MGR FRANCESCHINI: TURKS ARE MISSING POPE

AsiaNews.it, Italy
Dec 4 2006

The president of the Turkey’s bishops’ conference told how after
Ephesus, Benedict XVI "could at last be a religious leader through
and through" and how he won people’s hearts. And there were evident
signs of communion with the Orthodox Patriarch.

Ankara (AsiaNews) – Thanks to his gestures in Turkey in last week’s
visit, the Pope has managed to overcome the attitude of hostility
that many awaited him with. This is what Mgr Ruggero Franceschini,
president of Turkey’s bishops’ conference and the archbishop of
Smyrna, told AsiaNews. The archbishop accompanied Benedict XVI from
the very first steps of his journey in Turkish territory. Three days
after the pope’s departure from Istanbul, he is still taking in the
climate of joy and satisfaction. There are many signs, small and big,
of a climate of relaxation and serenity. Mgr Franceschini said: "I
am an optimist by nature but I am not one to be deluded. I looked in
the eyes of people many times, and every time I found expressions of
sympathy for the Pope. I cannot deny how tense the Holy Father himself
was in Ankara, during the political diplomatic meetings; it was the
spiritual immersion in Ephesus, especially as he took in the display
of affection and goodwill by the people, which calmed him. At last,
from being a political leader, a role that is not really his and
that certainly embarrassed him even if it was undertaken very well,
he could be a religious leader through and through.

Immediately, as soon as the Eucharistic celebration at Mary’s house
was over, he could exclaim joyfully: ‘Now I feel I can speak freely
and that I can express all my faith in God, I do my part and he
will do his.’" The archbishop continued: "I can truly say that I
saw him abandon himself into the hands of God and that this voyage
turned out to be a great success. The welcome from everyone was
especially marvelous, starting from his descent from the Mountain of
the Nightingale where Meryem Ana is situated. There were many people
– obviously Muslim, including many veiled women – who rushed to the
sides of the road so they could see and greet him. It was a popular
manifestation that offered, in all simplicity, a humane welcome of
reconciliation, and it enabled one to forget the other manifestation
against the pope, the gathering in Istanbul on the Sunday before
his arrival. Christians then took heart: this encouragement, this
reawakening, was needed, especially by Christians in Smyrna, who
do not have big problems to face as do Christians in other parts of
Turkey. But they tend to rest on their laurels; faith is no longer the
deepest dimension of their lives. They were roused by the Pope who
reminded them of the example of Don Andrea who wanted to be a seed
and who shed his blood in this land." Mgr Franceschini continued:
"Even the attitude of the civil authorities has been interesting:
some – with evident political intent – sought to gain the support
and sympathy of the Pope, even to the extent of affirming things
that Benedict XVI had not said. But others allowed themselves to be
led by their hearts, like the vice prime minister and various chief
officials and mayors, who were infected by people’s enthusiasm.

The mayor of Smyrna was exemplary, he affirmed that this was a great
day for him, and some civil leaders who went to shake the Pope’s hand
in Ephesus were hard pressed to keep back their tears of emotion.

Religious authorities also showed respect and esteem. The religious
affairs chief amazed people. After his hard words about the speech
in Regensburg, he had the courage to say there was the need to work
together for peace and dialogue, forgetting the past… But the Muftì
of Istanbul was still warmer and more affectionate as he welcomed
Benedict XVI in the Blue Mosque with such simplicity and sympathy.

The shared prayer was the right ending for a meeting between wise
people who are careful to pay mutual respect. It was no coincidence
that they exchanged the same symbol: a dove, sign of peace."

"The Orthodox, then, were affectionate in every way; they put
everything at our disposal, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate turned
out to be a welcoming and open environment where people from all the
world merged together, including the Korean metropolitan with many of
his faithful. They came from so far away precisely to underline their
communion with Patriarch Bartholomew I and the Pope. I was amazed,
finally, at the large crowd that gathered at the Armenian Patriarchate
and there too, by the warm welcome shown by the stupendous Armenian
choir." The president of the Turkish episcopate said: "This was the
most beautiful success of the visit: the Pope managed to win over the
hearts of all. A comment by a television journalist Mihat Bereket was
significant: "The unwanted Pope has become a Pope we will miss!" Mgr
Ruggero added optimistically: "We cannot tell now what the fruits of
this visit will be, but certainly this new esteem for Pope Ratzinger
will serve to give birth to something positive and lasting."

–Boundary_(ID_40g2wPkPqf92IJgSh6k r/w)–

ARMENIAN PERIODICALS HUNGRY FOR PAPER

ITAR-TASS, Russia
Dec 3 2006

YEREVAN, December 3 (Itar-Tass) — The majority of Armenian newspapers
will not be released next Wednesday because of the absence of
paper. Armenia buys paper from Russia.

"About 150 tonnes of paper have been kept in Vladikavkaz since June 19,
and another 350 tonnes are staying in Ilyichevsk," Vrezh Markosian,
Director of the Tigran the Great Yerevan Publishing House, said. "As a
rule, paper was delivered from the North Caucasus by truck, but this
is now impossible, because the Verkhny Lars border checkpoint closed
in June in a disagreement between Russia and Georgia. The Ilyichevsk
port administration has refused to send our paper by ferryboat to
Poti. Our paper reserves will last until December 6."

Even if the ferry traffic resumes, it will be impossible to supply
paper on time. Certainly, Armenia may receive paper through Iran or
Turkey, but that would cost a pretty penny, Markosian said.

ARMENIAN POLISHED DIAMOND PRODUCTION DOWN BY NEARLY 20%

Tacy, Israel
Dec 3 2006

Armenia reduced its polished diamond production by 19.7 percent in
the first ten months of 2006 compared to the same period of 2005,
says Gagik Mkrtchian, Head of the Armenian Trade and Economic
Development Ministry.

Meanwhile, cut diamond sales fell by over 17 during the same period
as compared to one year earlier.

A drop in global prices for cut and polished diamonds combined with
a weaker dollar in Armenia were behind the drop in output and sales.

