NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH QUESTION
By R. D. Gastil

Kurdish Aspect, CO
Dec 12 2006

Iranian Civilization and American Foreign Policy

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Nationalism has always been with us. But the modern version
of nationalism grew out of eighteenth century thinking. This
movement led to many of the countries or countries-in-waiting
that exist today. It is characteristic of nationalism that it may
both strengthen and tear apart a polity. Spanish nationalism made
possible the establishment of the present Spanish state, but it has
also led to the increasing threat of the dismemberment of that state
as its subdivisions, beginning with Catalonia, are granted increasing
political power. In Africa, new nations developing nationalisms on the
basis of political subdivisions established by colonial masters, are
threatened by nationalist movements that would further subdivide the
continent. There is no reason for the international community to reject
such movements out of hand. Each must be judged on its own merits,
no matter how difficult "merits" may be to establish in such matters.

In the Iranian region the nationalist ideology produced many of
the regional nationalisms that exist today, including Iranian and
Turkish nationalism. The modern emergence of Turkey and Iran bares
some similarity. Turkey is the remainder of the Ottoman Empire after
the rest of it was whittled away before and during World War I. For
a time, Turkey also represented the only sovereign state left over
after the great Turkish diaspora dating back to well before Genghis
Khan. Recently, new Turkish states have emerged in Central Asia and
the Caucasus after the Soviet collapse. Iran is the renamed successor
to the Persian Empire (with many names) that went through several
advances and retreats after its emergence at the beginning of the
classic period in the West. Its most recent territorial losses were
around Herat and in the Caucasus. Although descended from great
empires, both polities appear to have settled on the modern nation
state as the best alternative for now.

During World War I Turkey embarked on an extreme nationalist policy
that granted nothing to minorities. On the west, the Greeks were
largely driven out of the country. To the east, the Armenians were
driven out and killed in massive numbers in an attempt to create
an ethnically pure Turkey. Fortunately, the Armenians have at last
achieved a truly independent state of their own in the Caucasus after
the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Their attacks on the Armenians
combined with their treatment of their large Kurdish minority, has
been a major stumbling block on Turkey’s road to membership in the
European Union.

Iraq was one of several states carved out of the Ottoman Empire by
the victorious Allies at the end of the War. Before 1920, few people
understood that they were supposed to belong to an Iraq nationality,
although there were several nationalities in the area of Iraq. The
Kurds felt that they had been promised a state of their own, but
the international community and local interests in the end denied
Kurdish claims. The Kurdish people were divided up among Syria,
Turkey (the largest number), Iran (the second largest number),
and the new state of Iraq. Both Turkey and Iran have struggled to
keep their Kurdish subjects down. Eastern Anatolia has been plagued
by a Kurdish insurgency for years. In part, this is a response to a
Turkish state that until recently denied the existence of Kurds. They
labeled them "Mountain Turks". Kurds were not allowed schools or
broadcasts in their own language. The Iranians have been faced with
occasional flareups of Kurdish nationalism. After World War II, the
Russians sponsored a Mahabad Republic among the Kurds until the Shah
and the Americans forced them to abandon the project. More recently,
the Islamist state brutally put down Kurdish revolts. Nevertheless,
in the Kurdish provinces of Iraq regional states and the international
community has come closest to recognizing an entity that has achieved
something very close to independence. One should not romanticize the
Kurds or their achievements. The long term unity of even this small
area and the "democracy" they have achieved are doubtful. Yet it is
certainly true that they have demonstrated far more than most peoples
in such situations that they really would like to manage their own
affairs and may be capable of it.

For more on this, consider a short paper placing Kurdish
self-determination in the context of a more general argument. I
expanded the question of self-determination in my Freedom in the World:
Political Rights and Civil Liberties: 1978, especially pages 180-215.

In spite of vigorous efforts to promote their own rights of
self-determination as absolute, the leaders of Turkey, Iran, and
Syria have sometimes been unwilling to grant these rights to others.

In particular, the leaders appear to fear that if an independent
Kurdish state finally emerges in Iraq, this will encourage
independence movements in their states that they will be unwilling
to abide. However, if these states allow Kurds a reasonable level of
communal self-expression and fairly divide power in such a way that
their Kurds do not feel dispossessed, there should be little danger.

There is now, after all, an independent Azerbaijan next to Iran’s
Azerbaijan, and there seems to be little danger that this will
lead to an insurrection in Tabriz. It would help the reputation of
all three nations were they to see their way clear to welcoming an
Iraqi Kurdistan into the community of nations, should events lead to
this result. The United States and the world community should not
be reluctant to work with them on developing this opportunity in
their midst.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TURKEY ASSAILS EU’S DECISION TO PARTIALLY SUSPEND ENTRY TALKS
By Katrin Bennhold

International Herald Tribune, France
Dec 12 2006

BRUSSELS: Turkey reacted angrily Tuesday to a decision by the European
Union to impose a partial freeze on membership talks and said relations
were going through a difficult test.

