Planes Are Late

A1+

PLANES ARE LATE
[02:03 pm] 15 December, 2006

Today many of the residents of Yerevan arrived at work late. Although
the public transportation started its work on time, the drivers drove
so slowly that it took them twice as much to pass their route. It had
snowed at night. The snow was not a surprise as the meteorologists
predicted it two days ago.

The Yerevan municipality claims that the cars spreading sand in the
streets started their work at 5 a.m. This year 250 tons of salt and 6
825 cubic meters of sand has been stored. 213 cars have been allotted
to cover the streets with them.

The snow has stopped, but Yerevan is still in fog. «Armhydromet»
claims that there will be no snow in Yerevan for the coming two
days. It will snow in Syunik and Artsakh.

The weather has caused most trouble to plane passengers. We learned
from airport «Zvartnots» that the flights are delayed because of the
snow.

Intoxicated by Gas

A1+

INTOXICATED BY GAS
[05:07 pm] 15 December, 2006

On December 14, at 11:50 resident of Vanadzor Hamlet Haroutyunyan
(b. 1983) has been taken to hospital with severe gas intoxication
which he received while having a bath.

According to the Emergency Administration, on December 15 at 05:40
p.m. residents of the village of Lernahovit Azniv (b. 1966) and Bella
(b. 1988) Galoyans have been taken to hospital with gas intoxication.

According to the doctors, the situation of the patients is grave.

"Center on Young People’s Professional Orientation" to be founded

BY RA GOVERNMENT’S DECISION, "CENTER ON YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROFESSIONAL
ORIENTATION" TO BE FOUNDED

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 14, NOYAN TAPAN. The RA Government made a decision
at the December 14 sitting to found the "Center on Young People’s
Professional Orientation" state non-profitable organization. It was
mentioned that the main goal of the young people’s professional
orientation is to give a person general abilities of developemt of
career what involves his continual development as a student, worker
and citizen. According to the information submitted to Noyan Tapan by
the RA Government’s Information and Public Relations Department, the
program of founding the center arises from priorities of the
"2006-2007 Strategy of Youth State Policy."

C. Ter-Stepanian Appointed Head of Ad Hoc group on Religious Dialog

RA REPRESENTATIVE TO CE CHRISTIAN TER-STEPANIAN APPOINTED HEAD OF AD
HOC REFLECTION GROUP ON RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

STRASBOURG, DECEMBER 15, NOYAN TAPAN. Ambassador Christian
Ter-Stepanian, RA Resident Representative to the Council of Europe,
was appointed as heas of the Ad hoc reflection group responsible for
considering the objectives of a possible Council of Europe action
concerning the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue. The
group was created on December 14 by the decision of the Council of
Europe Ministerial Committee being based on the priorities stipulated
during the 2005 summit of CE member-states’ leaders. As Noyan Tapan
was informed from RA Foreign Ministry Press and Information
Department, over the past two years, being the head of the reporters’
group of CE Ministerial Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs,
RA Ambassador supported the activity promoted in the sphere of
development of intercultural and interreligious dialogue by CE. The
results of the group’s work will be presented during the CE
Ministerial session to be held in 2007 May.

Facts of Bottling Alcoholic Drinks Made in Non-Factory Conditions

FACTS OF BOTTLING ALCOHOLIC DRINKS MADE IN NON-FACTORY CONDITIONS
REVEALED

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 15, NOYAN TAPAN. Facts of bottling alcoholic drinks
made in non-factory conditions, as well as with violating rules of
marking with exci se stamps were revealed in various marzes by
employees of the State Tax Service (STS) adjunct to the RA government
in the last two months. NT correspondent was informed from the STS
press service that 21 bottles of brandy and 22 bottles of vodka, which
in terms of their contents did not correspond to the standards and
were marked with faked excise stamps were discovered in Gyumri.

According to the same source, 0.5 and 0.75 litre bottles of false
brandy with labels of the Yerevan Barndy Factory were taken from
Yerevan’s Ayrarat fair and turned out to a mixture of water and grapes
spirit. A bottle was sold for 1,000-4,000 drams (2.7-10 USD). Such
cases increase before New Year.

