Indian Students Returning From Iran Hit Roadblock As Azerbaijan Denies Entry

Emil Lazarian
India – Mar 17 2026

Dr Momin Khan, president All India Medical Students Association said that the evacuated students were not allowed to cross the border.

By Moazum Mohammad

Published : March 17, 2026 at 6:40 PM IST

Srinagar: With the first few batches of Indian students returning home from war-torn Iran due to safety concerns, the repatriation of students via Azerbaijan is in limbo after Baku closed the border crossing.

This has left over 200 students from Iran University of Medical Sciences, Islamic Azad University and Tehran University of Medical Sciences stranded at the Astara land border checkpoint at the Iran border.

Since last week, the students were transported by bus to the Azerbaijan and Armenia borders to exit Iran due to safety concerns, as Israel and the US have pounded the country with aerial strikes since February 28.

“But now, students are not allowed to cross the border,” said Dr Momin Khan, president All India Medical Students Association (AIMA), which alongside Jammu and Students Association (JKSA) is coordinating and overseeing the repatriation of students with Indian authorities.

“The Indian embassy instructed students to book tickets and visas from Azerbaijan to India. However, Azerbaijan border authorities are seeking some exit code from students at the checkpoint. We have taken up the issue with external affairs but there appears to be a lack of coordination between the Indian embassy and Azerbaijan,” he said.

Since last week, according to the ministry of external affairs, around 640 Indian nationals have exited Iran via Armenia and Azerbaijan. Unlike previous Operation Sindhu last year when India evacuated its citizens from Iran during a 12-day war, this time it facilitated bus travel for students to the borders so they could fly their citizens out at their own expense.

India’s External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that 90 Indian nationals were facilitated by the Indian embassy in Iran to cross over to Azerbaijan.

However, students who reached the border from Urmia Medical University said the border has been effectively closed since the initial batches crossed.

“Many have missed their scheduled flights since March 15 because border authorities are seeking a 16-digit exit code at the border,”said the student. “But we lack it and have been seeking help from the Indian Embassy.”

Back home, many parents in Srinagar are worried as their children studying MBBS missed their flights home.

“This situation has increased the worries of our children,” said Naseema Bano. “My daughter and her fellow students have been waiting at the border since March 13. The tickets and visa cost us about Rs 60000 but now these tickets stand cancelled. We will be unable to afford them again,” she said, requesting the Indian Embassy to take up the matter with their counterparts in Azerbaijan for smooth facilitation of their wards.

Another mother Asifa is worried her son who is a fifth-year student at IUMS will face the same trouble as his ticket is scheduled for March 18.

“They should have crossed the border today to reach hotels and catch their flight scheduled for 9 pm tomorrow for New Delhi. But they lack a code which has to be given by the Indian embassy to enter Azerbaijan,” she has told ETV Bharat. “Many students are sick as it is cold there. Also some are facing panic attacks. We request authorities to help us in bringing back our children.”

According to Asifa, this is the second time she had to face cancellation of tickets since the war began last month.

“I booked tickets costing Rs 60,000 from Tehran to New Delhi on March 5. But that was cancelled as the airspace was closed. This time, the ticket and visa cost another 60,000. We followed the instructions passed by the ministry of external affairs by booking tickets and visa,” she said, seeking answers for their fault.

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Why Central Asia Cares About the Middle Corridor–South Caucasus TRIPP Route

Anna Tamamian
The Times of Central Asia
Mar 17 2026
Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on March 11 and said he has no intention of delaying TRIPP, the newly proposed South Caucasus route through southern Armenia to be integrated into the existing Middle Corridor. He described the project as being “in the crystallization stage,” said that the Armenia–U.S. implementation framework (signed on 13 January) was already in place, and added that the two countries will “[i]n the near future … sign the relevant agreements, and the practical implementation of the project will begin.”

While mentioning that developments in Iran and the wider Middle East could shade an otherwise positive regional picture, Pashinyan explicitly did not connect that to any actual delay in the corridor project. This accords with the view of the EU itself, which treats the Middle Corridor and its South Caucasus segment, as does the World Bank, as an increasingly necessary connection between Central Asia and Europe through the South Caucasus and Turkey. Pashinyan’s statement should thereby reassure not just European governments but also the investors and shippers that want and need the route.

From Declaration to Implementation

Pashinyan tied TRIPP to the Washington Declaration of August 8, especially to its provisions on reopening communications and establishing a U.S.-supported framework for unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. The Washington meeting produced a joint declaration by Armenia and Azerbaijan and the text of the initialed peace agreement, while also making clear that signing and ratification still lay ahead.

In Strasbourg, according to Pashinyan’s own words, the Washington Declaration “essentially established peace” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. He also gave pertinent indicators. Pashinyan stated there had been eight months of complete peace on the border and that 2025 was the first full calendar year since independence without casualties or injuries from Armenian–Azerbaijani shooting. He also said that in November 2025, for the first time since independence, a train (carrying wheat from Kazakhstan) reached Armenia through Azerbaijan and Georgia after Azerbaijan lifted restrictions on that rail route. Azerbaijan has since sent fuel and other commodities through Georgia to Armenia. Such transits have now become a regular occurrence.

