ANKARA: Washington Times Criticizes Pelosi For Armenian Bill

WASHINGTON TIMES CRITICIZES PELOSI FOR ARMENIAN BILL

Turkish Press
Feb 26 2007

WASHINGTON D.C. – U.S. paper Washington Times harshly criticized U.S.
House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi who supports a bill on
so-called Armenian genocide.

"Not content with undermining the war effort in Iraq, House of
Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi has apparently set her sights
on Turkey, a NATO ally and one of the few Muslim-majority nations in
the world that is a democracy," said Washington Times in its today`s
editorial.

The editorial said the United States needs to be working more closely
with Turkey at such a dangerous time.

"But Mrs. Pelosi seems more interested in playing ethnic politics in
order to score some cheap political points and win additional votes,"
it said.

"The reality is that Armenian and Greek lobbying organizations hostile
to Turkey command far more power in Washington than do pro-Turkish
groups. And in their effort to settle old scores dating back to
World War I, they have the potential to damage our current ability
to maintain Turkey`s cooperation in stabilizing Iraq," it added.

ANKARA: Lobbying In Turkey – USA Relations

LOBBYING IN TURKEY – USA RELATIONS

Turkish Press
Feb 26 2007

ISTANBUL – "If Turkish lobbying is not conducted properly in the
United States, resolution on the so-called Armenian genocide will be
troubling for us", said Ercument Kilic, president of the Center for
Turkish American Chambers of Commerce, on Tuesday.

Ercument Kilic, who took the floor at a conference titled "Turkey – USA
relations Within the Framework of Lobbying" in Yeditepe University,
Istanbul, pointed out that an Armenian Museum will be opened in
Washington, capital of the USA.

"If Turkey is promoted on a regular basis and under a schedule, this
will have significant results in the U.S. parliament," he stressed.

-RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE LOBBY-

Pointing out that the Japanese have a dominant position in industries
such as insurance and banking, Kilic said relations with the Japanese
lobby must be enhanced.

Kilic, who lived in the USA for over 30 years, made some suggestions
for a better promotion of Turkey in this country.

Establishment of a "Lobbying Ministry" in Turkey, steps regarding
dual citizenship, new promotion campaigns, and establishment of a
legal protection institution to protect Turks in the USA against
unjust situations are some of Kilic`s suggestions.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ANKARA: No One Will Benefit From A Resolution In US Congress On Arme

NO ONE WILL BENEFIT FROM A RESOLUTION IN US CONGRESS ON ARMENIAN …

Turkish Press
Feb 26 2007

MARDIN – No one will benefit from a resolution in the United States
Congress on Armenian topic, U.S. Consul General in southern city of
Adana Eric F. Green said on Tuesday in south-eastern city of Mardin.

Green paid a courtesy visit to the Governor of Mardin today.

We will meet with representatives from the business community,
political parties and NGOs in Mardin and have a chance to learn about
economic and political developments in the region, told Green.

Asked what he thinks on an Armenian resolution in the U.S. Congress,
Green replied that "the American administration does not believe such
a resolution would be beneficial. I believe that bilateral relations
between Turkey and Armenia will provide an opportunity to evaluate
the incidents of the past. U.S.-Turkish relations are highly important
for us. The Armenian resolution will benefit no one."

In response to a question on terrorist PKK organization, Green stressed
that the USA is in constant contact with "our Turkish partners. North
of Iraq must begin to have stability so that terrorist acts against
Turkey in the region may be eradicated."

ANKARA: Turkish-European MPs Warn Gul About Increased Nationalism In

TURKISH-EUROPEAN MPS WARN GUL ABOUT INCREASED NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Feb 26 2007

Turkey, which last Saturday brought together in Ankara about 23
European lawmakers of Turkish descent for the first time, heard from
them that the biggest problems that they have been facing in Europe in
explaining Turkey have been the increased nationalism in the country,
as well as Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which criminalizes
any insult to state institutions or to ‘Turkishness."

The slain Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, has been the
latest victim of Article 301, which also is seen as paving the way
for violent ultra-nationalism in Turkey.

