Russia Realigns its Geopolitical and Economic Priorities Toward Asian-Pacific

May 17 2026

(Moscow Bureau) – Within the framework of the Greater Eurasia Union, Russia’s envisioned strategies have been directed at raising economic and investment levels with the former Soviet republics, particularly Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. While the primary reasons include preserving historical linkages, it has these years strengthening economic cooperation. Beyond that, Russia is also actively realigning its geopolitical and economic priorities toward Asian-Pacific region, driven by the Western sanctions and a shifting global landscape. While heavily anchored by ties with Beijing, Moscow is simultaneously deepening its engagements with China, India and Vietnam.
It was not surprising, on May 9th, which usually marks the historic Victory Day, Kremlin’s utilized the opportunity to review significant aspects of the current economic partnerships with a number of Asian-Pacific states who were specially invited to Moscow. As expected during the scheduled meetings, Kremlin has underlined the necessity of sustaining and raising full-fledged pragmatic coordination in the spheres of trade and economic cooperation. Beyond marking the historic May 9th, which was somewhat observed in a reduced format due to security concerns, Kremlin was, at the same time, seriously looking for fortifying economic partnerships with foreign states, particularly the former Soviet republics and a few from the Asian-Pacific region. These foreign leaders were, specially, invited to participate in the May 9th activities, including the Red Square parade.
The Russian Federation lost about 70 percent out of the 27 million lives laid on the altar of Victory in the Soviet Union. According to post-war documents, Russia lost nearly 70 percent or more precisely more than 69 percent. How many lives Russia lost if the total number is 27 million? Nearly 19 million lives. Of course, this is an event that concerns every citizen of the Russian Federation.
Reasons for Russia-Ukraine crisis
Now, the genesis of the war in Ukraine. It is the so-called globalist part of the Western elites, having provoked this Russia-Ukraine conflict. Strangely, it all began with Ukraine’s decision to join the EU. They could go ahead by all means, but this has led to a military conflict. That was the initial reference point, had no regard for Russia’s interests, whatsoever, the regional security. Moreover, seeking to use Ukraine as an instrument for attaining their geopolitical goals, these people in the West lied to everyone, as they have now openly admitted. They started to lie to Russia about the non-expansion of NATO to the east at the beginning of the 1990s. That NATO would not move a single step eastward. Taken together, all this has provoked the current situation.
In a critical assessment, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, explicitly explained that “Russia has no desire to worsen or damage relations with anyone” while outlining the potential consequences within the framework of the special military operation that began in late February 2022. Now in its fourth year, it is necessary for Russia to sustain collaborative work with major partners and friends, primarily with friends from the People’s Republic of China, India and some other countries in the Global South.
Russia and its former Soviet republics
In the Kremlin, there were a veritable marathon of bilateral meetings. These were focused on the main significant economic issues for Russia and for other countries, in this case, friendly countries. Of primary importance are, certainly, relations with former Soviet republics, closest allies and partners – Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Russia’s trade with Belarus is more than $60 billion. Isn’t this an impressive figure for a country with barely 10 million of population? asked Putin during a media briefing in the Kremlin., and added that there is always a great to discuss, there are really many issues of mutual concern.
Despite the fact that there are bound to be problems, reports indicated that Russia accounts for 60 or even more than 65 percent of trade with Belarus in the CIS and EAEU, which means that Belarus is the main trading partner in the post-Soviet space. Of course, given this huge volume, which is worth about $60 billion.
Armenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are rapidly developing economies, have solid plans, including in investment, and quite importantly, Russia has common interests with Kazakhstan in the framework of the EAEU. Putin noted that, “as for Armenia’s plans to join the EU, this certainly requires special consideration.” Putin has discussed it with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on several occasions, and do not see anything strange about it. History shows that Russia has maintained special relations with the Armenian people for centuries. Russia’s trade with Armenia was very modest, at $7 billion in 2025. Given that the country’s GDP is $29 billion, this is a serious amount, and Armenia also enjoys considerable advantages in the EAEU.
Specifically with Kazakhstan, Russia has been working on 177 industrial cooperation projects alone over the past 20 years, and 122 projects were implemented during the last five years. Russia is one of the main if not the key investor in Kazakhstan’s economy. Russia’s trade is developing successfully. According to forecasts, trade will confidently surpass the $30 billion mark by the end of this year, which is a good indicator.
The leaders highlight the development of humanitarian ties, in education, including higher, secondary and primary one. Sirius schools have actually begun working on the territory in Alma Ata, Astana and other cities across Kazakhstan. According to the results of 2025, Russia placed first by the number of tourists who visited Kazakhstan. China comes second, India third, Türkiye fourth, and South Korea fifth.
Trade and economic ties continue to grow, and major projects are being implemented. Russia remains one of the leading investors in the Uzbek economy. Bilateral relations are developing very dynamically. For instance, during the international industrial exhibition, First Deputy Prime Minister, Denis Manturov, and many other people visited it, including six governors. It was attended by 500 companies, and had a very busy programme. Today, the dynamics is very good. Compared to last year, trade has increased by 33 percent in the first quarter of 2026, which is a good indicator.