Office of Oppositional Party Set On Fire

A1+

OFFICE OF OPPOSITIONAL PARTY SET ON FIRE
[05:15 pm] 14 December, 2006

Yesterday evening unknown people tried to set fire to the office of
Armenian Liberal-Progressive Party (LPP), located on Abovyan 22.

At about 9 p.m. the residents of the building took notice of the fire
and rapidly extinguished it with joint measures. Shortly afterwards,
the members of the party and the police arrived at the site.

Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, leader of the party, informed us that unknown
people poured petrol on the door of the office and burnt it.

But for the hasty reaction of the residents, the whole office and even
the building would have countered serious problems.

Mr. Hovhannisyan doesn’t want to give political estimation to the
event. He only notes that he hasn’t got enemies and the hooliganism is
likely connected with the political activity of their party.

`LPP is a political party; we are engaged in politics and have no
other business to do here. I have been in the political sphere over
the past eight years. I don’t want to give any political estimation as
I am not sure of anything», said Hovhannes Hovhannisyan.

A criminal action has been brought in this respect.

The International Community is Confused

A1+

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS CONFUSED
[08:35 pm] 15 December, 2006

Defense Minister Serge Sargsyan noted about the attitude of the
international structures towards the December 10 Constitutional
Referendum in NKR that the most acceptable attitude for him was that
of the NATO officials according to which the Karabakh conflict is
being settled by the Minsk group and the NATO does not interfere with
it.

«The attitude of many people and officials towards the NKR referendum
was rather strange for me: I think they are confusing something. Some
of them think it was an independence referendum, but it was merely a
constitutional one. If some people do not want Karabakh to have a
referendum, that is another question».

Argentina Passes Law Declaring Armenian Deaths A "Genocide"

ARGENTINA PASSES LAW DECLARING ARMENIAN DEATHS A "GENOCIDE"

All Headline News
58103
Dec 14 2006

Matthew Borghese – All Headline News Staff Writer Buenos Aires,
(AHN) – Argentina has passed a bill labeling the mass killings of
Armenians in Turkey a "genocide."

The Argentinean Senate has unanimously voted to mark April 24 as
an annual day commemorating the deaths which occurred around the
time of World War I, and remain a sensitive subject for the modern
Turkish government.

The issue has been receiving recent attention after the French National
Assembly approved a bill making it a crime to deny calling the deaths
a genocide. However, the bill, passed in October, still needs to pass
through the French Senate and President.

French President Chirac has opposed the bill, while Turkish Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdogan has also spoken out against both bills.

http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/70058

Nagorno-Karabakh’s Referendum

NAGORNO-KARABAKH’S REFERENDUM
Shaun Walker
Daria Vaisman

Open Democracy, UK
Dec 14 2006

The Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan remains poised between peace
and war even after a decisive vote for independence, report Daria
Vaisman & Shaun Walker.

It was all a bit of an anticlimax. The contested territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh was voting on 10 December 2006 for a new constitution
– after twelve years of de facto independence from Azerbaijan, it
was meant to be the final stage on its path to statehood. Yet on
the streets of its capital Stepanakert, no one seemed particularly
excited. Two lonely posters and one small banner advertised the
referendum. While all the major international papers covered a similar
referendum in breakaway South Ossetia on 12 October, here only one
of the wires showed up.

This is surprising, considering that Karabakh has been the bloodiest,
highest profile, and most intractable of the frozen conflicts in
the region. But the neglect was less evidence of indifference to
independence than of a feeling that Karabakh is further down the line
to recognition than its breakaway counterparts; the referendum was
merely confirming its independence, rather than agitating for it.

Nagorno-Karabakh has a special history. The Armenians call it a centre
of their ancient civilisation; the Azeris point to their famous
Karabakh poets and musicians. The spectacular mountains and green
valleys give a dramatic backdrop to a region infused with Persian,
Turkish and Russian influences. Though the region’s ethnic groups
collided over the centuries, Stalin’s nationalities policies in
the early Soviet period exacerbated the tensions. Karabakh, though
always majority Armenian, was attached to the newly created republic
of Azerbaijan in 1921.

