a referendum in September on whether to
seek formal independence from Moldova.
`The recent example of Montenegro proves that a referendum is
becoming a norm for solving conflicts,’, said Mr Smirnov, 64, a
former metalworker.
In the unlikely event that Transdniestr wins independence, it would
become Europe’s 19th new country since the collapse of communism in
1989, and the fragmentation goes on.
>From the Basques of Spain to Turkey’s Kurds, there are minorities who
yearn for a country of their own, and Montenegro’s example has
kindled hopes that even tiny enclaves in Europe’s forgotten corners
can still become viable states.
The fear is that declarations of independence by mini-states could
spark fresh instability in already unstable regions.
In the Balkans, Montenegro’s independence drive is likely to be
followed by Kosovo, a predominantly ethnic Albanian province of
Serbia. That could spark fresh moves by the ethnic Serb Republika
Srpska to break away from Bosnia, and Herceg-Bosna’s Croats to join
Croatia.
In the Caucasus, Russia is still struggling to contain the separatist
rebellion in Chechnya. Georgia is split by breakaway regions in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is still no resolution to
Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed enclave in Azerbaijan that is controlled
by Armenia.
Not even Western Europe is immune. Nationalists in Northern Ireland
still seek a united Ireland. Scotland is in theory closer to
independence that at any time since the Act of Union with England 300
years ago. Separatist movements are active in the Basque country,
Corsica, Sardinia and Italy.
As for Europe’s newest would-be state, Transdniestr broke away from
Moldova in 1990 and the two sides fought a war in 1992 that left more
than 1,500 people dead. Although never recognised internationally, it
has close ties to Russia, which helped the ethnic Russians in the war
and has maintained 1,500 troops there.
Officially, they are there to keep the peace and guard a stockpile of
40,000 tonnes of weapons stored there in case of a Nato invasion. In
reality, this remains Moscow’s westernmost strategic outpost – a
bulwark against the expanding EU and Nato. It is also a haven for
money-laundering, smuggling and illegal weapons sales.
Mr Smirnov runs it as a personal fiefdom, financed by local oligarchs
and propped up by nostalgia for the Soviet Union. It has its own
currency based on the old Soviet rouble, uses the old Soviet Moldovan
flag, and stages annual Soviet-style military parades. Police wear
uniforms bearing the hammer and sickle.
There is no direct telephone link to Moldova and no mobile network.
Shop windows display tawdry goods from the 1970s and 1980s. The only
redeeming feature is Moldova’s only FIFA-approved football stadium,
which is home to the country’s top football club, Sheriff Tiraspol.
Peace talks, mediated by the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, have stalled over Transdniestr’s refusal to
accept autonomy within a Moldovan state. Russia has backed the
referendum.
Karel De Gucht, the Belgian Foreign Minister and OSCE chairman, has
said that there is no legal basis for a referendum and urged both
sides to return to the negotiating table.

vision magazine, CA
June 2 2006
Global Culture for a Globalized World
by Michael DeGuzman Nobleza
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The recent images flashing on LA’s KCAL-9 News have been stunning.
The heated debate around illegal immigration in the U.S. has led to
thousands of people on the streets of downtown L.A., young and old,
waving American, Mexican, Guatemalan, and Salvadorian flags. Korean
immigrants, dressed in traditional garb, marched in solidarity with
other immigrant groups. In the Crenshaw community, African-American
pro-immigrant advocates waving the red, black and green Black
Nationalist flag faced off against the `stars and stripes’ of a group
concerned about the impact of illegal immigration on the
employability of low-income African-Americans. The flag of Armenia
proudly flew around Hollywood on April 24th to commemorate the
Armenian genocide. On the anniversary of the start of the war in
Iraq, Muslim American mothers, donning headscarves, made a fervent
call for peace. On the surface, such symbolism might reflect an
increasingly fractured multicultural society. However, a deeper
reflection of these images helps us realize that Los Angeles-home to
188 distinct immigrant communities and innumerable cultural and
linguistic communities-represents a Global Culture that resonates
with a globalizing world.
It takes culture time to catch up with political and economic
changes. We can legislate new policy and enforce new taxes in short
order, but it takes time to change how we look at the world and how
we act based on that worldview. For years, international relations
scholars and economists have bemoaned the effects of globalization.
They’ve criticized the spread of McDonalds and Starbucks to the
world’s farthest flung locales and shown concern over the
instantaneity of information flashed across the bottom of CNN’s
regular reporting. What these academics have yet to account for is
the lived experience of diversity in major metropolises, like LA, San
Francisco, San Diego and New York, not as some bicoastal phenomenon
but as the cultural reality of the 21st century.
What, then, is `Global Culture’? What values does it have that speak
to today’s world affairs? Ten years ago, `global’ in the context of
Los Angeles would’ve meant efforts to make everyone speak English in
the workplace, while making sure Cinco de Mayo and Chinese New Year
were somehow celebrated. Global used to mean `universal’, that the
same ideas and values applied to everyone. Nowadays, the only real
thing that applies universally is the idea that nothing is universal;
the world for which today’s Global Culture exists is characterized by
the diversity of its ideas. In a world saturated by information and
communications technology, it is virtually impossible to not be able
to find at least ten different perspectives on any given issue.
Global Culture is embracing multiplicity. It’s about a Latino mayor
speaking to L.A.’s Jewish-American community about the Holocaust.
It’s about Scottish and Irish citizens marching together with
Nicaraguan day laborers.

It’s about affluent adults in the San Fernando Valley serving as
literacy volunteers to struggling and poor students. Culture used to
mean distinguishing yourself from `the others’ who were different
from you. In contrast, Global Culture has meant intentionally
blurring the lines in the name of connection and unity.
Global Culture is the re-imagining of community. That Sudanese `lost
boys’ who have resettled in California can reach out to and maintain
strong bonds with family and friends still in Africa proves that
Global Culture is no respecter of geography. Christmas posadas in
east L.A. and various cultural festivals throughout the city
exemplify the idea that we can find home in many places at the same
time: in the local communities in which we physically find ourselves
and in the more abstracted homelands overseas from which our parents
came. Global Culture means being comfortable with being part of
different communities simultaneously.
