Turkish man held for threatening ferry

kurdishinfo.com, Germany
Jan 28 2007

Turkish man held for threatening ferry

ANKARA, Turkey – Police detained a man who threatened to blow up a
ferry in protest of pro-Armenian slogans chanted at a slain
journalist’s funeral, a provincial official said Sunday.

The man, claiming to be armed and have plastic explosives, seized the
ferry as it was on its way from Gelibolu to Lapseki late Saturday,
said Yusuf Ziya Ince, deputy governor of Canakkale province.

The man gave himself up to police after 2 1/2 hours and released all
passengers unharmed, Ince said. He had a fake gun but was not
carrying any explosives, Ince said.

Television footage showed the man shouting: "I did it for the
country," as he was being led away from the ferry to a police
vehicle.

Ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who angered nationalists by
calling the mass killing of Armenians in the early 20th century
genocide, was gunned down outside his newspaper a week ago.

His funeral inspired a massive outpouring of support for
reconciliation between Armenians and Turks.

Ince said the man was angered by the pro-Armenia slogans chanted at
Dink’s funeral and unfurled a Turkish flag while aboard the ferry.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Tension on the rise between Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs over Kirkuk’s fate

International Herald Tribune, France
Jan 28 2007

Tension on the rise between Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs over Kirkuk’s
fate
The Associated PressPublished: January 28, 2007

KIRKUK, Iraq: When Abdul-Karim Wadi, a Shiite Arab, got what amounted
to thousands of dollars cash and a free apartment to move to Kirkuk
from Baghdad 18 years ago, he says he didn’t know he was a tool of
Saddam Hussein’s campaign to flood the ethnically mixed, oil-rich
city with Arabs.

Now, Wadi says, Kirkuk is home and he has no plans to leave. He’s
trying to ride out the increasing outbreaks of ethnic tension, a
symptom of a deeper struggle for the city’s future – a complex tangle
of ancient ethnic antagonism and hardball 21st century struggle for
oil resources.

The Arab and Turkmen population in Kirkuk are fighting Kurdish
efforts to join the city – they call it the "Jerusalem of the Kurds"
– to the their semiautonomous region just to the north. Thrown into
that ethnic cauldron are Armenian and Assyrian-Chaldean Christian
minorities.

Turkey, Iraq’s northern neighbor, has compounded the troubles over
Kirkuk as it exerts heavy pressure on the Iraqi government to protect
the interests of the Turkmen, ethnic Turks who once were the majority
in the city. Ankara seeks to assure that Kirkuk remains a part of
Arab Iraq.

Turkey’s motivation is simple. It continues to face harassing attacks
by Kurdish guerrillas who cross freely from Kurdish regions in
northern Iraq to fight with their ethnic brethren who live in
southeastern Turkey and have been fighting a secessionist war since
1984.

Turkey fears that the economic boom to Iraq’s Kurdish region, should
it gain control over the Kirkuk oil fields, could further embolden
Kurds inside Turkey in their bid for autonomy or statehood.

Iraqi Kurds, including some who hold high positions in the Baghdad
government – President Jalal Talabani for one – have accused Turkey
of interfering in Iraqi internal affairs through recent statements
that Kirkuk must not be annexed to the Kurdish region in Iraq’s
north.

On Sunday, Barham Saleh, a Kurd who is deputy prime minister, met
Turkey’s ambassador to reject the Turkish stand.

"The fate of Kirkuk and other local issues will be dealt with through
the will of the Iraqi people and the constitution," Saleh’s office
said in a statement.

Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, also a Kurd, met in Switzerland
Friday with Abdullah Gul, his Turkish counterpart, and rejected what
he called Turkish interference in the Kirkuk and statements about the
rights of the Turkmen, saying both were "a purely Iraqi matter."

Since the ouster of Saddam Hussein nearly four years ago, Arabs and
Turkmen have accused the Kurds of moving thousands of their people
back into the city to gain a majority in a referendum later this year
to determine Kirkuk’s future.

The last census in Iraq that showed ethic breakdowns was in 1957,
well before Saddam began his program to Arabize Kirkuk. That count
showed 178,000 Kurds, 48,000 Turkmen, 43,000 Arabs and 10,000
Assyrian-Chaldean Christians lived in the city.

Kirkuk, an ancient city that once was part of the Ottoman Empire,
subsequently witnessed a major deportation of Kurds in conjunction
with the forced influx of Arabs during Saddam’s 23-year rule. He
forced Kurds into refugee camps in the Kurdish provinces of
Sulaimaniyah, Irbil and Dahuk.

Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, tens of thousands,
perhaps as many as 100,000, of those deported have returned to their
hometown, local officials say.

Kirkuk is the capital of Tamim province, where the population is
estimated at 1 million. There are no good figures today about ethnic
percentages that make up that total, although most officials agree
that Kurds are now the majority, with Turkmen and Arabs about tied
for second position.

Those estimates are based on the results of the December 2005
election in which Kurds took 26 seats on the 41-member Provincial
Council. Turkmen had nine, Arabs five and Assyrian Christians one.

