AZERI, ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS TO MEET IN MOSCOW OCT. 6
Today, Azerbaijan
Oct 3 2006
The OSCE Minsk group has not finished its work, claim the Co-Chairs.
Today they announced that the Armenian and Azeri Foreign Ministers
will meet in Moscow on October 6.
The Co-Chairs are a little indignant at yesterday’s meetings in Baku
and the interpretation of the Azeri mass media. US Co-Chair Mettew
Bryza says that he couldn’t sleep the whole night after seeing his
announcement on GUAM in the press. According to the Azeri press
data, Mr. Bryza said that GUAM countries can render assistance to
OSCE Minsk group in Karabakh conflict settlement. Today Mr. Bryza
read his opinion on the GUAM in front of the Armenian journalists;
“GUAM member countries are not OSCE members.”
Bernard Fassier, French Co-Chair says that he didn’t announce in
Baku that Karabakh cannot participate in the negotiation process at
present. He didn’t answer the same question in Yerevan either. He
didn’t exclude the possibility that peaceful troops may be located
in vacated territories by 2006.
Tomorrow the Co-Chairs will leave for Karabakh. Mr. Bryza assured that
the Co-Chairs are of the same opinion on all questions, and there
is no discord among them. “I can assure that the Karabakh conflict
settlement has not a military solution,” said Mettew Bryza.
Bernard Fassier said that unless Armenians and Azeris are ready
to live side by side as neighbours, the Karabakh conflict won’t
be settled. As for the time when the conflict will find its final
solution, Mr. Fassier said, “Let’s live and see.”
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TURKEY RAPS CHIRAC COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
Reuters
Oct 3 2006
Turkey on Tuesday criticized remarks by French President Jacques
Chirac that Ankara must recognize the 1915 massacre of Armenians as
genocide before joining the European Union.
On a visit to Armenia last weekend, Chirac urged Turkey to come to
terms with a dark episode in its history just as Germany had done
with regard to the Holocaust under the Nazis.
Turkey strongly denies claims that Ottoman Turks committed a systematic
genocide against Armenians during World War One, saying that large
numbers of both Christian Armenians and Muslim Turks perished in a
partisan conflict raging at that time.
“We were deeply saddened by the statements supporting the baseless
Armenian claims during the visit by President Chirac to Armenia,”
the Turkish Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
Chirac should instead support Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s
call for a joint commission of Turkish and Armenian historians to
assess what really happened more than 90 years ago, the ministry
said. It noted that last year Chirac said the issue of France’s own
alleged maltreatment of peoples under its former colonial rule should
be left to historians to argue over.
The Armenian issue is especially sensitive in France, which is home
to a large Armenian diaspora and faces presidential elections next
year. The French parliament is due to debate a bill by the Socialists
opposition party proposing to punish anyone denying Armenian genocide
claims on October 12.
Chirac has also promised French voters a chance to vote on
whether Turkey should join the EU after it has completed its entry
negotiations. The talks are expected to last many years.
The EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said during a visit to
Ankara on Tuesday that recognizing the Armenian massacres as genocide
was not a condition for Turkey’s EU membership. “We want to encourage
a rational, constructive debate (about what happened),” said Rehn,
who said he had welcomed Erdogan’s proposal for a commission.

ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AGREE TO RESUME DIRECT TALKS
By Emil Danielyan
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
Oct 3 2006
The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan will meet in Moscow
on Friday for face-to-face peace talks that could be followed by
another crucial Armenian-Azerbaijani summit on Nagorno-Karabakh,
international mediators said on Tuesday.
The senior French, Russian and U.S. diplomats co-chairing the OSCE
Minsk Group made the announcement after talks with the leaders of the
two nations. They were in Baku on Monday and are scheduled to meet
with the Armenian leadership of Karabakh in Stepanakert on Wednesday
in their latest round of shuttle diplomacy.
Speaking at a joint news conference in Yerevan, the mediators said
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar
Mammadyarov will likely hold another round of negotiations next week
in an attempt to kick-start the deadlocked peace process.
In the words of Bernard Fassier, the group’s French co-chair,
the two ministers will specifically look into the possibility of
organizing yet another meeting of their presidents. Fassier and his
American and Russian colleagues refused to speculate on the chances
of a breakthrough.