Mkrtchian adds that Armenia did not buy any rough diamonds from Russia
in 2006, instead buying most of their rough from Israel and Belgium,
since it was not profitable to buy from Russia.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

AZERBAIJAN’S GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGE: IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH IRAN
By Tamine Adeebfar

Middle East Economic Survey, Lebanon
Vol: XLIX, Number 49
Dec 4 2006

The following paper was written by Dr Adeebar for the Tehran-based
Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies, and is
reprinted with the author’s permission.

In the post-cold war context, the geopolitics of the new state of
Azerbaijan, with its economic and security concerns, has become an
issue involving a range of complementary and competing factors. Since
Azerbaijan’s independence, just over a decade ago, the country has been
facing many challenges and opportunities, including: the landlocked
nature of the country and Caspian pipeline politics; the unresolved
issue of the legal status of the Caspian; the exploitation of its
natural resources and the attraction of the FDI needed to bring
hard currency into the country; the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict with Armenia; the impacts of the war in Chechnya; political
volatilities in its two powerful neighbors, Russia and Iran; and
the uncertainties in the Georgian territory. These and many more
challenges need to be taken into consideration by analysts approaching
Azerbaijan’s geopolitical issues.

In this broad context, the biggest challenge for Azerbaijan has been
to balance the threats and opportunities by minimizing the former
and maximizing the latter. This challenge has a clear political
dimension. In that context, it seems that in determining its behavior
as a newly independent state, Azerbaijan perceives two diverging
external axes of power between which it tries to play a balancing
game. These axes can be seen as US-Turkey-Israel on the one hand,
and Russia-Iran-CIS on the other. In that respect, the following key
parameters can be drawn:

Russia still has de facto influence over states close at hand and
mediates in the conflicts in the troubled areas in the region.

Russia’s interests in its ‘backyard’ neighbors have remained strong,
given its long history and ties with the new republics. These interests
may not necessarily be interpreted as confrontational, but rather as
a reality of regional politics.

Iranian Influence

Another major parameter has been Iran ­- Azerbaijan’s southern Islamic
neighbor – given the Muslim majority in Azerbaijan, the long border
between the two states, and the large population of Iranian Azeris in
Iran’s northern province. A key fear for Azerbaijan has been Iran’s
perceived ability to exercise its ideological/political power to
undermine Azerbaijan’s secular statehood.

Furthermore, since Azerbaijan’s independence, its primary foreign
policy criteria with other states has been their position towards
Nagorno-Karabakh and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In that
respect, Iran’s aid to Armenia has created some concerns for Azerbaijan
in terms of its relations with Tehran. Yet, it is important to bear
in mind that Iran’s aid to Armenia has never consisted of support
for the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Besides,
Iran has continued its trade relations with Azerbaijan’s enclave of
Nakhjavan, located in Armenian territory.

Nonetheless, the pro-US approach has resulted in a tendency to put Iran
and Russia in one basket, despite their different positions towards
Armenia, and thus to encourage Azerbaijan’s tense relations with it two
northern and southern neighbors. In line with that policy, Azerbaijan
has been strengthening its ties with the US and the regional US ally,
Turkey, and consequently it has supported US strategy in the region,
such as neglecting the pipeline routes through Russia and Iran, and
instead opting for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through
Turkey, regardless of its lesser commercial viability.

Azerbaijan’s pro-Western approach has developed as a counterweight to
its regional challenges and particularly its powerful neighbors. In
that direction and particularly in the aftermath of the events
of September 11th, which were followed by the US attacks on
Afghanistan and then Iraq, Azerbaijan has seized the opportunity of
mobilization of support for the US position to ally with the only world
superpower, probably in the hope that it would secure its economic
and security needs as a young state that is strongly dependent on
energy resources. Hence, Azerbaijan participated in sending troops
to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and also provided an air corridor
for the US military efforts.

Azerbaijan also began a closer relation with Israel through trade
and cultural cooperation as well as security-oriented exchanges,
regardless of the animosity between Iran and Israel. These attempts by
Azerbaijan were to define its foreign policy based on its perceptions
of geo-strategic interests rather than any other motivations such as
merely economic needs and/or cultural/ideological motivations.

Iran/Russia Interests

The common interests of Iran and Russia in the region, their support
for Armenia and particularly their shared wish to avoid Western
influence have increasingly encouraged Azerbaijan to play the US card
to act as a shield of security. Nevertheless, it needs to be kept in
mind that the US strategy in the region is defined by three issues:

First, a security-related presence in the region; second, control
over the energy-related issues in the economic context; and third,
political influence through an "Americanized democracy" in the region
to be exercised by pro-US governments. Obviously the latter approach
did not appeal to the Azerbaijan government, given its preferred
way of handling internal affairs. The ‘color revolutions’ in the
region in recent years have clearly acted as a "wake-up call" to
those in Azerbaijan favoring a pro-Western approach to modulate its
interactions with both flanks, while trying not to be seen leaning
too far in one direction.

A full alliance with the US, therefore, no longer seems to be
a golden opportunity, nor does it guarantee their "strategic
partnership". Rather it could be seen as a possible threat
to Azerbaijan’s stability. Given the US reputation of being an
unreliable ally when its immediate interests and power position are
at stake, Azerbaijan may need to take the following observations
into consideration.

Given that Russia’s challenges vis-a-vis the US are usually based on
grand bargaining, meaning that the short-term sacrifices can be made
for long-term gains, to what extent would it matter to Russia to face
instability in Azerbaijan, should a color revolution happen there?

Would it really affect Turkey’s strategic ambitions and interests in
the region if a pro-American government were to replace the present
Azerbaijani administration? How would Israel react to such change?

US Sanctions

Despite Armenia occupying almost 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory and
causing 1mn people to be displaced in Azerbaijan, the US-imposed
Section 907 Act1 on Azerbaijan in favor of Armenia remains effective.

Despite years of Western involvement – through the Minsk Group2
– in mediating between Azerbaijan and Armenia to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there has been no success in addressing
the conflict and assuring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, for
various reasons – from Russian interests to the Minsk group’s failings.