The decision on Turkey set the scene for a European summit meeting
Thursday where EU enlargement will figure prominently. The next phase
of expansion takes place Jan. 1, with the entry of Romania and Bulgaria
increasing the size of the bloc to 27 members.

EU foreign ministers agreed Monday to punish Turkey for refusing to
open its ports and airports to Cyprus, an EU member. They suspended
talks on 8 of the 35 issues under negotiation ahead of the possible
accession of the mainly Muslim country more than a decade from now.

The decision is expected to be endorsed by EU leaders at their summit
talks on Thursday.

"This decision is unfair to Turkey," Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan said in a televised speech. "Let us not forget that our
friends in the EU also have promises they have not fulfilled."

He said that relations between Turkey and the EU were "going through
a serious test, despite all our efforts."

Turks are bitter that they are being punished for not trading with
Cyprus at a time when the EU has not fulfilled a two-year-old pledge
to end a trade embargo on the Turkish Cypriot north of the island.

They point out that Turkish Cyriots backed a United Nations plan to
unify the island in 2004, while Greek Cypriots in the south rejected
it. But the Greek part of the island still became a member of the EU
and now has veto power over Turkish accession.

Egeman Bagis, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser, said the
Cyprus dispute was being used as a smokescreen in the debate
over whether Turkey should join the EU. "Some countries in the EU
unfortunately want to keep it as a Christian club," he said in a
telephone interview. "Some countries are using Cyprus – and Cyprus
is happy to be used."

The focus on Cyprus was also criticized from a different direction.

"The Cyprus issue has distracted from the fundamental issues,"
said Joost Lagendijk of the Netherlands, chairman of the EU’s Joint
Parliamentary Committee with Turkey.

"Human rights, minority rights, women’s rights, freedom of speech –
those are the issues that go to the heart of Turkey’s compatibility
with the European Union," he said.

A report by the European Commission last month that criticized Turkey’s
refusal to trade with Cyprus also faulted Ankara for backsliding on
many promised reforms. Turkey’s limitation of the rights of Kurds and
other minorities was sharply condemned, as were continuing reports
of cases of torture and limits on freedom of expression.

Erdogan’s government has still not scrapped Article 301 of the
penal code, which has allowed the prosecution of Turkish writers and
academics for insulting "Turkishness." A writer, Ipek Calislar, and
a publisher, Fatih Tas, are scheduled to be tried under the measure
next week.

The fact that the EU’s decision Monday did not mention human rights
violations was criticized by an Armenian lobby group. "The silence of
the member countries on other Turkish violations are a lapse that
seriously endangers European integration," a statement from the
European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy said.

Naif Bezwan, a Kurdish researcher at Osnabruck University in Germany,
said: "Of course it’s unacceptable that Turkey does not recognize
a member of the very Union it wants to join, but when it comes to
Turkey’s compatibility with the EU the main issue is how Turkey deals
with religious and national minorities."

Lagendijk said he hoped that a pledge Monday by EU foreign ministers
to seek an end to the economic isolation of the Turkish part of Cyprus
over the next six months would refocus the negotiations on economic
and political reforms.

"You would hardly find anyone in Turkey siding with the EU on Cyprus,"
he said, "but you’ll find a lot of people calling for our support on
human rights and political reforms."

Erdogan on Tuesday vowed to press ahead with reforms.

"Our reform process will continue with the same decisiveness," he said.

But Bagis, his adviser, said some damage had already been done. Ahead
of presidential and legislative elections in Turkey next year, the
mood has turned more nationalistic, and the EU’s demand on Cyprus is
one reason why support for EU membership has fallen sharply over the
last two years, analysts say.

RUSSIAN INVESTMENTS IN ARMENIA: THEIR ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPACT
Haroutiun Khachatrian

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Dec 12 2006

The recent takeover of the Armenian telecom operator, ArmenTel, by the
Russian company Vympelcom, the possible passage of the Iran-Armenian
gas pipeline to a company controlled by Russia, and the possible
accession of Armenian railroads by Russian railroads renewed the
discussion about the role of Russia in the Armenian economy.

Pro-western politicians claim the excessive penetration of Russian
capital into Armenian economy will lead to the country’s dependence
on Russia, which, in turn, may have political consequences. However,
there is no indication that Russian investments in the Armenian
economy pursue goals other than making profit.

BACKGROUND: Russia is the largest source country of investments in the
economy of Armenia, (US$405 million between 1996 and 2005) which is
significant for this small country. As a result, a significant part
of the country’s economic assets are controlled by Russians, both
by the government and state-owned companies, and by private Russian
companies. The bulk of the former group of assets came from the 2002
debt-for-equity swap, whereby Armenia repaid its US$97 million dollar
debt to Russia accumulated during the crisis of 1990s.