“We are not saying that we are on the verge of a grand breakthrough
or that the difficult problems have gotten any easier,” said, Matthew
Bryza, the U.S. co-chair. “But we do sense a willingness by the sides
to think in a deeper way and to look for a way to move ahead.”
Oskanian and Mammadyarov were already scheduled to meet in New York
late last month on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Oskanian
effectively cancelled the meeting in protest against the assembly’s
decision to discuss the conflicts in Karabakh and elsewhere in the
former Soviet Union during its ongoing session. Armenia is strongly
opposed to any UN involvement in Karabakh talks.
The issue was included on the assembly agenda at the insistence of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova that make up a loose grouping
of former Soviet republics known as GUAM. They are expected to submit
a relevant resolution to the body this fall.
Bryza indicated that the United States will oppose any GUAM resolutions
that would blame the Armenian side and run counter to the main points
of a framework peace deal disclosed by the Minsk Group in June. “If
the GUAM states put forward a resolution that is not balanced, that is
not fair, that is accusatory or simply doesn’t call for a settlement
based on the basic principles we’ve articulated, it won’t be helpful
and we won’t like it,” he said.
The mediators favor a gradual resolution of the Karabakh dispute that
would lead to a referendum on the disputed enclave’s status after the
liberation of surrounding Azerbaijani districts controlled by Armenian
forces. They made it clear on Tuesday that this formula remains at
the heart of their revised peace proposals. “We still believe that
our basic principles that we have articulated provide the best hope
for a fair, just and lasting settlement,” said Bryza.
Presidents Ilham Aliev of Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia
were widely expected to accept those principles as a basis for a more
comprehensive peace accord during two rounds of intensive negotiations
earlier this year. However, the talks yielded no agreement, all
but dashing hopes for the conflict’s settlement before the end of
this year.
Aliev has since repeatedly ruled out any settlement that would stop
short of restoring Azerbaijani control over Karabakh. He reportedly
reaffirmed this stance in an address to the Azerbaijani parliament
on Monday. Azerbaijani media quoted him as saying that Baku is under
pressure to accept a deal “contradicting the interests of our people.”
“Some forces wonder why the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has still
not be solved,” Aliev said, according to the Trend news agency. “This
is so because we are not opting for agreements that are not acceptable
to us.”
Bryza refused to comment on this, saying that there are discrepancies
between remarks attributed to the Azerbaijani leader by various
Azerbaijani media outlets.
Aliev was also quoted by Agence France Presse as also pledging to
“increase pressure on Armenia.” “Otherwise they are not likely to give
back our territories. We must be ready for war,” he said, according
to the French news agency.
Bryza reiterated in that regard the mediators’ view that “there is
no military settlement to the Karabakh conflict.”

ARMENIAN EXPORTS HURT BY RUSSIAN BLOCKADE OF GEORGIA
By Astghik Bedevian
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
Oct 3 2006
Armenian companies trading with Russia said on Tuesday that they are
already incurring losses as a result of Moscow’s decision to impose
a transport blockade on Georgia in retaliation for the arrest of its
Tbilisi-based military officers accused of espionage.
The Russian government suspended all land, sea, and postal links with
Georgia on Monday despite the release and repatriation of the four
officers who allegedly worked for Russia’s GRU military intelligence.
It also threatened to ban cash remittances from hundreds of thousands
of Georgians working in Russia.
The extraordinary move, criticized by the European Union, further
complicated Moscow’s already tense relationship with the pro-Western
administration of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. It could
also seriously hamper Armenian exports to and imports from Russia.
Those account for a considerable part of Armenia’s external trade.
Prime Minister Andranik Markarian downplayed the blockade’s effects on
Armenia, arguing that the Russians had already closed their main land
border crossing with Georgia in June and that Armenian companies can
continue to ship cargos to Russia via Ukraine. However, the owners
of some of those companies were far less sanguine, saying that they
are already counting the possible cost of the Russian blockade.
Ashot Baghdasarian, chief executive of the Kilikia beer and soft
drinks company, said a batch of its products bound for Russia was
left stranded in a Georgian Black Sea port following the suspension
of a regular Georgian-Russian ferry service. Kilikia is also unable
to import Russian raw materials used for the packaging of its natural
juices, he said.
“I have information that our cargos were stopped at the border
yesterday,” Baghdasarian told RFE/RL. “This is a very big problem for
businessmen.” The businessman, who is also a parliament deputy from
the governing Republican Party (HHK), urged the Armenian government
to help sort out the problem.
