RAUF RAJABOV: KOSOVO PRECEDENT FOR NAGORNO KARABAKH
Regnum, Russia
Nov 9 2006
Continuing the discussion about the role of the “Kosovo precedent”
in the settlement of the post-Soviet conflicts, REGNUM publishes an
article of the well-known Azeri political and conflict expert, the
director of the Peace, Democracy and Culture research center (Baku)
Rauf Rajabov.
“Karabakh triangle”
The political situations in Kosovo and Nagorno Karabakh should
not be mechanically identified not only because of their different
ethnic backgrounds but also in view of the status of the Armenian
population of Nagorno Karabakh and the policies of the Azeri and
Armenian authorities after the USSR collapse. The “Karabakh triangle”
looks even more explosive in the light of the aspiration to bring
together into one state all the territories with prevailing Armenian
population, including Nagorno-Karabakh. That’s why the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict is not only a regional but also an international problem. In
principle, the aspirations of some of the Armenian political elites
are no different from the same aspirations of the Albanians. Both
the Albanian and Armenian political elites aspire to create “Great
Armenia” from sea to sea. Both the Albanian and the Armenian elites
are supported by big and well-organized diasporas in Europe and the
US. However, it is impossible to peacefully create a mono-ethnic state
in the South Caucasus. Any ethnic cleansing sparks new armed clashes,
hatred and territorial claims.
What can the Kosovo precedent give to the Nagorno Karabakh peace
process?
The recognition of Kosovo’s independence would be a violation of the
UN Charter and might become a specific guideline for the Turkish part
of Northern Cyprus, Western Macedonia with its Albanian majority,
Corsica (France), the Basque Country and Catalonia (Spain), Northern
Ireland (the UK), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia), Transdnestr
(Moldova), Chechnya (Russia), Taiwan and Tibet (China).
The Kosovo precedent or the scenario of so-called conditional
independence – sovereignty with defense and international policy
restrictions – should be approved by the UN Security Council. I would
like to remind you that UN SC Resolution 1244 has de facto detached
Kosovo from Serbia. In fact, Serbia has been partitioned. In this
light, it should be noted that as many as 8 international standards are
neglected in Kosovo: the functioning of democratic institutions, the
supremacy of law, the freedom of movement, the return and reintegration
of refugees, the development of the economy, the protection of property
rights and the dialogue with Belgrade.
Just like in Kosovo, they in Nagorno Karabakh have held ethnic
elections without Nagorno Karabakh Azeris. As a rule, such elections
are just “counting of heads” according to their ethnicity and, as a
rule, they result in 99.9% support for the ethic movement.
The positive aspects of the Kosovo model are the protection of
the rights of ethnic minorities, the impossibility of one-sided
proclamation of Kosovo’s independence and its unification with
neighboring states (Albania). The European formula – first, democratic
rights and freedoms and, only then, the status – is, in fact, a
phased settlement scenario. Each armed – and especially ethnic –
conflict should be addressed separately. Still, the Kosovo precedent
will have an effect: the recognition of Kosovo’s independence will
set a precedent of two ethnic states formed in Europe. One of the
principles of the Kosovo model is the return of refugees and the
guarantees of their security. It is absolutely obvious that this
principle is not fit for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement. For
Armenia it would mean the loss of the so-called security belt and the
danger of mid-term growth of the Azeri community in Nagorno Karabakh.
Correlation of two principles
Whatever the causes of an ethnic conflict, the modern international
law is applicable only to the situation after the WWII and accepts
no arguments referring to earlier historical periods. In any case,
historical discussions are a blind alley as each side interprets
history in its own way. Each ethnos demands restoring “the historical
borders” it had at the times of its largest military expansion
and disregards the ethnic and historical events of the following
centuries. The key problem of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is that
the conflicting parties are convinced that their historical arguments –
even false – are superior to the principles of the international law.
The international law is rather consistent in this matter: all the
UN documents clearly reject any possible challenges to territorial
integrity and clearly declare the inviolability of territorial
integrity and political independence. The actions taken by the UN
and world countries since the 1960s show that the international
community recognizes only external self-determination defined as
the right of independence from former colonial rule and internal
self-determination defined as the right of independence from outside
interference or influence.