Since 2020, Armenia has turned toward Central Asia as part of its effort to reduce dependence on Russia. Kazakhstan has become the clearest practical partner in that effort as this turn has accentuated in recent months. During Pashinyan’s 21 November 2025 visit to Astana, the two sides upgraded relations to a strategic partnership and signed 15 intergovernmental and interagency documents, including a trade and economic roadmap for 2026–2030 that projects cooperation in agriculture, digitalization, healthcare, industry, science and education, and peaceful uses of atomic energy.

While the cooperation with Kazakhstan is a continuation of previous trends, the sharpest diplomatic change is with Uzbekistan. After Pashinyan’s 12 July 2023 telephone call with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, stressing the need to convene the first intergovernmental commission to move practical projects forward, that commission met in Tashkent on 3–4 August 2023, with a modest but real result in foreign trade growth. Armenia’s outreach to Central Asia exemplifies how the country’s broader diplomatic profile under Pashinyan complements the country’s eventual participation in the Middle Corridor through TRIPP.

Why Central Asia Cares

The Middle Corridor is correctly seen as a source of resilience and route diversification for trade between Asia and Europe. The World Bank describes it this way, while EU materials frame the South Caucasus and Turkey as the bridge through which Europe’s links with Central Asia are to be strengthened. This is all the more the case now that Iran-crossing options from Central Asia to Turkey, for example through Turkmenistan, have receded from feasibility for the foreseeable future. The same is true of the route agreed between Azerbaijan and Iran in October 2023 for access to Nakhchivan through northern Iran, which was never completed. 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states thus have an interest in maintaining the perception that the South Caucasus continuation of the Middle Corridor is viable enough to deserve policy attention, commercial planning, and further investment. In pursuit of cooperation from all interested parties, Kazakhstan has recently engaged in outreach to Gulf partners that point the same way, as Central Asian governments manage corridor risk diplomatically as well as commercially. Azerbaijan began its own programmatic connectivity outreach to the Gulf countries several years ago.

At issue is not just transit efficiency but strategic optionality. The westbound corridor through the Caspian and the South Caucasus has become perhaps the main instrument through which Central Asian countries widen their room for geoeconomic maneuver without pretending that older routes will simply disappear. An EU study released last month places this logic squarely in a Europe–Central Asia framework. The World Bank report makes a related point in more economic language, arguing that the Turkey–South Caucasus corridor can increase resilience and help reorient supply chains. 

In Strasbourg, Pashinyan reflected this logic, saying that Armenia was ready at once to provide road transit between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and between western Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, using existing Armenian infrastructure. The problem here is that such a route through Armenia would currently be extremely circuitous and does not necessarily have guaranteed security. But at the same time, Pashinyan stressed that this expressed readiness was not meant to delay, disrupt, or replace the Washington understandings that undergird the future TRIPP. His purpose here appears to be to show that continuing momentum does not depend on a final diplomatic architecture and is indeed integrated within that larger framework.

Wider Strategic Consequences

The question for Central Asia is whether Iran’s shadow over the South Caucasus is strong enough to damage confidence in the westbound TRIPP route that major IFIs and other state actors now regard as strategically necessary. By the evidence Pashinyan offered on 11 March, the answer is no. When Pashinyan insisted that Armenia had no reason to delay implementation, he was defending the investment logic of the TRIPP segment at a time when external observers might begin to wonder whether the Iran crisis could freeze momentum. Even after current hostilities end, it is unlikely that Iran-crossing routes will function at full commercial scale due to insurance and payments constraints.

The political momentum behind TRIPP has thus not been overturned, not least because Central Asian states need supply-chain redundancy. The same goes for the broader Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process that makes this segment of the Middle Corridor possible. This assessment emerges from Pashinyan’s first-person testimony, recent practical movement in Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization, and the fact that Europe and international financial actors now treat the South Caucasus bridge as part of a serious Europe-Central Asia connectivity project.

In addition to Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves, almost all external actors will benefit from TRIPP, although their strategic benefits differ. For the European Union, enhanced South Caucasus transit reinforces a connection to Central Asia that does not depend on Russia. For the United States, it moves forward the American diplomatic initiative to shape the region’s post-conflict order after the Washington breakthrough on the basis of mutual benefit. For China, any stable westbound connection across the Caspian and Caucasus adds redundancy to Eurasian transit without displacing Beijing’s other routes. Even Russia has come to support the TRIPP route, because it increases connectivity with Armenia, Turkey and Europe through existing Azerbaijani rail infrastructure. This configuration of interests represents the gradual consolidation of the route’s forward movement. Iran is objectively the only state or nonstate actor opposing the consolidation of this peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus, with benefits stretching from Central Asia to Europe. However, Tehran’s capacity for influence here is eroding as quickly as its military infrastructure.

https://timesca.com/why-central-asia-cares-about-the-middle-corridor-south-caucasus-tripp-route/




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EU to deploy rapid response team to Armenia ahead of elections amid hybrid thr

Babken Chilingarian
EU Alive
Mar 17 2026

EU to deploy rapid response team to Armenia ahead of elections amid hybrid threat concerns

Brussels steps up support for democratic resilience as warnings grow over potential foreign interference in the Eastern neighbourhood

EUalive with agenciesMarch 17, 202616:38

The European Union will deploy a “hybrid rapid response team” to Armenia ahead of the country’s parliamentary elections on 7 June 2026, in a move aimed at countering external interference and strengthening democratic resilience.