With regards to the Republic of South Ossetia, following a meeting on May 9th, an agreement on deepening cooperation with the Russian Federation, was signed. The relations are also developing positively. Last year, bilateral trade turnover increased by more than 14 percent. According to the President of South Ossetia, Alan Gagloev, Russia and South Ossetia completed an investment programme and that of socioeconomic development. This year, both are launching a new investment programme and new programme of socioeconomic development in close cooperation with the Government of the Russian Federation and the Presidential Executive Office.
As at today, Russian and Ossetian brothers are standing up to a shared history shoulder to shoulder. Where there are Russians and Ossetians, there is always brotherhood. On 9th May 2026,Vladimir Putin and Alan Gagloev signed a treaty on deepening integration of South Ossetia with Russia. The document is a testimony to close allied relations advancing to a new level, another step towards bringing the peoples closer together. South Ossetia has proven itself, over all these years, as a reliable ally and a friend who does not change its convictions depending on historical situations.
President of the Republic of Abkhazia, Badra Gunba, together with Vladimir Putin, to review their staggering historical ties. Suffice it to say that trade turnover has grown by 16 percent in 2025. Both expected to experience an active growth in virtually all potential areas, surely to witness an additional momentum to the relations and bilateral economic development.
Diplomatic talks with potential Asian partners
President Vladimir Putin interacted with President of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thongloun Sisoulith, who visited Moscow to take part in the Victory Day celebrations. Laos is an important partner – substantive and pragmatic. This country is advantageously located – the ASEAN is an important region. In 2025, Laos marked the 65th year of diplomatic relations with Russia, from the Soviet times.
As pointed out by the President of Laos, Thongloun Sisoulith, Lao side is ready to continue talks intended to expand the Russia-Laos interaction for significant practical results. The intergovernmental commission continues to play an important role in advancing trade and economic cooperation. And new opportunities for partnership are opening up now, that has become a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Last year in October, both delegations discussed, ways to raise collaboration, at the 25th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation held in China.
Supreme Ruler of Malaysia, Sultan Ibrahim, noted while discussing with Putin that trade and economic ties continue developing. Considering all the necessary prerequisites, they hope to make certain necessary adjustments in order to develop, steadily, multifaceted cooperation. Next year, marks the 60th milestone of Malaysia-Russia diplomatic relations. Since 1967, the partnership has grown steadily into a strong and productive bond. The last meeting in St Petersburg in 2025, was described as constructive, fruitful, where both delegations shared similar aspirations to elevate the relationship between two parties.
Peoples Republic of China (PRC): As is known, extensive preparations are underway for Putin’s upcoming visit to China, and a meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping is also expected. Is there any connection between these diplomatic contacts? First, there has been constant emphasis that cooperation between Russia and China is an essential factor stabilising international relations today. China and Russia have agreements regulating international security, disarmament, and nuclear arms control. In this context, cooperation between Russia and China serves as an important factor in deterrence and strategic stability.
Second, China is the largest trade and economic partner. Bilateral trade exceeds $140 billion – which is an impressive result – and continues to grow.
Third, this trade is increasingly diversified, particularly through cooperation in high-technology sectors. The leadership of the People’s Republic of China, President Xi Jinping, supports this diversification into advanced technologies. Russia has major areas for cooperation in energy, including nuclear energy. Russia continues joint work in China to construct nuclear power facilities. There are also opportunities for cooperation in alternative energy, an area in which China has achieved major progress.
In addition, cooperation extends to space and traditional energy resources such as hydrocarbons, both oil and gas. I will not go into details at this stage, but very close to an agreement on taking a highly significant step forward in oil and gas cooperation.
As for continued contacts between the United States and China, Kremlin, without doubts, regards them as important and welcome them. This is another factor contributing to global stability. As they are each other’s major trade and economic partners, the nature of their relations has a substantial impact on the global economy. Stability and constructive engagement between the United States and China can, to some degree, benefit Russia.
The entire world is rapidly changing. The parameters are shifting, twisting relations as a result. But now people are beginning to understand that the situation is not so simple and that serious challenges have emerged, and those are not easy to overcome. It would be wiser to look for ways to restore normal relations and move toward mutually acceptable agreements.
For next few coming years, as Russia’s economy becomes stronger, on the basis of mutual respect and on consideration of external partners’ interests, Russia’s businesses will continue functioning, the banking system will continue working, and millions of people will have stable livelihoods. Important to note that Russia, currently, has the unemployment rate of 2.2 percent–the lowest among all G20 countries. These are not merely diplomatic clichés–that is genuinely how Russia approaches its relations with external partners, especially in this emerging multipolar world.