The government seems reluctant to raise the issue with the Russian side
for the time being. “We have not yet received an official notification
from the Russian side on restrictions placed on shipments of our
goods.” the Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Vladimir Karapetian,
said.
Great Valley, a major Armenian brandy firm heavily oriented towards
the Russian market, has also seen its exports grind to a halt. “There
is an option of shipping things by air, something which we have done in
the past,” its owner Tigran Arzakantsian told RFE/RL. “But that is very
expensive. We are now examining ways of making shipments via Iran.”
Arzakantsian also owns a textile factory in his native town of Gavar
that exports most of its production to Russia.
Other Armenian exporters said they have so far been unaffected by the
escalating Russian-Georgian crisis. Arsen Ghazarian of the Apaven
cargo company said it continued to successfully ferry freight to
Russia on Tuesday. MAP, another major liquor manufacturer, likewise
reported non transportation problems.
“Only the shipment of Georgian cargos has been suspended,” the MAP
chairman, Alik Petrosian, told RFE/RL. “So our cargos keep going to
[the Georgian port of] Poti and then proceeding to Russia.”
But Petrosian too was worried about the situation. “Nobody knows what
will happen tomorrow,” he explained. “Everyone understands what a
serious blow to our economy could suffer.”
Armenian exports to Russia, dominated alcoholic drinks and agricultural
products, were already dealt a severe blow with the closure last June
of the main Russian-Georgian border crossing.
Armenian leaders tried unsuccessfully to get the Russians to reopen
the Upper Lars crossing. This prompted renewed complaints by Armenian
politicians and commentators that Russian ignores the interests of
Armenia, its main regional ally, in its dealings with Georgia.
Russian officials have denied any political motives behind the closure
of Upper Lars, saying that the “temporary” measure was necessary for
repairing roads and customs facilities on the Russian side of the
mountainous frontier.
Despite stepping up its economic and diplomatic blockade of Georgia,
Moscow has not cut off its vital natural gas supplies to Georgia and
on to Armenia, something which would have even more severe consequences
for both South Caucasus states.

PARLIAMENT BLOCKS GOVERNMENT BILL ON TV REGULATION
By Ruzanna Khachatrian
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
Oct 3 2006
The Armenian parliament rejected on Tuesday a controversial government
bill that envisages important changes in the formation of a powerful
state body regulating television and radio broadcasts in the country.
The bill was backed only by 46 of the 131 members of the National
Assembly after being strongly criticized by Armenia’s leading media
associations. It was also rejected by parliament deputies representing
the opposition minority and the governing Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (Dashnaktsutyun).
Its main stated purpose is to make the controversial National
Commission on Television and Radio (HRAH) more independent of
President Robert Kocharian in line with one of the recently enacted
amendments to Armenia’s constitution. Under the existing law, Kocharian
single-handedly appoints all of its nine members.
The proposed changes would reduce that number to eight and empower
the president of the republic to name only half of the commission
members. The other four members would be chosen by the parliament.
The HRAH would also have to “substantiate in a proper manner” the
distribution and withdrawal of television and radio frequencies.
In a joint statement, the Yerevan Press Club, the Armenian Union of
Journalists and three other groups said the proposed changes do not
ensure the HRAH’s independence, arguing that it would take years
before the composition of the Kocharian-controlled body changes
significantly. They suggested that the new HRAH have 16 members,
half of whom would be appointed by the parliament at once.
The media groups object to the government’s desire to give additional
powers to the broadcast regulator. They say this would make the
distribution and withdrawal of broadcasting licenses more arbitrary
and discretionary.
Speaking in the National Assembly last week, Justice Minister David
Harutiunian said the government is ready to accept some of these
suggestions but only after the bill is adopted in the first reading.
Parliament speaker Tigran Torosian backed this approach, urging fellow
lawmakers to vote for the draft law. Most of them clearly failed to
heed the call, however.

MAKING THEIR VOTES COUNT
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
Oct 3 2006
Breakaway Republics Start a New Round of Referendums
Fifteen years after the “parade of sovereignties” that was the end
of the Soviet Union, a new march is beginning in the Eurasian space.
This time it is a “parade of referendums” being held by the
unrecognized republics that form a kind of parallel Commonwealth of
Independent States.