Global Culture also means choice. A recent study conducted by ReBoot
of Jewish-American generational perspectives on the Jewish faith
found that the so-called `iPod Generation’ valued the ability to be
selective about which parts of their faith and other faiths they
wished to practice. Global Culture is about having the opportunity to
visit the Baha’i Center, the Hare Krishna Community, or First AME
Church and taking knowledge from each to create a spirituality that
encompasses your entire world.
Finally, Global Culture is about doing what is right. From Nepal to
Liberia, to the debate around mayoral control of L.A.’s behemoth
school district, people around the world are hoisting up protest
signs and banners to show their support for the suffering on our very
streets and thousands of miles away. Global Culture is about taking
the American democratic experiment to the next level, in every
district, ward and borough. It is taking a few dollars at the end of
each pay period and donating to Doctors Without Borders’ work to
eradicate tropical diseases in the sub-Sahara. It’s about
transparency and accountability, about morality. It’s about enough
really being enough.
The cynics in Los Angeles’ media community can lament the city’s
political corruption, race relations and drug trade. But I’ll side
with those who see hope in the Global Culture emerging in Los
Angeles, a culture that fits the world we live in now; one that draws
strength from differences, that imagines community in broader terms,
a culture that is in sync with the world today.
Michael DeGuzman Nobleza is a writer and life coach based in Los
Angeles and author of the book, To Love and Grow in Love: A
Meditation, tentatively scheduled to be self-published in the next
year ().

Heritage.org, DC
June 2 2006
Putin’s Legacy and United Russia’s New Ideology
by Ariel Cohen
Backgrounder #1940
June 1, 2006 | |
a/bg1940.cfm
`The Party has been, and remains, the main organizing and
coordinating force capable of leading the people along the path of
profound Socialist renewal….’
– Mikhail Gorbachev
With the fall of the USSR, the Russian post-Soviet elite was
demoralized by the collapse of Soviet power and sought a new
direction. For a time, ideol – ogy took a back seat to market reforms,
competition, and repudiation of government control. However, `men of
the state’ and `men of force’ – known in Russian as `derzhavniki’ and
`siloviki’ – have reversed this trend.
The resurgence of nationalist rhetoric has acceler – ated markedly
since the 2000 election of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the
rise of oil prices. With Putin’s departure scheduled for 2008, his
United Russia party will require more than fond memories of the
popular president to maintain the support and trust of the people. It
needs a coherent political doctrine. This effort has finally been
accomplished.
In February 2006, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s deputy chief of staff and
chief political strategist, delivered an extensive speech at a United
Russia political semi – nar.[1] For the first time, he outlined the
underlying ideology, goals, and aspirations of the Russian
Feder – ation’s largest political party. Surkov’s speech was
sub – sequently published in two consecutive issues of Moskovskie
Novosti, a formerly liberal weekly, under the title `The General
Line’ in direct allusion to the term applied to Soviet Communist
Party policy between the 1920s and 1980s. The speech was later widely
reprinted elsewhere, and media leaks from the Kremlin indicate that
such wide circula – tion amounts to publication of the new official
Kremlin doctrine.[2]
Surkov’s speech defines the strategic direction that Putin wants
Russia to pursue, the goals to which she should aspire, and how the
party can lead the country to achieve those goals. Much of it was
reflected in Putin’s State of the Federation speech to both houses of
the Duma, Russia’s parlia – ment, on May 10. It combines democratic and
mar – ket rhetoric with deliberate actions of power centralization and
ideological and economic nationalism bordering on protectionism.
This ideological treatise is a great insight into the Kremlin’s
thinking and policy. Recent steps under – taken by the Russian
Federation and public state – ments by Russian officials indicate that
Russia may be asserting its dominance abroad, especially in the
former Soviet area. The speech provides a number of reasons for the
United States to reevaluate its policies toward Russia and act on the
basis of what is realistic and possible.
Importance of Surkov’s Speech
Surkov’s speech is intended both to outline a social contract between
the Russian leadership and the Russian people and to ensure that
United Rus – sia continues to enjoy its position as the dominant party
in Russian politics. If this social contract is accepted, United
Russia will have succeeded in cre – ating an ideological framework for
national unity and a road map to national greatness; at the very
least, it will have ensured its position as a ruling party until the
presidential elections of 2012 or even beyond. This is a greater
accomplishment than previous attempts to create a ruling party in
post-Communist Russia, such as Russia’s Choice (1993) and Our Home
Russia (1996).
The text of the speech and the timing of its deliv – ery reflect
Russia’s social, political, and economic trajectory, including
aspirations of single-party rule, energy superpower status, and
geopolitical conflicts and alliances. All of this is contingent upon
United Russia maintaining its status as the only political party in
Russia with the means to implement its political agenda.
Democratic Rhetoric vs. Restrictive Reality
On the positive side, Surkov entreats Russians to become more active
in politics, to familiarize them – selves with all sides of current
debates, and to be part of the solution to Russia’s myriad pressing
problems. His refusal to condone expropriation of private property is
also hopeful. The development of a propertied class that is
encouraged to partici – pate politically may be a decisive factor in
the future growth and strengthening of democracy in Russia. The
growth of such a class may increase calls for stronger protection of
property rights and rule of law as well.
These would be welcome developments, as they not only help to improve
the current situation in Russia, but also would enhance the security
of for – eign investments in Russia. Unfortunately, how – ever, the
current situation indicates that it is the bureaucracy, not the
elected political leadership, that calls the shots in Putin’s and
Surkov’s Russia.
Also promising are Surkov’s calls for picking up the pace of economic
reform and integrating more fully into global markets. Increased
openness to trade will likely foster improvements in economic
efficiency, management, and transparency, all of which have suffered
throughout the post-Commu – nist transition.
These democratic and free-market ideals will benefit Russian society
if they are put into practice. However, calls for strengthening
democracy coin – cide with legislation restricting representation and
participation. Assets continue to be concentrated in the hands of a
well-connected few. Simply put, in today’s Russia, democratic
rhetoric is contradicted by increasingly centralized political
practice.