The announcement was made by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas following a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels. Speaking at a press conference, Kallas said the initiative comes at the formal request of the Armenian government and reflects the bloc’s broader commitment to safeguarding democracies under pressure.

“At Armenia’s request, the European Union will deploy a rapid response team to counter hybrid threats ahead of the upcoming elections,” Kallas said. “Supporting the sustainability of democracies in our neighbouring countries remains a top priority. We will not leave Armenia alone in the face of external interference.”

The mission is designed to assist Armenian authorities in addressing a range of hybrid risks, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and other forms of destabilisation that have increasingly targeted electoral processes across Europe and its neighbourhood in recent years.

The deployment builds on earlier EU commitments. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos had previously indicated that Brussels is ready to allocate €12 million to support Armenia in countering such threats. A separate plan outlined in late 2025 envisaged up to €15 million in assistance to help Yerevan tackle malign foreign influence.

The move comes amid growing concerns among European officials about the vulnerability of democratic processes in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. Armenia, a traditionally close ally of Russia, has in recent years sought to deepen ties with the EU, a shift that has raised geopolitical sensitivities.

In March, the Armenian parliament adopted legislation formally launching the country’s bid for EU membership, signalling a strategic reorientation away from Moscow. This shift has heightened concerns about possible attempts to influence the country’s political trajectory.

Warnings about potential interference are not new. In December 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz cautioned that Russia could seek to meddle in Armenia’s upcoming elections, accusing Moscow of attempting to undermine closer ties between Yerevan and the EU.

“It has become a worrying normality for elections to be targeted by enemies of democracy,” Merz said at the time, alleging that Russia was using disinformation and intimidation tactics to influence Armenian voters and spread false narratives about the European Union.

Western security services have repeatedly accused Russia of intensifying hybrid activities across Europe since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including cyberattacks, sabotage operations and coordinated disinformation campaigns.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has also acknowledged the risks, noting that the country already faced significant challenges during its 2021 elections, including disinformation efforts. He stressed that Armenia has gained experience in dealing with such threats but continues to require support.

The EU’s decision to deploy a rapid response team reflects a broader EU focus on stability in its Eastern neighbourhood. During the same meeting, foreign ministers discussed democratic backsliding in Georgia, highlighting concerns about governance and political freedoms in the region.

Parallels are already being drawn with other elections in Eastern Europe, including in Moldova, where authorities have similarly warned of potential Russian interference. As in Armenia, the risk of hybrid threats has become a central issue in the electoral landscape, reinforcing the EU’s push to bolster resilience across neighbouring states.

The EU’s engagement in Armenia comes at a time of shifting regional dynamics. In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan committed to a peace agreement following decades of conflict, in a deal mediated by the United States. The agreement has opened new political space for Yerevan to pursue a more diversified foreign policy.

The deployment of the rapid response team is therefore likely to be closely watched, both as a test case for EU crisis response mechanisms and as a signal of its geopolitical ambitions.

Sources: netgazeti.ge, BGNES, Public Radio of Armenia, eeas.europa.eu

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Robert Kocharyan named prime minister candidate: will he become represent oppo

Emil Lazarian
JAM News
Mar 17 2026

Former Armenian president Robert Kocharyan will run as a candidate for prime minister from the Armenia bloc in the parliamentary elections scheduled for June.

At the end of January, Kocharyan said no one could “lead the country out of this situation” better than him. At that time, however, he did not say that he himself would be the candidate for prime minister.

“We will conduct a sociological survey and decide who will lead the bloc. If the poll shows that it is me, I will take the lead. If it is someone else, then they will lead. I will be very glad if it is not me. A great burden will fall from my shoulders,” he said.

At a ceremony held the day before in Yerevan, organisers confirmed that Kocharyan will take part in the elections together with the ARF Dashnaktsutyun party and the Forward party as part of the bloc.

Experts now say Kocharyan and his bloc risk failing to enter parliament. Armenian political analysts point out that electoral blocs must clear an 8% threshold. They say this will be a difficult task for a force led by the former president.

Below, we look at which political forces plan to take part in the elections, whom they have named as prime ministerial candidates, who could become the “face” of the opposition, and what experts and social media users say.