On September 17, the breakaway Moldovan region of Transdnestr
held a referendum that included two questions. The first was: “Do
you support the course toward independence of the Transdnestrian
Moldovan Republic and the subsequent free joining of Transdnestr to
the Russian Federation?”; the second was “Do reject the independence
of the Transdnestrian Moldovan Republic with the subsequent entry of
Transdnestr into the Republic of Moldova?”
On November 12, South Ossetia will hold a referendum on its
independence from Georgia. The South Ossetian vote will be held
simultaneously with presidential elections in the unrecognized
republic. This is no coincidence: President Eduard Kokoity is trying
to gain additional legitimacy by asking people to identify him
as the force behind independence. It appears that definitions of
“legitimacy” are being used to justify the political situation in
unrecognized republics.
Legitimacy, however, is not the same as recognition from the
international community. Quite the opposite – the wave of referendums
is unacknowledged by influential international organizations. Terry
Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, expressed
doubt as to whether the results of the South Ossetian referendum will
be recognized at all. He added that the South Ossetian authorities
should start talks with Georgia aimed at finding a peaceful solution.
“The secessionist authorities of the South Ossetian region of Georgia
are wasting time and effort on the organization of a referendum on
independence in November,” he said
In an interview with Kommersant-Ukraina, EU Special Representative to
Moldova Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, said that international law made
Transdnestrian secession an impossibility. “Separating Transdnestr
can happen only if agreement is reached with Moldova,” he said.
But if legitimacy is understood as the local population accepting
the authorities as “their own,” then legitimacy exists, even if it
is unrecognized. In South Ossetia, like the other de facto states,
authorities that maintain no ties with the recognized “mother
state” are seen as “ours.” Thus, this fall will likely see another
manifestation of unrecognized legitimacy. In addition to the previously
mentioned referendums, Nagorno-Karabakh will hold a vote in December
on a project for formulating a Basic Law that will govern the region’s
relationship with Azerbaijan. The question of independence for the
region and its status is seen as closed for further discussion. The
region’s foreign minister, Georgy Petrosyan, said: “Independence for
Nagorno- Karabakh is of the highest value to the republic’s people
and was supported by a popular referendum on state independence of
December 10, 1991.”
Virtually all the unrecognized post-Soviet republics held referendums
in the early 1990s. On January 19, 1992, South Ossetia approved a
referendum to secede from Georgia and to join Russia. Transdnestr
has already held six referendums before Sept. 17, including votes to
approve a Transdnestrian Constitution and to confirm the republic’s
existence.
The current “parade of referendums” seems justified on three grounds.
First, as a rule, the plebiscites of the early 1990s took place
against a backdrop of armed conflict between the breakaway territories
and their “mother countries.” In this sense, they enjoy much less
legitimacy than equivalent votes during peacetime. Fifteen years
later, the de facto states have demonstrated their viability not
only to the countries of which they are part, but also to the whole
world. Transdnestr, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh all have territory
under their control and their own legal structures.
Even among these areas, however, South Ossetia is a special case. The
region is not ethnically homogeneous and the capital, Tskhinvali,
is cut off from North Ossetia – and therefore from Russia – by the
“Liakhvsky corridor,” a strip of Georgian villages along the river of
the same name. Nevertheless, polls and other sociological research
– including some conducted in 2003 by the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University – among South Ossetians aged
20-27 show that support for Georgian jurisdiction is zero. Thus,
the new wave of referendums is a test of viability and evidence of
the sustainability of unrecognized statehood.
The second justification for the referendums is as a demonstration
of the foreign-policy priorities of the unrecognized territories,
although this rule will be observed differently in each case. In
Transdnestr and South Ossetia, the referendums will serve as a
strategic choice in Russia’s favor, while in Nagorno-Karabakh the
vote on the constitution is primarily about territorial and political
institutionalization. Many in the region hope that deciding on the
final arbiter of the state’s viability – the Constitution – will
significantly hasten international recognition of the region.
Third and finally, the current wave of plebiscites is a reaction to
the Balkan example of ethnic self-determination.