Arab and Turkmen members suspended participation in the provincial
council in November, charging unfair Kurdish dominance.

Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution stipulates that Kirkuk’s
status must be resolved by the end of the year. No date has been set
yet for the referendum, and Arabs and Turkmen reject the
constitutional directive. Kurds want it enforced in hopes of annexing
Tamim province and, therefore, Kirkuk, to the Kurdistan
semiautonomous region.

The U.S. Iraq Study Group, headed by former U.S. Secretary of State
James A. Baker III and former Democratic congressman Lee Hamilton
said in its report released in December that "given the very
dangerous situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary
to avert communal violence. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk
would be explosive and should be delayed."

Hundreds Kurds demonstrated in Kirkuk against the report.

Rizgar Ali, a Kurd who heads the provincial council, also criticized
what he called Turkish interference in Iraq’s affairs, saying "the
question of Kirkuk has solutions and mechanisms that the Iraqi
politicians and people agreed to according to article 140 of the Iraq
constitution. This is an internal Iraqi affair and no country should
stand against that."

"These countries should stand with our democratic project not to
block it," said Ali, an official in Talabani’s Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan.

Jamal Abdullah Chan of the Iraqi Turkmen Front accuses the Kurds of
trying to drive ethnic Turks from the city with bomb attacks on
predominantly Turkmen that have killed or wounded scores.

"There is a political plan to force Turkmen to leave Kirkuk in order
to empty it from its people, even though we see Kirkuk as an Iraqi
city with Turkmen culture," Chan said.

Unlike Kurdish officials, Chan sees Turkey’s stance "as supportive to
Iraq’s unity especially that Kirkuk is a regional and international
matter because of its multicultural nature."

He said paragraph 140 of the constitution should be excised or its
implementation delayed.

Arabs in the city see the plan to annex Kirkuk to the Kurdish region
as part of a campaign to divide Iraq.

"The stance of Arab countries and Turkey is aimed at salvaging Iraq
from the increasing violence and attempts to tear it apart," said
Abdul-Rahman Munshid al-Asi, an Arab tribal leader in the city.

Wadi, the Shiite Arab who settled here 18 years ago, insists – along
with many others in the polyglot city – that the referendum and
Kirkuk’s final status won’t force him to abandon his 18-year roots.

"Kirkuk is a beautiful city. It’s pleasant to live here. It is not
easy for a person to leave it. If they ask me to leave, I will say
‘no’ even if they annex it to Kurdistan," Wadi said.

___

Mroue reported from Baghdad.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Damascus: Syrian and Armenian Officials Hold Talks

SANA – Syrian Arab News Agency, Syria
Jan 28 2007

Syrian and Armenian Officials Hold Talks

Sunday, January 28, 2007 – 05:05 PM

DAMASCUS, (SANA)-A discussion session was held on Sunday between
Syrian delegation headed by Assistant Foreign Minister Ahmad Arnous
and Armenian delegation headed by Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister
Gegham Gharibjanian.

Talks dealt with situation in Iraq and Palestine in addition to the
necessity of seeking to realize just and comprehensive peace in the
region in line with the relevant United Nations resolutions, Madrid
terms of reference, principle of land for peace and the Arab
initiative.

Talks dealt with situation in Iraq and Palestine in addition to the
necessity of seeking to realize just and comprehensive peace in the
region in line with the relevant United Nations resolutions, Madrid
terms of reference, principle of land for peace and the Arab
initiative.

both sides discussed bilateral relations between the two countries
and means of developing and boosting them in all domains.

Both sides discussed bilateral relations between the two countries
and means of developing and boosting them in all domains.

Thawra- Ghossoun

Georgia: Uranium case underscores nuke safety fears

EurasiaNet, NY
Jan 28 2007

GEORGIA: URANIUM CASE UNDERSCORES NUKE SAFETY FEARS
Claire Bigg 1/28/07
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL

Moscow and Tbilisi have traded harsh words after Georgia revealed it
had arrested a Russian man last year trying to sell weapons-grade
uranium.

The incident marks a new low in already strained Russian-Georgian
relations and raises fresh fears worldwide that some of Russia’s huge
nuclear stockpiles could fall into terrorist hands.

Last February in Tbilisi, a Georgian undercover agent, aided by the
CIA, posed as a rich foreign buyer interested in purchasing
weapons-grade uranium for a Muslim man from "a serious organization."

The mission: seize Oleg Khinsagov, a Russian man trying to sell a
small amount of highly enriched uranium, and confiscate his
merchandise.

The operation was a success and Khinsagov was sentenced to 8 and 1/2
years in prison.

Although the purity of the uranium seized is ideal for making nuclear
weapons, the quantity is too small. A nuclear bomb requires at least
15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.

Both the trial and the incident itself were kept secret until
Thursday (January 26), when Georgian Interior Minister Vano
Merabishvili, who was visiting Washington this week, revealed the
case in comments published by U.S. media.