  • Poll: Will Armenia’s ruling party win June election?
  • Pension rise in Armenia: economic growth or voter handout?
  • ‘Kocharyan’s views are hopelessly outdated,’ – Pashinyan in response to ex-president’s remarks

Political forces taking part in the elections and their candidates for prime minister

Here is a list of political forces that have announced they will take part in the parliamentary elections:

  • The ruling Civil Contract party (prime ministerial candidate — Nikol Pashinyan)
  • Strong Armenia (prime ministerial candidate — businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who is under house arrest on charges of calling for a seizure of power)
  • Prosperous Armenia (has not yet named a prime ministerial candidate; party leader, businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, says he does not seek the post)
  • Armenian National Congress (prime ministerial candidate — Levon Zurabyan)
  • Republic (prime ministerial candidate — former prime minister Aram Sargsyan)
  • Wings of Unity political initiative (prime ministerial candidate — former ombudsman Arman Tatoyan)
  • DOK party (prime ministerial candidate — blogger Vardan Ghukasyan, who is in a US prison)
  • “I Am Against All” movement (has not yet announced its prime ministerial candidate)

The Republican Party of Armenia, led by former president Serzh Sargsyan, has not yet decided whether to take part in the elections. The Homeland party, led by former National Security Service chief Artur Vanetsyan, initially announced it would participate. However, in late February, it decided not to run. Vanetsyan called on his supporters to vote for “any genuinely opposition force.”

Ruling party suggests opposition is betting on Kocharyan

Representatives of the ruling party highlight shifts within the opposition camp ahead of the elections. They point out that some members of former president Robert Kocharyan’s team have joined the Strong Armenia party, led by Russian businessman Samvel Karapetyan. They believe the new party aims to help Kocharyan become prime minister.

Samvel Karapetyan himself cannot run for the post. Armenia’s constitution does not allow it, as he holds citizenship of Armenia, Russia and Cyprus.

His nephew, Narek Karapetyan, a member of the party’s political council, gave an evasive response when local media asked about possible cooperation with Kocharyan’s bloc. He said he had never met Robert Kocharyan.

“According to all polls, Strong Armenia, Samvel Karapetyan’s party, is the leading opposition force,” Narek Karapetyan said.

He added that Samvel Karapetyan would go all the way, overcome poverty and ensure security in the country.

“Having started this process in Armenia and spent seven months in an NSS detention centre, he will see it through and personally deliver these changes.”

Robert Kocharyan: “Our goal is victory”

Kocharyan delivered a keynote speech to his supporters. Organisers invited him onto the stage as “the first president of the Republic of Artsakh [the former unrecognised NKR] and the second president of the Republic of Armenia”.

When he reached the podium, he stressed that becoming a candidate for prime minister was “not a promotion, but a step down” for him, but said he was ready to do anything for the sake of the country.

“We are determined, our goal is victory. I am sure that the evil represented by this government will be defeated. I have fought them since their first day in power and will not rest until they are gone,” he said.

Kocharyan said one of Armenia’s main tasks in the coming years is to ensure security. He added that this requires “a combat-ready army, a strong leader and a powerful ally”. Kocharyan has long held pro-Russian views, so his remark likely referred to Russia.

On the peace process with Azerbaijan, he said he supports peace but only with “real security guarantees.”

Expert opinion

Political analyst Robert Ghevondyan commented on the chances of Kocharyan’s Armenia bloc entering parliament:

“In fact, there was some intrigue over whether Kocharyan would run as part of a bloc or lead the list of the Dashnaktsutyun party to try to pass the electoral threshold.

By choosing to lead the Armenia bloc, Kocharyan is taking a risk. He needs to secure 8%, which is quite a difficult task. Samvel Karapetyan’s force has taken a large share of the votes that Kocharyan received in the 2021 elections.

If he gains 6–7% and finishes third, he still will not enter parliament under the current law. Prosperous Armenia, led by Gagik Tsarukyan, would become the third force to pass the threshold after securing more than 4%.

In essence, Kocharyan has to take this risk if he wants Russian circles, which brought Samvel Karapetyan into Armenian politics, to continue seeing him as an important figure. […]

The forecast looks like this:

  • First place will go to the ruling Civil Contract party, which will most likely form the government.
  • Second place will go to Strong Armenia, which could win 20–30% of the vote.
  • Third place will go to the Armenia bloc, with 6–8%. Whether it enters parliament will depend on whether it reaches the 8% threshold.
  • Fourth place will go to Prosperous Armenia, which could win 5–7% and enter parliament, as it is a party rather than a bloc. [The threshold for parties is 4%.]

Other political forces have much lower chances of passing the threshold.”

Social media reactions

Users in the Armenian segment of social media are actively discussing the decision by the Armenia bloc to nominate Robert Kocharyan as its candidate for prime minister. Most reactions are critical.

Here are some of the comments:

“I don’t want to burn in that fire a second time.”

“Congratulations, and I wish you victory in the elections, Robert Kocharyan.”

“Hey, mothball-smelling relic, don’t you realise there is no way back, even if you tear yourself apart?”

“Most people clearly understand who your candidate is — the governor of your hearts and of Russia. He will never become the prime minister of Armenian hearts.”

“It’s like in fairy tales: you cut off a dragon’s heads, and they grow back again.”