The international law is the result of the consensus of the world
countries, who, as a rule, object to the violation of the principle of
territorial integrity. And so, it says that the territory of a state
cannot be changed without its consent. The international community
realizes that the only alternative to the priority of territorial
integrity is chaos and permanent conflicts. That’s why all the
UN documents on self-determination contain a paragraph clearly
confirming the priority of the principle of territorial integrity
and inviolability of borders. The other paragraphs are declarative
and vague and, therefore, give ground for endless discussions.
Neither European nor American human rights conventions recognize the
self-determination right. The only thing the international community
recognizes is the internal aspect of self-determination – the right
of existing states to restore their independence if they are occupied
or conquered by foreign troops.
The real correlation of the two fundamental principles –
self-determination and territorial integrity – depends on a specific
geo-political situation: when the international community either
supports one of them or manipulates both for attaining its specific
geo-political goals.
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a conflict of these two principles.
On behalf of the international community, the OSCE Minsk Group
is trying to combine them, which means that, at this point, the
international community wants to preserve the Armenian population of
Nagorno Karabakh and, at the same time, to prevent the ethnic division
of Azerbaijan, which is fraught with the recurrence of the Nagorno
Karabakh precedent in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr and,
mostly dangerously, with military-political destabilization in the
South and North Caucasus.
Azerbaijan is internationally recognized as an independent state within
the administrative borders of the Azeri SSR, which means that Nagorno
Karabakh is an inalienable part of this state. No country, including
Armenia, has recognized the secession and independence of Nagorno
Karabakh or its joining Armenia. Nevertheless, de facto this territory
fully depends on Armenia. In 1992 Armenia adopted a law saying that it
cannot recognize any agreements considering Nagorno Karabakh as part
of Azerbaijan. Obviously, Armenia hopes that in the mid-term future
its military success and de facto control over Nagorno Karabakh will
allow it to attain the international recognition of this situation.
If the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is resolved according to the
self-determination principle, Azerbaijan will either split into two
independent states or lose part of its territory in favor of Armenia.
I would like to note that the existence of two Armenian states in
the region may prove quite useful for external players. Armenia is
not interesting to the world powers in terms of energy resources
or geography. So, it means that it should act as a fighter for the
interests of the states having certain influence on the geo-political
and geo-strategic tasks of external forces. If the conflict is resolved
according to the territorial integrity principle, the Armenian
community of Nagorno Karabakh will hardly want to stay there. This
does not, however, mean that one of the conflicting parties should make
one-sided concessions. The art of politics is exactly about turning the
external interests of geo-political players into one’s own advantage.
The OSCE MG’s “common state” concept and the plan to conduct a
referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status are attempts to allow the
Nagorno Karabakh Armenians to determine their status on their own.
The presence of contradictions between the two nations does not mean
that their interests cannot and must not coincide. Today, many people
say that the Nagorno Karabakh peace talks have reached a deadlock, but
they are not right: Armenia and Azerbaijan have just specified their
positions but not interests. The Armenians and the Azeris are doomed
to co-existence in the South Caucasus and they should do something
to make this co-existence mutually beneficial. They should also learn
to jointly and adequately respond to modern threats and challenges.
The most effective scheme of political settlement of the “Nagorno
Karabakh triangle” is the “phased” scenario. The point is that this
scheme should provide the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians and Armenia with
effective security guarantees. This will be a good basis for the
restoration of horizontal relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and regional relations between the Armenian and Azeri communities
of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The effectiveness of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement depends
on the choice of the settlement model. In case of the model of own
interests, no compromise is possible. But, in reality, we see that
the only thing everybody is talking about today is exactly mutual
compromise. This all is a national approach to the problem. But there
is also European approach: when borders gradually disappear. This is
exactly what we see in the EU, where there are no more territorial
disputes or claims: French-English and French-German, Polish-German,
Romanian-Hungarian, Turkish-Bulgarian, etc. In the future, the South
Caucasus will also lose its internal borders. There will be only an
external border, which will need joint protection against outside
challenges: drugs-trafficking, international terrorism, etc.
The Kosovo model is an ethnic principle of self-determination. The
authors of the Kosovo model believe that the simultaneous admission of
Serbia and Kosovo into the EU and NATO will allow to de facto return
them into common economic space, while the independence ambitions of
the Kosovo Albanians will be formally satisfied.