Reasons For Disclosure

So why is Tbilisi making the incident public now, almost one year
after it occurred?

Nikoloz Rurua, the deputy chairman of the Georgian parliament’s
Committee for Defense and Security, told RFE/RL’s Georgian Service
that there had been "a request by our American colleagues — not to
publicize this information due to certain considerations related to
the operation."

"I cannot say more about this. It was their request, and we complied
with it. This applied to a particular period of time, which has now
passed, and we — the country on whose soil this legal violation took
place — naturally made this information public," Rurua said.

Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, however, had a
different story. He said he was revealing the case out of frustration
with Russia’s lack of cooperation in the investigation that followed
the arrest.

According to him, Russia hampered Georgia’s attempts to determine
whether Khinsagov had access to larger quantities of uranium, as he
had boasted prior to his detention.

New Russia-Georgia Spat

Russian authorities confirmed the arrest, but struck back by saying
Georgia prevented Russia from identifying the substance’s country of
origin by presenting a sample too small to work with. He accused
Georgia of failing to provide a larger sample despite repeated
requests.

The Khinsagov case has also revived tensions over Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the two Georgian separatist republics backed by Moscow.

Merabishvili said the Russian smuggler came to Georgia’s attention
during an investigation into what he called extensive smuggling
networks in and around the breakaway border regions.

The incident has once again prompted calls in Georgia for
international observer missions in both regions, a proposal that
Tbilisi has been pushing in past months.

"Any uncontrolled territory represents dangers not only for the
country within which this territory lies, but for the international
community as a whole,” deputy Rurua said. "We believe this is a
crucial reason for the international community to take the resolution
of problems in the Tskhinvali region and in Abkhazia seriously."

Nuclear Safety Fears

The international community, however, seems more concerned about how
100 grams of nuclear-bomb grade uranium fell into the hands of a
50-year-old Russian trader, who specialized in fish and sausages.

Speaking today at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
International Atomic Energy Agency chief Muhammad el-Baradei
reiterated the urgency of joining forces in preventing rogue states
from obtaining material for nuclear weapons.

The incident is reminiscent of a similar case in 2003, when Georgian
border guards caught an Armenian man with about 170 grams of highly
enriched uranium. According to Georgia, the man said the uranium came
from the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, home to a major nuclear
complex.

A number of experts say Khinsagov, too, is likely to have obtained
uranium in Russia, where a nuclear black market emerged from the
chaos that followed the 1991 Soviet collapse.

Efforts To Be Safe

But Ivan Safranchuk, who heads the Moscow office of the U.S.-based
Center for Defense Information, says getting hold of highly enriched
uranium in Russia is not that easy.

"Over the past nine years, serious efforts have been made to improve
the system of physical protection and security of nuclear facilities,
both military and civilian. So in my opinion, obtaining nuclear
substances in Russia is extremely difficult. Today, if I were a
terrorist seeking nuclear substances, I would go to Pakistan, not
Russia," Safranchuk says.

Former Soviet countries have indeed taken steps towards boosting
nuclear security, often financed by the West.

Russia, in particular, says it is actively cooperating with other
nations, including the United States, to combat nuclear
proliferation.

But Vladimir Chuprov, the chief nuclear expert at Greenpeace’s
Russian office, says security at Russian nuclear facilities remains
deplorable.

"In Russia, the physical defense and security of radioactive material
doesn’t meet the required standards. In 2002, a group of Greenpeace
activists, together with journalists and a State Duma deputy, entered
without difficulties the territory of the national stockpile of
wasted nuclear fuel, climbed on the roof of the stockpile’s building
complex, shot photographs and videos, and quietly left. Nine months
later, the Federal Security Service repeated the same experience.
Nothing had changed," Chuprov says.

According to Chuprov, poor working conditions and rampant corruption
in Russia’s post-Soviet nuclear sector continue to provide a fertile
breeding ground for nuclear contraband.

The Khinsagov case is likely to put the state of Russia’s sprawling
nuclear stockpiles back into the spotlight once again.

Unknown assailants break windows of Protestant church in Turkey

International Herald Tribune, France
Jan 28 2007

Unknown assailants break windows of Protestant church in Turkey
The Associated PressPublished: January 28, 2007

ANKARA, Turkey: Unknown assailants on Sunday stoned a two-story
building housing a Protestant church in the Black Sea port city of
Samsun, the pastor of the church said.

"The assailants broke at least 10 windows in an overnight attack,"
Mehmet Orhan Picaklar, the pastor of the Agape Church, told The
Associated Press by telephone. "This is the seventh or eight such
attack over the past three years. Separately, I am constantly
receiving death threats by e-mail."

Picaklar said the church had moved into the building just two weeks
ago. Uniformed police officers were deployed outside the church after
the attack, the private Dogan news agency reported.

The attack was the latest against Christians in this predominantly
Muslim country.

Ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who spoke out about the mass
killings of Armenians in the early 20th century, was gunned down
outside his newspaper on Jan. 19.