Single Party Rule: A Democratic Deficit
United Russia was created in December 2001 by combining the pro-Putin
Unity and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s and Moscow mayor
Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland-All Russia parties. It was a political
construct of the Kremlin: the party of power, meant to occupy the
center of Russia’s body politic.
United Russia is now the most powerful political party in the Russian
Federation, with an estimated 100,000 members. Its showing in the
March 12, 2006, regional and local elections, in which it won 197 out
of 359 regional legislative seats, was a clear indicator of its
strength.[3] Surkov suggests that, as with Germany’s Christian
Democrats and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party after World War II,
United Russia should remain the dominant force in Russian politics
for the next 10-15 years, and recent changes in the electoral system
may ensure that this will come to pass.
At this point, no opposition group in Russia appears capable of
posing any real threat to United Russia’s overwhelming share of
popular support in the 2007 parliamentary or 2008 presidential
elec – tions. However, the Kremlin is taking steps to rein in potential
political challengers, first by abolishing the election of Duma
members in `single mandate’ electoral districts, opting instead for
national party lists. Such a proportional electoral system seriously
weakens the relationship between a voter and his elected
representative. Deputy Director of the Cen – ter for Political
Technologies Boris Makarenko has called this a `further stage in the
consolidation of a monolithic system.'[4]
Rodina (Motherland), a leftist nationalist party that many suspect
was created by Kremlin officials to siphon off support from the
nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the
Com – munist Party, was barred from participation in the December 2005
Moscow City Duma elections for inciting racial hatred.[5]
The Duma is considering several amendments to electoral law.
Ostensibly aimed at strengthening the party system by creating a
small number of large parties, these laws, if passed, will rob the
opposi – tion of their only means of competing with United Russia:
through coalitions.[6] Another legislative proposal would authorize
governors, who are Kremlin-appointed, to abrogate mayoral powers.
Although so far ignored by the West, such extraor – dinarily broad
powers will prove effective in con – solidating the Kremlin’s top-down
authority.[7]
If all of the proposed electoral changes come to fruition, governors,
mayors, and political parties will all be Kremlin-controlled,
ensuring a predict – able outcome in the future parliamentary and
pres – idential elections. The Kremlin is consolidating its own power
at the expense of opposition forces and raising the possibility that
United Russia will dom – inate politics in the Russian Federation for
at least the next two electoral cycles (2007-2008 and 2011-2012).
At present, the majority of United Russia’s popu – lar support is
derived from the popularity and cha – risma of President Putin, whose
approval ratings fluctuate between 65 percent and 75 percent.[8] It
is unlikely that the next president will share Mr. Putin’s appeal and
popular support. United Russia must therefore replace the personal
legitimacy of its leader with a more long-lasting ideological
founda – tion to provide legitimacy for future leaders. Creat – ing a
sense of unity, pride, and common purpose that is closely linked both
to Putin and to United Russia may allow the party to stay in power
even with a weak next president.
Strategic Resources
By maintaining control of the executive branch, the judiciary,
security services, government-owned companies, and the parliament,
United Russia offi – cials will be able to secure control over their
share of the profits from nationalized resources[9] and, in many
cases, expand the assets that they effectively control. At a recent
conference in Moscow, Minister of Economic Development and Trade
German Greff cited the acquisition of assets by large state-owned
companies as a threat to Russia’s economic health. Minister of
Finance Alexei Kudrin echoed this sen – timent, asserting that the
state should play a smaller role in Russia’s economy.[10] Economists
in Russia, Venezuela, and Bolivia agree that asset holding by the
`state’ or `people’ in reality means beneficiary ownership by
specific politicians and senior bureaucrats.
Government officials are reluctant to release their hold on strategic
economic sectors because these same officials control and benefit
from these assets. Gazprom, Russia’s behemoth state-owned gas firm,
is chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Rosneft,
the state-owned oil firm that forced a sale of Yugasnknefte – gaz, the
production arm of YUKOS, below mar – ket price, is chaired by Igor
Sechin, the Kremlin deputy chief of staff. Alexei Kudrin, despite his
calls for less government control over the econ – omy, chairs the
Russian state diamond monopoly, Alrosa.[11]
The melding of business and politics has created a pressing need by
government officials to maintain the status quo at all costs. As is
true elsewhere in the world, men whose wealth relies on government
control of strategic economic sectors are unlikely to loosen their
grasp on those resources, or on the political machinery that controls
those resources, for the sake of reform.
Surkov stresses in his speech that the nationaliza – tion of strategic
resources is in the interest of distrib – uting wealth among the
Russian population. Russian GDP per capita has grown dramatically,
from $1,170 in 2000 to $3,400 in 2004. However, income ine – quality in
the Russian Federation remains remark – ably high. Energy superpower
status certainly benefits Russia as a whole, but it benefits members
of the political-bureaucratic-security elite with access to
government-controlled resources far more than it benefits others.
Aside from its domestic implications, Russia’s energy superpower
status is a means to protect sovereignty and exert influence abroad.
Auton – omy is desirable for any state; however, Russia is using
zero-sum game analysis and tactics in the global energy markets to
promote its economic interests.
Alexei Miller, CEO of Gazprom and Deputy Energy Minster of the
Russian Federation, recently threatened that `attempts to limit
Gaz – prom’s activities in the European market and politicize questions
of gas supply’ might induce Russia to shift its export focus to
Asia,[12] and these sentiments were echoed by President Putin
him – self.[13] Russian leaders were particularly upset about
resistance in Europe to selling gas-distribu – tion networks, such as
Centrica in the United Kingdom.
Surkov asserts that in the global economy, Russia can either be a
spider or a fly – an apt metaphor, as it reveals Russia’s attitude
toward competition in global markets, which includes neither
compro – mise nor cooperation.
`Enemies of the People’
Russia is to achieve full autonomy as a global geopolitical player by
successfully manipulating energy markets. Energy superpower status
under the guidance of United Russia is the key to Russia’s future,
and anyone who would thwart Russia’s aspirations – oligarchs,
opposition groups, terror – ists, foreign powers – is an `enemy.’ Surkov
seeks to rally popular support by identifying those who seek their
own ends and oppose United Russia’s grand strategy as being among
these common enemies.