Road to nowhere
Even though, when joining the CE in Jan 2001, both Azerbaijan and
Armenia undertook that they would use exclusively peaceful means to
resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, theoretically, there is also
a possibility of military resolution. First, there is no package of
settlement proposals; second, the sides do not observe the political
settlement procedure; and, third, they have no agreement guaranteeing
non-resumption of military actions. The point is that the more time
passes since the “Bishkek Accords” (the agreement on cease-fire of
1994 – REGNUM), the bigger the possibility that the sides can start a
new war (in fact, the present situation on the Armenian-Azeri contact
line clearly shows that they really can). But once they have started
a new war, they will hardly be able to stop it quickly.
The “second Nagorno Karabakh war” will extend the conflict to
a regional and geo-political scale. According to this scenario,
Azerbaijan will launch a blitzkrieg and will fully restore its
territorial integrity all along its border with Armenia. However, the
advocates of this scenario forget that the “second Nagorno Karabakh
war” will be even more destructive and bloody than the first one.
This will impede the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem as
the NK Armenians will no longer be able to live in the territory
of Azerbaijan.
They will simply leave their houses for fear of the approaching army
and will flee to Armenia. This will seriously hamper the conclusion of
peace agreement with Armenia. The point is that Armenia will regard
Azerbaijan’s campaign for liberating the occupied territories and
Nagorno Karabakh as their own defeat and ethnic cleansing of Armenians
in Nagorno-Karabakh. Besides, for the world Armenians, Nagorno Karabakh
is a kind of ideological basis of their unity. Under such conditions,
the Armenian leaders will not dare to sign a defeatist peace agreement
with Azerbaijan. Even more, the only thing the Armenian authorities
and the Diaspora will be thinking about will be revenge and they will
start preparing for the “third Nagorno Karabakh war.”
Theoretically, the Azeri authorities can save their future generations
from new wars with Armenia. For this purpose, their troops will
have to reach the Armenian-Turkish border in order to solve the
“Armenian cause” once and for all. But will the world community
allow Azerbaijan to do it? Of course, not. That’s why, as a victim
of military aggression and occupation, Azerbaijan must resolve the
conflict by peace. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict has one crucial
aspect – Nagorno Karabakh has no common border with Armenia. Hence,
the continuing demands for Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, even after
Azerbaijan’s refusal to recognize it, prove that Armenia wants to annex
the Azeri territories outside Nagorno Karabakh – particularly, Lachin
and Kalbajar – with a view to create a transport corridor with it. If
Lachin is a bridge between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Kalbajar is
the source of 85% of the water resources of Nagorno Karabakh and Arpa
and Vorotan – the rivers that play the key role in the salvation of
Lake Sevan (80% of Armenia’s water).
Investment factor
After the Nagorno Karabakh war Azerbaijan desperately needed foreign
capital for restoring and developing its economy and industry.
Azerbaijan had no internal funds but it had huge natural resources,
relatively cheap labor force and high domestic market capacity. In
order to attract foreign investments, Azerbaijan had to substantially
reform its economy. Investment is a key element of Azerbaijan’s
social-economic development. Multi-billion investments in the Azeri
economy guarantee its stability, market transformation and integration
into the world economy as they allow the country to introduce advanced
technologies in the oil industry. Foreign investments are really
important for Azerbaijan as they help the country to service its
foreign debt.
When attracting investments, each country should provide the investors
with guarantees that they will freely command their property. One of
the guarantees is political and social stability.
Even though in the coming years the Azeri economy will get
multi-billion oil inflows, Azerbaijan must do its best to preserve
the image of a country with a favorable investment climate.
Settlement models
Azerbaijan and Armenia are situated in a very hard region – the
Caucasus – a region with plenty of existing and potential “trouble
spots” and clashing geo-political and geo-economic interests. The world
practice knows two models of armed and ethnic conflict settlement:
when the conflict is settled with due regard for the interests of both
sides and when the sides regard only their own interests and disregard
the interests of the opponent. This is a kind of “position haggling”
and this exactly what is presently happening in the Nagorno Karabakh
peace process. Armenia’s position is generally known: Azerbaijan must
recognize the independence of Nagorno Karabakh or Armenia will do
it. Naturally, this position is unacceptable for Azerbaijan. In fact,
Armenia’s true plans are evident: as soon as Nagorno Karabakh becomes
independent, it will immediately join Armenia.