Although both the United States and the European Union have said that
the cases of Montenegro and Kosovo are unique and should not be used as
templates for blind political copying, the former Soviet unrecognized
states are adopting political decisions aimed at acquiring additional
legitimacy and, finally, at becoming de jure independent based on
the concept of ethnic self-determination.A struggle for international
recognition based on the Balkan precedents will take place, regardless
of the genuinely significant differences between Montenegro and Kosovo
and the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
As the largest and most influential state in the post-Soviet
space, Russia faces the problem of how to act in the face of this
“Balkanization.” Moscow has two basic options – either continue
to support the status quo, hoping to prolong this state of affairs
indefinitely, or, if Kosovo is recognized, to attempt to escalate the
situation by recognizing Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh
and Transdnestr as a “symmetrical measure.”
By choosing to defend the status quo, Russia would be saying,
in essence, that it will not carry out the political will of these
regions. The wishes of the de facto states are obvious, and even evoke
some political sympathies, but identifying their political interests
with those of Russia would be incorrect. Russia is a major player on a
global scale and needs to calculate the best use of its resources and
its opportunities for politicking regarding the unrecognized states.
Obviously, international recognition of Transdnestr, Abkhazia or South
Ossetia should not just mean recognition by Russia. This would not be
satisfactory for the breakaway republics and risks the possibility
of the “Balkanization” of Russia itself. Russia needs to look for
allies in the changing configuration of the post-Soviet space. But
for this it first needs coherent arguments as to why it should take
up the case of the unrecognized republics, as well as clear criteria
to present to the international community as a whole.
The first criterion should be the countries’ viability – both in terms
of the strength of their political structures and their territorial
stability. Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr, for example, are states
that already exist, and for this reason their peaceful reintegration
into their former “mother countries” is an impossibility.
The second criterion could be the ability of the mother countries
to control the “breakaway territory” in question by means other
than wholesale deportation or ethnic cleansing. In other words,
reintegration should be considered impossible if it will lead to
subsequent military conflict. A third criterion could be evidence
of democratic procedures in the unrecognized regions. All of these
states have been through several electoral cycles, and leaders have
been changed by popular vote – an extremely difficult procedure for
the post-Soviet space and something that cannot be said about many
recognized post-Soviet states.
In addition to these criteria, which are focused on the public
political space, dialogue must be carried out behind the scenes. This
requires other arguments and other issues, including the stability of
the Caucasus region as a whole and the fate of the regions’ valuable
energy resources and energy transport systems. But this kind of
backstairs horse-trading should be supplemented by active public
measures, since influencing the opinion of Brussels, Washington,
and individual EU capitals in a particular direction also relies on
forming expert and public opinion in the countries in question. This
in turn requires speaking to the West in language it understands –
the language of human rights, ethnic minority rights, guarantees for
minority languages, and the inadmissibility of military solutions.
Last, but certainly not least, recognition of the unrecognized states
is not the same as their inclusion into Russia. These two ideas must
be clearly separated. Russia will not fight alongside separatists
in the Galsk region of Abkhazia or the villages of Tamarasheni and
Kekhvi in South Ossetia, or end up with Transdnestr as a second
exclave alongside Kaliningrad – especially given that in all these
cases the local elites are certainly not dreaming about the arrival
of Russian prosecutors or tame Kremlin governors.
Only by defining such clear criteria, calculating available resources,
and undertaking serious informational and diplomatic efforts can
Russia attempt to find a final solution to the problem of unrecognized
territories. The most important thing to remember in this process is
that is should be guided not by abstract humanism, or by the interests
of the self-proclaimed elites, but by Russian national self-interest.
Sergei Markedonov is head of the international relations department
of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. He
contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

GEORGIA AND RUSSIA: WITH YOU, WITHOUT YOU
Donald Rayfield
Open Democracy, UK
Oct 3 2006
Wine and roses, spies and sanctions, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia…Tbilisi’s long, intimate and turbulent relationship with
Moscow has gone badly wrong. Donald Rayfield explains how and why.
The current quarrel between Georgia and Russia – which started with
the arrest of an alleged Russian spy-ring on Georgian territory,
and quickly escalated via embittering mutual accusations towards
the imposition of a range of severe sanctions by Russia on its small
southern neighbour – is based on more than a conflict of interests;
it has all the viciousness of a love affair gone sour, which is
why it seems so hard to see an end to the ever-escalating series of
recriminations between the two countries.