Though there were desultory cries for greater control from the Armenian
population of Karabakh throughout the Soviet period, their demands
grew stronger as the union collapsed. Azeri and Armenian friends
and neighbours turned against each other, fuelled by nationalism and
Armenian Karabakh’s irresistible drive for independence.

A still-standing but shaky ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994,
after six years of fighting. The results were dire: more than 700,000
Azeris and 400,000 Armenians were displaced from their homes, and
Karabakh is now a monoethnic shadow of its cosmopolitan past. The
status of Karabakh has been discussed and contested over the decade
since, but with each failed peace talk, the chance for compromise on
either side fades further. With its symbolic importance and its value
as a cause around which political elites can harness public sentiment,
it is the region’s Jerusalem.

A frozen status quo

The Karabakh border with Azerbaijan is a frontline. In fact, the actual
line of control, where nervous young Karabakh conscripts train rifles
at Azerbaijan from clumsily dug trenches, is well outside the borders
of Karabakh proper, in territory occupied as a buffer zone.

With this border closed, Karabakh is only accessible by a single
major road that wends through the mountains from Armenia.

There is no way of knowing where Armenia ends and Karabakh begins –
no visible signs mark the border, and a barely noticeable checkpoint
intermittently stops cars with a friendly request to register in
Stepanakert. Armenia funds approximately half of Karabakh’s state
budget, and trains its military. This makes true independence for
Nagorno-Karabakh difficult to imagine.

Even less likely, however, is a return to Azerbaijan. By the
territorial-integrity standards applied to the other breakaway states,
Azerbaijan should keep Karabakh, as it was part of their territory
during the Soviet period, just as South Ossetia and Abkhazia were parts
of Georgia. Azerbaijan has promised the "highest level" of autonomy,
but Armenian Karabakh is understandably sceptical.

A comparison is sometimes made to the Aland Islands – an archipelago
with a Swedish population that was given to Finland in 1921. Decades
of broad autonomy under Finnish rule left a contented population and an
example that this kind of dispute can be solved peacefully. In 1993, a
mediation group brought the three sides in the Karabakh dispute to the
islands, and suggested a similar arrangement. The Karabakh Armenians,
so goes the apocryphal tale, surprised everyone by agreeing to the
idea. "Yes," they said, "we’re happy to be ruled by Finland."

The peace process

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk
group, a multilateral group led by Russia, the United States and
France, has been charged with negotiating a solution to the conflict.

A series of summits have been unsuccessful, including most recently
at Rambouillet earlier in 2006 despite widespread expectation of a
breakthrough. While the sides have been close to agreement on many
issues, the recurring problem has been the most fundamental one: the
status of Karabakh. As with Jerusalem, there is no status acceptable
to both sides.

With Karabakh’s independence already a de facto achievement, the
Armenian side already has a disproportionate share of what it wants.

True, the situation is far from ideal for Karabakh – the regime is
concerned about an attack from Azerbaijan, and lacks the investments
and political status that come with international recognition. But
the imperfect status quo seems more appealing to the Armenian side
than other options on the table, particularly those which seek to
reunite the region with Azerbaijan.

This stumbling-block has led many to advocate a "step-by-step"
approach to resolving the conflict, rather than a "package deal"
to solve the conflict all at once. The idea is to build up trust
first while negotiating on less contentious issues, such as troop
withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territories, and then deal with
Karabakh’s status at a later date. But even this approach has failed
to yield results so far.

The regional powers

The United States sees the Caucasus as a strategic energy corridor that
bypasses both Iran and Russia. With the newly built Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline, which will soon be pumping a million barrels of oil per
day from the Caspian to the Mediterranean, the US is worried that
regional conflict would jeopardise its sizeable energy investments.

Iran, which borders Armenia and Azerbaijan, has helped both sides at
different times. During the height of the conflict, Iran supported
Christian Armenia against its fellow Shi’a state Azerbaijan. With
much of northern Iran populated by increasingly anti-government
ethnic Azeris with ties to Azerbaijan, it’s in Iran’s interests to
keep Azerbaijan occupied with Karabakh.