Despite the possible perceived threat of a successful Azerbaijan
as a role model for the more-than-20mn Azeri Iranians in Iran, the
question needs to be posed: is Iran really worried about the success
of any small country in its neighborhood? In the absence of a threat to
Iranian security through the use of a neighbor as a base for potential
attacks by a powerful state, Iran has shown no concern about the
economic success of any neighboring country. Dubai is an example. Iran,
historically, has tended to compete with more distant countries.

Also, Iranian Azeris play a leading role in Iranian society and the
economy, especially in the state’s key systems. There is no reason
for them to wish to create a troubled area within their own homeland.

In that context, the famous American marketing principle of "If you
advertise your wish often enough to make it believed, then your wish
will come true", makes one wonder if this overly repeated concept of
"Azerbaijan’s threat to Iran in terms of awakening separatist ideas
among Iranian Azeris" has ever had a genuine base. Could it be that
it is rather the expression of another agenda – to undermine potential
cooperation between the two countries?

Support For Azerbaijan

Despite the perceived threat of Iranian ideologically expansionist
tendencies, the economic and political potential for Tehran to provide
support for Azerbaijan is real and may be worth further examination
by both neighbors. From the standpoint of Azerbaijan’s need for a
balancing mechanism, Iran’s geopolitical importance in the context
of US interests in the Gulf as well as in Iraq, the tension over the
Iranian nuclear issue, the historical animosity in Iran-US relations,
and the regional rivalry among Iran, Turkey and Russia – all these
factors represent a strong card that could be played in Azerbaijan’s
geopolitical balancing game to secure its stability.

Moreover, all the economic advantages and potentials – from the
possibility of Iranian investments in Azerbaijan to inter-state
cooperation on areas of interests such as a Nakhjavan trade agreements
and/or gas pipelines to the neighboring markets – could bring more
balance into Azerbaijan’s policies in terms of the perceived divergent
interests of the two states.

Given the complex context in which it finds itself and the need to
balance the interests of competing outside interests against its
own national ones, Azerbaijan should reassess its real strategic
geopolitical interests. As outlined above, that assessment should
include consideration of a closer relationship with its southern
neighbor, Iran. Such a move is likely to offer more opportunities
and fewer threats than meet the eye.

1. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act was passed by the United
States Congress in 1992. The article bans direct aid to the Azeri
government.

2. The OSCE Minsk Group was created in 1992 by the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)) to encourage a peaceful,
negotiated resolution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh.

les/oped/v49n49-5OD01.htm

–Boundary_(ID_b6H8oJK1 mBMZu4LEaSDiSA)–

TURKEY MUST PROVE IT IS FIT FOR THE EU
By Boston Herald Editorial Staff

Boston Herald, MA
Dec 3 2006

Pope Benedict XVI took the occasion of his visit to Turkey to let it
be known that he no longer believes Turkey should be excluded from
the European Union. That may help Vatican diplomacy in the wake
of the Pope’s September quoting of a Byzantine emperor of half a
millennium ago on the violent nature of Islam. But it’s not proof
that EU membership is a good idea.

We have supported Turkey’s membership, but now we welcome the
just-arisen impasse in negotiations. It can provide the opportunity
for a long pause, as recommended by the EU Commission, while Europe
and the world see what kind of country Turkey is going to become.

(The impasse arises because of Turkey’s refusal to let ships from
Cypriot ports trade to Turkish ports.)

Turkey asked to join Europe in 1993 and for years seemed to be making
a good case. It even abolished its death penalty to qualify.

But recently Turkey has been backsliding.

The Muslim nature of the country is not an issue for us, though it
is for much of Europe and once was for the pope. Turkey’s secular
revolution of 1923 remains firmly in place. Support for Sharia, strict
Islamic law, has declined from 21 percent to 9 percent in the past
seven years. Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s Islamist government has
only nibbled at the dominant secularism of public life to accommodate
a measure of religious expression.

But the country has long refused to permit free religious expression
for others. The tiny Christian community is forbidden to operate a
seminary or to publish anything.

Last year prosecutors charged Orhan Pamuk, winner of the Nobel Prize
in literature this year, with "public denigration of the Turkish
identity" because of interview comments about Turkey’s treatment of
its Kurdish and Armenian minorities. The case was later dropped,
but the brand-new law on which it was based, making it a crime to
discuss the 1915 massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians –
a true attempted genocide – remains in force.

The military, which staged coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and forced
the resignation of a prime minister in 1997, retains the last word,
and the top general regularly reminds the country of this. This is
quite foreign to real democracy.

As long as Turkish life is curbed in these ways, there is no point
in discussing Cypriot ports.

U.S. DIPLOMAT URGES RUSSIA TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM GEORGIA, MOLDOVA

The Associated Press
International Herald Tribune, France
Dec 4 2006

BRUSSELS, Belgium: A senior U.S. diplomat on Monday called on Russia
to continue the withdrawal of its troops from Georgian and Moldovan
territories, warning that the two ex-Soviet states will remain unstable
as long as support for separatist regimes continues from outside.

Nicholas Burns, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs,
told a meeting of foreign ministers from the 56-nation Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe that maintaining forces
in another country against its will goes against the spirit of a
21st-century Europe.

"The very principles that are the bedrock of our shared values are
increasingly being brought into question by some countries," Burns
said. "We must give Georgia and Moldova our full support."

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov dismissed the ideas as
simplistic, saying that the OSCE must not make one-sided efforts to
force through what he called "politicized solutions" to long-lasting
disputes in ex-Soviet republics.

"These attempts … have very little to do with efforts on the ground
to achieve settlements. Such action leads to exacerbation of tensions
and mistrust, and sets back the clock on any possible solution,"
Lavrov told the conference.

Lavrov called for a reform of the OSCE’s election monitoring, which
he said must guarantee "equal treatment" to all countries observed –
an apparent reference to the organization’s persistent criticism of
election standards in former Soviet republics.

Europe’s "frozen" conflicts are on the agenda at the two-day meeting
of the OSCE. The ministers will also assess Kazakhstan’s candidacy
for 2009 chairmanship of the trans-Atlantic political group, backed
by Russia and some other European states but opposed by the United
States and Britain over human rights concerns.

The meeting focuses on conflicts in the breakaway Georgian regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russian peacekeepers are accused
by Georgia of siding with the separatists; on the pro-Russian
separatist Trans-Dniester province of Moldova; and on the disputed
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.

Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oksanian said hopes are high for a
solution of the years long conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh after last
week’s meeting of presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

"No one wants a lasting solution more than we in Armenia. The last
meeting of presidents gives hope that agreement is possible even
on the most problematic issues on which we don’t see eye to eye,"
he told the conference.

Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht, whose country holds the
Vienna, Austria-based OSCE’s rotating presidency this year, also said
a possible solution was emerging.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are discussing terms of holding a referendum
on the status of the mountainous region in Azerbaijan that has been
under control of Armenian and ethnic Armenian Karabakh forces since
the 1994 end of a separatist war.

Years of negotiation have produced little visible sign of progress in
resolving the dispute, which prompted Azerbaijan to close its borders
with Armenia.

The OSCE, a leading international security organization founded in
1973, is concerned particularly with conflict prevention, election
observing, crisis management and rehabilitation of post-conflict areas.
From: Baghdasarian

MISUNDERSTANDING ISLAM II: IN DEFENSE OF POPE BENEDICT XVI
Written by Gregory Borse

ChronWatch, CA
Dec 3 2006

Pope Benedict XVI has just returned from an historic visit to Turkey
and some find his trip remarkable more for what it was not rather
than for what it was: namely, a Christian challenge to Islam.

One example of criticism of the Pope’s visit is from the opinion
section of ABC News International. (I employ it here not because it
is exemplary, but because I think it typical).

In an article entitled "Pope’s Silence on Armenian Genocide Shameful",
Attorney Mark Geragos takes the Pontiff to task for his failure to
call attention to the many shortcomings of the Turkish government,
especially in regards to its refusal to admit to the Turkish sponsored
genocide of Armenians in 1915. Mr. Geragos, who is of Armenian descent,
is to be sympathized with-he is a board-member of the "All-Armenian
Fund," an organization dedicated to raising money in support of
substantial infrastructure improvement in Armenia.

Still, his article is perhaps representative of a type-open
criticism of a Christian leader in a post 9/11 world is less risky
than open criticism of Muslim sponsored terrorism, whether emanating
(historically) from Turkey or (presently) from Iran, Syria, or anywhere
else . . . just ask Salman Rushdie, or the family members of murdered
film maker Theo Van Gogh, or the cartoonists who offended Islam in
the Netherlands, or, for that matter, Pope Benedict himself, whose
remarks at Regensburg University in Germany last September caused such
controversy in the Muslim world and led to the murder of a Catholic
nun in Africa, prompting the would-be assassin of his predecessor,
John Paul the Great, to write a letter warning the present Pontiff
not to travel to Turkey . . .

Mr. Geragos’ opening salvo is to criticize Pope Benedict’s "ill
advised" remarks about the "legacy of Mohammed," in his speech
made at the University of Regensburg. Then, Benedict quoted what
Christopher Orlet called "the antepenultimate emperor of the
Byzantine Empire," the now little known Manuel II Paleologus (go
here: 368). At
the time, Paleologus was traveling 14th century Europe trying to
convince the Western and Eastern Christian Empires to set aside
their differences long enough to repel the Muslim threat against
Constantinople. Paleologus failed, Constantinople fell, and, as
Orlet writes, the "Roman-Byzantine Empire. . . disappear[ed] from
the earth forever."

The comments made by Benedict about Islam and jihad that so offended
Muslims-and apparently Geragos-were widely quoted: "Show me just what
Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only
evil and inhuman . . ."

But here is the context for the above from Benedict’s actual speech:

"In the seventh conversation
(διά&# 955;εξις – controversy)
edited by Professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of
the holy war. The emperor must have known that surah 2, 256 reads:
‘There is no compulsion in religion.’ According to some of the experts,
this is probably one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed
was still powerless and under threat. But naturally the emperor
also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the
Qur’an, concerning holy war. Without descending to details, such as
the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the ‘Book’
and the ‘infidels,’ he addresses his interlocutor with a startling
brusqueness, a brusqueness that we find unacceptable, on the central
question about the relationship between religion and violence in
general, saying: ‘Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new,
and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his
command to spread by the sword the faith he preached’. . . The
emperor, after having expressed himself so forcefully, goes on
to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through
violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with
the nature of God and the nature of the soul. ‘God,’ he says, ‘is not
pleased by blood – and not acting reasonably (σὺν
&#95 5;όγω) is contrary to God’s nature. Faith is born
of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs
the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence
and threats… To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a
strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening
a person with death…’" (emphasis added).

(Go here for a translation of the Pope’s entire speech:
tml?sid=94748)

First, it must be understood that the Pope’s remarks are directed not
at Muslims specifically, but at members of the scientific community at
Regensburg University and his topic is not jihad or even violence in
the spreading of any religious faith, but the notion of the splitting
off of reason from faith (and the reverse) in our understanding not
only of religion or science, but of civilization, politics, society,
culture, and human nature. Benedict recognizes that Peleologus faced
a similar dilemma as we face today: he too lived in a world in which
two essential qualities of the human soul were increasingly at odds
with each other-reason and faith. That Benedict made his remarks to the
scientific community of a German University is telling, as it implies
that Europe’s current problems are rooted in the deep antagonism
that secular-humanist reason has especially toward the specifically
Christian faith upon which European civilization was built. But an
important and related corollary for the post 9/11 Western world is
the deeply antagonistic attitude that a radical interpretation of
Islamic faith has of reason of any kind. And Benedict seems not to
have chosen his words by accident.

In a world in which people who have abandoned faith in favor of reason
are pitted against people who have abandoned reason in favor of faith,
disaster lurks.

Hence, to call Benedict’s comments "ill-advised" is simply to
betray a deep ignorance. Benedict’s remarks are the antithesis of
ill-advised-they are quite carefully considered, crafted, precise,
and deliberate-nuanced even. They imply that Europe today faces a
double enemy-one within and one without. And Europe’s denial of the
enemy within (the insistence upon a false dichotomy between reason
and faith) is precisely the weakness that invites the enemy without
(which operates according to a false dichotomy that pits faith against
reason). In this sense, Benedict is a kind of Winston Churchill on
the eve of World War II-warning Europe that it is on the verge of a
disaster, not only because it cannot and will not recognize the enemy
that openly defies it at every turn, but also because it refuses to
assess appropriately those weaknesses of its own character that may
well prove to be suicidal.