This position is forcing Azerbaijan to be also tough: Azerbaijan
demands the unconditional restoration of its territorial integrity
and the return of its refugees to their homes. However, this position
is contrary to the interests of the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians and
Armenia. In other words, the existence of the Armenian community of
Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan is noting more but the restoration
of the status quo – i.e. the situation of 1987. Consequently,
Azerbaijan should offer a scenario of mutually beneficial cooperation
with the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian community of Nagorno
Karabakh.
For this purpose, the Azeri side should answer the following
questions: In what capacity do the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians see
themselves within Azerbaijan? What security system will there be in
the Azerbaijani Republic and the South Caucasus?
This system of republican and regional security should consist of
two interrelated and interdependent levels: the guarantee of secure
existence of the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians within Azerbaijan and the
guarantee of their security by Armenia. Today, Armenia openly says that
the system of its security starts from the occupied territories of
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh – which are a buffer zone protecting
its borders. In fact, Armenia is forced to worry about its security
as it is surrounded by Turkic countries. That’s why Armenia should
be offered a specific model of its national security.
It is time to replace the model of position haggling by a model
considering and protecting the interests of the conflicting sides.
The mutual benefits of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the two communities of
Nagorno Karabakh are peaceful co-existence, economic cooperation, the
right to life for all citizens of both Armenian and Azeri nationality.
Conclusions and recommendations
1. During the talks both conflicting parties should strictly comply
with the international law, rules and precedents. The authorities of
the two countries, the two nations and the two communities of Nagorno
Karabakh are responsible for the adoption and implementation of any
solution to the “Nagorno Karabakh triangle.” The political elites
of the conflicting parties should show responsibility, good sense,
will and aspiration to live within united Europe. This – rather than
any other – factor will lead to the singing of a mutually beneficial
political agreement. Peace and economic prosperity in the Caucasus are
possible only when each country of the region starts regarding the
threat to its neighbor as its own threat and protects the interests
of its neighbor as it would protect its own ones.
2. The conflicting parties have so far failed to resolve the cardinal
problem of transformation of the image of enemy into the image
of opponent. Only opponent – but never enemy – can transform into
partner. The model of interests stipulates that the image of enemy
should be transformed into the image of opponent. And printed and
electronic mass media should contribute to this transformation.
3. Since a representative of the Armenian community of Nagorno
Karabakh is already involved in the negotiating process as a member
of the Armenian delegation, there is no need to form a separate
delegation. In order to attain the long-awaited agreement, it is
necessary to improve the quality of the negotiating process rather
than to increase the quantity of the negotiators. Only subjects of
the international law – Azerbaijan and Armenia – have the right to
sign a comprehensive agreement. Otherwise, the agreement will be
invalid. The leaders of the Armenian community of Nagorno Karabakh
can conduct a dialogue with their colleagues representing the Nagorno
Karabakh Azeris. Azerbaijan should legitimize the status of the Azeri
community of Nagorno Karabakh.
4. Whether peacekeeping forces are deployed in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict zone or not will depend on how comprehensive and mutually
beneficial the political agreement will be. If the agreement is
well-balanced, there will be no need of peacekeeping. Otherwise,
the security of Armenians and Azeris will have to be ensured by
peacekeepers. Consequently, this will be an imposed concessive peace.
True and long-term security can be achieved only through the joint
efforts of the two nations. This will pave the way for mutual
confidence.
5. It is necessary to establish close relations with the unrecognized
but de facto existing Nagorno Karabakh. Its a priori exclusion from
the negotiating process is leading to the toughening of its position.
Being debarred from the talks, the political elite of the Nagorno
Karabakh Armenians are losing their political experience and ability
to form political class.
6. Any mediation and settlement models should consider the consequences
of the Nagorno Karabakh war, which differ from its causes.
7. The efforts oriented exclusively towards increasing Azerbaijan’s
economic potential will not result in long-term stability in either
Azerbaijan or the South Caucasus. In order to attain stability and
effective security, it is necessary to develop a strategy on how to
improve relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and between the two
communities of Nagorno Karabakh.
8. Azerbaijan’s strategic importance is based mostly on the oil
production in the Caspian Sea. The question is: Will Azerbaijan’s oil
resources be used for the country’s prosperity or its militarization?
If the oil incomes are distributed fairly, peace will become much
more possible and Azerbaijan will turn into a center of regional
development, security and cooperation.
9. The Azeri and Armenian elites should give up their ethno-historical
myths, regional and global political complexes and prejudices.