The lawmakers from the European Union’s parliament, as well as from
regional and national assemblies in Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark and Sweden, were invited to Ankara for discussions over
Turkey’s EU membership bid, and to discuss ways to help Turks in
Europe better integrate into those societies. Gul asked for their
support in overcoming what he described as European prejudices
against Turkey. Having lunch with Gul at the Ankara Sheraton, the
European Parliamentarians of Turkish origin for their part stated,
amongst other things, that they themselves suffered a lot from the
ultra-nationalist trends in Europe.

"Turkey has a similar problem as well. How can we defend Turkey while
nationalism is increasing in the country, which carries the danger
of making Turkey inward-looking," they reportedly told Gul during
the lunch.

Gul, in turn, reportedly told the MPs that they should leave it to
him to tackle Turkish internal politics. "Defend Turkey in accordance
with the conditions that prevail in the countries where you are
represented in their parliaments’," Gul reportedly told the MPs,
which included those like Devrim Baba, a Turk of Kurdish origin.

Despite some earlier press criticism that the Foreign Ministry had
invited such controversial people as Devrim Baba, Ankara did not
refrain from hosting him during the Ankara gathering, said some
government officials.

Hearing complaints from MP’s about Turkey’s Article 301, Foreign
Minister Gul stated that they have an intention to change this article
in a very short time. He reportedly said: "In parallel to the changes
planned to be made to Article 301, the mentality in Turkey should
also change. The judges have a role in implementing Article 301 and
the government can not interfere in the judiciary."

One MP suggested to Gul that the article could be softened, and that
the concept of "Turkishness" could be turned into a more abstract
concept.

Those Turkish officials who attended the meeting shared an observation
of theirs with Today’s Zaman, their admiration for the MP’s, whom
they said speak Turkish better than many Turks, as well the several
other languages that they speak.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ANKARA: Germany To Propose Common EU History Book

GERMANY TO PROPOSE COMMON EU HISTORY BOOK
Selcuk Gultaþlý Brussels

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Feb 26 2007

European Union term president Germany is to propose an EU-wide common
history book that is expected to be a model for history textbooks
for the 27 members of the union.

In the wake of another history-related proposal to punish the deniers
of "genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity," Germany is
expected to unveil its proposal at an upcoming informal meeting of
EU education ministers in Heidelberg on March 1-2.

While the common history book initiative has created yet another
controversy like the one on penalizing deniers of genocide, another
debate on history is on the way. Eastern European member countries
want a reference to the dark days of communism in the declaration of
the 50th birthday of the EU that will be held in Berlin on March 25.

While EU education ministers are set this week set to debate the
possibility a common European history book, some member countries have
already taken a position against the initiative. British politicians
say it is an encroachment on the sphere of education that should
be national.

The Armenian lobby has supported the proposal to punish deniers of
genocide hoping the Armenian "genocide" will also be included on the
list. EU members like Britain, Italy and Denmark oppose such measures
on the grounds they damage freedom of expression.

While the German initiative is expected to be announced by the German
education minister Annette Schavan, EU diplomats, speaking to Today’s
Zaman, said it was not yet a proposal. "It is just an idea, nothing
more nothing less. We will see how EU members react. It is going to
be a preliminary debate. If the reaction will be positive, then we
will be able to proceed," said a diplomat.

As reactions have already started to come forward, German government
spokesman Rainer Rudolph said: "It is not the idea at all to rewrite
history. There would be no suggestion of leaving out anything that
might be unpleasant or difficult for the Germans or for anyone else.

That would be ridiculous," according to the British daily The Guardian.

EU diplomats say the idea was inspired by a similar project already
existing between France and Germany involving a book called "Histoire
Geschichte" written by 10 historians, five from each country. Though
the Germans say it is a very successful initiative, experts argue
that already this version — bringing together only two countries —
exposed national differences, with room made for separate paragraphs in
the French and German versions on communism and the US role in Europe.

Meanwhile, European history is also emerging as a potential point of
conflict on the planned declaration to mark the EU’s 50th anniversary,
which will be signed by European leaders in Berlin on March 25.

–Boundary_(ID_iUyb7iliuG05oiCGIbUhVQ)–

Turkey, Cyprus And The European Division

TURKEY, CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN DIVISION
Rebecca Bryant

Middle East Report Online, DC
Feb 26 2007

(Rebecca Bryant is assistant professor of anthropology at George
Mason University and author of Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of
Nationalism in Cyprus [London: I. B. Tauris, 2004].)