To be fair, Geragos’ real concern, something he credits "more
discerning" members of the European Union for being able to recognize,
is "Turkey’s ongoing legacy of intolerance and oppression." Such
a statement, however, in an article that uses the War in Iraq as a
framing device to imply that any success by that measure is actually
failure, is rather astonishing. Turkey, among Muslim nations,
is a model of moderation-from a Western, and especially American,
point of view. And yet, if Geragos is to be believed (and I have
no reason to doubt any facts Geragos offers about life in Turkey
for its non-Muslim minorities), Turkey ought not to be admitted to
the European Union until it "adopt[s] something other than medieval
standards of justice." Geragos’ clear implication is that the Pope,
as a leader of the Christian world, has missed a real opportunity
to instruct the Muslims in Turkey regarding lessons important to
their civilization and, perhaps more significantly, about joining
ours. This assumes, of course, that the European civilizational model
is superior to Turkey’s and that they ought to want to join Europe,
rather than desire to make the EU like them . .

.a stance that is, Mr. Geragos might be interested to know,
antithetical to the prevailing liberal view (according to which all
cultures are equally valid, including Turkey’s–even when it sponsors
Armenian genocide).

But did Benedict actually miss the opportunity presented to him by
his being received in Turkey?

Perhaps a look at some of Benedict’s own words would be
enlightening. Here is part of what he said to the President of the
Religious Affairs Directorate in Turkey:

"For more than forty years, the teaching of the Second Vatican Council
has inspired and guided the approach taken by the Holy See and by local
Churches throughout the world to relations with the followers of other
religions. Following the Biblical tradition, the Council teaches that
the entire human race shares a common origin and a common destiny:
God, our Creator and the goal of our earthly pilgrimage. Christians
and Muslims belong to the family of those who believe in the one
God and who, according to their respective traditions, trace their
ancestry to Abraham (cf. Second Vatican Council, Declaration on the
Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions Nostra Aetate 1,
3). This human and spiritual unity in our origins and our destiny
impels us to seek a common path as we play our part in the quest for
fundamental values so characteristic of the people of our time. As men
and women of religion, we are challenged by the widespread longing
for justice, development, solidarity, freedom, security, peace,
defense of life, protection of the environment and of the resources
of the earth. This is because we too, while respecting the legitimate
autonomy of temporal affairs, have a specific contribution to offer
in the search for proper solutions to these pressing questions.

Above all, we can offer a credible response to the question which
emerges clearly from today’s society, even if it is often brushed
aside, the question about the meaning and purpose of life, for
each individual and for humanity as a whole. We are called to work
together, so as to help society to open itself to the transcendent,
giving Almighty God his rightful place. The best way forward is
via authentic dialogue between Christians and Muslims, based on
truth and inspired by a sincere wish to know one another better,
respecting differences and recognizing what we have in common. This
will lead to an authentic respect for the responsible choices that
each person makes, especially those pertaining to fundamental values
and to personal religious convictions" (emphasis added).

These words are significant given that they were delivered to an
almost entirely Muslim audience. For, they deny some fundamental
Muslim realities. First and foremost, they seek to lay as common
ground between Christians and Muslims that we share a belief in "one
God." But, the Muslim faith denies the Holy Trinity-and, more to the
point, counts Christians as infidels precisely for their expressed
belief in "one God in Three Persons-Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

According to Islam, this makes Christians idolators and pagans. But is
this a mistake on Benedict’s part? Perhaps it is an indication that one
of the world’s leading Christian theologians is not very well versed
in the Islamic faith. It would be naïve to believe that to be the
case. Pope Benedict is quite well aware of the differences between
Christianity’s understanding of God and Islam’s. His deliberately
quoting that bit about the 14th century Paleologus’ dialogue with a
"learned Persian" proves it. And yet, in a pilgrimage to Turkey-on
a trip that he was warned not to take in a letter from the would-be
assassin of his predecessor, John Paul the Great-a land rich in
Christian history (Benedict said Mass in Ephesus, honored by both
Muslims and Christians as the home if not the final resting place
of the Virgin Mother), he makes these remarks. They are not a
mistake. They are a challenge.

Then Cardinal Ratzinger chose his name, upon his election as
Pontiff, deliberately-pointing to two other Benedicts, especially,
as foundations for his present pontificate. He explained his choice
of name this way:

"Filled with sentiments of awe and thanksgiving, I wish to speak
of why I chose the name Benedict. Firstly, I remember Pope Benedict
XV, that courageous prophet of peace, who guided the Church through
turbulent times of war. In his footsteps I place my ministry in the
service of reconciliation and harmony between peoples. Additionally,
I recall Saint Benedict of Nursia, co-patron of Europe, whose life
evokes the Christian roots of Europe. I ask him to help us all
to hold firm to the centrality of Christ in our Christian life:
May Christ always take first place in our thoughts and actions"
(go here for quote: ).

So, his name evokes two dedicated to Europe-one in "turbulent times
of war" and the other the "co-patron" of Europe, "whose life evokes
the Christian roots of Europe." Significantly, St. Benedict, founder
of the Benedictine Order and of Western Monasticism, is the principal
model in Europe for Christian life as a balance between prayer and
work-in other words, between our concerns for our relations with the
divine and for our relations with our fellow man. The implication is
clear-we must care for both if we are to be whole-as individuals and
as culture-bearers.

It is those Christian roots that are, at present, under attack-not
only in Europe, but in the West. And this Pope has assumed his role
as a Christian leader in a time that requires someone able to see the
forest, as it were, despite the trees. In an age that plays witness
to the ramifications of the war between reason and faith, Benedict
has stepped forth to speak directly to the consequences of such an
artificial-and potentially fatal-bifurcation of the very nature of
man. He makes such comments in the breach. He does so, now, directly
(as at Regensburg) and indirectly, as in Turkey.