For hundreds of years Russia was for Georgia a distant Christian
neighbour, if one slowly but surely expanding towards Georgia’s
northern frontiers. After the collapse of the Byzantine empire and
the devastations wrought by the Mongols, Georgia was for centuries
vulnerable to invasion and despoliation by Iran from the east and
Ottoman Turkey from the west, while the wild highland tribes of
the north periodically came down like wolves on the fold. Russia
during this period was a land more of myth than reality: only a
few inter-dynastic marriages linked the ruling families of the two
countries, and the remnants of the Scythians and the Golden Horde
put an impenetrable barrier between them.
Likewise, Georgia was at first a Shangri-La for Russia, a Christian
kingdom which would in principle be an ally in the expansion of Russian
rule and Orthodoxy throughout the orient, a state which had a common
interest in dominating the Circassians and Chechens who resisted all
forms of statehood and empire.
Donald Rayfield is professor in the department of modern languages,
Queen Mary College, University of London. Among his books is Stalin
and his Hangmen (Random House, 2005)
A wary embrace
Only in the 17th and 18th century did reality modify the dreams;
Russia and Georgia made contact, at first over the Caspian sea and
then, spasmodically, across the mountain passes. Russia provided
hospitality for Georgian exiles and refugees from Iranian depredations;
through Russia, Georgians got a European education, access to western
culture, and experience as officers in the Russian armies. They were
even given large estates and their aristocratic rank was recognised.
Finally, in the 1780s Russia offered military assistance in
repelling the Iranian forces. And here the first rifts appeared in
the relationship. Russian help consisted too often in encouraging the
Georgians to attack Persians or Turks, standing by while both sides
fought each other to a standstill, and then mopping up the remnants.
Georgians had their first lesson in modern Realpolitik.
When in 1783 the exhausted Georgian kingdom accepted the Russian
offer of protectorate status, they had their second lesson: within
two decades the Georgian kingdom was dismantled, the royal family
was exiled (comfortably and respectfully) to St Petersburg, the
Georgian church was incorporated into the Russian church – its
frescoes whitewashed, its polyphonic singing replaced by chant –
and a Russian viceroy governed the country.
Still, under Russian rule a corrupt, ignorant bureaucracy was
a distinct improvement over Persian and Turkish satraps. Nobody
was beheaded, castrated or enslaved, even if they were taxed and
occasionally exiled, and Georgian nobles enjoyed unfettered control
over their peasants and protection from bankruptcy. The Georgian
rebellions against Russian rule were half-hearted, and for most of
the 19th century, given liberal viceroys, the gratitude was greater
than the grievances.
The aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 transformed
the picture. Soviet rule in 1921 violently crushed the independent
Georgian state that had sprung up in 1917; while lip-service was paid
to the status of Georgian language and culture, both Lenin and Stalin
systematically destroyed all hopes of any real autonomy. Instead,
autonomy (accompamnied in some cases by Russification) was granted to
several of Georgia’s provinces – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adzharia –
following the same tactics of divide and rule that the Iranian shahs
had applied. Georgians were subjected to mass arrests and executions in
the “great terror” of 1937-38, and their male population was reduced
by a fifth in the terrible fighting of the second world war.
The problem is that, relatively, Georgia remained a land of
plenty, even in the hungriest years of the 1930s and 1940s. Soviet
Russia, like Czarist Russia, was convinced that it had provided the
protective mantle under which grateful Georgians could enjoy peace and
prosperity. But gratitude was not apparent; many Russians were aware
of Georgian attitudes to them as a nation of male boors and female
sluts. After Stalin’s death the conviction steadily grew among ordinary
Russians that Georgians had parasitically exploited Soviet tolerance.
On the rocks
Today’s mutual hostility has escalated from this misunderstanding.
Georgia’s eagerness to declare independence in 1990 was taken by many
Russians as monstrous ingratitude. Within two years, Georgia seemed
on the verge of dismemberment, as Abkhazia broke away, South Ossetia
rose up against the abolition of its autonomy and Adzharia fell into
the hands of a narco-baron (Aslan Abashidze) with close links to the
mayor of Moscow.
Much of the responsibility for the loss of Georgia’s provinces
has to be blamed on Georgian politicians and their inflammatory,
nationalist – at times even fascist – rhetoric, in which they insisted
that their own minorities (Abkhaz, Ossetes, even Armenians) were just
“guests” on Georgian territory. But Georgian suspicions that Russia
was surreptitiously fomenting separatism are justified. South Ossetia
is a paradise for racketeers among the Russian army “peacekeepers”,
while Abkhazia’s magnificent villas and resorts are coveted by the
Russian business and bureaucratic elites. The issue of offering Russian
passports to the population of Abkhazia, the Georgians rightly believe,
amounts to effective annexation of Georgian territory.