Last February, a Turkish teenager shot dead a Catholic priest, the
Rev. Andrea Santoro, as he knelt in prayer in his church in the Black
Sea port of Trabzon. The attack was believed linked to widespread
anger in the Islamic world over the publication in European
newspapers of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. Two other Catholic
priests were also attacked last year.

Of Turkey’s 70 million people, some 65,000 are Armenian Orthodox
Christians, 20,000 are Roman Catholic, and 3,500 are Protestant,
mostly converts from Islam. Around 2,000 are Greek Orthodox and
23,000 are Jewish.

Lebanon’s Tenuous Transformation

The Middle East Forum – Promoting American Interests
Jan 28 2007

Lebanon’s Tenuous Transformation
by Michael Rubin
Aspenia
October 2005

This is the original English version of an Italian article in "Pax
Euroislamica," Aspenia (Aspen Institute Italia Review). No. 30,
October 2005.

On June 28, 2005, Lebanon’s parliament selected Fuad Siniora to be
prime minister. Siniora was a close associate of Rafiq al-Hariri, a
former prime minister and Sunni powerbroker who was assassinated on
February 14, 2005 as his motorcade drove down a Beirut street. Like
Hariri in his later years, Siniora has taken an increasingly defiant
stance in opposition to Syrian domination of Lebanon.

While Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution has already reverberated throughout
the region, the transformation it sought to unveil is tenuous.
Syria’s nearly three-decade occupation of Lebanon may have ended, but
the country remains susceptible to Syrian domination. During the
years of occupation, Syrian proxies altered the Lebanese legal system
to undercut the ability of political society to transform through
elections. Syrian intelligence operatives continue to permeate
Lebanon, killing and intimidating dissidents and independent-minded
politicians. Syrian interests continue to dominate Lebanon’s black
market. Lebanon’s political position remains precarious. Hizbullah
remains a Syrian proxy and, flouting U.N. Security Council resolution
1559, has refused to disarm. While many Lebanese officials privately
say they would like the group to lay down its weapons, the Lebanese
government remains too weak to broach the subject publicly.

The triumph of democratic liberalism in Lebanon will depend not only
upon continued European and American assistance to Lebanese
democrats, but also upon the ability of Western governments to
identify and direct pressure upon mechanisms of continued Syrian
control. At stake is more than freedom for Lebanon, but rather the
ability of the Arab world to reform itself. The evaporation of the
Cedar Revolution would embolden autocrats in countries Egypt and
Yemen that they can outlast reformist demands.

Background

Syrian troops entered Lebanon in 1976, a year after the outbreak of
the Lebanese civil war. While the 1989 Ta`if Accords called for the
withdrawal foreign forces from Lebanon, the Syrian occupation
continued with the tacit approval of the George H.W. Bush
administration which saw the Syrian presence as stabilizing.[1]

While the United States and European countries valued stability, the
Syrian government sought to prolong its involvement in Lebanon in
order to fulfill a historical ambition. The French government created
modern Lebanon in 1920 as Paris and London divided up former Ottoman
domains. While France was Mandatory power for both Syria and Lebanon,
the latter’s separate identity helped protect and empower Mount
Lebanon’s large Christian population. Syrian nationalists, though,
never forfeited their claim to Lebanon nor, in some cases, to
Transjordan and Palestine, also considered by some in Damascus to be
part of Greater Syria.[2] In 1946, a Syrian diplomat declared Syria’s
borders with Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan to be "artificial." In
August 1972, Syrian president Hafez al-Assad said, "Syria and Lebanon
are a single country." Syrian ambition undercut diplomatic
formalities. The Syrian regime does not maintain an embassy in
Beirut; exchange of ambassadors would indicate recognition of
Lebanese independence.

After dispatching the Syrian army into Lebanon, Assad treated Lebanon
as a colony. The late Ghazi Kana`an, chief of Syrian military
intelligence in Lebanon between 1982 and 2002, and his deputy and
successor Rustum Ghazali, acted as if they were colonial high
commissioners. In many ways, they were. Officials in Damascus
determined which Lebanese politicians could run for office and who
could hold ministerial portfolios. Judicial and legal officials
picked for their loyalty to the Syrian regime could silence
independent-minded Lebanese parliamentarians and lawyers by
threatening to have their professional immunity lifted. In 1994, for
example, Lebanese parliamentarian Yahya Shamas had his immunity
stripped and was imprisoned on trumped-up drug charges after a
business deal gone bad with Kana`an.. Likewise, after the Lebanese
human rights lawyer Muhamad Mugraby criticized the Supreme Judicial
Council’s lack of independence, the Beirut Bar Association lifted his
immunity. Lebanese security forces subsequently arrested him.

In August 2004, Syrian disdain for Lebanese sovereignty culminated
when Syrian president Bashar al-Assad ordered the Lebanese
constitution to be amended in order to enable Syrian client Emile
Lahoud to serve a third term as president. According to the United
Nations fact-finder dispatched sent in the wake of Hariri’s
assassination, when Hariri balked, Assad told him that opposition to
Lahoud "is tantamount to opposing Assad himself."