And, for such a one, there will be nothing but persecution-from those
within the Europe whose very nature he wishes to preserve and from
those without, members of the Islamic faith, to whom he offers the
olive branch of peace, and an invitation to a coexistence in the
mutual recognition of not merely a common humanity, but a common
humanity rooted in the Divine.

Perhaps the fact that his gestures are being rejected by both parties
is a sign that he is right.

Related: "Misunderstanding Islam" by Gregory Borse
play.asp?aid=23917&catcode=13

–Boundary_(ID_ Z550TtsHZXwhw82+MOK+OQ)–

PRAYING FOR THE IMPERFECT STORM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A COUP D’ETAT IN TURKEY
Barin Kayaoglu

Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 3 2006

What are the chances of another military coup in Turkey? Impossible?
Unlikely? Imminent? According to Turkish analyst Zeyno Baran, who is
currently a senior fellow at the Washington-based think tank Hudson
Institute, "the chances of a military coup in Turkey occurring in 2007
are roughly 50-50." Based on her recent conversations with unnamed
senior officers, Baran argues that Turkish Armed Forces might decide
to step in to avert Turkey’s perceived march toward Islamism under
the Erdogan government next year. [1]

In similar exchanges, claims Baran, she had seen the previous "coup"
back in 1997. According to one of Baran’s contacts, who had "asked the
Iranian generals after the 1979 [Islamic] revolution why they had done
nothing to stop it," their Iranian counterparts responded that by the
time they had realized what was going to happen, it was too late to
stop it. "We will never let that happen in Turkey," vowed the Turkish
generals. Perceiving the current situation in Ankara in similar terms,
Baran informs us that the 50 percent prospect is more likely than not.

Coup-mongering is as old a problem in Turkish intellectual circles as
coups themselves. Turkish political history has been marked and marred
by varying degrees of military interventions. The first one was in
May 1960, when a junta led by junior-ranking officers overthrew the
democratically elected but inept government of Adnan Menderes. The
next one came in March 1971, when the Chief of General Staff sent
a memorandum to Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel that the military
was not happy with the ongoing political turmoil and "advised" the
formation of an "above-party" government to bring order. Following
the memorandum, Demirel got the message and resigned. Less than a
decade later, Demirel, together with the late Bulent Ecevit, failed
to stabilize the country and was once again ousted by a military
coup in September 1980. The subsequent plebiscite in 1982 produced a
constitution which had to be amended more than a dozen times to fit
the needs of a rapidly transforming Turkey. Finally, in February 1997,
mounting pressure against the coalition government led by the Islamist
Necmettin Erbakan culminated in a standoffish National Security Council
meeting with the military top brass and led to Erbakan’s resignation
a few months later. That move also failed to bring about economic
and political stability to Turkey since then.

This synopsis tells volumes as to why another military intervention
in Turkey is a bad idea. The first reason is that not a single coup
has attained its goals. None of military coups have resulted in
bringing long-term political stability to Turkey. The most common
word in Turkish political lexicon is still "crisis" and not "merit"
or "success." On the contrary, many of the times those who were
ousted came back even more strongly. The Ecevit-Demirel-Erbakan trio
came back in the 1990s and did their thing, arguably leading to the
economic crisis of 2001. In that regard, coups have been an assured
way for those incompetent politicians to ultimately keep their clout,
the exact reason why those coups are carried out in the first place.

Coups are also bad for business. Turkey is still on the economic
margins of Europe, in stark contrast to where it could and should be.

In living standards, Turkey still fails to provide its citizens
adequately. Public education is a mess. Those who wish to remain
healthy try to avoid hospitals. Roads, electricity and water grids,
and urban planning fall quite below public needs. Unemployment cannot
be pulled down and direct foreign investment does not go up. Research
and development is still not a sector in and of itself.

Coups do not address any of these problems. Worse yet, they produce
setbacks through their own devices. The most dangerous of these is the
negative impact on the military’s professionalism. The primary duty of
a country’s armed forces is not to run that country but to defend and
promote its political interests in the international realm. In other
words, the best military is that which does not govern at all. When
an officer corps that is trained to lead infantry charges, fire
artilleries, fly airplanes, and command naval vessels are asked to
do myriad things such as running municipalities, inspecting schools,
prosecuting criminals, conducting diplomacy, setting agricultural
policy, and writing constitutions – all at the same time – the result
can be anything but satisfactory. The military’s energetic and vibrant
officers, who are well-trained in martial affairs, will only not be
successful if they assume control over matters that are not a part of
their training. Consequently, that can have adverse effects on their
professional self-esteem and would certainly hamper on the Turkish
military’s effectiveness as a fighting force and Turkey’s security
and defense policy.

Coups are self-fulfilling prophecies. The more likely they get, the
more insecure that civilian politicians become. The more insecure they
become, the deeper their ineptitude gets. Even though popular belief in
Turkey maintains that military "oversight" helps to "straighten out"
politicians, a good deal of the time the result is the opposite. In
terms of civilian control of the military, this is pretty bad. The
Turkish military’s professional attitude is that (as it is true with
all respectable militaries around the world) they dislike weakness in
superiors and subordinates. Professional soldiers do not like personal
weakness; they respect strength, character, and expertise – qualities
that Turkish civilian leaders lack most of the time. Yet overthrowing
democratically-elected governments, no matter how tempting, is not
a remedy but a guarantee for the perpetuation of strained relations
between the civilian and military wings of the government.

Another reason why a coup d’etat is a bad idea is because Turkey
has changed too much for that. Twenty-six years ago, Turkey
was not integrated to the global economic system. There were no
private television or radio networks. Mass communication was not
as ubiquitous and society was not as open as it is today. It was
easy to talk down to the public, implement massive curfews, and
streamline a poorly-written constitution. Today, doing those things
are nigh-on-impossible. Administering the required discipline and
regimentation on a society that has enjoyed the blessings of greater
openness is not that easy and would create insurmountable tensions
between the idolized army and the Turkish people.