`Oligarchic revanchists’ provide a perfect scape – goat for the
troubles of the post-Communist period, an ideal backdrop for the
emergence of the great leader who creates order out of chaos, and a
conve – nient rationale for nationalization of the most lucra – tive
sectors of the Russian Federation’s economy. Surkov and others often
allege that in the 1990s, oligarchs stole all of Russia’s assets and
profited from them, denying ordinary Russians their rightful share of
national resources. According to Surkov’s narrative, President Putin
(despite being a senior Yeltsin official and designated successor)
saved both Russia and its valuable resources from the oli – garchs. In
this new age of order and democracy, these greedy individuals are no
longer permitted to use Russia’s resources to their own advantage,
but must use them instead for the Fatherland and the people.
Despite their alleged heinous crimes, however, oligarchs are
deserving of membership in Russia’s elite – provided that their
transgressions do not contradict Kremlin policy. Roman Abramovich,
former partner of Boris Berezovsky in ownership of Sibneft, the
Siberian oil company, is responsi – ble for the expatriation of
billions of dollars. Putin however, recently reappointed him
gover – nor of Chukotka, a province in the far Northeast of Russia.
`Isolationists,’ or nationalist extremists, are a threat to the
leadership of the Russian Federation because they are bad for both
domestic stability and international perceptions of Russia. Isolating
ultra-nationalists is necessary to maintain an image of
respectability abroad and the ability to keep order at home, despite
alarmingly frequent instances of hate crimes.
However, Russian law enforcement has been remarkably lenient in
punishing the crimes of these `enemies of the Russian Federation.’
For example:
In early 2006, a Russian nationalist wielding a knife stabbed nine
people in a Moscow syna – gogue. He was sentenced to 13 years in
prison, but despite his claims that the attacks were inspired by
anti-Semitic Web sites, the charge of inciting interethnic hatred was
dropped, much to the surprise and consternation of human rights
activists.[14]
In 2004, a nine-year-old Tajik girl was murdered in a brutal attack
by a group of Russian nation – alists whose ringleader was sentenced to
five and a half years on a charge of `hooliganism.'[15]
In 2006, an Armenian teenager was stabbed to death in Moscow by
skinheads, apparently on racist grounds.[16] According to an Amnesty
International report, in 2005, 31 people were murdered and 382 others
were attacked in race-related incidents in Russia.[17]
In addition to racially motivated crime, Russian officials have
exhibited an alarming degree of reli – gious intolerance. Young Russian
Orthodox Chris – tians, who claimed that the exhibit had offended them,
vandalized an exhibition of atheist art at the Sakharov museum. A
Moscow court dismissed the case against them.[18] In January 2005, a
group of Duma representatives called for the banning of all Jewish
organizations in Russia, claiming that these groups incite ethnic
hatred and `provoke anti-Semitism.'[19] There have been recent calls
for offi – cial Russian Orthodox chaplains in the Russian military and
the teaching of Russian Orthodoxy in state schools without any
corresponding proposals with respect to other religions.
The Kremlin is doing very little to combat these `oligarchic
revanchists’ or `isolationist national – ists.’ The reason is that
these elements, in addi – tion to being useful as political scarecrows
and scapegoats, provide justification for new laws to restrict the
activities of non-governmental organi – zations (NGOs) that have little
to do with political extremism.
As for enemies from outside the Russian Federa – tion, the Kremlin
seems similarly ambivalent about the West, which is an invaluable
trade partner but which also embodies democratic values and the rule
of law. This foreign menace is all the more rea – son to support United
Russia’s vision: a plan to ensure that Russia no longer has to bow to
Western influence.
Why the West Should Be Concerned
Taken at face value, Surkov’s speech identifies Russia’s goals in
both domestic and foreign policy and indicates whom Russia might
consider ene – mies and friends. The doctrine also sheds light on a
reality that many have been loath to admit: The period of the
post-Communist honeymoon is over.
While the United States and the Russian Fed – eration can have common
interests and reasons to cooperate, the U.S. must evaluate Russian
poli – cies over the past five years. From the perspective of American
national interests, these include (among others) developing ties with
China and Iran, energy security, non-proliferation, democ – racy, human
rights, and the rule of law. Russia is no longer weak and does not
rely on Western funds and favor to maintain its place in the global
order.
President Putin’s May 10, 2006, State of the Fed – eration address
indicates that the Russian leader – ship intends to refashion the state
as a capable counterweight to the United States, not only
eco – nomically, but demographically and militarily as well. Putin
called for women to return to their tra – ditional role of
childbearing, and for government subsidies to mothers, in order to
reverse the current population decline. He also emphasized the need
for drastic improvements in all aspects of Russia’s military, from
manpower to better ballistic missile defense, as protection against
those that would undermine Russia’s sovereignty. In a not-so-veiled
reference to U.S. foreign policy, he stated, `Com – rade wolf knows
whom to eat – he eats and does not listen to anyone.'[20]
The goal of United Russia and its president is to make Russia once
again an autonomous interna – tional player by returning to the values
that made it strong in the past. If United Russia is successful, the
U.S. and other Western powers must engage Russia on an entirely new
level: as a competitor, not as a junior partner.
Will the Doctrine Work?
The predictive value of the doctrine outlined in Surkov’s speech is
contingent on its fulfillment, which in turn relies on United
Russia’s performance for the next 10 to 15 years. United Russia must
attempt to hold on to hundreds of thousands of its current members
once President Putin is no longer at the helm.
Surkov’s speech appeals to a broad range of the Russian population.
Its nationalist undertones are tempered by denunciation of
ultra-nationalists. Its excoriation of oligarchs is offset by its
call for pro – tecting Russian businessmen and creating a new Russian
business elite.