“This man lost Artsakh, his ancestral home and family grave. If he does not fight for Artsakh, then who will?”

“Change the name of the bloc. What does it have to do with Armenia?”

“This alliance will not be elected again. It is outdated and rotten, and we have changed. We have already lived through our fears, we have seen everything and gone through it all. But this self-confident leech, this parasite, still cannot understand that his time has passed. That is his problem.”

https://jam-news.net/robert-kocharyan-named-prime-minister-candidate-will-he-become-represent-opposition-in-armenias-upcoming-elections/



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Armenia and Turkey explore boosting energy connectivity

Emil Lazarian
Eurasianet
Mar 17 2026

Taking steps towards economic normalization.

David O’Byrne Mar 17, 2026)

Energy interests are helping to fuel fresh efforts aimed at normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations.

Meeting on the sidelines of a gathering sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA), Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, along with his minister for infrastructure, Davit Khudatyan, talked with Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar to explore a variety of energy-related connectivity issues. 

“We discussed infrastructure and energy issues that will contribute to lasting peace and stability in our region; within this scope, we addressed areas of cooperation, primarily electricity interconnection, nuclear energy, and natural gas,” Bayraktar stated in a social media post.

The March 10 meeting marked the highest-level contact between Armenian and Turkish officials since Pashinyan’s visit to Istanbul for talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last June.

That meeting has been widely viewed as kick starting a new reconciliation and rapprochement initiative. A previous effort to normalize relations stalled in 2010. 

The Istanbul visit was also seen as consistent with Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia“ strategy, under which his government strives to focus on economic development while setting aside historical grievances that have impeded the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Turkey, including an insistence that Ankara recognize the Ottoman-era mass killings of Armenians as genocide. 

None of the three ministers shared details of their March 10 discussions, although Bayraktar’s mention of energy and infrastructure issues suggested a focus on practical cooperation, without necessarily addressing the historical and ideological topics that have dominated bilateral relations since Armenia regained independence in 1991.

Speaking to journalists in Istanbul in February, Bayraktar said, “We support the normalization of economic relations with Armenia. We can realize cooperation in energy. This is an opportunity for both countries,” he said. 

While the meeting took place at the IAEA summit, nuclear cooperation was not likely a major subject of the Armenian-Turkish discussions. Both countries have nuclear power plants, but talks more likely to focused on integrating Armenia into regional power and natural gas transmission networks, as well as exploring new cooperation opportunities created by the Armenian-Azerbaijani provisional peace deal, and the landmark agreement to create the TRIPP corridor. 

For most of the post-Soviet era, Turkey and its strategic ally Azerbaijan maintained an economic blockade of Armenia as part of the decades-long conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh territory. Azerbaijan completed its reconquest of Karabakh in 2023 with Ankara’s help. Ankara has long signaled readiness to end the blockade – action that could boost the economic fortunes of poor regions bordering Armenia – but has hesitated out of a sense of loyalty to Baku. 

Armenia has few energy resources of its own and has been dependent on Russia and Iran for supplies of natural gas and petroleum products. Yerevan has also depended on Russia for nuclear fuel for its Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, which meets up to 40 percent of Armenia’s electricity needs. 

Those supplies are now threatened by the ratcheting up of sanctions on Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine, and more immediately by the US-Israeli war in Iran. Armenia, which needs to replace the aging Metsamor plant, signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in February.

Although primarily expected to be a road and rail transport route, plans for the TRIPP corridor through southern Armenia also envisage the laying of a power transmission line and a gas pipeline.

Azerbaijan has already started laying 330 kilovolt (kV) lines on both sides of the corridor in anticipation that the envisioned US-run TRIPP Development Company will begin work on the route across Armenian territory.

Armenia already has a functioning 220 kilovolt (kV) connection with Turkey which, to date, has seen little use. Ankara is expected to upgrade and expand the connection as part of a wider program to increase power connectivity with Turkey’s near neighbors. 

Turkey completed construction of a gas pipeline link in 2025 to Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, which is expected to be extended through the TRIPP corridor to the Azerbaijani mainland. That pipeline could potentially be used to supply Armenia with gas from either Azerbaijan or Turkey. It would also be relatively straightforward for Ankara to extend a separate gas pipeline into northern Armenia from an existing line that runs through Kars province near the Armenian border.


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Facing Russian Hybrid Threats in Advance of Elections, Armenia Struggles to Ma

Badalian Vardan
Just Security
Mar 17 2026


Facing Russian Hybrid Threats in Advance of Elections, Armenia Struggles to Maintain Pro-U.S. and EU Path

By Laura Thornton
Published on March 17, 2026

Armenians head to the polls on June 7 to elect all 101 members of its parliament, the National Assembly, at a time of intense regional and geopolitical uncertainty. A country long dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, the 2018 Velvet Revolution and the 2023 war in which Azerbaijan seized the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh have spun off new foreign policy alignments — and prospects — for the country. The government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has sought to turn around the 2023 loss by redoubling his pursuit of new ties with the European Union and the United States and by redefining Armenia’s relationship with powerful neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey. He is seeking to finalize a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that the two sides agreed last year at the White House, and is discussing new border and trade deals with Turkey.