The state-controlled Russian companies are especially strong in
the energy and power industry. In particular, more than half of
the electricity-producing capacities of Armenia are controlled by
Interengo, a subsidiary of RAO UES. Among this company’s assets in
Armenia are four blocks of the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant (TPP), the
largest power plant in the country, and Armenia’s energy distribution
network. Another Russian state-controlled giant, Gazprom, owns 45%
of Armrosgazprom, Armenian gas network operator (with another 45%
belonging to the Armenian government and 10%, to another Russian-
and Gazprom-associated company, Itera).

Recently Gazprom declared its decision to increase its stake in
Armrosgazprom to 58 percent, by buying a new issue of shares. This
stake will be increased even more when the declared sale of the
fifth block of the Hrazdan TPP to Gazprom is completed. Among
non-governmental Russian companies, Vympelcom is by far the largest
single investor in Armenia, as it took 90 percent of the ArmenTel
shares of its previous owner, Greece OTE for some Euros 482 million
or US$616 million dollars, equivalent to more than 10 percent of
Armenia’s projected GDP this year. Another large private investor
is the Russian aluminum giant Rusal, which owns Armenal, a large
foil-producing factory. Rusal in recent years invested 80 million
dollars to modernize it.

The Russian leadership looks interested in activating this process,
as seen, in particular, from the statement by president Vladimir
Putin, who told his Armenian counterpart Robert Kocharyan on October
30 that he regretted that in recent years Russia "occupied a shameful
third place" among foreign investors in Armenia. Not surprisingly,
in recent years an increasing number of concerns have been expressed
in Armenia about "selling the country to Russians," or about Armenia
"becoming an appendix to Russia," etc. Concerns are expressed that the
penetration of Russian capital may keep Armenia far from approaching
the West, and that Armenia may fall out of the prevailing trend
for the South Caucasus region which is westward. The government,
of course, says this process is beneficial to Armenia. As for the
Armenian population, it is neutral if not positive, given the absence
of significant anti-Russian sentiments among Armenians.

IMPLICATIONS: The facts show that, at least for the time being, Russian
investments in Armenia have had a mostly positive impact with the
goals pursued appearing to be purely economic. Whereas in the 1990s,
there were cases of politically motivated competition among Russian
and western investors for Armenian assets, no such cases are known
to have taken place in the past six years. Moreover, Russian funds
have often been the only available investments in Armenian assets,
with no competitors. This was the case, in particular, with the fifth
block of the Hrazdan TPP, which was founded back in Soviet times but
has remained unfinished as the Armenian government failed to find
interested investors. Under the deal agreed in April 2006, Gazprom
not only pledged to invest US$150 million to finalize this block,
but also promised to keep gas prices stable at US$110 per 1000 cubic
meters for three years to come (meanwhile, most other CIS buyers will
pay twice as much in 2007). The political context of these investments,
if any, is not obvious.

On the one hand, the Russian government does not conceal its
interest in acquiring assets in Armenia, just as Is the case in other
countries. However, the real influence of the political factor in these
deals is mostly overestimated. The ArmenTel deal is good evidence,
as in this case, two out of the four companies participating in the
tender were Russian ones, and reportedly, the Armenian government
would prefer to see MTS, a company close to the Russian government,
as the winner. However, the tender was won by Vympelcom, whose largest
shareholder is Telenor of Norway. In addition, the Armenian government
used the sale as an opportunity to get rid of the ArmenTel monopoly
on many communication services, which strongly hindered development
of the IT and telecom sectors in Armenia.

Finally, it is not obvious that these deals will make Armenia even
more dependent of Russia than it already is. In fact, the opposite
may be true. For example, Armenia has long been dependent on supplies
of Russian gas, and this is, of course, a leverage of political
pressure. However, as Russia has spent money to acquire large energy
consuming assets in Armenia, it would be less inclined to stop gas
supplies to Armenia as that would harm its own economic interests as
well. As for the problem of ownership of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline,
its value seems highly overestimated. This is a 40 km long pipeline
connecting the Iranian-Armenian border with Armenia’s existing gas
distribution network, owned by ArmRosgazprom. It cannot serve as
a transit route due to its small diameter, as Russia reportedly
purposefully prevented the construction of a larger pipeline. Even
if this fragment is given to Russia (in fact, to ArmRosgazprom,
a subsidiary of Gazprom, which works according to Armenian laws),
the valve of this pipeline is controlled by Iran rather than by
Russia. Aside from satisfaction that no Armenia does not transit
Iranian gas, it will not be great enhancement of Russia’s influence
in this sector.