10. Azerbaijan should critically revise its position and replace the
idea of regional rivalry with Armenia by the policy of constructive
cooperation. This will greatly contribute to the resolution of this
conflict and will prevent new conflicts in the region.
11. If Azerbaijan wants to preserve its territorial integrity and
political unity, it should express and confirm its wish to see the
harmonious development of all the ethnic groups and nations comprising
its society and take effective steps towards this end.
12. If the OSCE MG talks fail, Azerbaijan should consider the
possibility of addressing the International Court of Justice in
line with Article 36, Paragraph 1 of the IC Charter. Azerbaijan,
just like Armenia, has signed the UN Pact in line with Article 93,
Paragraph 1 and has consequently joined the ICJ Charter. The Kosovo
precedent allows Azerbaijan to be sure that the UN SC resolutions 822
(1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) will be implemented.
13. According to UN SC Resolution 853 (1993), the member-states
should refrain from supplying the conflicting parties with any types
of arms and ammunition so as not to escalate the conflict or prolong
the occupation of the Azeri lands.
14. The international community should diversify and control
investments in the South Caucasus. If the new big regional project
to build a railroad Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku considers the
regional interests, it will have a positive effect on the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict settlement. This will also provide Azerbaijan with
legitimate opportunities to invest money in the economies of the
neighboring countries, just like other foreign countries do.

AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT CAN SAY ANYTHING
Azat Artsakh, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh
Nov 9 2006
The only obstacle in continuing the talks and reaching settlement is
the lack of confidence. Everyone points to this, the EU, the OSCE,
the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. And there is nothing the world can
do here. The reason is not the reluctance of the Armenian side for
a dialogue, like Azerbaijan is fond of to present, but the idea
of complete isolation of Armenia put forward by Ilham Aliyev. The
Azerbaijani president often appears to have lost the sense of
reality, and he thinks that if Azerbaijan is a medieval feudal state,
others also think like him: destroy Armenia, which dares to disturb
Azerbaijan. And while the Azerbaijani media are delighted to hear
the confessions of their president, the other countries keep silent.
Ostensibly, this silence indicates reluctance to comment on nonsense
rather than agreement. The US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group
Matthew Bryza gave the best evaluation. He said the Azerbaijani
president may say anything, but they are not going to comment on his
statements. Ilham Aliyev will fail to drag Armenia to a deadlock and
become a “nation’s leader” like his father for several reasons. Most
importantly, he makes statement which would be appropriate for an
ambitious tribal chieftain rather, whereas Heydar Aliyev would never
make such statements. He had a more serious approach to the issues.
He did not simply make allegations but paid the mass media to concoct
pro-Azerbaijani reports. However, soon Moscow and not only Moscow
realized this and started to report the reality. By exaggerating the
influence of the Armenian lobby, Azerbaijan, roughly speaking, doubts
the reason of the entire world. In Baku too they realize that Ilham
Aliyev’s policy on Armenia leads nowhere. They also know that not only
the patience of the Azerbaijani people may start wearing thin, which
does not care, in the long run, but also the international community
may run out of patience. Ilham Aliyevs hopes based on the political
dividends of the oil pipeline cannot become the truncheon to “keep
down” the Armenians of Karabakh. And these dividends are like soap
bubbles, for according to the American expert Richard Kirakosyan,
the value of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan depends on Kazakhstan. In other
words, if the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev suddenly
decides that he need not support Azerbaijan, he will turn off the
spigot, and the flow of Aliyev’s oil dollars will stop. And if we
consider the decline of price of oil, Azerbaijan will be having serious
trouble. The Caspian oil is only 3 percent of the world resources,
meanwhile 63 percent is in the Near East. Azerbaijan cannot be taken
seriously by the United States and Europe as a major supplier of
oil. Consequently, the political importance of this country directly
depends on this 3 percent.

REFERENDUM ON DECEMBER 10
Azat Artsakh, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh
Nov 9 2006
On November 3 NKR President Arkady Ghukassian signed the decree
on appointing the day of the referendum on the Constitution of
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The press secretary of the NKR president
reports that in accordance with the decree the referendum will be
held on December 10, 2006.