In the first regular parliamentary election since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract party faces a challenge from two oligarch-led opposition blocs that are closely tied to Russia. Many Armenians are undecided and dislike their options, according to polling, and describe the country’s political parties as personality-driven and scant on policy. However, one clear distinction between the political options is on the country’s future foreign alignment.

The ruling party is running on “peace,” emphasizing the continuing negotiations with Azerbaijan and closer ties with the EU and the United States. Pashinyan and his supporters accuse the opposition of being puppets of Russia (more on that later). The main opposition blocs criticize the government’s peace agreement, claiming to have an alternative plan (though scant on details) and accuse the government of being under Azerbaijani and Turkish control. The main opposition blocs also do not support EU membership, arguing that the country is not ready.

Unlike in some other frontline democracies teetering between authoritarianism and democracy and between a Western orientation and Russian control, the political divides don’t run neatly along “pro-West vs. pro-Russian” lines. Relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey are front and center, evolving and being redefined in the aftermath of the 2023 war. Armenians see both Azerbaijan and Turkey as far greater threats to the country than Russia. Further, none of the viable parties embraces a full break from Russia, mindful that a plurality (43 percent) of Armenians believe Russia is the country’s most important political partner, though it did nothing to prevent Azerbaijan’s offensive in 2023. Still, the parties do differ significantly on how the relationship with Russia should look going forward.

As for Russia, despite being largely consumed by its war on Ukraine, it is loathe to have Armenia drift further from its sphere of influence. The Kremlin has thus turned to its well-practiced hybrid-warfare toolkit, employed in Georgia, Moldova, and other countries, to defeat the ruling party in Armenia. Disinformation campaigns, influence operations, and financial cooption are in full swing, presenting an extraordinary stress test for the fledgling democracy.

While in Armenia recently on a pre-election mission with the McCain Institute, Armenian government officials, civic leaders, and international representatives all acknowledged the unprecedented scale of — and lack of preparedness for — such hybrid threats. Russia dominates the information space without consequences, and Kremlin investments in political, religious, media, and societal actors go mostly unchecked and take advantage of plentiful legal loopholes. Armenian stakeholders said the Trump administration’s elimination of foreign aid has undermined the country’s democracy efforts and ability to defend against Russia.

The Armenian Apostolic Church is also a key player in these elections, given the ongoing conflict between the government and Church leaders that the Kremlin has both fueled and used to its advantage. Church leaders — headed by Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians — have called for the resignation of Pashinyan. In turn, Pashinyan last year alleged they were fomenting a “coup” and the government has taken action against clergy, including arresting several bishops on various charges, prosecutions which many independent groups believe lack strong evidence. Church leaders are campaigning against the government and actively supporting the opposition, particularly the block run by Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan.

In addition to threats to the election process — disinformation campaigns, possible cyberattacks, financial interference, vote buying — observers fear that the post-election period might be contested if the ruling Civil Contract party wins. Opposition parties, aided by Russia and its proxies, are sowing the ground to reject the results of the elections, casting doubts on the integrity of the election process.

Armenia is at a fragile crossroads. The election represents an opportunity for the country to carry on a new course for peace, foreign policy alignment, and democracy but many forces stand in the way and support is needed.

Foreign Relations Pivot

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia has been closely tied to Russia — part of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to ensure economic integration, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security alliance. Russia has been Armenia’s largest supplier of military aid and a key trading partner. However, Russia’s failure to defend Armenia during the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict soured ties between the two states. Following a months-long Azerbaijani economic blockade of Armenian-occupied territory, Azerbaijani forces seized the area and forced most ethnic Armenians to flee. Russia did not intervene. Yerevan has since suspended its participation in the CSTO and ordered the removal of Russian border troops from the airport that had been stationed there since 1992. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a historic peace agreement.

As it turns away from Russia, Armenia has pursued European Union (EU) accession. Pashinyan made EU membership an explicit part of his government’s agenda in 2024, and, in March 2025, Armenia’s National Assembly endorsed this goal. Armenia has also signed a strategic partnership agreement with the United States. In January, Armenia and the U.S. announced a framework to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which aims to establish a transit route in the south Caucasus, building off the peace agreement.

While the ruling Civil Contract party prioritizes deepening these new foreign alignments, the opposition disagrees. The opposition bloc Armenia Alliance is led by former President Robert Kocharyan, who serves on the board of directors for Sistema PJSFC, one of Russia’s largest investment companies. Russian citizen Samvel Karapetyan founded the other major opposition bloc, Strong Armenia. Karapetyan is the owner of the Russia-based Tashir Group conglomerate. In addition to their obvious Russian ties, representatives from both blocs stated clearly during my visit that they reject Pashinyan’s peace agreement, do not approve of TRIPP, and believe Armenia is “not ready” for the EU. Both opposition blocs are campaigning on a strong anti-government message. Pressing their allegation that the government is under Azerbaijani and Turkish influence, they argue that Armenia’s “sovereignty is at stake.” Of the opposition parties, only Strong Armenia is polling above the required 8 percent threshold to enter parliament.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare

During my visit to Yerevan, international observers, diplomats, and experts in Russian threats described Russia’s hybrid warfare in Armenia today as unprecedented and “incredibly sophisticated.” They noted that the primary goal of Russia’s efforts is to thwart a Pashinyan victory.