Despite support for Armenia during the conflict, Russia in recent
years has tried not to take sides, maintaining good relations with
both parties. Karabakh officials remain cool on relations with
Russia, however, and are keen to avoid being lumped in with the
other breakaway states. As one Karabakh official put it, "Of course
we’re very interested in hearing from the others as the status of
Nato-controlled Kosovo’s independence nears. But we have bilateral not
multilateral ties with them." The fear is that Russia is using the
breakaway states as an anti-western policy instrument, and Karabakh
has no interest in taking part.

There is a sense even among the other breakaways that they would
prefer a guarantor other than Russia if they had a choice. Karabakh
does – in large part due to the powerful Armenian diaspora. This is
evident even before arriving; the road between Armenia and Karabakh
is perhaps the best in the Caucasus, and was funded by $25 million of
diaspora money. Maps, tourist brochures and websites about Karabakh
are glossy and professional.

Masis Mayilian, Karabakh’s deputy foreign minister, asked us in
flawless English if we wanted to see the text of a lecture he had
delivered at a university in the United States. It was worlds away
from South Ossetian or Transdniestrian officials – Russian-speaking
and suspicious of anything and anyone western.

While these regions have no voice in western capitals, the Armenian
diaspora acts as an international lobbying group. "The moral and
political support is more important than the investments; they can
lobby our interests in the US Congress," said Mayilian. In October
2005, fifty-nine members of congress sent a letter to President
George W Bush calling Karabakh an independent country of "proud
citizens committed to the values of freedom, democracy and respect
for human rights."

The Azeri factor

There is one thing that may shift the balance in the medium term:
Azerbaijan’s oil windfall, estimated by President Ilham Aliyev to be
about $140 billion in the next twenty years. A good amount of this is
being spent on updating the Azerbaijani military, and with nearly a
million internally-displaced people (IDPs) in Azerbaijan as a result
of the Karabakh conflict, regaining lost territory is a huge priority
among the populace and elites. While an all-out military attack might
be unlikely, having the capability to launch it might shift the balance
at the negotiating table, and give some force to Azerbaijan’s demands.

The Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents met again on 28 November,
at the CIS summit in Minsk, and again no progress was made. If and
when progress does come in the negotiations, it will be a long time
before Karabakh returns to any kind of normalcy. If Azerbaijan recovers
control of some or all of the territory occupied as a buffer-zone,
it will take years of investment to make it habitable again. Walking
around a destroyed Azeri town like Fizuli is rather like visiting ruins
from ancient Rome – all the evidence of former civilisation is there,
but the devastation is so complete that it is difficult to imagine
it as a living community.

Despite the fact that more than a million people remain displaced from
their homes, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have too much to lose from a
new conflict. While a breakthrough in negotiations seems unlikely in
the near future, so does further bloodshed. Instead, the most likely
scenario is more of the same – a fragile status somewhere between
peace and war.

sus/Nagorno_Karabakh_4182.jsp

http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-cauca

Nagorno-Karabakh: Between Vote And Reality

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: BETWEEN VOTE AND REALITY

Open Democracy, UK
Dec 14 2006

Nagorno-Karabakh has followed Transdniestria and South Ossetia
in holding an independence referendum. But democracy in these
"non-recognised entities" is not so simple, reports Sabine Freizer
of the International Crisis Group.

On 10 December 2006, Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum in which
close to 75,000 people, or 83% of voters, approved the entity’s
first constitution. The document calls Nagorno-Karabakh a "sovereign
democratic" state. The date of its approval is significant: the poll
took place fifteen years to the day after the mountainous Caucasian
enclave’s Armenian population voted overwhelmingly for independence.

But neither the 1991 referendum nor that of 2006 is recognised as
legitimate abroad. Nagorno-Karabakh may have been establishing
state-like institutions since 1991, but it continues to be
internationally considered as part of Azerbaijan, and no state –
not even Armenia – has ever recognised its statehood.

The long-running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most significant
obstacle to peace and regional cooperation in the south Caucasus.