MARTIAL LAW ON EVERY OCCASION
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
In Armenia, the legislation on martial law was adopted in 1992. The
government of Armenia has worked out a new bill on martial law and
presented to the National Assembly on November 9. When Member of
Parliament Victor Dallakyan saw Arthur Aghabekyan, deputy defense
minister at the hall of the National Assembly before the meeting, he
announced that the bill must be presented by the minister of defense
as the government had notified. In about two hours after starting the
meeting Tigran Torosyan informed that the government had replaced its
representative and the deputy defense minister Arthur Aghabekyan would
present the bill on martial law. Perhaps opening a water pipeline is
more important than this issue, said Victor Dallakyan.
The Republicans, the United Labor Party, the National Solidarity,
the People’s Deputy, Ardarutiun were not present, only 4 or 5 members
of parliament were present: Victor Dallakyan, Arshak Sadoyan, Manuk
Gasparyan, Speaker Tigran Torosyan. Only Victor Dallakyan discussed the
question with the representatives of the government, and stated that
the purpose of the bill is “to declare, impose martial law on various
occasions, not to hold presidential and parliamentary elections,
to restrict the activities of the citizens, political parties and
the media.”
Victor Dallakyan says the provision that martial law can be imposed
when the life and security of the citizens is threatened can be
interpreted arbitrarily. For instance, “talking loudly can be defined
as a threat.” Victor Dallakyan thinks that a number of points of the
bill are unconstitutional and allow for arbitrary interpretations.
The member of parliament thinks it is natural that martial law
is declared if another country shells the territory of Armenia,
but he is against imposing martial law “in case any other weapon is
used. In other words, if our neighbor shoots the gun for several times,
martial law will be imposed.”
Victor Dallakyan says it is unacceptable to impose martial law
in the region of Syunik but restrict the rights of the political
parties, citizens and media all over the county. In particular,
the government proposes a provision, which allows confiscating
recorders and cameras of journalists, hold meetings, marches, search
the apartments of the citizens under martial law. The bill does not
set at least approximate timing of martial law. “In other words,
they can organize a provocation at the border and the president may
remain in office until the year 3001. Or if people in a political
party speak loudly, it may be considered as a different type activity
and the political party may be banished.”
Victor Dallakyan states that the powers of the president under martial
law do not comply with the powers of the president set down in the
Constitution. The bill contains “points reminding the times of Stalin”
and in case it is adopted, “we will appear in the time of Pinechet.”

WHICH ARMENIAN ORGANIZATIONS WILL SUPPORT ARKADY GHUKASYAN?
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
NKR President Arkady Ghukasyan is visiting the United States, where
the annual telethon will be held on November 23. The president left
for the United Stated 20 days before the telethon to meet with the
representatives of the Armenian organizations. Because it is not
easy to persuade people to give money. Especially that you have done
this before.
The Armenian community of America is not homogeneous. There are
controversies between organizations and individuals. Often an
organization refuses to take part in an event because another
organization helped to organize it. There are controversies among
the political parties and other organizations. This is the reason why
there is no established all-Armenian organization up today. It is not
clear how complicated the situation has become after the election to
the U.S. Congress.
Will Arkady Ghukasyan be able to come to persuade all these forces?
Who will support the president of Karabakh who has already stated
that he will not run in the election next year.

KARABAKH IS PREPARING FOR REFERENDUM
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
Sergey Nasibyan, chair of the NKR Central Electoral Commission said
36 million drams was allocated for holding the referendum. The voters
registers are ready, and the amended draft of the Constitution will
be printed and distributed to the divisional and district commissions.
We have learned that the text of the Constitution is not ready,
whereas the referendum has already been appointed on December 10. The
local experts cannot understand the reason for this hastiness. We have
delayed the adoption of the Constitution for 15 years and suddenly
we decided to adopt it as soon as possible. The problem is that most
people have not read the text and apparently will not manage. Only
a month is left.

GREET YOUR VOTERS AT LEAST
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
On November 9 the bill on expropriation, which had been voted down
three times, and returned to the parliament with minor unimportant
changes, got 61 votes and was passed on first reading. 11 members
of parliament abstained. Meanwhile, the parliament can pass a law
if at least 66 members of parliament vote. The opposition did not
vote, and if the ARF Dashnaktsutyun, which abstained, had not voted,
the votes of the Republicans and the United Labor Party would not be
enough to pass the law.