CONCLUSIONS: For the time being and for an foreseeable future, the
large Russian investments look beneficial for the Armenian economy
and have no visible political impact in terms of Armenia’s attitude
to the West. They do not prevent Armenia from continuing advanced
market reforms and establishing closer ties with the USA and the EU,
in particular, through the recently signed Action Plan of Armenia in
the European Neighborhood Policy.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroutiun Khachatrian is an analyst on political and
economic issues based in Yerevan, Armenia.

php?articleid=4637

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NEEDED: A U.S. BLACK SEA STRATEGY
Ariel Cohen and Conway Irwin

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Dec 12 2006

U.S. interests in the Black Sea area-energy transit, security,
counter-terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and people-have taken
on particular significance since 9/11. The Black Sea basin is a
strategic region bordering the Greater Middle East and a key transit
route for Caspian oil. Confronted with developments in the region,
the U.S. needs a comprehensive regional policy to protect American
interests and security.

BACKGROUND: The Wider Black Sea region is a patchwork of overlapping
political areas and spheres of influence. Bulgaria and Romania are
NATO members and soon-to-be EU members. Ukraine is caught between
the West and Russia. Georgia leans toward the West, but borders on
Russia’s soft underbelly. Turkey vacillates between East and West,
pulled in different directions by national interests and national
pride. Russia, in a more pronounced way, it staking its own course.

The Black Sea’s six littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine,
Russia, Georgia, and Turkey) and several additional countries in
the wider region are beginning to tentatively construct a regional
identity just as foreign powers and outside forces are searching for
footholds in their vicinity. The region is geopolitically significant
precisely because it is a nexus of cultures, international trade
(legal and illicit), ideas, and influences.

Oil and gas from Central Asia and the Middle East move along Black
Sea shipping lanes and pipelines to Europe and other points west.

These same shipping lanes are used for smuggling of narcotics, persons
(including terrorists), conventional weapons, and components for
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

The Black Sea region can be a launching platform for military,
reconstruction, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and possibly Iran and for the protection of energy shipping lanes
between the Caspian region and Western markets. It is also Europe’s
new southeastern border. Thus, both the European Union and the U.S.

have strong interests in safeguarding the movement of some goods,
preventing the movement of others, and maintaining a presence in the
Black Sea region.

Turkey and Russia are key powers uneasy about the U.S. presence in
the Black Sea basin. Turkey desires stability in the Black Sea, but
the moderate Islamist AK Party government in Ankara does not see eye
to eye with its Western partners over how to achieve this. Turkey’s
perception of the United States was profoundly changed by the Iraq
war. Long an ally of the West and an EU aspirant, Turkey has recently
distanced itself from the U.S. and NATO.

In response to its real or perceived grievances with the U.S. and the
EU, Turkey is seeking a stronger position from which it can pursue
its own ends without interference. Turkey’s most recent National
Security Policy Document emphasizes the importance of Turkey using its
geopolitical position to become a hub for energy storage and transit
between suppliers in Russia, the Middle East, and Central Asia and
markets in the West.

Russia, even more than Turkey, has been increasingly moving away from
the West and is focused on maintaining regional hegemony. The Kremlin
has been using Russia’s recently acquired economic might, by virtue
of the high price of oil and unprecedented demand for natural gas, to
pursue its foreign policy goals. One of those goals is to become the
world’s primary supplier of energy resources. Òhat requires a tight
grip on purchasing and transporting of the oil and gas resources of
the former Soviet Union.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia has turned a generous profit as the middleman
between cheap Central Asian oil and gas and energy-hungry economies
in the West. By selling Central Asian oil and gas at a premium abroad,
Russia has earned windfall profits and undertaken obligations to supply
countries such as the EU and China well beyond its own abilities to
produce. Russia also supplies two thirds of Turkey’s natural gas and
roughly 40 percent of the EU’s-a position that may be in jeopardy
if the pipelines through Turkey are built using non-Russian sources
of supply.

Further complicating regional security in the wider Black Sea
region are the unresolved conflicts in the region: South Ossetia
and Abkhazia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova, as well
as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. These conflicts raise two
primary concerns. First, they threaten the territorial integrity
of internationally recognized states. Implications for separatists
in Chechnya, Daghestan, Kurdistan, Khouzistan, Baluchistan, and
even Xinjiang are easy to imagine, to say the least. Second, the
local governments of the secessionist regions operate according to
their own "laws", not those of the central governments, resulting in
insufficient oversight and crime prevention. These lawless enclaves
have become breeding grounds for international smuggling and other
illicit activities. Until the conflicts are resolved, ruling elites in
these statelets will frustrate efforts to establish a lasting peace,
which is a precondition for stability, security, and economic growth
in the broader region.