As in China, economic growth may provide an antidote against a
decline in the party’s popularity. At the moment, Russia is flush
with cash, benefit – ing from skyrocketing prices of oil and gas. But
energy prices are volatile, and many oil and gas consumers are
becoming convinced of the need to diversify supply sources,
especially as Russia’s mis – handling of the Ukrainian and Georgian
supply controversies contributed to Europe’s mistrust of Moscow. It
is possible that a synthetic ideology will not suffice to keep United
Russia in power once the Kremlin’s coffers are not so full.
Russia’s economy has seen healthy growth – about 7 percent a year for
the past five years – and there is little expectation that oil and gas
prices will decline any time soon. However, the high costs of
exploration and of oil and gas in Russia’s inhospitable physical and
investment climate, as well as stifling government control, make
eco – nomic slowdown a real possibility. Although Surkov says quite
clearly that reprivatization is not a desirable option, Russia has
weak rule of law and a track record of arbitrary changes in and
application of its tax codes. Lack of predictability and insufficient
protection of investor rights is a strong deterrent to foreign
investment, specifi – cally in non-natural resources sectors of the
econ – omy. If these sectors do not grow, the Russian economy will be
at the mercy of fluctuations in commodity prices.
Instead of privatizing Gazprom, however, Rus – sia has transferred to
it a significant part of the oil sector and is using the giant
company as an instru – ment of foreign policy. As the government’s
appe – tite for spending grows, Russia will likely have to rely on its
stabilization fund to finance the govern – ment budget.[21] The Kremlin
may be faced with mounting economic difficulties sooner than
expected.
How the United States Should Respond
In order to protect not only U.S. interests, but also the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the states of the former Soviet Union,
the U.S. should adopt the following measures:
Recognize that Russia is an autonomous actor no longer willing to
play second fiddle to the United States. It is seeking to limit U.S.
pres – ence and influence in the areas in which it has the ability to
project military and political power. These areas include Central
Asia, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The U.S.
should promote the principle of territorial integrity in Georgia and
Moldova. Overall, it should encourage negotiations and non-military
solutions.
Continue to support diversification of energy transit routes in
Eurasia, specifically from Kaza – khstan and/or Turkmenistan across the
Cas – pian, to be linked with Europe through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzerum gas pipeline via Turkey.
Encourage Russia to sign the Energy Charter, an international treaty
on energy production and transportation, which promotes foreign
investment in the energy sector through trans – parency and
accountability.
Support free media, the rule of law, and demo – cratic political
development in Russia through NGOs. These include both indigenous
Russian NGOs and foreign NGOs working in Russia. The Department of
State and the National Endowment for Democracy should identify,
support, and expose to their peers abroad those young politicians,
writers, and media personal – ities who disseminate the values of
democracy, tolerance, and human rights and support polit – ical and
economic liberty.
Conclusion
Vladislav Surkov’s ideological treatise is a great insight into the
Kremlin’s thinking and policy. Recent steps undertaken by the Russian
Federation and public statements by Russian officials indicate that
Russia is trying to assert its dominance abroad, especially in the
former Soviet area.
Surkov’s speech provides a number of reasons for the United States to
reevaluate its policies toward Russia on the basis of what is
realistic and possible. There may be relatively little that the U.S.
can do to affect Russian domestic politics, but America can and
should be prepared to support those who seek freedom.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Pol – icy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies,
at The Heritage Foundation. The author wishes to thank Con – way Irwin
for contributing to this paper.
Appendix
The World According to Surkov
Russia’s Historic Legacy
At present, there is no consensus in Russia as to the assessment of
events in its past, nor is there any consensus as to which direction
it should take in the future. Russia is a European country, but there
are differences between the Russian Federation and countries with
deep traditions of Western demo – cratic values. `The fundamental
values of democ – racy are ingrained in the citizens of the U.S.A.,
England, France. Wake them up in the middle of the night – they’ll
start telling you about human rights and so forth.’ These values
should take on greater meaning in the daily lives of Russians, and
Russians should develop their ability both to act according to these
values in their interactions with one another and to triumph over
opponents by means of an ideological offensive. `[T]he party, so that
it may retain its dominant position in the polit – ical system (and
that is our fundamental goal), must more actively master the skills
of ideological warfare.’
Nikolay Berdyaev, an important early 20th cen – tury Russian
philosopher, said, `It is necessary to strive for a free and fair
society. Without freedom there can be no justice. Justice demands
freedom for all people.’ Berdyaev was a Russian thinker, and this was
a Russian thought, unlike the works of Marx or Hegel. Russians should
respect their ances – tors and should not pass undue judgment on the
Soviet Union, as it is associated with `all our close kin, it is in
fact we ourselves.’
There were two great achievements of the Soviet Union. The first was
its powerful ideological mes – sage, which spread worldwide and
included an understanding of freedom and justice. Soviet
power – ideological, military, and even moral – was hugely influential
on a global scale. It was even popular among Western intellectuals
and contrib – uted to the liberation of colonies. It played a major
role in world history, and that is something that Russians should
remember.
The other astonishing achievement of the Soviet Union was
industrialization. Russians today are profiting from this
inheritance, which includes rail – roads, pipelines, factories, and
nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union had its negative side as well. Its repressive,
closed Soviet society, `in which results are evaluated by party-dogma
rather than pragma – tism, produced an ineffective elite…. Society was
not only unjust, it also wasn’t free. It did not address the question
of material needs’ and `obviously fell behind the new quality of life
of the Western coun – tries in satisfying the demands of the people.’
A Time of Crisis
The Soviet Union’s downfall was inevitable. `The Russian people
themselves chose this fate – they rejected the socialist model’ as
inconsistent with their search for freedom and justice. However, the
USSR tried to reform, to embrace the democratic values embodied in
the Soviet constitution. The constitution of the USSR and its
language about democracy made `the Soviet Union, uncondition – ally,
the greatest modernization project. It already carried with it the
seeds of democracy.’ The col – lapse was the result of the Soviet
people’s finally holding their country accountable for its promises
of democracy, and `the loss of territory, the loss of population, the
loss of a huge part of our economy’ was the price that Russia paid.