Ecumenism is crucial in the face of secularism, Armenian Apostolic Church lead

Catholic Culture
May 19 2026

May 19, 2026

Ecumenism is of “crucial urgency” in the face of secularism, Aram I, head of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia, said on May 18 in an address to Pope Leo XIV.

The Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia, based in Lebanon, is one of the two chief jurisdictions in the Armenian Apostolic Church (CNEWA profile). The Armenian Apostolic Church is among the Oriental Orthodox churches that ceased to be in full communion with the Holy See following the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451).

“In the present time, secularism, with its corrupt ideologies and values and politico-economic forces, with their immoral arrogance are increasingly questioning the integrity and relevance of Christian faith and values,” the Armenian Apostolic leader said. “I believe that ecumenical collaboration among churches is of crucial urgency. In the face of these emerging realities, which impact the life, missionary outreach, and pastoral ministry of the church, the churches’ ecumenical agenda, in my humble view, should be more holistic and responsive.”

“Therefore, the unity of the church, its missionary engagement, and diakonal action need to be perceived and implemented as one comprehensive whole,” Aram I continued. “In fact, a divided church cannot take credibly and efficiently the Gospel to the world. A united voice and common witness in a polarized world is the call of Christ.”

The Catholicos also thanked Pope Leo for the Vatican’s support of the “Armenian Church and people in their continuous advocacy for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and reparation.”

After Aram I addressed the Pope, the Pontiff, in turn, addressed the Catholicos and praised him for his ecumenical zeal. Following the two addresses, Pope Leo and the Catholicos prayed together in the Chapel of Urban VIII in the Apostolic Palace (link to booklet).

What’s at stake in Armenia’s June election?

Reuters
May 19 2026
By Lucy Papachristou
May 19 – Armenia holds a parliamentary election on June 7 that pits the governing Civil Contract party, which is pursuing closer ties with the West, against an array of opposition parties, many of which are pro-Russian.
Opinion polls and analysts predict that Civil Contract, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, will emerge as the largest party but will likely fall short ‌of the two-thirds majority needed to make changes to the constitution.
Here’s what to look out for:

REFERENDUM ON PEACE DEAL

* Civil Contract, in power since 2018, has spent much of the pre-election period touting its progress towards a peace deal with Azerbaijan after Pashinyan signed an initial agreement with Baku at the White House last August.
* A landlocked country of around 3 million, Armenia has been at war off and on with Azerbaijan since the late 1980s, mostly over the mountainous territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
* Baku retook full control of Karabakh in ⁠a lightning offensive in 2023, causing nearly all of the region’s 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia.

PRO-RUSSIAN OPPOSITION

* Armenia’s opposition is dominated by pro-Russian groups, several of which are tied to unpopular former presidents.
* The biggest challenger is the Strong Armenia party, led by an Armenian-Russian billionaire who is currently on trial for making calls to overthrow the government.
* Strong Armenia is running on a pro-business platform and has accused Pashinyan of attempting to stoke war with Moscow.

CHANGING TIES WITH RUSSIA

* Relations with Russia have frayed since 2023, when Azerbaijan retook Karabakh despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.
* Armenia is a member of a Russian-led economic union and fully decoupling from Moscow, a major trading partner, would be difficult. The country is also heavily dependent on Russia and neighbouring Iran for energy supplies and hosts a large Russian military base.
* Russia has expressed ‌displeasure with ⁠Armenia’s westward pivot, saying it could spell “negative political and economic consequences” for Yerevan.Here’s what to look out for:

REFERENDUM ON PEACE DEAL

* Civil Contract, in power since 2018, has spent much of the pre-election period touting its progress towards a peace deal with Azerbaijan after Pashinyan signed an initial agreement with Baku at the White House last August.
* A landlocked country of around 3 million, Armenia has been at war off and on with Azerbaijan since the late 1980s, mostly over the mountainous territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
* Baku retook full control of Karabakh in ⁠a lightning offensive in 2023, causing nearly all of the region’s 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia.

PRO-RUSSIAN OPPOSITION

* Armenia’s opposition is dominated by pro-Russian groups, several of which are tied to unpopular former presidents.
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* The biggest challenger is the Strong Armenia party, led by an Armenian-Russian billionaire who is currently on trial for making calls to overthrow the government.
* Strong Armenia is running on a pro-business platform and has accused Pashinyan of attempting to stoke war with Moscow.

CHANGING TIES WITH RUSSIA

* Relations with Russia have frayed since 2023, when Azerbaijan retook Karabakh despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.
* Armenia is a member of a Russian-led economic union and fully decoupling from Moscow, a major trading partner, would be difficult. The country is also heavily dependent on Russia and neighbouring Iran for energy supplies and hosts a large Russian military base.
* Russia has expressed ‌displeasure with ⁠Armenia’s westward pivot, saying it could spell “negative political and economic consequences” for Yerevan.
* Armenian civil society groups have raised alarm over what they say are Russian state-sponsored disinformation efforts in the lead-up to the election. Moscow routinely denies it meddles in other countries’ internal affairs.

WARMING TO THE WEST

* Armenia last year adopted a law to launch its European Union accession process, and Pashinyan has sought to project Armenia as a key partner for Europe in the South Caucasus.
* ⁠Part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement sees a proposed transit corridor built across Armenian territory to better connect Asia to Europe while bypassing Russia.
* An agreement signed with U.S. Vice President JD Vance during a visit this year to Yerevan could pave the way for an American company to build a new nuclear ⁠reactor in Armenia.

NORMALISATION WITH AZERBAIJAN, TURKEY

* Yerevan and Baku reached a U.S.-brokered peace agreement in August but have yet to sign a formal deal. Azerbaijan is demanding Armenia first change some wording in its constitution, which Yerevan says it is willing to do. A constitutional referendum is ⁠possible after the election.* Armenian civil society groups have raised alarm over what they say are Russian state-sponsored disinformation efforts in the lead-up to the election. Moscow routinely denies it meddles in other countries’ internal affairs.

WARMING TO THE WEST

* Armenia last year adopted a law to launch its European Union accession process, and Pashinyan has sought to project Armenia as a key partner for Europe in the South Caucasus.
* ⁠Part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement sees a proposed transit corridor built across Armenian territory to better connect Asia to Europe while bypassing Russia.
* An agreement signed with U.S. Vice President JD Vance during a visit this year to Yerevan could pave the way for an American company to build a new nuclear ⁠reactor in Armenia.