Because the U.S. does not have a free rein in the Black Sea region,
it is essential that the countries in the region develop their own
intraregional capabilities in maritime security, counterterrorism,
disaster preparedness, and other aspects of securing their waterways
and coastlines. However, the Black Sea littoral states are operating
according to their own distinct agendas, and there is no consensus
about how to achieve common security goals. Tensions over status
within the region, conflicting allegiances, and varying perceptions
of what constitutes stability are preventing these states from finding
mutually acceptable ways to combat their common problems.

U.S. presence currently has the support of Bulgaria and Romania, but
U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are on shaky ground.

Neither Turkey nor Russia supported U.S. operations in Iraq, and
relations with both countries have taken a downturn ever since.

Ukraine has adopted a more pro-Russian stance since Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovich took office. Georgia is under severe economic
and political pressure from Russia and preoccupied with internal
conflicts and is thus ill-equipped to act as a strong U.S. ally. This
tangled web of interests and alliances and the recent rapprochement
of Russia and Turkey, which has anti-American implications, may hamper
U.S. activities in the area.

CONCLUSIONS: To maintain a presence in the region, the United States
needs a realistic strategy to enhance the security and stability of
the Black Sea region. This specifically involves coordinating U.S.

and EU policies in the region, especially with regards to the European
Neighborhood Policy. It also involves increasing NATO cooperation
with non-NATO countries through Partnership for Peace by offering
technical and training assistance in security areas, and strengthen
bilateral military ties with Ukraine.

Other elements could include sponsoring trilateral military exchanges
and consultations between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to assuage
Turkish concerns about losing its dominant position in the Black Sea
basin to the growing influence of the U.S. America can contribute to
existing regional security structures either as a participant or as an
observer. This could include providing crucial technical intelligence
capabilities, airlift, and other specialty capacities.

These structures could also be included in NATO military and disaster
preparedness exercises to improve interoperability.

A stable Black Sea region must include urging Russia to lift sanctions
against Georgia and pushing for renewed multilateral talks over the
resolution of the region’s "frozen conflicts", particularly acute
in the case of Georgia. This includes promoting the replacement
of Russian/CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with
international peacekeeping forces – under the EU or UN umbrella,
or otherwise constituted.

Even with all of the current U.S. foreign policy concerns (e.g.,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea), the U.S. would be unwise
to concentrate on these crises to the exclusion of all others.

Shoring up alliances and improving relations with states in strategic
areas bordering on main theaters of operation, such as the Greater
Middle East, is of utmost importance in developing future geopolitical
arrangements, enhancing strategic stability, and assuring military
egress and re-supply.

Given the current state of U.S. relations with Turkey and Russia,
the only way for the U.S. to maintain and strengthen its footholds
in the Black Sea is to develop cooperation across a broad spectrum
of issues of common interest and mutual concern. The U.S. needs to
learn to tread lightly, offering support where possible and backing
off where necessary. This is not an impossible balance to achieve. If
successful, it could be used as a model for cementing U.S. presence
in other strategic areas, such as Central Asia. It is time for the
U.S. to launch a coordinated policy effort in the Wider Black Sea
region to gain support for addressing some of the most pressing issues
of the decade: the rise of Iran, WMD proliferation, cooperation in
the global war on terrorism, and energy security.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian
and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at The Heritage
Foundation. Conway Irwin is an energy writer with Argus Media.

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ARMENIAN COURT SANCTIONS ARREST OF OPPOSITION LEADER
The Associated Press

International Herald Tribune, France
Dec 12 2006

YEREVAN, Armenia: A court in the Armenian capital sanctioned the
arrest of the head of an opposition group and a fellow activist on
coup plotting charges and ruled Wednesday to keep them in jail.

Zhirair Sefilian, a Lebanese citizen who heads the Association of
Armenian Volunteers, was detained Sunday along with another activist
of the group, Vadan Malkhasian. Authorities accused them of plotting
a coup, making public calls for the government’s ouster and possessing
illegal weapons – charges they denied.

The court on Wednesday ruled to keep both men in jail for two months
pending investigation.

Armen Agaian, a leading member of the same group, said the arrest was
part of authorities’ efforts to muzzle dissent in the run-up to next
year’s parliamentary elections.

Sefilian is a veteran of the 1988-1994 war in the disputed enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended when Armenia-backed separatists drove
out Azerbaijan’s government forces.

BREAKING SILENCE, A SHOAH SURVIVOR WRITES IN SPANISH ABOUT HIS MIRACLES
By Larry Luxner

Combined Jewish Philantropies, MA
Dec 13 2006

BUENOS AIRES, Dec. 12 (JTA) — On his 68th birthday, Jorge Klainman
decided he could remain silent no more about his Holocaust horrors.

The Polish-born, retired businessman sat at his electric typewriter,
he said, "and suddenly the curtains of my memory began to part,
revealing events that happened 50 or 60 years ago. After that my life
changed completely. I felt liberated."