More than three years after the opening of the ceasefire line that
divides Cyprus, the island is closer than ever to rupture. When the
Green Line first opened in April 2003, there was an initial period of
euphoria, as Cypriots flooded in both directions to visit homes and
neighbors left unwillingly behind almost three decades before. But a
year later, when a UN plan to reunite the island came to referendum,
new divisions emerged. While Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the
plan, their Greek Cypriot compatriots rejected it in overwhelming
numbers. Visits stalled, and today social relations are mired in an
increasingly divisive politics. Recent polls show a majority of Greek
Cypriots in favor of partition, while Turkish Cypriots are anxious
about a spate of lawsuits over property that they occupied when the
island was divided. They perceive these suits as a direct threat to
their existence in the absence of an acceptable plan for reunification.

Moreover, in the absence of such a plan, Cyprus has become a key
obstacle in Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. Only a week after
the fateful referendum in 2004, the Greek-controlled Republic of Cyprus
itself joined the EU, and immediately began using its membership to
put pressure on Turkey. Indeed, the prospect of doing so was one of
the main reasons that Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos gave
for rejecting the UN reunification plan. Today, the stumbling block
is the question of whether Turkey will "recognize" the Republic by
opening its ports to ships bearing the Republic of Cyprus flag. The
Turkish government has clearly stated that it will open ports only
when the economic isolation of Turkish-majority northern Cyprus
ends-something promised by the EU after the referendum but never
delivered. Turkey had put its full weight behind the reunification
plan, which would have ensured the withdrawal of Turkish troops from
the northern part of the island. Indeed, the Turkish government was
eager to be rid of the Cyprus problem, but subsequent events have
shown that it will not be rid of it at all costs.

Contrary to what many analysts expected and hoped for so long, the
bumbling entry of the European Union into the Cyprus equation has
produced only an insoluble tangle. Local actors now use their access
to EU legal and political mechanisms to threaten, bluff and bully
their way into a future that looks more and more like partition.

Turkey’s journey toward the EU may run aground on Cyprus’ shores. And
as usual, it is Turkish Cypriots who are caught in between, unable
to rid themselves of Turkey’s presence and unable to have their own
political presence recognized by their Greek compatriots.

UNITE AND DIVIDE

Not long after the referendum, a Greek Cypriot refugee told me
something that seemed boldly to summarize the growing mood in the
south. Like many refugees, she refuses to cross the ceasefire line to
visit her home in the north, saying that she will not be a tourist
in her own country. But it soon became clear that her refusal meant
something very specific in political terms. Such refugees desire a full
return to their villages and the recreation of their communities —
something that would not have been allowed under the UN reunification
plan. But the plan was only the latest instantiation of the idea of
a federal government uniting two, ethnic states, an idea to which
the Republic has paid lip service for more than 30 years.

The refugee woman’s position, however, was clear: "Either we will
return to the 1960 constitution and all refugees will go back to
their homes, or we’ll continue to live in our dreams." In other words,
there would either be a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would
return to their status as a minority, or, in her words, a wall should
be built to keep them apart.

Internally displaced persons and their descendants make up about a
third of the Greek Cypriot population and so constitute the single
most important interest group in the south. Moreover, many refugees
are closely tied to the refugee organizations that sprang up around
lost villages and towns to fill the gap created by the loss of
their communities. Not surprisingly, refugees were the key group to
which much propaganda was addressed during the period leading up
to the referendum. During that time, minute calculations of land
to be regained and numbers of refugees to return eclipsed serious
discussion of a federal state or the process of reconciliation. It
became clear that there were many contradictions in the Republic’s
stance on reunification, the most obvious being an avowal of support
for a federal state while at the same time insisting on the absolute
return of all displaced persons to their original homes.

Indeed, in all its actions since, the Republic has made it increasingly
clear that a federal state simply is not on the agenda.