There are many varieties of anti-Georgian opinion in Russia. At the
crudest level is the view that all Caucasians are gangsters; at a
higher level, Eduard Shevardnadze (the former Soviet foreign minister
who returned to head Georgia in 1992 after the chaotic rule of Zviad
Gamsakhurdia) is seen as the traitor who enabled Mikhail Gorbachev
to dismantle the Soviet Union and hand the remnants to the Americans.
Mikheil Saakashvili’s “rose revolution” of November 2003-January 2004
was in fact given tacit assent by elements in the Russian government:
primarily in order to punish Shevardnadze, and secondarily because
Saakashvili was seen as an amateur who would not be able to intrigue
as cunningly as his tetri melia (white fox) predecessor.
In fact Saakashvili has shown a mixture of astuteness and
incompetence. On one hand, he secured the return of a lost province,
hounding out Abashidze from Adzharia, and he has made the Russians
agree eventually to evacuate their military bases. On the other hand,
to assuage his electorate he has made one inflammatory statement
after another, for each of which Georgia has been punished by denial
of energy and bans of exports.
No Georgian politician dares admit to the electorate that Abkhazia
is lost forever, like a wife that has run off to be with a bigger
and richer man, and that South Ossetia is now almost certainly
irrecoverable; nor would he or she have the wisdom of a Czech or
Hungarian politician to say that the country is all the better off
for being smaller and ethnically more homogeneous.
Meanwhile, although Russia has reconciled itself to the independence of
the Baltic states, Russian public opinion cannot swallow the idea of
an independent Georgia. Given the disparity of size and power between
the two countries, and given the certainty that if the Americans and
Europeans ever have to make a choice they will side with the Russians
(who have gas, oil and platinum, whereas the Georgians have only
a pipeline route to offer), Georgia is going to get the worst of
the conflict.

OSCE BROKERS NEW ROUND OF NK TALKS BETWEEN ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN
International Herald Tribune, France
The Associated Press
Oct 3 2006
YEREVAN, Armenia Envoys from the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe on Tuesday brokered a new round of talks between
foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict following a tense impasse.
Yuri Merzlyakov, a Russian diplomat who co-chairs the so-called Minsk
group of the OSCE dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, said
the two nations’ foreign ministers were to meet Friday in Moscow. He
said a time and venue for a meeting of presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan remain to be negotiated.
The foreign ministers’ meeting would restart bilateral talks which
have been interrupted recently due to the lack of progress.
“We would like to rejuvenate direct contacts between the sides,
and I think we have achieved this goal,” said U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Matthew J. Bryza, another co-chair.
OSCE envoys held talks in Armenia Tuesday a day after visiting
Azerbaijan.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in Azerbaijan that has been under the
control of Armenian and ethnic-Armenian Karabakh forces since a 1994
cease-fire ended a six-year separatist war that killed about 30,000
people and drove about 1 million from their homes. The region’s final
status has not been worked out, and years of talks under the auspices
of OSCE mediators have brought little visible result.
Talks in France in February between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev
and Armenian President Robert Kocharian about the enclave broke down,
and the two leaders again failed to agree on principles for settling
the conflict when they met again in Romania in June.
“We aren’t saying that we are on the verge of a grand breakthrough
or that the difficult problems have got any easier, but we do sense
the willingness of the sides to think in a deeper way and look for
a way to move ahead,” Bryza said.
He said that lack of trust between the parties continued to hinder
the talks and said that “an effort to rebuild that confidence” was
particularly important.
Earlier this year, OSCE mediators proposed a set of principles for
settling the conflict which included withdrawing Armenian troops
from the Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh but
suggested that a corridor linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would
remain under Armenian control.
The principles also included deploying international peacekeepers,
resettling displaced people and a referendum – its timing and format
to be worked out later – on the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Merzlyakov said Azerbaijan and Armenia were advised to proceed from
the same set of principles. “It’s wrong to say that the things already
done are no longer on the table,” he said.
YEREVAN, Armenia Envoys from the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe on Tuesday brokered a new round of talks between
foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict following a tense impasse.