NORMALISATION WITH AZERBAIJAN, TURKEY

* Yerevan and Baku reached a U.S.-brokered peace agreement in August but have yet to sign a formal deal. Azerbaijan is demanding Armenia first change some wording in its constitution, which Yerevan says it is willing to do. A constitutional referendum is ⁠possible after the election.
* Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed for decades, with the latter shuttering its frontier in 1993 in solidarity with its key ally Baku over the Karabakh issue.
* Progress has been made recently towards normalisation with Ankara, including in trade, but in general the process has been slow.

Reporting by Lucy Papachristou in Tbilisi; Editing by Mark Trevelyan and Alex Richardson* Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed for decades, with the latter shuttering its frontier in 1993 in solidarity with its key ally Baku over the Karabakh issue.

* Progress has been made recently towards normalisation with Ankara, including in trade, but in general the process has been slow.

Reporting by Lucy Papachristou in Tbilisi; Editing by Mark Trevelyan and Alex Richardson

Arrests and controversy following several heated campaign encounters with Pash

OC Media
May 19 2026

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was involved in multiple heated arguments as he campaigned around Armenia ahead of the June elections in recent days, prompting arrests, criticism from observers, and reported calls for resignation.

During his campaign in Yerevan on Monday, tensions escalated when individuals in two different places approached Pashinyan with accusations related to the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020.

In one incident, an argument broke out with a Nagorno-Karabakh refugee, Artur Osipyan, who was later arrested on suspicion of hooliganism.

‘You should have gone and died in place of our children, […] you thieving animals. Why are you alive? Why are you alive, when you’re even talking about another 5,000 victims, you scum — why are you alive?’, Pashinyan told Osipyan during their exchange.

He further warned others not to approach him with what he described as ‘Kocharyan–Serzh–[Karapetyan]-like spy narratives’ — referring to ex-presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, as well as Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan.

Earlier the same day, another confrontation involved Arpine Sogoyan, an obstetrician-gynaecologist, who accused Pashinyan of ‘stealing [her] homeland’ and ‘destroying an entire generation’, referring to the victims of the 2020 war and subsequent escalations.

According to Factor, Sogoyan’s brother, Lieutenant Colonel Hrant Papikyan, went missing during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Reports later emerged that she had been asked by the head of the clinic she works for to submit a resignation request, though her daughter, Tatevik Sogoyan, stated that no resignation had been submitted.

Yerevan Mayor Tigran Avinyan, on Monday, in a press briefing, ruled out ‘that any person would be fired for their political views’.

Separately, observers have criticised Osipyan’s detention.

Daniel Ioannisyan from the Independent Observer argued that there were no elements of hooliganism or other criminal offences in Osipyan’s actions, and that he had only ‘expressed political criticism directed’ at Pashinyan. Ioannisyan noted that Pashinyan, in turn, made ‘personal, dignity-insulting remarks’.

The Independent Observer demanded the ‘immediate removal of restrictions on Artur Osipyan’s liberty’, and urged authorities to issue a public apology if the response was found to be disproportionate or politically motivated.

A separate incident on Tuesday in the Lori region also drew attention, where an elderly man attempting to approach Pashinyan was forcibly removed by what appears to have been plainclothes police officers.

The man, later identified as Artyom Grigoryan, is the grandfather of Aram Manukyan, a soldier who died in the deadly fire at a military barracks in the village of Azat in Geghakunik in January 2023 that left 15 soldiers dead.

Grigoryan accused Pashinyan of being culpable for the incident and demanded justice.

Military officials sacked as fire kills 15 Armenian servicemen

In turn, Pashinyan dubbed such actions as provocations orchestrated by Karapetyan, claiming that those criticising him in public in such a manner were paid ֏200,000 ($510) to do so.

‘It’s become a trend — sending one person everywhere. Let’s not pay attention’, Pashinyan said.

More arrests and investigations

Separately, Armenian authorities on Tuesday reported a newly uncovered case of alleged vote-buying linked to Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia Alliance.

According to investigators, several individuals, despite legal restrictions on acts of charity during the pre-election period, paid rent for a number of voters in the Lori region.

‘To avoid detection and reduce the traceability of their actions, the group members used intermediaries and vehicles belonging to them. The funds were mainly provided in cash, and employees of affiliated companies, as well as people from their circles, were involved in the process of receiving and distributing the money. In order to make tracking the movement of funds more difficult, they also planned to use Russian bank cards for financial transactions’, the Anti-Corruption Committee said in its statement.

This comes to be the latest uncovered case of alleged vote-buying from Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia. Since the start of the election campaign on 8 May, such reports have been made almost daily, predominantly concerning Karapetyan’s affiliates.

Also on Tuesday morning, Armenian authorities raided about 15 addresses in Yerevan for yet undisclosed reasons. According to Factor, the searches were being conducted to find weapons and ammunition.

Armenia launches investigation into alleged plot to assassinate Pashinyan

Other incidents raise concerns

A number of civil rights organisations have expressed ‘deep concern’ regarding the death of Armen Hovhannisyan, who reportedly took his own life at the Mental Health Centre following his detention after tearing down campaign posters for Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party.

The civil rights defenders called for an ‘immediate, independent, and effective investigation’ into the circumstances of his alleged suicide and the legality of his detention.

In a separate case, campaign events led by Defence Minister Suren Papikyan in Lori were disrupted on 16 May by supporters of the Strong Armenia Alliance.