Syrian penetration of Lebanon permeated all aspects of state. On May
20, 1991, the Syrian government and its proxy in Lebanon signed a
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination charging both
countries "to achieve the highest level of cooperation and
coordination in all political, economic, security, cultural,
scientific, and other fields… [and to] expand and strengthen their
common interests as an affirmation of the brotherly relations and
guarantee of their common destiny." In effect, the treaty made Syria
suzerain.

The September 1, 1991 "Lebanon-Syria Defense and Security Agreement"
formalized the domination of Syria’s military and security services
in Lebanon. Two years later, an "Agreement for Economic and Social
Cooperation and Coordination" outlined a program of economic
integration which, in practice, made Lebanon an outlet for Syrian
goods and labor.

While Siniora’s government or that of some future successor might
abrogate the more parasitic treaties, it will be far more difficult
to overcome mechanisms of informal control which the Syrian
government made to Lebanese society. In August 1999, for example, the
director-general of the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment and
his Lebanese counterpart agreed to route Lebanon’s fiber optic
network through Syria, enabling Syrian intelligence to more easily
monitor telephone and internet traffic. Such routing allowed Syrian
officials and their Lebanese allies to bypass embarrassment over
revelations that Lahoud had illegally tapped the phones of Hariri and
more than a dozen parliamentarians.

Electoral Damage

Undoing the damage caused by past Syrian manipulation of the Lebanese
electoral system will be a far greater challenge for renewed
democracy in Lebanon.[3] The 1989 Ta’if Accords stipulated that the
governorate should be the base unit for national elections in
Lebanon. In effect, this split the country into five electoral
districts in which voters could select from slates of parliamentary
candidates. At the urging of Damascus, and in contravention to the Ta
`if Accord, the Lebanese parliament divided the Mount Lebanon
governorate into six separate electoral districts. The narrowing of
pro-Syrian officials’ constituencies facilitated their re-election by
undercutting the formation of opposition coalitions across wider
swaths of territory.

In the 1998 municipal elections, 40 percent of the candidates backed
by the pro-Syrian Lebanese government lost. In the aftermath, Kana`an
and Bashar al-Assad, then his father’s trusted aide, met with the
Lebanese prime minister, parliamentary speaker, and other pro-Syrian
ministers to further gerrymander districts in order to divide the
opposition’s support base. The new law subdivided Northern Lebanon
into two electoral districts. The gerrymandering combined the largely
Maronite Christian town of Bsharre with Muslim towns to which it was
not contiguous, making victory by an independent Christian candidate
impossible. Likewise, the government divided Beirut into three
districts calculated to reduce Hariri’s power. Bolstering the number
of seats in parliament from 108 to 128 seats enabled Damascus to
ensure a pro-Syrian majority. Unable to break an impasse over a new
electoral law, the Lebanese government held its June 2005
parliamentary elections under the 2000 electoral law.

Gerrymandering has amplified the power of pro-Syrian politicians
because, under the Lebanese confessional system, voters cast ballots
for multi-sectarian slates of candidates. While the political
characteristics of the parliament may be in doubt, its sectarian
components are not: Sixty-four seats are reserved for Christian
representatives (34 Maronites, 14 Greek Orthodox, eight Greek
Catholic, five Armenian Orthodox, one seat each for Armenian
Catholics, Evangelical groups, and other minorities), 56 seats are
for Muslim representatives (27 Sunnis, 27 Shi`ites, two Alawites),
and eight seats are slated for Druze candidates.

By placing Maronite communities into more populous Muslim districts,
Muslim voters could determine which slates – and therefore which
Christian representatives – entered parliament. On May 12, 2005, the
League of Maronite Bishops complained that, as the districts were
drawn, "the Christians can elect only 15 MPs out of 64 while the
others, almost 50 MPs, are elected by Muslims."

The electoral system undercut independent Shi`ites for a different
reason. Lebanese law requires citizens to vote in their ancestral
districts, effectively disenfranchising thousands of elderly war
refugees who fled southern Lebanon more than two decades previously
and subsequently settled in Beirut. Unable to cast their ballots, a
slate dominated by Hizbullah won the southern district elections,
ensuring Damascus a strong voice in the Lebanese parliament.

While in the short-term, the electoral law might undercut independent
Lebanese voices, it is in the longer-term in which the danger of the
Syrian-imposed system lies. By seeking to disenfranchise certain
groups based on their ethnicity, the gerrymandered districts amplify
differences and favor either unrepresentative or more extreme voices.
Lebanese surveyed during the June 2005 campaign said that
sectarianism has never been so high and voiced fear that the relative
calm following the Syrian withdrawal might foreshadow renewed
sectarian strife. The gerrymandered districts are geared to prevent
coalition-building, and the inability of many Beirut residents to
vote in the districts in which they reside means gradual migration
and mixing of populations cannot alone mitigate problems.