Yuri Merzlyakov, a Russian diplomat who co-chairs the so-called Minsk
group of the OSCE dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, said
the two nations’ foreign ministers were to meet Friday in Moscow. He
said a time and venue for a meeting of presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan remain to be negotiated.
The foreign ministers’ meeting would restart bilateral talks which
have been interrupted recently due to the lack of progress.
“We would like to rejuvenate direct contacts between the sides,
and I think we have achieved this goal,” said U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Matthew J. Bryza, another co-chair.
OSCE envoys held talks in Armenia Tuesday a day after visiting
Azerbaijan.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in Azerbaijan that has been under the
control of Armenian and ethnic-Armenian Karabakh forces since a 1994
cease-fire ended a six-year separatist war that killed about 30,000
people and drove about 1 million from their homes. The region’s final
status has not been worked out, and years of talks under the auspices
of OSCE mediators have brought little visible result.
Talks in France in February between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev
and Armenian President Robert Kocharian about the enclave broke down,
and the two leaders again failed to agree on principles for settling
the conflict when they met again in Romania in June.
“We aren’t saying that we are on the verge of a grand breakthrough
or that the difficult problems have got any easier, but we do sense
the willingness of the sides to think in a deeper way and look for
a way to move ahead,” Bryza said.
He said that lack of trust between the parties continued to hinder
the talks and said that “an effort to rebuild that confidence” was
particularly important.
Earlier this year, OSCE mediators proposed a set of principles for
settling the conflict which included withdrawing Armenian troops
from the Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh but
suggested that a corridor linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would
remain under Armenian control.
The principles also included deploying international peacekeepers,
resettling displaced people and a referendum – its timing and format
to be worked out later – on the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Merzlyakov said Azerbaijan and Armenia were advised to proceed from
the same set of principles. “It’s wrong to say that the things already
done are no longer on the table,” he said.

FM MEETS WITH EU TROIKA DELEGATION
AzerTag, Azerbaijan
Oct 3 2006
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov met October 3 with
the delegation of the European Union troika.
At the press conference following the meeting, Mr. Mammadyarov said
Azerbaijan and the EU have already ended the Action Plan-related
talks within the European Neighborhood Policy.
The Minister said the document would be adopted at the EU-Azerbaijan
Cooperation Council’s meeting in the Belgian capital Brussels on
November 14.
Mr. Mammadyarov said his meeting with the EU troika delegation
included discussions over the issues concerning the Action Plan,
adding this document will deepen the Azerbaijan-EU ties.
Finland’s Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, in his turn, said the
Action Plan will enhance the cooperation between the European Union
and Azerbaijan.
European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood
Policy Mrs. Benita Ferrero-Waldner stressed the importance of the
document to Azerbaijan in terms of integration into the European Union.
***
The same day, the EU troika delegation gave a press conference in the
“Park INN-Azerbaijan” Hotel to sum up their visit.
Finland’s Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja said the main goal of the
visit to the South Caucasus was to end the Action plans-related talks
with the region’s countries.
On the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagrono-Karabakh, Mr. Tuomioja
said it is the OSCE Minsk Group which is responsible for settlement
of this dispute, adding “we support their activity”.

COE CRITICISES CHIRAC’S REMARKS ON SO-CALLED GENOCIDE
Turkish Press
Oct 3 2006
STRASBOURG – Rene van der Linden, President of Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), criticised French President Jacques
Chirac who commented that Turkey should acknowledge the so-called
Armenian genocide in order to become a member of the European Union.
“I did not like Chirac`s statements. These statements are political
and have a clear intention”, said Van der Linden, speaking at a
press conference.
PACE President stated that Turkey had activated rapid reforms of
vital importance in recent years and kept its promises.
“We can not define new conditions at the moment just because Turkey
activated such reforms”, Rene van der Linden said.
Reminding that EU made promises to Turkey and such promises should
be kept, “rules can not change in the middle of the game”, PACE
President stressed.
Van Der Linden also emphasized that Turkey had further steps to
take prior to the membership, nonetheless, it was not appropriate to
determine the recognition of the so-called genocide as a precondition.
Stressing that politicians should inspire confidence to the society,
Van Der Linden noted that contradictional statements on such issues
ended up in distrust.
PACE President also said that supporters of the reforms in Turkey
should be encouraged.
Moreover, upon a reporter`s question on Cyprus, Van Der Linden said
that if Greeks had accepted the Annan Plan, there would not have been
problems regarding this issue.