After the downfall, because of disillusionment with the Soviet
government, there was widespread belief that `government is evil…and
having reduced it to nothing, everything would turn out fine. Of
course, this vacuum [of power] was filled, and it was exactly these
ambitious and self-serving commercial leaders who placed themselves
in the myriad opportunities for power…. [E]ntire minis – tries,
regions, parties found themselves under the control of independent
financial groups, moreover under direct and literal control.’
The framers of the Soviet constitution did not foresee leadership by
commercial interests. The constitution was not written for the
purpose of sub – jugating elected officials to people with money.
Democracy in the oligarchic period of the 1990s was not rule by many,
nor was it rule by a substan – tial number. `You could count these
people on your fingers…. [A]s a result, all the foundations of
democracy were distorted…. If that was a democ – racy, then I don’t
know what democracy is.’
Freedom of speech during this period took on its own special meaning.
`[L]eading television net – works became weapons in the hands of famous
oli – garchic groups’ who used them to gain access to and divide among
themselves even more govern – ment assets. Although privatization in
and of itself is a good thing, it was carried out by means of
awk – ward and confusing schemes, such as rigged oil-for-food auctions.
`In the federal system chaos ruled.’ Centrifugal forces threatened
Russia’s territorial integrity in the 1990s, especially rebellion in
Chechnya and the inability of disparate regions to agree on a federal
budget. In the midst of these centrifugal forces, Russia `was on the
verge of losing its sovereignty.’
Russia’s Democratic Development
`If we want our society to be democratic, to pos – sess sovereignty and
be an actor in world politics, we must develop our democracy, and
here fundamental human rights are part of the strengthening the
struc – ture of civil society. I see the [United Russia] party first of
all as an instrument of civil society, as an instrument of societal
participation in political life and in power…a self-regulating and
non-commercial organization of a completely different kind…an
insti – tute of civil society, a self-organization of citizens.’
Regarding changes in the political system in Rus – sia, such as the
move to proportional representa – tion in the parliament, a
proportional system is more democratic, as it will require a greater
num – ber of votes for United Russia to have a majority in parliament:
`more votes than all other electoral lists combined.’ This is a means
to strengthening the opposition and the party system in general.
As for presidential appointment of governors, and the oft-repeated
question of how this helps to win the war on terrorism, it helps to
avoid the chaos of the 1990s, in which there were too many parties,
leading to the atomization of society. The goal of these changes is
to `benefit society, strengthen its foundations.’
Among the political reforms of the past few years is the creation of
the Public Chamber: `a new organ for the realization and development
of opportunities for cooperation between government structures and
societal organizations.’ In effect, the Public Chamber is intended as
an intermediary between the Kremlin and non-governmental
organizations.
But democracy has one great enemy: corruption. It also has a
downside: poverty. The government of the Russian Federation has yet
to prove its effec – tiveness in providing a social safety net and
seeing that wages are paid; for the `stable development of free
society, free economics demands fairer distri – bution of GDP.’
The Path to Greatness: Obstacles and Opportunities
The fundamental threats to Russian sovereignty are international
terrorism, military conflict, lack of economic competitiveness, and
`soft’ takeovers by `orange technologies [U.S.- and
Western-sup – ported opposition movements] in a time of decreased
national immunity to foreign influence.’
Although military conflicts are not a current threat, anything can
happen, and the army, navy, and nuclear weapons are the `foundations
of [Rus – sia’s] national sovereignty.’ Russia’s economic growth,
though impressive, started from a very low level. Structural reform
has dragged out for far too long, and this will eventually take its
toll on growth. Other problems include enormous govern – ment
expenditures, budgetary problems, and lack of development.
The liberal idea that with full liberalization, all of these problems
will right themselves is erroneous. Russian society must `work out a
realistic model of further development. President Putin himself
already outlined this model, although we find our – selves at the
beginning of the road. We must use our competitive advantage and
develop it.’
Energy Superpower
Russia should be an energy superpower. The energy industry is the
state’s main enterprise and brings in the lion’s share of Russia’s
GDP. Becoming an energy superpower requires technological
improvements in the fuel-energy complex; other – wise, Russia relegates
itself to the role of exporter of raw materials, at which point `we
become spetsnaz, guarding their [the West’s] pipelines.’ Russia
already has the resources – research organizations, people, and
specialists – with which to achieve technological advances in its
energy sector.
As regards Russia’s strategic industries, `national is not
necessarily governmental. But the fuel-energy complex, strategic
communications, the financial system, and defense must be chiefly
Rus – sian,’ while other industries must open themselves to foreign
investment.
It is necessary for Russia to control certain sec – tors in order to
carve out a place in the global hier – archy. `Only the direct
participation of Russian companies in the creation of global
information links will be able to guarantee Russia a place in polite
society. Our sovereignty and who we are in the world’s spider web
[the Russian term for the Internet] – spiders or flies – depends on
this.’
Another threat to Russia’s sovereignty is `soft invasions…. [T]hey
blur values, declare the gov – ernment ineffective, provoke internal
conflicts. `Orange technology’ shows this very clearly.’ There is
only one way to prevent a `soft invasion’ or `color revolution,’ and
that is by creating a `nation – ally-oriented leading layer of
society.’
It is also vital that Russia not give up its sovereign interests for
the interests of others. Russia must par – ticipate in the global
economy’s multinational corpo – rations: `multinational, not trans-,
supra-, or just national. The economic future is not in the
disap – pearance of great nations, but in their cooperation.’
There are problems with Russia’s business elite: namely, that many
Russian businessmen take their families and assets offshore. `It is
not important that he have offshore accounts, let him have them. But
mentally he does not live here, in Russia, and such people will not
help Russia, and they will also not take care of Russia.’ Russia’s
future relies on transformation of the Russian business elite into a
national bourgeoisie.
Any talk of contradictions between business and government is a
`delusion. Business is in contradic – tion with society, because a
government official takes his cues from society.’ Disavowing a
populist position calling for expropriation of the assets of the
rich, Russia must protect its business class, who in return must `pay
taxes and respect traditions and morals.’ The other element of a
leading class of society is an effective bureaucracy. `The
bureau – cracy must make a transition from quasi-Soviet,
quasi-competent, accustomed to defeat, to a com – petitive, competent
community of civil servants, because it is here that we lose in
relation to the cor – poratism of other governments.’