The result was "El Septimo Milagro," a harrowing Spanish-language
tale of life and death in a series of Nazi concentration camps that
has captivated readers from Buenos Aires to Barcelona.

Translated into English as "The Seventh Miracle" and into Hebrew as
"Nes Ha-Shev’i," Klainman’s first-person account differs from most
other Holocaust memoirs in its extraordinary attention to detail. It
ranges from the 1939 roundup of Jews from his Polish hometown of
Kielce to Klainman’s frightful March 1944 encounter with psychopathic
concentration camp commandant Amon Goeth, the SS officer portrayed
by Ralph Fiennes in Steven Spielberg’s movie "Schindler’s List."

Goeth marked Klainman, then 15, for execution by firing squad.

"My mind refused to comprehend the reality of what was happening,"
Klainman wrote. "The end had come. They were going to shoot me and
burn me. I thought of my loved ones, and that soon I would be joining
them. I reached a state of mind where I just wanted, with all my being,
to get it over with."

But Klainman’s Ukrainian executioners somehow missed their target,
and later that night fellow Jewish prisoners risked their lives to
bring his bleeding body to the camp infirmary. A kindly doctor there
gradually nursed the teenager back to health.

Fate intervened five more times before he was liberated by American
soldiers in 1945, and Klainman was saved from certain death.

In 1947 — with the help of international Jewish organizations —
Klainman set sail from Italy to Rio de Janeiro, caught a plane to
Asuncion, Paraguay, and smuggled himself across the heavily guarded
border into Argentina, where he eventually married and raised a family.

"Six actual miracles occurred and saved my life," according to
Klainman, 78. "The seventh was my being able to write the story."

And now, with anti-Semitism again rising throughout his adopted
country, Klainman told JTA he feels compelled to share that story
with Argentines who may not have yet gotten the message.

"Ten years from now there won’t be any Holocaust survivors left to
transmit the truth to young people," he said in an interview at his
Buenos Aires apartment. "They’ll begin forgetting the Jewish Holocaust
just as they’ve forgotten the Armenian Holocaust. So it’s important
that everybody knows what happened. That way they’ll be able to
understand the terrible struggle of the Israeli people against the
fundamentalist Islamic savages who want to throw us into the sea."

Klainman, a jewelry retailer by profession, lived in Tel Aviv from
1971 to 1990 and again from 1999 to 2004. He is fluent in Polish,
Russian, German, Yiddish, Hebrew, Spanish and Italian, and was
recently appointed official representative of the Holocaust Museum
in Buenos Aires.

"I’ve dedicated the rest of my life to explaining the Shoah to
students from all over the country," he said. "Since I’ve moved back
from Israel, thousands of students have heard my testimony."

Klainman says he has "lots of work to do" in explaining the reasons
behind the Holocaust to fellow Argentines, many of whom grew up with
anti-Semitic attitudes encouraged by the Roman Catholic Church and
the thousands of Nazi war criminals who were welcomed by Argentina’s
military dictatorship after World War II.

"I’ve visited many colleges and universities throughout Argentina,
giving speeches for high-school kids," Klainman said. "I even spoke
at a Catholic seminary, and afterwards the kids cursed the Vatican
for ignoring the Jews.

"Usually when I finish speaking after an hour, for three or four
minutes they sit there in silence. Then they surround me, hundreds
of kids, hugging me, crying, asking for my autograph. Once I took a
taxi in Corrientes and the driver recognized me. He took my hand and
kissed it, and told me, ‘God bless you, may you never die.’"

He said the reaction of Argentina’s Christians to his book is much
stronger than the Jews because "the Jews already know this story."

Klainman said he was inspired to write "El Septimo Milagro" after
his son Miguel began asking him troubling questions about his past.

"For 50 years I guarded my silence like a hermit, but then I got tired
of these delinquents denying the Holocaust," he said. "I realized
that by keeping silent, I was becoming an accomplice, collaborating
with them."

It took Klainman four months to write the book. His original draft
version ran 107 pages; only 25 copies of that version were printed.

"When I read what I had written, I realized nobody would believe it
was true," he said. "So we [Klainman and his wife, Teresa] decided
to travel to Poland to look for details. It was very traumatic,
that first time back in Poland, more so for Teresa than for me."

"Jorge didn’t talk about it. I knew very little," said Teresa Klainman,
an Argentina native who had no idea what a concentration camp was
until she met her husband. "I knew he was a survivor, that he had no
family and that he was in camps, but it was a taboo subject. Whenever
I asked, he would tell me a few things, but he wouldn’t want to go
into details, and I didn’t want to upset him, so I learned not to ask."

The Klainmans would return to Poland twice more, most recently as
part of a program to bring Jewish children to Poland to teach them
firsthand about the horrors of the Holocaust.