Authorities initiated criminal proceedings on charges of campaign obstructions, placing six people in pre-trial detention and another four under house arrest.

Another individual from Lori has also been placed under house arrest on suspicion of hooliganism over a social media post targeting a Civil Contract supporter.

Armenia keeping tabs on Russia-linked churches ahead of elections

May 19 2026

With just weeks to go before parliamentary elections in Armenia, Yerevan’s National Security Service is closely monitoring the activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church and its supporters within the Russian Orthodox Church.

The activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), led by the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II, are being closely monitored by Yerevan’s National Security Service (NSS) in the run-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections.

The authorities suspect the Armenian Apostolic Church (IO, 14/11/25) of helping Moscow’s attempts to manipulate the 7 June vote and of being part of Russia’s array of hybrid attacks directed against the South Caucasus nation (IO, 14/11/25).

Tensions between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Karekin II reached their high point in December when the premier said during a question-and-answer session in parliament that he “does not need a Catholicos who will obey him” but a Catholicos “who will not obey a lieutenant-colonel from a foreign special service”.

SVR connections

This was a thinly veiled reference to Karekin II’s brother, Archbishop Ezras Nersisyan, who the NSS alleges was recruited by the KGB in the 1980s and continues to work for Russian intelligence.

Suspicions were further fuelled after Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk, head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate (DECR), made a discreet courtesy visit to Nersisyan in Moscow.

The metropolitan has himself long been suspected of working for Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence service, having in 2023 notably awarded a Swedish priest an SVR medal, along with a message from the service’s director Sergey Naryshkin.

Places of worship under surveillance

According to our sources, three sites are under particularly close surveillance in the run-up to the elections. The first is the Holy See of Etchmiadzin, which the NSS already raided on 27 June last year to arrest archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, with the help of the service’s Alpha group.

The second is the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God in Gyumri, north of Yerevan, also home to the Russian 102nd military base. It was from this cathedral that Ajapahyan called for a military coup against the authorities in Yerevan.

Finally, the NSS is also keeping an eye on Yerevan’s Church of the Intercession of the Most Holy Mother of God, also the headquarters of the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Armenia, established in 2023 with the support of Metropolitan Leonid of Klin. He is known as the “Prigozhin in a cassock” because of his ties with Russia’s late Wagner militia founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Leonid regularly voices his disapproval of Pashinyan’s actions against Karekin II, as well as Yerevan’s growing ties with Greek-American and European Christian and Orthodox circles. This rapprochement was evidenced by the visit of US Vice-President J.D. Vance in February.

ICJ: Trials of Armenians in Baku do not meet fair trial standards

Mediamax, Armenia
May 19 2026

ICJ: Trials of Armenians in Baku do not meet fair trial standards

Yerevan /Mediamax/. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has published a report on the problems within Azerbaijan’s justice system.

The report states that the rights of the Artsakh leaders were violated in the Baku military court, and the trials are marked by “practices that violate basic guarantees of justice. It explicitly records that these trials do not comply with international human rights law standards.

The report exposes structural and institutional problems in Azerbaijan’s judicial system, and presents the trial of the Artsakh leaders as an illustration of acute problems with the judicial system of the country.

ICJ recorded that the trials of Artsakh leaders “were conducted before a military court, the defendants were denied effective access to counsel of their choosing, case materials were withheld or provided in a language the accused did not understand, defence motions were systematically dismissed without reasoning and omitted from the trial record; interpretation was inadequate or absent, and public access, including access by accredited diplomatic representatives, was denied.”

“According to publicly available reports, these trials are marked by practices that violate basic guarantees of justice “a fundamentally unfair procedural situation has been created, where the defence is deprived of any realistic opportunity to contest the charges or prove innocence. In such conditions, the very concept of a fair trial turns into a formality, devoid of any content,” the report states.

As for the separate trial of former Artsakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan, the ICJ report notes that the charges against him date back to 1988, when Vardanyan did not hold any position in Artsakh.

“The prosecution of Vardanyan for conduct alleged to have occurred in 1988 raises fundamental concerns under the principle of legality. Vardanyan held no political position at the time the charges relate to and could not have foreseen that conduct from that era would form the basis of criminal charges upon his later entry into political office. The principle of legality requires that criminal liability be foreseeable and that criminal law be applied with precision and clarity, not selectively against individuals based on their subsequent political activities,” the report explains.

ICJ urged Azerbaijani authorities to “ensure that any appeal in the cases of the former Artsakh officials is heard by an ordinary civilian. Ensure the provision of case materials to the defence in a language the accused understands and ensure adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence in all proceedings, including on appeal.”

How Can Turkey–Armenia Trade Easing Impact the South Caucasus Dynamics?

Special Eurasia
May 19 2026

How Can Turkey–Armenia Trade Easing Impact the South Caucasus Dynamics?

Executive Intelligence Snapshot

Turkey’s decision to lift restrictions on direct trade declarations with Armenia marks a limited but symbolically significant shift after three decades of a closed border.

The measure does not reopen the frontier or restore full diplomatic ties, yet it signals Ankara’s readiness to adjust to new power relations following Azerbaijan’s gains in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia views the opening as a strategic economic necessity amid isolation and weakened ties with Russia.

The move carries wider implications for regional trade corridors and the balance of influence among Turkey, Russia, and Iran.