Russia’s educational system is `not bad, but we must develop it,
reorient it, and very important is that it produce a national elite.’
Education is `the creation of a nation, the organization of life and
the culture of the nation.’
Russia’s Enemies
Russia’s enemies are those who demand that Russia take a step back
and those who demand that Russia take two steps back.
The first group are `oligarchic revanchists’ – those who profited from
the chaos of the Yeltsin era and are nostalgic for those times.
`Whereas before – hand they influenced decisions, now, to be honest,
they exercise no special influence. People have many motives for
turning back the clock. There are potential leaders of this school of
thought. And for – eign sponsors. Unconditionally, we cannot have a
restoration of the oligarchic regime because that is a road to
nowhere…leading to a great loss of sover – eignty and democracy…. But
the potential danger of their return exists, we shouldn’t dismiss
them.’
The second group – those who would take two steps back – are
`isolationists.’ They call themselves `patriots,’ but one should not
sully the word by using it to describe them. They are neo-Nazis. `The
difficulty of establishing democracy in our country, the double
standards of Western politicians stimu – late disappointment in
democratic values. Secret CIA prisons in Europe, illegal use of force
in Iraq, `orange’ revolutions in neighboring countries – these hardly
contribute to the popularity of democratic ideas.’ Analysis of this
new `enemy list’ follows.
The Role of United Russia
`United Russia’s goal is not just to win in 2007, but to think about
what everyone should be doing to guarantee the domination of the
party for the next 10-15 years’ in order to prevent these enemy
political forces from knocking Russia off its current political path.
People should engage in political debate; if you do not discuss among
yourselves, how will you convince others? Forget about right and
left. The party is for people of all stripes – left, right, sol – diers,
teachers, businessmen. `All who aren’t against us are for us,’ and
efforts should be made to form coalitions, even with opposition
parties.
Political discussions can be used to develop new approaches for
achieving the national project. In order to educate themselves, party
supporters should `study the ideological documents of the president
and the party.’
—————————————– —————————
[1]For a detailed summary of Surkov’s speech, see the Appendix.
[2]Vladislav Surkov, `General’naya Liniya,’ Moskovskie Novosti, No. 7
(1324), March 3-9, 2006, pp. 10-11; Vladislav Surkov, `General’naya
Liniya,’ Moskovskie Novosti, No. 8 (1325), March 10-16, 2004, pp.
10-11.
[3]Marina Mokhovets, `The March 12 Triumph: United Russia Is Today’s
CPSU,’ WPS Media Monitoring Agency, March 17, 2006, at
(May 11, 2006).
[4]Aleksei Titkov, `Proposals for Transition to a Proportional
Electoral System and the Prospects for Multi-partisanship in Russia,’
Carnegie Moscow Center, May 24, 2004, at
(May 1, 2006).
[5]For example, Rodina leader Dmitry Rogozin has appeared in a
television spot calling dark-skinned migrants from the Cau – casus and
Central Asia `trash’ and suggesting that the streets of Moscow should
be swept of such `trash.’ Rodina was expected to make a strong
showing in the elections, and analysts suggest that the real reason
for its exclusion was to ensure electoral victory for United Russia.
See Claire Bigg, `Russia: Nationalist Party Barred from Moscow
Election,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 28, 2005, at
58b58d-
c196-4cb1-b0f8-6db948f452c7.html (May 11, 2006).
[6]`Duma Set to Toughen Election Laws,’ Kommersant, April 11, 2006,
at ;id=66 5355 (May 11, 2006).
[7]Francesca Mereu, `Mayors Could Lose Their Powers,’ Moscow Times,
April 5, 2006, at
/2006/04/05/ 002.html.
[8]Yuri Levada Analytical Center, `Putin Approval Stands at 72% in
Russia,’ Angus Reid Global Scan: Polls and Research, April 14, 2006,
at on
/viewItem/itemID/11551.
[9]Natalya Olenich, `The Laws of Attractiveness,’ Gazeta.ru, March
13, 2006, at
STYLE=739318018&PRESENTÛ=985,AN=222750
611,FM= 9,SEARCH=MD.GenericSearch (May 11, 2006).
[10]Gleb Bryanski, `Ministers Call State’s Asset Grab a Threat,’ The
Moscow Times, April 5, 2006, at
5/043.html.
[11]Ibid.
[12]Peggy Hollinger, `Gazprom Threat Adds to EU Fears on Supply,’
Financial Times, April 20, 2006, at
– istration/barrier?referer= arch?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rls=GGLG, GGLG:2005-40,GGLG:en&q=hollinger+threat&lo cation=http%3A//news.ft.com/cms/s/1bfa611c-d09c-11 da-b160-0000779e2340.html
(May 11, 2006).
[13]Guy Chazan, `Putin Uses Asia in Power Play on EU,’ The Wall
Street Journal, April 27, 2006, at
752882973 6665-search.htmlKEYWORDS=Putin+Europe+gas&
COL LECTION=wsjie/6month (May 11, 2006).
[14]`Moscow Synagogue Attacker Appeals Sentence on Mental Health
Grounds,’ Israeli Insider.com, April 4, 2006, at
90.htm (May 11, 2006).
[15]Claire Bigg, `Russia: Sentences in Tajik Girl’s Slaying Spark
Public Outcry,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 31, 2006, at
4fe30c-
5ee2-4543-9401-f8b29f08cdbd.html (May 11, 2006).
[16]`Moscow Police Arrest Teenager in Connection with Fatal Stabbing
of Armenian Student,’PRAVDA.Ru, April 24, 2006, at
06/79470-
Armenian-0 (May 30, 2006); see also Nick Paton Walsh, `Armenian
Student Killed in Moscow Race Attack,’ The Guardian, April 24, 2006,
at ,,175981 4,00.html (May
26, 2006).
[17]`Human Rights Group Raps Russia for Tide of Racial Violence,’ The
Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2006, at
348
-search.htmlKEYWORDS=amnesty+international+
ru ssia&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month (May 11, 2006).