In October, Jorge and Teresa Klainman came to the United States
for a two-week visit that included lectures at secondary schools,
colleges and Jewish community centers throughout New Jersey. The
trip was organized by Kal Wagenheim, the Millburn, N.J., freelance
journalist and playwright who had translated Klainman’s book from
Spanish to English.

Klainman proudly showed off a thick folder full of letters from a
seventh-grade civics class in Millburn.

"Thank you for the presentation. I found it interesting that you seemed
to keep barely missing death — especially the time you got shot in the
leg near the pit," wrote one student. "Maybe it was fate that allowed
you to live to tell your tale, or maybe it was just luck. Either way
I am grateful that you came all the way from Buenos Aires to present
us with your story."

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PAKISTANI NEWSPAPER "THE PATRIOT": ARMENIA MUST LIBERATE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF AZERBAIJAN

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Dec 13 2006

An article concerning Armenian invasion of Azeri territories has
been published in newspaper "The Patriot" in Pakistan. "Armenia must
liberate occupied territories of Azerbaijan" by Nergiz Malik presents
facts that Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan and Armenia has occupied it,
APA reports.

The article notes that Upper and Lower Karabakh always belonged to
Azerbaijani states through the history.

"The notion of Karabakh emerged in north part of Azerbaijan in 4th
century B.C and was a part of Caucasus Albania till 8th century",
the article writes.

The author noted that Russian imperia used religion to its interests.

On this purpose, Russia subordinated the independent Alban church to
Armenian Grigoryan church. So the Christian people of Albania were
obliged to join Armenian Church.

"Russia attached Lenkeran, Baku, Guba, Derbend, Nakchivan and Irevan
khanates to its territory. Russia wanted to place Armenians as a buffer
to the khanates fighting for independence. Russian imperia deported 130
thousand of Armenians from Iran and Turkey to Azerbaijan in 1828-1830
according to Turkmenchay agreement. 50 thousand of them were settled
in Karabakh. The notion of "Armenia" did not mean territory when
Russia invaded Azerbaijan. Armenians were known as a community among
Muslims of Azeri khanates. But Russia called the invaded territories
"Armenian province" after the agreement.

"Armenian province" was replaced with Yerevan governorship according
to the new administrative territory division in 1849. Between 1878
and 1914, more 500 thousand Armenians were deported to Azerbaijan.

February and October revolutions in Russia were the beginning of a
new stage for "Armenian issue". Council of People Commissars adopted
a law "Turkish Armenia to decide self-termination" signed by Lenin and
Stalin. Armenian territory included Ichmedzin, Aleksandropol and Yeni
Beyazid that half of people were Azerbaijanis. Armenian government
headed by Dashnaktsutyune demanded Nakchivan, Zengezur and Karabakh
territories and that caused a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in
1918-1920. Russian Communist Party Central Committee Caucasus Bureau
adopted the following laws on June 5, 1921: "Considering national peace
between Muslims and Armenians, economical relations between Upper and
Lower Karabakh and permanent relations between Karabakh and Azerbaijan,
Nagorno Karabakh will remain in Azerbaijan SSR territory and Nagorno
Karabakh will be large autonomy, centre Shusha". Azerbaijan SSR was
included in USSR in 1922", the author wrote.

She also noted that near 1 million Azerbaijanis were deported from
Nagorno Karabakh in 1988-89. Khojali genocide and Armenian violence
of international laws are also mentioned in the article. She also
noted that the negotiations to settle the conflict are continuing.

OSCE MG CO-CHAIRS AND INGOING CHAIRMAN MIGUEL ANGEL MORATINOS MEET IN MADRID

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Dec 13 2006

OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs Matthew Bryza (the US), Yuri Merzlyakov
(Russia) and Bernard Fassier (France) met with Spanish Foreign
Minister, OSCE ingoing chairman Miguel Angel Moratinos in Madrid,
OSCE MG co-chair Matthew Bryza’s office told the APA.

The co-chairs made a report to the OSCE chairman on the details
of the meeting between Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents held in
Minsk. The parties exchanged views on the current situation of the
process of settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

The meeting in Madrid aimed at introducing the co-chairs to the OSCE
ongoing chairman.

WHERE NEXT AFTER THE IRAQI GENOCIDE?
Anwar Darkazally, Electronic Iraq

Electronic Iraq
Dec 13 2006

Six men burned alive, an entire government ministry kidnapped, over
two hundred dead in a series of car bombs. Another week in Iraq.

Nothing new and headline news.

We have become anaesthetised to the pain of the conflict in
Iraq. The sheer scale of bloodshed has numbed our comprehension of
what the violence means in human terms. What would have been termed
"spectaculars" in the bad old days of the IRA are just day to day
events in Iraq. Our perspective is becoming distorted through a
kaleidoscope of laser-guided bombs and razor-sharp satellite images.