Journalists described how Russia dominates the airwaves. Unlike bans on Russian broadcasting in countries like Moldova, there are no such regulations in Armenia and multiple Russian channels freely broadcast on television. There is also no regulation of the online space, and Ministry of Internal Affairs officials explained that the only situation in which they can legally remove or block a website is if it related to drug transactions. Russian music, films, and news are also ever-present and serve as effective psychological warfare. Films such as Ararat 73, which is ostensibly about an Armenian football team, is embedded with Kremlin messages about Armenia’s loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Russian narratives are similar to those used elsewhere, leaning heavily on anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and gender issues and associating any defense of such rights with a move toward the West. Messaging also reinforces the opposition’s talking points, building fear about Armenia’s security if it abandons its ties with Russia and giving false hope that Russia will “bring back” Nagorno-Karabakh. Economic messages, according to international organizations that track foreign interference, include “Armenia will collapse if they leave the Russian market” and “Turkey will swallow Armenia and kill its economy.”

The Kremlin has also infiltrated charities, movements, and foundations, such as the “Foundation to Battle Injustice,” established by the late Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin. Russia also actively uses Armenian clergy to spread their narratives. Garegin II, the Catholicos of All Armenians, the supreme head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, has a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, who bestowed him with the Russian State Honor in 2022, and Garegin’s brother serves in the Armenian church in Russia.

To pay for these operations, Russian money can easily flow into Armenian politics as Russian banks and businesses operate throughout the country. Internal Affairs Ministry officials acknowledged that foreign transfers were “very significant” and that they did not have satisfactory measures to address it. There are also legal loopholes. Third-party expenditures by entities such as movements, charities, and foundations on behalf of political campaigns are not covered under existing regulations. Further, political finance reporting for parties occurs only annually, preventing real-time monitoring and exposure.

There are key vulnerabilities in the election process, as well. Election officials explained they were under-resourced and lacked the tools, legislation, and mandate to effectively address hybrid threats. A key issue raised by election experts was how Russia was actively involved in paying and organizing groups of diaspora Armenians in Russia to return home to vote. The Central Election Commission acknowledged that 60,000 such voters could affect the outcome. Disinformation about election results has also been a problem in the past, and Armenian observer groups expressed an even greater concern this year, with Russia and its proxies already sowing distrust in the election process. For example, Russia uses doppelganger accounts to mimic real news sites and spread false information. Cyberattacks are another risk, and observers worry about the possibility of Russia interfering with the cameras in polling stations.

Church and Democracy

The conflict between the government and leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Church dominates the political landscape and translates into partisan divisions. In Yerevan, one bishop explained the Church leadership blamed Pashinyan for “losing the war” in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to Catholicos’ demand for the prime minister’s resignation. The government, for its part, has arrested several clergymen on various charges. Most notably, Archbishop Mikael Adjapahyan was arrested for inciting a coup against the government. Church leaders and the main opposition parties accuse the government of violating free speech and committing judicial malpractice, describing a “culture of fear” for believers.

Many civil society, media, and international representatives also believe that the government overstepped in its prosecution of clergy. According to one diplomat, the investigations of the Armenian Apostolic Church were launched based on “the prime minister’s wants.” This has fed into broader concerns about the government’s anti-democratic behavior. Though democratic progress since 2018 is undeniable, accusations of selective justice and abuse of freedom of speech beleaguer the government. One representative from an international observer group said there was clear “abuse of the judicial system.” A leading Armenian civic leader said, “Over the past six months, we have seen alarming signs of democratic backsliding in Armenia, including the ruling party’s instrumentalization of law enforcement and the judiciary for narrow political interests.”

International Support Needed

Armenia’s coming parliamentary election represents a generational opportunity for the country to solidify a new course for peace, foreign policy alignment, security, and economic opportunities, which would have profound positive ripple effects on regional stability and growth. The United States and the EU benefit from a democratic ally in the region, in contrast to Georgia to the north, which has descended into authoritarianism and forged ties with Western adversaries, and Iran to the south.

But forces inside and outside the country are investing in thwarting those opportunities. The country is not adequately prepared to take on these threats, particularly unprecedented Russian hybrid attacks on the election process. The elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has made matters far worse, by kneecapping critical civic and media efforts, government monitoring and preparedness, and strategic communications support.

There is much the Armenian government, civil society, and election bodies can do to fortify against threats – improving inter-agency communication, appropriating resources and staff, enhancing investigations and oversight, and investing in public communications, increased cyber security efforts, and voter education. But they need international support. That should include increased technical assistance, financing, and training for Armenian partners and enhanced intelligence cooperation, as well as exchanges with other countries for officials involved in Armenian election, anti-corruption, and security bodies.