How the West can help Lebanon

Lebanon’s transformation is far from complete. Western governments
can help the Lebanese people solidify their gains in two ways: First,
they should target mechanisms of Syrian control and second, they
should assist judicial and electoral reform. Weakening Syrian power
in Lebanon will facilitate ability to make the electoral changes
necessary to enable the Lebanese people to translate democratic will
into more permanent political reformation.

Gary Gambill, editor of the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin,
identified several mechanisms of Syrian control in Lebanon which have
continued beyond the military withdrawal.[4] Damascus’ economic grasp
is significant, and may siphon from the Lebanese economy more than
ten billion U.S. dollars annually. While the Lebanese drug trade
declined under international pressure in the early 1990s, drug
cultivation has rebounded since 1997 when, more for diplomatic than
objective reasons, the U.S. State Department removed both Lebanon and
Syria from its list of drug producing and trafficking countries.
Narco-traffic has provided an independent revenue stream for
Hizbullah and other Syrian-backed interests. This undercuts the
Lebanese government’s ability to exert full control over its
territory.

Corruption also cripples Lebanon. A 2001 United Nation-commission
report estimated that Lebanon loses nearly ten percent of its gross
domestic product to corruption. The Administration for Tenders vetted
and approved less than three percent of the Lebanese government’s
reconstruction and development expenditures. Eighty percent of
Lebanese companies acknowledge paying bribes. Many Lebanese
politicians and Syrian security officials enter into silent
partnerships with Lebanese companies. Security services have arrested
parliamentarians and other Lebanese officials who have questioned or
exposed corruption. While the Syrian military has withdrawn from
Lebanon, Assad’s reliance on Lebanese capital to keep the Syrian
economy afloat suggests that Damascus will continue to intervene to
preserve its own interest at the expense of the Lebanese electorate.

There are remedies. On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department
announced its decision to freeze the assets of Kena`an and Ghazali.
Any action to undercut Syrian officials’ business interests erodes
their power. Such targeted sanctions should be applied not only upon
Syrian officials, but also on pro-Syrian Lebanese figures who
accumulated wealth in an illegal manner.

Hizbullah will remain a major impediment to Lebanon’s
democratization. A unified American and European approach is needed.
In a March 15, 2005 interview with Beirut’s Daily Star, a senior
Hizbullah official described the group as both "a resistance group
and political party." Western officials should not accept such
rhetoric. The United Nations certified Israel’s complete withdrawal
from Lebanese territory, Hizbullah’s claims notwithstanding. To
accept the group’s claim to legitimate resistance undercuts the
European Union claim to champion international law and undermines the
moral legitimacy of the United Nations in the region.

The State Department and European foreign ministries should instead
insist that the Lebanese government adhere to Security Council
Resolution 1559’s call for "the disbanding and disarmament of all
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias." While Hizbullah’s leadership
claims that 1559 does not apply because they define Hizbullah as a
political party and not a militia, such distinctions are
disingenuous. Political parties do not maintain armed wings. Foreign
and Defense policy should be the solitary domain of the Lebanese
central government. While Hizbullah might claim an electoral mandate,
its legitimacy as a force for Lebanese sovereignty ended when it
sponsored a March 8, 2005 rally in Beirut endorsing Syrian
occupation. Its showing is as much an artifact of Syrian
gerrymandering as a sign of true popularity. If Lebanon is to become
a stable, multi-confessional democracy, neither Europe nor the United
States should legitimize Hizbullah.

Assisting Reform

In the wake of the Ta`if Accord, U.S. and European policymakers made
an implied bargain with Damascus: In exchange for stability in
Lebanon, the West would turn a blind eye toward Syrian ambitions in
Lebanon. For fifteen years, the Syrian regime eviscerated Lebanese
institutions in order to better control Lebanese society and exploit
its resources. If Western governments wish to solidify Lebanon’s
transformation, then they need to help Lebanon restore the
transparency of government.

Syrian authorities and their Lebanese proxies eviscerated the
Lebanese judiciary. An October 2004 incident symbolized the
subservience of the judiciary to Syrian intelligence when Lebanese
television broadcast the visit of Ghazali to Marwan Hamade, an
opposition parliamentarian who had just survived an assassination
attempt for which many Lebanese believed the Syrians responsible. The
Lebanese Justice Minister trailed behind Ghazali, symbolically
affiliating himself as the Syrian official’s subordinate.

The European Union has already offered to advise and finance judicial
reform through its Neighborhood Program. Such aid should become a
priority so that Lebanon’s judiciary can begin to tackle the
country’s corruption and abuse-of-power problems.

Both Washington and European foreign ministries should also push for
comprehensive electoral reform. While Lebanon’s confessional system
makes tinkering sensitive, Western diplomats should encourage the
repeal of Syrian-sponsored gerrymandering by, for example, reverting
to the governorate-based system agreed to under the Ta`if Accord.
Western governments might support Lebanese reformers who seek to
allow residency-based rather than ancestry-based voting.