Context

Turkey has removed restrictions that prevented goods transiting via third countries from listing Armenia or Turkey as the direct origin or final destination. The land border, closed since 1993 due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Ankara’s support for Azerbaijan, remains shut, and diplomatic relations are still not fully restored. The practical economic effect of the customs change is modest for now, but it breaks with a long-standing pattern of complete closure and signals a cautious opening.

The decision follows Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Karabakh war and subsequent operations that sharply reduced the Armenian presence in the region and allowed Baku to fully restore its control on the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Buoyed by the success of the Turkey–Azerbaijan axis, Ankara now feels able to adopt a more flexible stance towards Yerevan without jeopardising its strategic partnership with Baku. Turkish officials are advancing normalisation through controlled, incremental steps, with technical talks ongoing and no fixed timetable, seeking to project an image of a pragmatic regional stabiliser and central actor in the South Caucasus.

Why Does It Matter?

For Armenia, the partial trade opening is a strategic requirement. After losing the Nagorno-Karabakh and experiencing a deterioration in relations with Russia, Yerevan is searching for new economic and diplomatic outlets to reduce isolation. Improved access to trade channels through Turkey could lower logistics costs, generate new economic opportunities, and give Armenia greater room for manoeuvre in regional affairs.

A major unresolved issue remains the 1915 Armenian genocide. Turkey continues to reject that term, whereas Armenia regards recognition as a core element of its national identity. This unresolved historical dispute continues to block deeper political reconciliation and could limit the durability of economic normalisation if not addressed at some stage.

The South Caucasus has gained geoeconomic importance after the Ukraine conflict and the worsening of Russia–West relations, turning the region into a strategic corridor linking Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Turkey, and Europe. Armenia risks exclusion from emerging trade flows if it cannot shift from an isolated position to that of a transit node.

Turkey’s calibrated opening gives Ankara greater leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while reinforcing its claim to shape regional trade and security arrangements. By moving in small, controlled steps, Turkey can test reactions from Baku, Moscow, and Tehran and adjust its pace without committing to full normalisation. This approach allows Ankara to present itself as a stabilising force and gatekeeper for access to European and Asian markets through the Caucasus.

On the security side, Azerbaijan retains a clear strategic, economic, and military advantage, backed by close cooperation with Turkey. Armenia is attempting to rebuild its security posture after experiencing the limits of Russian protection.

Russia views the gradual rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara with growing concern, as it could erode the Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus. Iran is also wary of any reconfiguration of regional corridors that might further empower the Turkey–Azerbaijan axis or sideline Tehran in emerging trade arrangements.

Outlook

The current thaw between Turkey and Armenia is cautious and incomplete, centred on technical trade measures rather than full political reconciliation. Short-term progress is likely to continue through incremental steps, provided Ankara can reassure Baku and avoid sharp pushback from Moscow and Tehran. Armenia will try to convert limited openings into broader economic gains and transit roles, but its success depends on further easing of restrictions and a gradual rebuilding of security guarantees.

The unresolved genocide dispute and Armenia’s security vulnerabilities remain major constraints on deeper normalisation. A more substantial shift would require political dialogue on historical issues and clearer arrangements on regional corridors and security, which are unlikely in the near term. Over time, even modest customs changes can signal a wider geopolitical adjustment in the South Caucasus, with Turkey seeking a stronger ordering role, Armenia striving to escape isolation, and Russia and Iran attempting to prevent marginalisation in emerging trade and security structures.


*Report in media partnership with Notizie Geopolitiche

Listen to What Vladimir Putin Is Saying About Armenia

The National Interest
May 19 2026

Listen to What Vladimir Putin Is Saying About Armenia

May 19, 2026
By: Joseph Epstein

Putin and other Kremlin insiders are threatening a hybrid warfare campaign to bring down Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan. The Trump administration should back him up.

For years before Russia invaded Ukraine, Western leaders reassured themselves that longtime Russian President Vladimir Putin was merely posturing. The consensus held that Russia’s all-out propaganda blitz—talking heads on state TV denying Ukrainian sovereignty, calls for referendums in the east, and warnings of Euro-Atlantic encroachment—was empty political posturing and was not meant literally. Even weeks before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, now rightly remembered as a stalwart hero of Ukraine’s defense, insisted that Russia’s threats to invade were mere rhetoric. Until they were not.

The same vocabulary is now being aimed at Armenia, and last week, Putin took it on himself. Days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan explicitly announced that Armenia was not Russia’s ally in the war on Ukraine, Putin warned that the country is “now living through everything that is happening on the Ukrainian track”—a path that began with Ukraine’s move toward the EU and ended in “the coup d’état, the Crimea story, the position of southeastern Ukraine, and military actions.” As an alternative, Putin proposed an overt referendum on whether Armenia should break with Russia, followed by “a soft, civilized, and mutually beneficial separation.”

The threat behind Putin’s words could not have been clearer. Even so, others within his orbit went a step further. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova alleged that Yerevan had been drawn into an “anti-Russian orbit” by the European Union—the same framing of Euro-Atlantic encroachment into the historical Russian sphere of influence that the Kremlin used to justify its war on Ukraine. Not to be outdone, Russian state propagandist Vladimir Solovyov argued for Russia to expand its “special military operation” into Armenia.

What Is Russia Planning in the Caucasus?