The United States and the EU also are in a unique position to ensure Armenia stays on the democratic path by including clear reform benchmarks in their agreements. Democratic strength, security, and strategic alignment go hand-in-hand, while backsliding democracies are far more likely to abandon Western alliances and form closer ties to autocratic regimes.

Without Western support, the risk is that Russia is successful in Armenia. That means Armenia could fall as Georgia has — forging closer relations with Iran and China, serving as a sanctions-evasion route, and adopting a hostile anti-American, anti-EU posture. The result would be a new adversarial, anti-democratic wall built from Russia to Iran, blocking the West from economic, trade, and security alliances in the region.

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Vice Speaker meets NB8 delegation

Liana Toganian

External policy15:47, 17 March 2026
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Vice Speaker of Parliament and Armenia’s Special Representative for Normalization with Türkiye, Ruben Rubinyan, held a meeting with a delegation of directors of the Eastern Europe departments of the ministries of foreign affairs of the Nordic–Baltic Eight cooperation format, as well as with ambassadors accredited to Armenia.

Rubinyan emphasized the importance of cooperation with the Nordic-Baltic countries, the parliament’s press service said in a readout.

Regional developments were discussed.

The delegation also inquired about the Armenia–Türkiye normalization process.

Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) is a regional cooperation format that includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden.

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Armenpress: PM’s press secretary Baghdasaryan says fake report on Pashinyan,

Kanayan Tamar

Armenia21:08, 17 March 2026
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The press secretary of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nazeli Baghdasaryan has  rejected a report published by the website VT Foreign Policy and its author Lucas Leiroz, which alleged that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and several officials were involved in trafficking and organ sales.

Baghdasaryan said the article contained “serious and obviously unfounded accusations” and was part of an information manipulation campaign.

“It is obvious that the publication exploits extremely sensitive and emotional topics for society- human health, organ transplantation and alleged trafficking – in an attempt to create a shocking and discrediting information background,” Baghdasaryan wrote on Facebook.

She said such methods are commonly used to undermine trust in state institutions and officials.

Baghdasaryan also pointed to dynamics of the dissemination of the material, noting it first appeared on social media, including on the X platform via the author, then quickly spread through bot networks and was republished by several Azerbaijani media outlets. She said the claims were later circulated within Armenia by certain political groups.

“This sequence is typical of the mechanisms of disseminating disinformation often encountered in the regional information environment,” she said.

Baghdasaryan stressed that the allegations had no factual basis and urged media and the public to treat the publication as “another manifestation of information-hybrid influence actions.”

“Several media outlets in Armenia have already sought clarification. Therefore, I consider it necessary to state clearly that this publication is disinformation and should be regarded as another manifestation of information-hybrid influence operations,” Baghdasaryan said.

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Published by Armenpress, original at 

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Verelq: Genocide Museum director’s press release on secret negotiations with Azerbaijan

Alex Nanijanian

“Hraparak” newspaper writes:


“The acting director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, former diplomat Hrachya Tashchyan, who has expressed his willingness to advance the “line” of Nikol Pashinyan, it turns out that while working as an assistant in Pashinyan’s staff, he participated in secret negotiations with the Azerbaijani side in 2018-2019.


Let’s remind that on July 9, 2020, he was appointed the head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Prime Minister’s Office for a period of 3 years, and 1.5 years later, in 2021. in December, Pashinyan released him when there were leaks about those negotiations. In particular, he was in correspondence with Hikmet Hajiyev, head of the foreign policy department of the Azerbaijani President’s office.


They say that he served his predecessors with the same willingness. before being appointed as Pashinyan’s assistant, he held positions in the RA Foreign Ministry: head of the NATO department, ambassador of the RA Embassy in the USA, head of the Department of External Relations of the RA Government Staff. Tashchyan has the diplomatic rank of RA envoy and plenipotentiary minister.


VERELQ reminds that US Vice President Vance visited the Tsitsernaberd Memorial with his wife on February 10, and made a note in the memorial book of honored guests of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute. Vance was escorted to the memorial Edita Gzoyan, he also presented a book about the Artsakh problem to Vance. A month later, Edita Gzoyan submitted an application for release, Nikol Pashinyan stated that this happened on his instructions, because “there is no Karabakh movement, what does it mean to present a book on the subject of the Artsakh issue to a foreign guest?”

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The flight of the Algerian Air Force to Baku through the territory of Armenia was for diplomatic purposes.

Emil Lazarian

The Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Super Hercules aircraft of the Algerian Air Force made a diplomatic flight through the territory of Armenia to Azerbaijan. This was reported by the RA Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to Sputnik Armenia’s inquiry.


“According to the information provided by the executing party, the flight of the C-130J aircraft on the Bufarik-Baku route through the airspace of Armenia took place for diplomatic purposes,” the Foreign Ministry emphasized.


It should be noted that the plane used Armenian airspace to fly from Ankara to Baku and from Baku to Boufarik (Algeria) in February.

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