In April 2005, the State Department called for the Syrian government
to establish an embassy in Beirut. This demand should be echoed by
European foreign ministries. The refusal of the Syrian government to
recognize the right of Lebanon to exist as a fully independent state
is a problem that should be directly addressed. Diplomatic
obfuscation will fail. There is precedent. After the Iraqi prime
minister recognized Kuwait in 1963, the international community
claimed diplomatic victory and ignored the Iraqi government’
subsequent refusal to ratify the treaty. Twenty-seven years later,
Iraq revived its claims, declared Kuwait an Iraqi province, and
invaded. Neither the United States nor European Union should for
short-term convenience accept anything less than unambiguous Syrian
recognition of Lebanon’s independence.

In the wake of Hariri’s assassination, the Lebanese people
demonstrated their desire for reform. At great danger to themselves,
they demanded a Syrian withdrawal. While the impetus for democracy
was internal, international community pressure was vital to the
Lebanese freedom movement’s success.

The reverberations of the Cedar Revolution extend beyond Lebanon’s
borders. Lebanon is a trend-setter: Racy Lebanese videos and
television shows promote a vision of openness and worldliness which
competes culturally with the resurgence of political Islam. Ideas
spread across social strata. Lebanon’s greatest export is its people.
Among the greatest advocates for reform in Saudi Arabia, for example,
are Lebanese businessmen, long resident in Jeddah and Riyadh. Their
agitation for democracy makes reform an Arab issue, less easily
dismissed as an import from the West.

While the potential of Lebanese transformation is large, the
withdrawal of Syrian troops is not enough to guarantee success. The
Assad regime has ideological and economic motivations to deny Lebanon
its freedom. If the United States and Europe wish the Cedar
Revolution to succeed, they must work together to undercut Syrian
obstructionism and bolster Lebanese reformers.

Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute, is editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

[1] For greater background on the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, see:
William Harris. Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions
(Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1997), pp. 261-2; and William Harris.
"Bashar al-Assad’s Lebanon Gamble." Middle East Quarterly. Summer
2005. pp.33-44.
[2] Daniel Pipes traces pan-Syrian ideology in Greater Syria: The
History of an Ambition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). He
makes a summary of his argument in "Greater Syria: Another Lion Roars
in the Middle East." The Washington Post. October 21, 1990.
[3] Gary C. Gambill provides excellent analysis on this issue in
various Middle East Intelligence Bulletin articles on the subject
from 1999 and 2000.
[4] Gary Gambill. "Hooked on Lebanon." Middle East Quarterly. Autumn
2005.

http://www.meforum.org/article/781

Turkey May Repeal Law on `Insulting Turkishness,’ Gul Says

Bloomberg
Jan 28 2007

Turkey May Repeal Law on `Insulting Turkishness,’ Gul Says

By Gregory Viscusi

Jan. 28 (Bloomberg) — Turkey will weaken or repeal a law against
insulting the nation that has been used to prosecute writers and
intellectuals, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul said.

“We will change that law,” Gul said in an interview yesterday at
annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Asked if the change could come before Presidential elections, Gul
answered “it could come even before the elections.”

Turkey’s parliament will pick a new president in May. Gul’s governing
Justice and Development Party isn’t slated to face legislative
elections until November, though some politicians have called for
bringing those elections forward. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and Gul, who is also foreign minister, are possible presidential
candidates. Neither has declared his intentions.

Article 301 of the country’s penal code outlaws “insulting
Turkishness.” That law was used to convict Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink to a six-month suspended prison term in July
for a 2004 article he wrote about the massacre of Armenians by
Ottoman Turkish troops during World War I.

Dink was murdered Jan. 19 by a teenage nationalist. Tens of thousands
of Turks attended his funeral, which turned into a protest against
Article 301. Nobel Prize-winner Orhan Pamuk and other Turkish writers
have been prosecuted under the law, though Dink’s was the sole
conviction. The charges are generally brought by lawyers linked to
nationalist movements, not by the government.

Armenians say at least 1.5 million of their people were slaughtered
in a genocide from 1915. Turkey says the number is inflated and both
Turks and Armenians were killed during ethnic clashes.

A message to Mr Hrant Dink mourners

Kurdish Media, UK
Jan 28 2007

A message to Mr Hrant Dink mourners

1/28/2007 KurdishMedia.com – By Kameel Ahmady

A message to Mr Hrant Dink mourners: Kurdish people are eager for
reconciliation and peaceful respect between ethnicities

It was with sadness that I heard last week of the death of Hrant
Dink, who worked courageously and tirelessly for a Turkey where
understanding and acceptance of diverse cultures, and open dialogue
between ethnicities would triumph, instead of the intractability from
many sides which currently reigns.