The South Caucasus was, until recently, Moscow’s domain. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 to punish Tbilisi’s Western pivot. To the south, the Kremlin played off Armenia and Azerbaijan against one another—guaranteeing Armenia’s security while selling weapons to Azerbaijan—in order to keep the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict frozen, and thereby maintain its regional indispensability. That arrangement collapsed in late 2020, when Azerbaijan retook most of Nagorno-Karabakh after a six-week war, and again in 2022, when Moscow tied up its capacity in Ukraine. After Azerbaijan retook Nagorno-Karabakh in its entirety in 2023, a regional detente set in, and both Yerevan and Baku began turning to other mediators. The August 8, 2025 peace summit—which placed Washington at the center of the South Caucasus for the first time — was the final blow to a Russian position already in retreat, and the foundation of an American one.

This is Washington’s problem. The ongoing situation in Armenia is the first stress test of a major, though under-celebrated, achievement of President Donald Trump’s second administration. The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal put the United States in operational control of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) corridor spanning the two countries, benefiting both and significantly improving the US position in the South Caucasus. If the Kremlin engineers a change of government in Yerevan by whipping up hardline anti-Azerbaijan sentiment in Armenia, the deal goes back on the table, and so does America’s foothold.

The Middle Corridor—the trade route connecting Europe to Central Asia—is the only major commercial artery that bypasses Russia, China, and Iran simultaneously. That matters because Central Asia holds some of the world’s largest untapped reserves of rare earths. The United States currently depends on China for roughly 70 percent of its rare earth supply, a dependency Beijing has already weaponized in trade disputes. Lose Yerevan, and TRIPP shuts down.
A Russian invasion of Armenia at this stage is highly improbable. Russian forces are tied down in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia and Armenia do not border each other: in order to reach Armenia, Russian forces would need to pass through Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, or Iran, each posing its own military or political problem.

What is more likely—and in fact already underway—is an intensified hybrid campaign to bring down Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and reinstall a Kremlin-aligned government in Yerevan. The Kremlin’s opening is the June 7 parliamentary election. Pashinyan’s principal challenger is the political vehicle of Samvel Karapetyan—a Russian-Armenian billionaire enriched by Russian state contracts who has lobbied for closer ties with Moscow, railed against the peace deal, and is now under house arrest on charges of plotting a coup.

How America Can Stop a Russian Takeover in Armenia

Fortunately, the United States has a major asset in the fight against Russia for influence in Armenia: the Armenian people themselves. The Armenians have not forgiven Russia for standing aside as Azerbaijan retook Nagorno-Karabakh, and they remember that every leader since independence except Levon Ter-Petrosyan governed in Moscow’s pocket. The demand for a Western pivot is real.

Washington has tools to make that pivot durable. The United States can build out a strategic transit partnership centered on TRIPP and support Armenia’s nascent AI and technology sector. Each prospective investment or partnership does double duty: economic upside for Armenians, geopolitical insulation against Moscow.

Washington also has tools against the Kremlin’s preferred candidate. Executive Order 14024 authorizes the Treasury Department to sanction individuals who “undermine democratic processes or institutions in the United States or abroad” for the benefit of the Russian government. The same authority was used against Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder of Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party. Karapetyan fits the same description: a Russian-state-contracts billionaire campaigning for closer ties to Moscow.

The strangest piece of this puzzle sits in Washington itself, where the Armenian-American diaspora organizations that should be the strongest advocates for a US–Armenia partnership are working against it. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the Armenian diaspora’s main lobbying organization in the United States, has remained generally bipartisan for most of its existence, recognizing that a strong US-Armenia relationship cannot be maintained in the long run if the movement aligns openly with one political party. Yet ANCA policy director Alex Galitsky recently accused Trump of “genocidal ethnic cleansing of [Nagorno-Karabakh],” “genocide in Palestine,” and “threaten[ing] genocide against Iran”—language that aligns the organization with the American far left and amplifies Iranian-aligned talking points. ANCA has also organized legislators to undermine the peace deal, including Senator Adam Schiff, and amplified Robert Amsterdam, a Kremlin-aligned lobbyist who represents Vadim Novinsky, the Ukrainian oligarch who fronted Moscow’s effort to weaponize a breakaway Orthodox faction against Kyiv on charges of “Christian persecution.” Amsterdam has appeared with Karapetyan’s nephew on right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson’s program to recast Karapetyan as a defender of Christianity persecuted by his own government. The Kremlin is using the same playbook it used against Ukraine—talking out of both sides of its mouth to different fringe audiences—with a new target in mind.

Pashinyan is not a perfect leader. Yet for all his various faults, he is attempting to take Armenia out from under Moscow’s thumb. He deserves America’s support, and the diaspora organizations running interference for the Kremlin must be treated as exactly that.

The West’s mistake on Ukraine was not ignorance, but disbelief. For years, Moscow shouted what it thought of Kyiv’s drift westward, and Western capitals minimized the rhetoric. Armenia now sits at the edge of the same pattern. The language is intimately familiar to anyone who listens, and the pressure campaign is already underway. The date is June 7. Washington has time to lock in the gains of the peace deal and anchor the South Caucasus in a Western orbit—but only if it understands that when the Kremlin repeats itself, it means it.

About the Author: Joseph Epstein

Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an expert at the N7 Foundation, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University. He also sits on the advisory board of the Alekain Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to providing education to women and girls in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He specializes in Eurasia and the Middle East, and his work has been featured in various outlets such as Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, The Hill, the Atlantic Council, Novaya Gazeta, RFE/RL, Foreign Policy, and others.