In as much as they believe in their duty to protect their country
from internal and external enemies, Turkish officers also know
that they have a standing order from Ataturk not to get involved in
politics. Ataturk’s vision for Turkey was not a place where those
who wake up earlier have a better shot in staging a coup. Even though
he failed in his life-time to consolidate a liberal democratic form
of government, Ataturk was a democrat at heart and he was aware
of his country’s shortcomings. He firmly believed that Turkey’s
problems of backwardness and democratization could only be remedied
by modernization. Democracy, Westernization, and modernization meant
more or less the same thing. He reportedly said in the mid-1920s that
"Turkey is going to build up a perfect democracy." U.S. ambassador
Joseph Grew observed Ataturk’s failed attempt to commence multi-party
democracy in 1930 as follows:

Ataturk began to think the single party as a sign of Turkey’s
inferiority in comparison with Europe and the West. American and
European writers have in recent years devoted much space to the
Turkish dictatorship which has often been described as Western in
form but Oriental in fact. These descriptions have been brought to
the Gazi’s attention and he has not been pleased.[2]

A coup d’etat would only affirm that Turkey is indeed a dictatorship
that is "Western" in outlook but "Oriental" in essence. Zeyno Baran
would probably disagree with my statement, as her concluding remarks
reveal:

If a coup were to happen, it would not necessarily translate to a
non-democratic Turkey. More likely, it would simply mean the end
of Turkey’s current "Islamist experiment" and a return to a more
conservative government-stalwartly secular, yes, but a democracy
nonetheless. Ironically, this Turkey might ultimately be seen to be
a better member of Europe than today’s.

This is too serious a joke to warrant laughter. It is an indisputable
fact that democracy cannot exist without secularism. Religion plus
politics equals disaster. On the other hand, a "stalwartly secular"
system does not automatically guarantee the stature of democracy to
a political regime. A coup d’etat would only demonstrate that, in
the face of the perceived Islamist challenge, Ataturk’s principles
are ineffective in modernizing Turkey and need to be defended by force.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Turkey will not turn Islamist
as long as variables operate in the realm of the real. The previously
quoted Iran analogy is therefore extremely ill-suited in explaining
Turkey’s position. The problem with Iran during the 1970s was the
irresolvable conflict between its socio-economic structure and its
political system. Mohammed Reza Shah’s feverish modernization policies
which started in 1963 resulted in a country that had the best shot
in becoming the industrial, commercial, and military center of the
Middle East by the late 1970s. The Pahlavi monarch’s insistence on
maintaining a firm grip on political power, however, coupled with
mistreating Iranian citizens at the hand of his infamous intelligence
agency SAVAK, destroyed whatever support there was for the Shah’s
regime and led to his ultimate downfall.

For all its faults, lack of heeding popular will is not a deficiency
on the part of Turkey’s political system. Elections happen regularly;
they are contested fairly; and result in a change of political
leadership. Turkish people might still be frustrated with the slow
pace of improvement in their lives, but there is a lot of room for
optimism. Freedom of expression, notwithstanding the hideous article
301 of the penal code, is light years further from what it was just
ten years ago. Turkey is discussing its touchy Armenian and Kurdish
issues with an unprecedented amount of maturity. These advancements
might be the first losses in the face of a coup d’etat and it therefore
eludes reason as to how that course would "not necessarily translate
to a non-democratic Turkey."

Looking at this picture, what are the chances of a coup d’etat in
Turkey next year? 5 percent? 50 percent? Less? More? One cannot know.

That is not even the point. Meteorologists are more equipped in
predicting actual weather patterns than political analysts who quite
often fail in foretelling the political climate. Maybe Ms. Baran
is right and I am wrong. But before praying for the imperfect storm
that would damage Turkey’s political landscape, it is necessary to
consider what the implications of a coup might be for Turkey.

Patriotism dictates that the Turkish High Command and Mr. Erdogan’s
government need to think about that before making their next move.

2 December 2006, JTW

+++

Barin Kayaoglu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of
Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to
the Journal of Turkish Weekly.

E-mail: [email protected]

[1] Zeyno Baran, "The Coming Coup d’Etat?" Newsweek, Dec. 4, 2006;
available from .

[2] Grace Ellison, Turkey To-Day (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1929),8;
quoted in Ertan Aydin, "The Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary
Ideology in the 1930s: The Ulku Version of Kemalism, 1933-1936"
(Ph.D. diss., Bilkent University, 2003), 8; Joseph C.

Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945,
(London: Hammond, Hammond & Co., 1953), 869.

=2373

LAS VEGAS POLICE OFFICERS CLEARED IN TASER DEATH

KVOA.com, AZ
Dec 3 2006

LAS VEGAS — A coroner’s inquest jury has cleared two Las Vegas police
officers of wrongdoing in the death of a schizophrenic man who choked
to death after being shocked by a Taser gun.

The jury deliberated for 40 minutes before ruling that officers Michael
Martin and Stephen Cwalinski took excusable action when they shocked
29-year-old Vardan Kasilyan twice with a stun gun while trying to
subdue him in his parent’s apartment.

His parents, Areknaz and Vrezh Kasilyan, told the jury their son was
handcuffed at the time, the Las Vegas Review-Journal reported Saturday.

Medical examiner Dr. Gary Telgenhoff testified Friday that Vardan
Kasilyan died by choking on his own vomit. He said contributing
factors were Kasilyan’s use of methamphetamine and cocaine a short
time before the incident, the mental illness and the use of the Taser.

Areknaz Kasilyan just wanted to get her son to the hospital, she
testified through an Armenian interpreter.

Her son hadn’t been taking his medications and she was afraid he
might hurt himself, she said.

"I didn’t want police to come. I wanted just an ambulance to come to
help him," Kasilyan said.

An ambulance and the officers showed up at the apartment shortly
after Areknaz Kasilyan called for help at about 9:00 p.m. on Sept. 30.

She told the 911 dispatcher that her son might be armed with a
screwdriver or small knife. She made the call discreetly because
when she made a similar call two years ago, her son had jumped from
the second floor when he saw emergency vehicles and broke both legs,
she told the jury.

The officers did not wait for a crisis intervention team member,
who is trained to deal with mentally ill people, before entering
the apartment.

"There was a sense of urgency because we could hear a male voice and
a female voice adamantly arguing," Martin testified.

When he saw the officer in the apartment, Vardan Kasilyan moved toward
a patio door, Martin said.