Later that week, I was also saddened to read some articles on
websites, statements which for me so missed the point of Hrant’s life
and work. I refer to those that were tinged with an anger and hatred
that seemed to reflect this intractability and betray movement toward
honest and respectful dialogue, both between ethnic groups and with
the state. These were marked by the kind of chauvinism which we see
all too often in (ethnic) nationalist ideologies; focussing on
Kurdish suffering, they do little to empathize with the plight of
Armenians. In conclusion, one such article invited us to view grisly
images, which, though tragically honest in their depiction of the
brutality of the Turkish state, were out of place in the context of a
memorial to one man’s life.

This week at the funeral of Mr. Dink, mourners, in the thousands,
poured into Istanbul’s streets, carrying placards which read `We are
all Armenians now’. Even this was critiqued in mocking tones. Some
have cynically raised the question that it is not reasonable for
Turks to now be claiming kinship with Armenians, since their very
ancestors participated in the genocide of 1915. However, let us not
question or condemn this act out of turn. Cannot people admit to
their past transgressions, and does this not display a will for
future peace? I am sure that it is not necessary to remind my Kurdish
friends that there were some of our people who participated in the
slaughter of their Armenian neighbours perpetrated by the Ottoman
state, just as there were many Kurds who fought to protect and save
Armenians, hiding them in their homes.

Reconciliation calls for honesty, and a real will to respect the
memory and experience of others; to put aside hatreds, however
justified; to acknowledge that we all have elements of good and bad.
The symbolic power of this gesture – `We are all Armenians’ – a
gesture of openness, and yes, even empathy, must not be
underestimated. Indeed, this sort of identification with `the other’
may represent the greatest hope we have seen for a long time in the
battle to overcome inter-ethnic tensions in Turkey. The Turkish state
has been accused of making hasty and false remarks of condolence
which exploit the death of Mr. Dink; I think such statements are no
less guilty of this charge.

While I try to understand and even empathize with life experience in
which violence and oppression lead to such rage, I cannot see it as
justified in this context. Some of us have tried, and should continue
to reaffirm our commitment to working with our friends in the
struggle for democracy and human rights of Kurdish people; this
includes a responsibility to be honest, to give a viewpoint which is
not entrenched in ideology, but in ideals. We should challenge some
of our extreme point of views to bring about change through openness
and goodwill.

Will such statements help to promote the spirit of respect and
communication that Mr. Dink advocated, often alienating him from even
many fellow Armenians? My fear is that they will have the opposite
effect, and indeed might easily be dismissed by detractors as just so
much fanatical ranting.

Worse still, they degrade the memory of Hrant Dink and his
achievements, by flying in the face of all he worked for. Hrant Dink
lived his life and pursued his work with a sense of goodwill and
openness towards all, including those who had been responsible for
the attempted extermination of his people. Surely we can honour his
memory by continuing in this spirit, and in offering the same to our
perceived adversaries.

Let us show the world that the Kurdish people are eager for such
reconciliation and peaceful respect between ethnicities. Let us
embrace the legacy that he left for us.

KUWAIT: Kuwait to buy Lebanon

Kuwait Times, Kuwait
Jan 28 2007

Kuwait to buy Lebanon

Fouad Al-Hashem (Al-Watan, Jan 27) came up with a "genius" proposal
in relation to Lebanon chronic crises. Al-Hashem suggests that Kuwait
buy Lebanon for a hundred billion dollar and call it the 7th borough.
The money should be distributed among all Lebanese. The Christians
could migrate to America and Canada. The Druze should go to Syria,
the Armenians to Armenia, the Shiites to Iran and Iraq and the Sunnis
to the Arab Gulf. Those Lebanese who want to stay, will get an
identity card without naming faith and ethnicity. If Syria tries to
invade Lebanon, the American retired General, Schwarzkopf would be
called to oust the Syrians.

My comment: The "genius" proposal has one big snag. The Kuwaitis
would replicate Kuwait in Lebanon. The Kuwaitis would import "Asians"
to do the job. They would sit idle and demand salary raise and
writing off private debts. The Islamists would have all the say and
Talebanise Lebanon. Waleed Al-Tabtabae would be appointed as head of
the new Kuwaiti province.

ode=article&artid=171959517

http://www.kuwaittimes.net/Navariednews.asp?dism

Russia plans refinery for Iranian oil

Gulf Daily News, Bahrain
Jan 28 2007

Russia plans refinery for Iranian oil

MOSCOW: The oil division of Russian energy giant Gazprom is planning
to build a refinery in Armenia to process oil coming from
neighbouring Iran, a Russian newspaper said yesterday.

The plan would involve pumping oil into Armenia from the Tabriz
region of northern Iran along a 200km pipeline, then transporting the
refined oil products back into Iran by rail, the Kommersant daily
said.

"We are looking into building a refinery in Armenia, but we cannot
give details for the moment," Natalya Vyalkina, a spokeswoman for
state-controlled Gazprom Neft, said.

Kommersant quoted analysts as saying that the project would be
"essentially political" since the high transport costs involved would
bring little economic profit.

Russia has close economic ties with Iran and is building a nuclear
power station in southern Iran. Moscow long resisted the imposition
of UN sanctions over Iran’s nuclear programme.