[18]Lera Arsenina, `Secular Court Supports Religious Zealots,’
Gazeta.ru, August 12, 2003, at
tml (May 11, 2006).
[19]Steve Gutterman, `Russian Lawmakers Target Jewish Groups,’
Associated Press, January 25, 2005, at
s/2005/
01/25/russian_lawmakers_target_jewish_grou ps?mode=PF (May 25, 2006).
[20]Anatoly Medetsky, `Comrade Wolf Eats Without Listening,’ The
Moscow Times, May 11, 2006, at
1/003.html.
[21]Rudiger Ahrend and William Tompson, `Russia’s Economy: Keeping Up
the Good Times,’ OECD Observer, October 2005, at
aid/1658/
Russia’s_economy_:_Keeping_up_the_good_t imes.html
(May 11, 2006).

The Sweet Science
June 2 2006
Aussies! Vic Darchinyan Defends Title
by David A. Avila
Flyweights are the smallest of guys in the world of boxing at 112
pounds and less, but inside the ring they can dazzle with their
speed. Sometimes a guy like Australia’s Vic Darchinyan emerges with
his knockout power and sparks the division.
Get ready to be sparked.
Darchinyan, the IBF flyweight titleholder, makes his fourth defense
of the belt he captured against Irene Pacheco, a tall flyweight out
of Colombia who defended it six times before running into the Aussie
buzzsaw. Darchinyan meets Mexico’s Luis Maldonado (33-0-1, 25 KOs) at
the Thomas and Mack Center on Saturday. It will be televised on
Showtime.
It’s been three years since an opponent lasted all 12 rounds with
Darchinyan. He likes it that way.
`It is very important to me to win by knockout,’ said Darchinyan
(25-0, 20 KOs) who is also known as `Raging Bull.’
See, it’s the knockouts that get you noticed in the flyweight
division. Not since Ricardo `Finito’ Lopez has someone grabbed the
attention of the casual boxing viewer. He did it with his surprising
knockout power.
Darchinyan knows this.
`I am looking forward to this fight Luis Maldonado. He is a good,
strong fighter,’ said Darchinyan, who is trained by the former Aussie
great Jeff Fenech. `It is a very good opportunity for me. I have won
a lot of my fights since winning the title by knockout.’
Knockouts are his choice. He also wants to meet other titleholders
like Jorge Arce who reigns supreme in the 112-pound class with his
ability to end a fight by sudden knockout.
A proposed matchup with Arce was shrugged off by the popular Mexican
prizefighter.
`I’m going up in weight,’ said Arce last month, who has struggled to
make weight the last several fights. `There are a lot of good
fighters I can meet at junior bantamweight like Martin Castillo and
Jose Navarro.’
Darchinyan was disappointed but might go up to a heavier weight class
too.
`I was very unhappy. Maybe he (Arce) didn’t want to lose his belt. I
am looking forward to fighting all champions,’ Darchinyan said. `I am
ready for super flyweight (115 pounds), I am ready for bantamweight
(118 pounds) and I am ready for super bantamweights (122 pounds).’
One thing he knows, knockout victories are the key to success.
`If you can show your power, people really love you,’ said the
Armenian boxer. `That is why I want to show my power.’
Flyweights are some of the quickest and slickest prizefighters in the
sport, but even without Arce, the weight class has some pretty
exceptional boxers like WBO flyweight Ivan `Iron Boy’ Calderon,
Lorenzo Parra, Omar Narvaez, and Giovanni Segura.

Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
June 2 2006
Stationing of peacekeepers in Garabagh possible – Azeri official
Baku, June 1, AssA-Irada
The issue of stationing peacekeeping forces in the Upper (Nagorno)
Garabagh conflict zone is currently on the agenda of talks on
settling the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the Azeri Foreign Ministry
spokesman Tahir Taghizada said commenting on Russian Defense Minister
Sergey Ivanov’s statement in this regard.
He said the 8-10 `components’ currently on the negotiating table
include a plan of comprehensive activities on providing security.
`From this standpoint, the stationing of peacekeepers in the conflict
zone is not ruled out.’
Taghizada noted that under the preliminary agreement reached, the
contingent of these forces could not include servicemen from regional
states or the countries that co-chair the mediating OSCE Minsk Group
– Russia, France and the United States.*

Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
June 2 2006
Norwegian envoy visits Nakhchivan
Baku, June 1, AssA-Irada
The Norwegian ambassador to Azerbaijan Steinar Gil has paid a visit
to the country’s exclave of Nakhchivan on Wednesday.
Gil met with representatives of political parties, NGOs and public
organizations operating in the Autonomous Republic.
The diplomat told a news conference following the meetings that his
country is making effort to settle the Armenia-Azerbaijan Upper
(Nagorno) Garabagh conflict within international norms and backs the
activity of the OSCE mediating the negotiations.
The ambassador praised the relations between the two countries. He
said issues of economic cooperation were in focus during the
discussions he had with the leadership of Nakhchivan.*

Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
June 2 2006
Garabagh mediators due Tuesday

Baku, May 22, AssA-Irada
The OSCE mediators brokering settlement to the Armenia-Azerbaijan
Upper (Nagorno) Garabagh conflict will arrive in Baku on Tuesday
evening.
The Minsk Group co-chairs Steven Mann of the United States, Yuri
Merzlyakov of Russia and Bernard Fassier of France are to hold
meetings in the Azeri capital on Wednesday and leave for Yerevan on
the next day, the Foreign Ministry told AssA-Irada.
Visiting the region along with the intermediaries will be Russia’s
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin, US Assistant Secretary of
State Daniel Fried and French Foreign Ministry political director
Stanislas de Laboulaye.
The Russian mediator Yuri Merzlyakov said the next meeting of the
Azeri and Armenian leaders may be held in Bucharest June 4-6. The
discussions are to take place on the sidelines of a summit on
cooperation and dialogue in the Black Sea region, he said.
The parties failed to agree upon the issues of principle during the
latest talks held by the two presidents in Rambouillet, France in
February, which was followed by Azerbaijan’s threats to resort to
military action.*