Before the meeting of parliament the victims of expropriation
gathered at the gate of the National Assembly and offered the entering
members of parliament to vote against the bill. Only oppositionist
Vardan Mkrtichyan and Aram G. Sargsyan listened to the call of the
victims. Republican Hamlet Harutiunyan and the others “failed to
notice” the people gathered there. Meanwhile Artak Sargsyan, who had
left his political party for the sake of the seat in the parliament,
flew into a fury when one of the protesters advised him to say hello
to his voters.
Artak Baghdasaryan, chair of Victims of Expropriation for Democracy
NGO said the bill must not be adopted because the government rejected
all the proposals offered after the public hearings. And the members
of parliament did not accept the call of Speaker Tigran Torosyan
to vote each for himself. By the way, voting for someone else is a
violation of the bylaws of the parliament. And while the bill was
adopted in the traditional manner of one voting for three, more
and more protesters gathered outside the parliament. The movement
of Armenian mothers for legality joined them. Susanna Harutiunyan,
a member of the movement said everyone who is dissatisfied with
this government are with them. On the proposal of the government,
the National Assembly will hold the second reading of the Bill on
Expropriation within 24 hours after the first reading.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIA CAN SUSTAIN ONE SCIENTIFIC SYSTEM
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
Armenia has delayed considerably the reform in science, stated the
economist Edward Aghajanov November 9 at the Pastark Club. For the
new policy on the scientific reform, Edward Aghajanov said he is not
acquainted with this policy because he was not invited to cooperate
on working it out. However, the economist thinks that the financial
possibilities of Armenia does not allow having both academic and
university science.
“Armenia is a poor country. I think Armenia needs a system of
scientific education. In order not to demolish the Academy, and not
to destroy and cause a painful transition, I think institutions of
scientific educational should be established, which combine both
science and education,” says the economist.

DONKEY OR ELEPHANT, DIFFERENCE IS NOT BIG
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
The Armenian government is delighted about the defeat of the
Republicans in the election to the U.S. Congress. The pro-Hay Dat
conglomerate of this circle is encouraged by the statistics of the
Hay Dat offices suggesting that there are more pro-Armenians among the
Democrats than the “oil-smelling” Republicans. The Republican layer of
the Armenian government is also in high spirits. It may be thinking
that the American Republicans, depressed by the defeat, will seek
comfort in the idea of the victory of the Republican idea somewhere
else and will use the first opportunity. And the first opportunity
will be the Armenian parliamentary election. These approaches might
be stemming from the tendency to think that the U.S. Congress election
will influence the U.S policy on Armenia.
Therefore, the Armenian government is part by part explaining and
making the victory of the Democrats favorable for it.
However, disappointment is awaiting the Armenian government both in
terms of Hay Dat and the U.S. Policy on Armenia. And U.S. Charge
d’Affaires Anthony Godfrey hinted that the U.S. foreign policy is
the power of the executive, and the executive power has not changed.
Undoubtedly, and the charge d’affaires does not hide that the American
voters, nevertheless, expect a change in the foreign policy.
For us, however, it is important to know what is our role and
importance in the framework of the U.S. policy so that changes in
the foreign policy of this country affect the U.S. – Armenian relation.
Judging by the present U.S. – Armenian relation, Armenia has an
absolutely strategic importance for the United States. The evidence
to this is that in tactical matters the United States often yields
to Russia. The examples are the deals that the Armenian government
signs with Russia giving the country’s important infrastructures and
factories to this country. The reaction of the United States to this
process is highly reserved.
Most people might think that over the past few years the Republicans
have been conducting an obviously pro-Azerbaijani policy both regarding
Karabakh and generally the Caucasus, advising Armenia to learn from
Azerbaijan. They considered that the reason was the oil interest
of most leaders of the Republican administration. It should not be
overlooked, however, that the pro-Azerbaijani stance of the Republican
administration, such as the elimination of Resolution 907 or greater
military assistance to Azerbaijan, was permanently counterbalanced
at the Congress by the Republican majority.
However, besides this, over its rather short but effective history the
U.S. has made it clear for everyone that in terms of geopolitical
strategy it almost never undergoes changes. This country has a
clear-cut strategy, and in different stages of its implementation
the dominance of the Democrats or Republicans becomes necessary, not
more. In other words, figuratively, in the United States the policy
determines the government, not the government decides the policy.
Besides the fact that the U.S. Congress mainly deals with the internal
problems of the country there is another important thing.