Martin said he ordered Vardan Kasilyan to show his hands, but he
wouldn’t comply. Martin said he fired his Taser because he worried
Vardan Kasilyan might attack with a screwdriver, escape through the
patio door or grab what Martin thought was a shotgun on the floor
nearby.

The item on the floor was a black metal cane that Vardan Kasilyan
has used since he broke both legs, his father testified.

The officers said they then tackled Vardan Kasilyan to the ground
and tried to handcuff him. Martin was able to put cuffs on his right
hand, but Cwalinski couldn’t get the left hand out from under Vardan
Kasilyan’s body, they said.

The officers shocked Kasilyan again, handcuffed him and rolled him
to his side when he began to vomit immediately, they said.

Paramedics took him to the hospital, where he died.

Both parents testified that police shocked their son while his hands
were handcuffed behind his back.

The officers said they wouldn’t have done anything differently.

"In my mind, there’s nothing we could have done," Martin said. "I
would have to do exactly what I was trained to do and do what I did
that night."

Information from: Las Vegas Review-Journal,

asp?S=5760175

CAUCASUS: AZERBAIJANI, ARMENIAN, KARABAKH OFFICIALS ASSESS TALKS
Liz Fuller

EurasiaNet, NY
Dec 2 2006

A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL

Over the past 12 months, the three co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk
Group that seeks to mediate a solution to the Karabakh conflict have
warned repeatedly that upcoming elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan
could scupper chances of reaching a peace settlement.

rmenia is due to hold parliamentary elections in 2007. Both Armenia
and Azerbaijan will hold presidential elections in 2008.

In the run-up to those ballots, the co-chairs reason, the two
countries’ leaders will be reluctant to agree on the serious mutual
compromises that a settlement will inevitably necessitate.

Consequently, a sense of urgency has imbued successive meetings this
year between either the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers
or the two countries’ presidents.

The meeting in Minsk on November 28 between Armenian President
Robert Kocharian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev was
thus widely perceived as the last chance for some time to reach even
a preliminary agreement.

Comments On Azerbaijani TV

The two presidents did not issue any formal statement after their
meeting in Minsk. But Aliyev told Azerbaijani National Television on
November 29 that since the so-called "Prague process" talks between the
Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers on approaches to resolving
the conflict began, the negotiating process has gone through several
stages. "We are approaching the final stage," he said.

The first Prague talks took place in April 2004, and Aliyev has met
with Kocharian seven times since then; the Minsk meeting was their
third this year.

Aliyev said the Minsk talks "were held in a constructive way," and
that "we managed to a find a solution to a number of problems we could
not agree on before." He added, however, that "divergences remain on
crucial points," and that further progress "depends on us ourselves,"
presumably meaning the conflict sides, as opposed to the Minsk Group.

Position ‘Unchanged’

Aliyev stressed that "Azerbaijan’s negotiating position remains
unchanged," insofar as any solution must preserve Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity. He further stressed that Azerbaijani displaced
persons (whose number he said exceeds 1 million, compared with UNHCR
estimates of 800,000) must be enabled to return to their homes.

Aliyev also said the four resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh adopted by
the UN Security Council (in 1993, and which call for an immediate and
unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani
territory) must be fulfilled.

He said the population of Nagorno-Karabakh "must be provided with
the highest form of self-government" possible within Azerbaijan. The
constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic defines the Nakhichevan
Republic as an autonomous republic within the Azerbaijan Republic,
with its own parliament, but makes no mention of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia, however, rules out any "vertical subordination" of the NKR
to the central Azerbaijani government.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, who with his Armenian
counterpart Vartan Oskanian also traveled to Minsk, similarly
described the meeting between the two presidents in a December 1
interview with day.az. He said the meeting took place in a productive
and open atmosphere.

Mammadyarov said that only one issue remains on which the two
presidents have failed to reach agreement, but he declined to
specify what it is, referring to the need to keep the peace process
confidential. He added that he plans to meet in Brussels on December
4-5 with Oskanian and the Minsk Group co-chairs.

Foreign Minister Oskanian for his part was more guarded in his
comments on the Minsk meeting, telling journalists on his return to
Yerevan late on November 28 that "I cannot say concretely whether
progress was made or not, but both presidents assessed the meeting
as positive in terms of atmosphere and constructive approaches,"
RFE/RL’s Armenian Service reported on November 29.

Echoing Aliyev, Oskanian said the presidents "mainly concentrated on
the issues in the document on which no agreement has been reached,"
presumably an allusion to a half-page document, drafted by the Minsk
Group co-chairs and enumerating general principles, that the two
presidents discussed earlier this year.

Oskanian also said that the elections due in Armenia next spring
"will not interrupt" the ongoing peace negotiations, but he admitted
that they could make it more difficult to reach any agreement.

Lacking Armenian Response

Kocharian declined to comment on the talks. In Stepanakert, however,
Armen Melikian, an aide to Arkady Ghukasian, president of the
self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), expressed concern
over the implications of President Aliyev’s pronouncements.

"If President Aliyev is saying that the process is moving in a
positive direction, that is quite dangerous in itself," Melikian
told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service on November 30. "To my knowledge,
his idea of a positive direction is that Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be
an independent and sovereign state."

As outlined by the Minsk Group co-chairmen in June, the draft peace
plan under discussion envisages the gradual withdrawal of Armenian
forces from territory they currently occupy contiguous to the NKR;
the demilitarization of that territory, including the strategic
Lachin corridor and Kelbacar, and the deployment of an international
peacekeeping force; then, at some future date, the future status of
the NKR vis-a-vis the Azerbaijani central government would be decided
in a "popular vote or referendum." Insofar as the population of the
NKR is overwhelmingly ethnic Armenian, such a vote would indubitably
register support for independence.

Even so, Melikian admitted to RFE/RL in February that the Karabakh
leadership is not enthusiastic about that draft proposal. He said
that any discussion of a referendum is inappropriate in light of
Baku’s a priori insistence that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity
must be preserved at all costs.

The Armenian leadership, for its part, has repeatedly made clear that
it will not sign any final peace settlement that is unacceptable to
the NKR.