Fighting from 1992 to 1994, when a ceasefire came into effect, caused
at least 30,000 deaths and over a million Azeris and Armenians were
displaced. Ceasefire violations and casualties continue to occur
monthly along the line of contact. Exiles from Nagorno-Karabakh and
seven other occupied territories around the enclave have been unable
to return to their homes and continue to live in miserable conditions
elsewhere in Azerbaijan.

Today, Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto authorities demand independence
and international recognition, citing their right to national
self-determination. Azerbaijan pledges that Nagorno-Karabakh’s
population will be provided with the highest form of self-government
but within the country’s frontiers. It claims the sanctity of
international borders and its right to preserve its territorial
integrity. It also blames Armenia for supporting Nagorno-Karabakh
militarily and economically, in effect participating in the annexation
of Azerbaijani land.

A year of stasis

Since 1992, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been negotiating to find a
solution. Talks have been facilitated by the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk group, chaired by France, Russia
and the United States. In 1997, 1998 and 2001 it seemed as though the
sides were close to agreeing on a comprehensive settlement. However,
each time, hopes were dashed.

The same occurred in 2006. Two summit meetings between Azerbaijani
president Ilham Aliyev and Armenian president Robert Kocharian were
held in the first half of the year. The two were supposed to sign
a short agreement on principles to launch more substantial talks on
the details of a full accord. They failed to do so. In the summer,
the Minsk group co-chairs expressed their deep frustration, issuing
a hard-hitting statement announcing they saw no point in continuing
their intensive shuttle diplomacy or initiating further meetings
between the presidents. They called on both leaders to summon the
political will necessary to clinch a deal and sell it to their deeply
sceptical publics.

Despite the difficulties, the building blocks of the potential
settlement are well-known. The International Crisis Group spelled
them out in two reports in 2005, and the mediators’ summer statement
confirmed the details: all sides would renounce the use of force;
Armenian troops would withdraw from parts of Azerbaijan surrounding
Nagorno-Karabakh; displaced persons would be allowed to return; and
both sides would commit to holding a referendum – whose results would
be recognised by all – in Nagorno-Karabakh on final status, with the
participation of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris. In the meantime, the
entity would have an interim status, and the international community
would provide substantial assistance, including peacekeepers – for
this, the only "frozen conflict" in Europe without international
monitors.

The Montenegro example

In a surprise turnaround after a brief meeting between the Azerbaijani
and Armenian presidents on the sidelines of the CIS summit in Minsk
on 28 November, President Aliyev optimistically declared, "we are
approaching the final stage" of the negotiations process. Azerbaijani
foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov added that only one matter remains
a source of disagreement.

What could this be? In the past, negotiations have stalled over
several issues, including the future of two land corridors linking
Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (Lachin and Kelbajar), and the
modalities of the future referendum and its conditioning on refugee
return. After the Minsk meeting, Aliyev also stated "Azerbaijan’s
negotiating position remains unchanged." As Baku has refused to
consider granting Nagorno-Karabakh any status outside Azerbaijan,
the remaining sticking-point in the negotiations is likely to be
the modalities of the referendum; and more specifically whether it
would allow Nagorno-Karabakh to gain independence and international
recognition or not.

(On 5 December 2006 the OSCE ministerial council issued a statement
on Nagorno-Karabakh saying: "we are encouraged that negotiations
in 2006… have brought the sides closer to agreement on the basic
principles for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict…We
urge the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to redouble their
efforts in the coming year to finalise these basic principles as soon
as possible.")

Allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to hold an internationally accepted
referendum on its future status, with the participation of Karabakh
Azeris and Armenians, is a key element in any resolution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Such a deal would be comparable to what
Serbia agreed to in signing the Belgrade agreement in 2002, which
created the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro". A clause was
inserted into the Belgrade agreement stating that Montenegro could
begin independence procedures in 2006, culminating in a referendum.

During those four years, Montenegro did not waste time: it set
up a multi-ethnic government, established good relations with its
neighbours, founded a self-sufficient economy, engaged in a serious
fight against organised crime, strengthened the rule of law, and began
"stabilisation and association" talks with the European Union.