Armenian ambassador praises Canada as group accuses Carney of dialing down pea

MSN
May 19 2026

The Canadian Press
Armenian ambassador praises Canada as group accuses Carney of dialing down peace push

Story by Dylan Robertson

OTTAWA — Armenia’s ambassador in Ottawa is praising Canada’s ongoing support for democratic reforms in the Caucasus nation — even as a group representing Armenian-Canadians says the federal government is easing up on efforts to bring peace to the region.

“For us, democracy is not just a simple slogan. It was a choice in a very difficult geopolitical reality,” Ambassador Anahit Harutyunyan told The Canadian Press.

“Everyone in Armenia understands how important it is. That’s why we have the engagement of countries like Canada, closely supporting Armenia’s aspiration.”

Harutyunyan spoke after Prime Minister Mark Carney visited the Armenian capital of Yerevan earlier this month.

Armenia has for decades been locked in a territorial dispute with Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Canada and other countries recognize that region as part of Azerbaijan, despite its population being largely ethnic Armenian.

As tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh were rising in 2023, Azerbaijan restricted access to the region and cleared out more than 100,000 residents. Canada described those residents as having been “forcibly displaced to Armenia.”

That same year, the government of Justin Trudeau opened an embassy in Yerevan and weighed in multiple times on the conflict. Ottawa also joined an EU security mission to deter escalation along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.

Ottawa also has sought to support what it called “fragile” democracies in former Soviet states such as Armenia. That includes efforts to counter Russian disinformation.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia has tried to position itself as a European democracy. Freedom House has tracked significant improvement in Armenia over the past decade, as well as some backsliding in recent years, such as corruption and political influence in courts.

The International Observatory for Democracy in Armenia, meanwhile, has accused Yerevan of suppressing opposition voices and consolidating power ahead of a June 7 election. Canada is likely to send observers to monitor that election.

“We have a lot of work to do, and that’s why we’re engaging closely with Canadian authorities,” Harutyunyan said.

The Liberals have rarely mentioned issues in the Caucasus region since Carney took office.

Sevag Belian, head of the Armenian National Committee of Canada, said the Armenian diaspora is “a bit confused” about Ottawa’s approach to the region. He pointed out that Carney did not publicly call out Azerbaijan’s approach to the peace process or the power consolidation undertaken by Armenia’s government during his visit.

“The visit to Armenia really was just a photo-op,” Belian said, noting Carney did not publicly raise concerns about Azerbaijan’s detention of Armenians or its destruction of Armenian cultural sites.

Belian said the Carney government only raised these publicly in a statement last August. Carney touched briefly on what he called “humanitarian issues” during his visit to Yerevan earlier this month.

Speaking in the capital on May 4, the prime minister noted that there had been no hostilities along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border for months.

“A peace process is proceeding. We’re encouraged by that. We will do what we can, as Canada, in supporting it,” Carney said.

Belian said his community is concerned about Canada strengthening its ties with Turkey, a country Canada says committed an act of genocide against Armenians a century ago. Turkey denies that claim.

Carney is likely to visit Turkey in July for a NATO summit. Just seven years after Ottawa restricted arms sales to Turkey — and five years after it tightened those restrictions over concerns Turkey was diverting arms to Azerbaijan — Turkey has pitched the idea of a strategic partnership with Canada.

Belian said Carney’s visit to Yerevan suggested a shift away from standing up for democracy and human rights.

“He sort of fell short of addressing them, the way they were being addressed by Ottawa over the last several years. That is a bit concerning to us,” he said.

Harutyunyan said her country is committed to human rights and political reforms, and to living in peace with its neighbours.

“Canada’s support matters because it strengthens the resilience of Armenian democratic institutions, and sends a message that democracies like Armenia should not be left alone and must be supported,” she said.

Harutyunyan said Armenia is also trying to capitalize on Carney’s focus on trade diversification. Armenia sent representatives to a recent major mining conference in Toronto.

The ambassador noted U.S. President Donald Trump is brokering a peace agreement that would involve a large American investment across borders to create strategic trade corridors in the region that might deter further conflict.

“We would like to see more engagement in Canada, but I think having this high-level political engagement creates a very good ground, for turning this collaboration into something concrete and result-oriented,” she said.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published May 19, 2026.

Dylan Robertson, The Canadian Press

Armenian opposition leader warns of Azerbaijani interference ahead of June 7 e

Panorama, Armenia
May 19 2026

Armenian opposition leader Arman Tatoyan on Tuesday accused Azerbaijan of attempting to interfere in Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections, saying the actions were designed to benefit Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party.

Tatoyan, who is the prime ministerial candidate of the Wings of Unity party, said in a Facebook livestream that recent remarks by Azerbaijani officials amounted to direct involvement in Armenia’s political process. He pointed to comments by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev suggesting Armenians needed “psychiatrists, psychologists and doctors,” which drew no official response from Yerevan.

“Afterwards, Azerbaijani publications and lawmakers issued threats, calling Armenians an ‘irrational society’ and insisting that before the elections they must be shown that force, the iron fist, is still in place. This is clear interference,” Tatoyan said.

He added that he would submit evidence of the interference to the European Union delegation in Armenia.

“If the EU acts against Russian interference based on government statements, which is good, then Azerbaijani interference must be prevented equally,” he said. “We must protect the Armenian people so that elections are held not in fear, but in the interests of our country and people.”

Armenia is set to hold parliamentary elections on June 7.