The Democrats have always been known for their focus on the internal
problems of the country. In this respect, the Democratic majority will
tackle the internal problems rather to win over the American voters
in 2008. As to foreign policies, despite the obvious dissatisfaction
with the steps that are taken, the Democrats will not try to change the
situation. The Democrats will need the current failure, or in others
words, problems to use against the Republicans in the presidential
election in 2008.
And if the change of the foreign political strategy is almost excluded
because it is not expedient, the U.S. policy on Armenia will not
change and therefore its being favorable or unfavorable depends on
whether Armenia can build an effective political and economic system.

THEY DRANK TO VICTORY IN ADVANCE
James Hakobyan
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 9 2006
Javakheti is a country of lakes. In this territory with a population
of about 70 thousand there are about 20 big and small lakes. The
most famous, the biggest and the “water symbol” of Javakheti is
Lake Parvana. It is difficult to say what the minister of defense
hinted when he invited the foreign minister of Georgia and his
Armenian counterpart to dine at the Parvana Restaurant. Perhaps
he had calculated that even if Bejuashvili were reluctant to speak
about Javakheti, the name of the restaurant would constantly remind
him of it. On the other hand, it is possible that Bejuashvili had
greater interest to speak about Javakheti. And it is possible that
he considered this in choosing the Parvana for dinner. Perhaps it
was a hint that the Armenians are the host in Parvana. However, it is
hardly possible that Georgia does not know this and needs additional
remarks. Otherwise, official Tbilisi would not try its best to replace
the hosting side in Javakheti and would not visit Armenia on the eve
of the local election there. Meanwhile, in this context the relation
with Armenia has a definite purpose. Georgia realizes that at least
in the upcoming few years the demographic pattern in Javakheti will
be in favor of the Armenians. Radical actions are required to change
it quickly. But radical actions would lead to an adequate reaction of
the population and instability. This is not favorable for Georgia at
the moment. Therefore, Tbilisi does not make radical moves in Javakheti
like in the case of the Azerbaijanis of Marneuli. Sahakashvili started
a real chase there and made it clear in this relation that the power
would belong to Tbilisi.
Georgia has chosen a different tactics with regard to the issue of
Javakheti, and thinking and considering that for the time being
they can have little influence on the Armenians of Javakheti,
Tbilisi tries to set up relations with the Javakheti Armenians
via the Armenian government or influential figures of the Armenian
government. In other words, if the Armenians of Javakheti are not
subject to Tbilisi, they must make efforts to make them subject to
Yerevan. And perhaps Bejuashvili was trying to settle this problem by
having a meal in Armenia before the local election. On the other hand,
it is a rather dangerous game for Georgia because if the Armenian
government establishes its influence in Javakheti, it may “take away”
this region from the Georgians. Apparently, however, Tbilisi has
thought about this. Before coming to dinner in Armenia Georgia hinted
at its reluctance to pay for anything and stated that Armenia should
do. It was not accidental that when the Russian-Georgian spy scandal
started, Georgia stated that the actions of the Russian spies were
coordinated from Yerevan. This statement did not appear to have a
continuation but it is notable that Armenia did not react. Official
Yerevan did not try to demand explanations from Tbilisi. The reason
might be that Tbilisi could give an explanation. In that case, it
would be Yerevan’s turn to explain.
Even if there was espionage, and was instigated by the Russians, it
is related to Armenia if it was coordinated from Yerevan. And it is
already an issue of national security when the territory of a country
is turned into headquarters of spies in the region.
Considering this, the seriousness of the accusation from Tbilisi
becomes apparent, and in this context the silence of official Yerevan
kindles doubts that in reality it was considered more expedient to keep
silent about this fact rather than demand explanation. And in politics
everything has its price. Tbilisi agrees to keep silent, and Yerevan
agrees to keep the processes in Javakheti under control. And whatever
they cannot keep under control they keep at the remand prison of the
National Security, like in the case of Vahagn Chakhalyan, who did not
agree to join the national organizations of the Armenians of Javakheti
gathered under the flag of the ruling political party of Georgia, which
got 70 percent of votes in the local election by official statistics.
In fact, it was the victory of official Tbilisi and Yerevan rather
than the Armenians of Javakheti, and the toast to this victory may
have been drunk at the Parvana, in advance. It will become clear
in the course of time what this victory will bring to Javakheti. It
should be noted, however, that Yerevan and Tbilisi have always reached
agreement on Javakheti, and the only problem that has been solved is
enclosing the exiting problems successfully.