Most importantly, it obtained Belgrade’s consent that if 55% of
Montenegro residents voted in favour of independence, Serbia would
accept the result. When the referendum was held on 21 May 2006, all
sides had agreed on its modalities and pro- and anti-independence
groups were given equal rights to campaign.

Montenegro’s successful referendum has helped launch a series of
copycat efforts in non-recognised entities in the post-Soviet space,
including the breakaway Moldovan region of Transdniestria, South
Ossetia (a splinter of Georgia), and now Nagorno-Karabakh. On 17
September, Transdniestria voted on independence. It was followed by
presidential elections the same weekend as Nagorno-Karabakh’s vote.

On 12 November, two parallel referendums were organised in South
Ossetia, one backed by the de facto authorities in the breakaway
capital of Tskhinvali, the other by Tbilisi. In the first, South
Ossetians voted overwhelmingly for independence; in the second, voters
called for a resumption of dialogue with Georgia on the creation of
a federal state. Two parallel presidential elections were also held.

Amongst the region’s non-recognised entities, only Abkhazia has
abstained from the holding a referendum on independence in 2006.

According to Abkhazia’s de facto minister of foreign affairs, Sergei
Shamba, it has no need to repeat an exercise it already held in 1999.

At that time, a referendum adopting the constitution of Abkhazia as a
"sovereign, democratic and legally based state" passed with a large
majority of current Abkhazia residents, though it failed to include
those forced to flee the province during the 1992-93 war, and the
vote was never recognised internationally.

These post-Soviet referenda, like Nagorno-Karabakh on 10 December,
are in no way comparable to Montenegro’s. They did not meet the same
conditions: most importantly, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova never
gave their consent for them to occur. The Azerbaijani ministry of
foreign affairs said that the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum "interferes
with an ongoing peace process", and the vote could not be considered
legitimate until the area’s ethnic Azeris were able to return.

An agreement for all

But there is another aspect to the Nagorno-Karabakh vote. It was
after all a referendum on a constitution, a basic law which will
govern the state, help assure democracy and human-rights protection.

In an interview with the Associated Press, Nagorno-Karabakh’s de
facto deputy foreign minister Masis Mayilian suggested that the
constitutional referendum was "necessary to formalise the already
existing foundations of state system and relations between the state
and its citizens." As a vote on how self-government will be temporarily
exercised in Nagorno-Karabakh until there is a comprehensive settlement
to the conflict, the referendum has at least internal legitimacy
and utility.

Since the early 1990s, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transdniestria have been left in limbo, isolated from the
outside word, unsure of their future, with few contacts to their
former metropolitan states. De facto authorities have been elected,
have set up governmental institutions, have started providing social
services, have organised defence forces, have tried to restart local
economies, and in the Abkhaz case, have even allowed some 40,000
Georgian returnees and adopted the language of international minority
rights protection. They should not be blamed for refusing to allow the
lack of progress in international negotiations, especially on status,
to stall democratisation and reform in their entities.

Ultimately, the people still living in Nagorno-Karabakh and the other
non-recognised entities are better served by accountable government
protecting the rule of law (according to the Freedom House Index,
for example, Nagorno-Karabakh ranks as "partly free"). Only if they
can demonstrate commitment to democratic values will the de facto
authorities in Stepanakert, Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Tiraspol be treated
as legitimate partners in negotiations. It is also in the best interest
of the international community and the metropolitan states to have
responsible leaders in the entities to defuse instability and join in
dialogue. Participatory and pluralist politics in the non-recognised
entities will help build the peace constituency essential to the
eventual implementation of any peace settlement.

But what of the Karabakh Azeris, who were unable to participate on
10 December in deciding the future of Nagorno-Karabakh’s internal
arrangements? According to international norms, these former
inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh should not be deprived of their right
to participate in the entity’s political life.

If Stepanakert wants to be gain legitimacy, it needs to show the
international community not only that it can organise orderly and
fair referendums, but also that it allows all those who should be
eligible to vote to actually cast their ballots. In other words,
they must begin to accept the return of the 40,000 Karabakh Azeris
who were forced to flee in 1991-92.

aucasus/nagorno_reality_4184.jsp

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-c