The cemeteries are filling up and human lives are becoming numbers,
or less.

So far in Iraq, America has nearly lost the same number of soldiers
as civilians murdered in the 9/11 atrocity. Although images of the
coffins of the American war dead are not allowed to be shown since the
Bush administration banned them in March 2003, at least the Americans
are granted the unseen dignity of being counted as individuals by
the Department of Defence and borne home in flag-draped coffins. But
Iraqi civilian deaths are not counted by the US government.

To armchair warriors in Washington ignoring Iraqi casualties is perhaps
an extension of the de-humanising concept of collateral damage. To
the Arab and Muslim world glued to their satellite TVs, the little
limp bodies being rushed to hospitals in the Mickey Mouse T-shirts
could be their children. That none of these Iraqi deaths will ever
be officially recorded makes it hard for the viewer not to conclude
that an American life is not equal to an Arab life.

John Hopkins School of Public Health has calculated Iraqi civilian
deaths and their estimates vary between a third of a million to 900,000
dead. The lower fatality estimate is almost the same as the total
number of British civilian and military fatalities in the Second World
War (388,000). The higher Iraqi fatality figure is almost identical
to the total number of British soldiers killed in the First World War
(908,000).

The US and Britain have disputed these figures and this is not
surprising. If these estimates are correct, or even in the right
region, these fatality figures will have far-reaching consequences for
a war started with questionable, at best, legitimacy. Fatality figures
this high could make the US and British governments culpable for
over-seeing the second genocide in the Middle East since the Armenian
holocaust in which over a million were killed between 1915 and 1917.

The definition of genocide from Article 2 of the Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is intent to wholly
or partially destroy any religious, ethnic or national group through
killing or causing bodily or mental harm. The wholesale sectarian
slaughter between Iraqi Sunnis and Iraqi Shia undoubtedly qualifies
as mutual attempts at genocide.

The first Middle Eastern genocide since 1917 was perpetrated by Saddam
Hussein and became one of the justifications of the war after the
Weapons of Mass Destruction were never found. In what Human Rights
Watch rightly termed a "genocide" in 1993, between 50,000 and 182,000
Kurds were killed by Saddam. But if the figures are correct, and
we have no other data to go on, then the current situation in Iraq
dwarfs even the evil done by the Saddam regime.

Wilful failure to record the victims of the US-led and British-backed
2003 war is perhaps an attempt to not create evidence which could be
used for war crimes and genocide prosecutions against the politicians
responsible. But there is no statute of limitations on war crimes
and the new generation of mass graves in the post-Saddam era can be
excavated for the evidence.

The United States and Britain should recognise the terrible gravity
of the situation they created and start recording the Iraqi victims
of this war. These records may become part of eventual prosecutions
for genocide, but the evidence is there anyway. What it will do is
allow some dignity in death to the victims and their families.

Few predicted that the situation in Iraq would ever amount to murder
on a genocidal scale. Every murdered soul makes it harder to see a
way out or where the killing will lead next. An all-out regional war
with millions of victims would have been unthinkable only three years
ago. But in a world where Arab casualties are not counted, perhaps
it is not such a distant possibility. As regional tensions rise,
regional solutions must be pursued.

The door to regional peace in the Middle East is in Jerusalem and
it can and must be pushed open – it is in everyone’s best interests,
including Israel. The US has pressured its allies before. Let us not
forget that George Bush senior was the President who forced Israeli
participation in the Madrid Process through threatening to withhold
loan guarantees. Peace for Palestine may not stop the bloodshed in
Iraq, but it will go a good way for the US and Britain to start
winning back the Arab people and perhaps prove to them that Arab
lives do count.

Anwar Al Darkazally is a political analyst an was the legal adviser
to the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) of the PLO with responsibility
for the Jerusalem file in final status negotiations.

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IMF FORECASTS ARMENIA’S GDP WILL GROW 11% IN 2006

Interfax Russia
Dec 13 2006

YEREVAN. Dec 13 (Interfax) – The International Monetary Fund
is forecasting that Armenian GDP will grow 11% compared with a
planned growth in the budget of 7.5%, Nienke Oomes, IMF permanent
representative in Armenia, said at a Wednesday press conference.

GDP will be $6.114 billion in nominal terms in 2006 and per capital
GDP will be $1,882, he said.

The Armenian budget deficit is forecast at 2.3% of GDP in 2006, budget
revenue at 17.4% of GDP and spending at 19.7% of GDP, Oomes said.

Armenian GDP grew 13.1% year-on-year to 2.033 trillion dram in
January-October 2006. GDP grew 13.9% in 2005.

The official exchange rate on December 13 was 365.11 dram/$1.