Interestingly, it is actually EU membership that has allowed the
Republic to take this stance, enabling them directly to pressure
Turkey without having to negotiate with Turkish Cypriots. In a
November 2006 interview with the Turkish Cypriot Kýbrýs-TV, Greek
Cypriot Minister of Foreign Relations Yiorgos Lillikas reiterated
that the only interlocutor the Republic of Cyprus will recognize is
Turkey. Indeed, until a brief meeting in July 2006, Papadopoulos
had refused since the referendum to meet with his Turkish Cypriot
counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, on these grounds. "Look, the Cyprus
problem is becoming more and more confused every day," Lillikas
remarked. "We say, our interlocutor on this subject is not Mr. Talat,
it’s Turkey. But because neither Talat nor Turkey accepts this,
we’re constantly experiencing differences of opinion."

The Republic insists that it is really Turkey that controls what
happens, and that Talat is an insignificant player. But the Republic
also operates with a limited understanding of Turkish politics or
of the complex relation between Turkey and its de facto colony in
northern Cyprus. At the height of his power and popularity, former
Turkish Cypriot president Rauf Denktaþ was known for his ability to
make or break governments in Turkey. The 1974 Cyprus intervention
is a matter of Turkish national pride, and the recent rebellion of
Turkish Cypriots against their "protectors" has soured relations,
leading many Turks to call their Cypriot counterparts ungrateful.

After sweeping to power in 2002 elections, the Justice and Development
Party adopted a surprisingly compromising stance on Cyprus. While
this softened line was initially unpopular, the demise of Denktaþ
and the rise in Cyprus of a party that seeks freedom from Turkish
colonial rule has shaken popular attitudes toward the problem.

What it has not shaken, however, is the refusal to be blackmailed. In
July 2006, the Justice and Development Party published a booklet
entitled "The European Union in One Hundred Questions." The primary aim
of the booklet seems to have been to dispel fears that EU requirements
would divide the country or that the government would bow to demands
that would damage national "honor." Its stance on the recognition of
the Republic is clear: "In the present circumstances Turkey cannot
recognize the Greek administration of Cyprus under the name the
Republic of Cyprus. Political recognition will come only when a
comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem can be found."

The Republic and its EU allies appear to believe that the Turkish
government is simply bluffing and that it would not rebuff the chance
at EU membership. Unfortunately, things are not as simple as that.

In the past, US support for the Turkish military overlooked that
military’s anti-democratic tendencies in favor of its supposedly
secularist ones. When Turkey’s EU candidacy became a real possibility,
the support of another power besides the US became a balance that
enabled the development of a stronger democracy in the country, one
that might make the military answerable to the government rather than
the other way around. But European support for Turkey’s candidacy
has been wavering and contradictory, and many Turks now believe
that the EU will simply continue to erect new hurdles before an ever
receding finish line. Many Turkish analysts agree that giving in to
the Republic of Cyprus’ demands will accomplish nothing, because new
demands will appear to take their place. Turks recognize, moreover,
that the Republic’s hardline approach conveniently dovetails with
the desires of extremists in the EU to exclude Turkey at all costs.

One of the unfortunate costs has been the shattering of political
stability in Turkey, as the Cyprus problem becomes a wedge to
drive in further divisions. In the summer of 2005, a middle-aged
Turkish Cypriot woman hinted to me that she is an ulkucu, a word
that literally means "idealist" but has come to connote members of a
wide coalition of fringe, fascist-nationalist organizations based in
Turkey that also have supporters in Cyprus. The most famous of such
supporters is Denktaþ, known for his association with the Gray Wolves,
an organization infamous for its use of violence and provocation. When
the Turkish Cypriot woman discussed her involvement in the larger
web of ulkucu politics, she also angrily threatened that they would
never allow the Turkish government to "sell out" Cyprus. Indeed,
she hinted that they would go so far as to overthrow the Turkish
government to prevent it.

Although her threat appeared toothless at the time, such threats
from the periphery nevertheless produce a sense of disquiet. Indeed,
provocations in Turkey over the next months appeared to have links
to Turkish nationalists in Cyprus. The assassination in May 2006
of a High Court judge in Ankara, originally blamed on Islamists,
eventually was linked to one Muzaffer Tekin, a retired army officer
with ties both to radical organizations in northern Cyprus and the
Turkish "deep state" — the term used for a nexus of military officers,
police chiefs and far-right paramilitary groups existing in parallel
to the official Turkish state. The assassination marked the crest of
a wave of radical dissatisfaction with the Justice and Development
Party government, known for its neo-liberal policies, its desire for
integration into Europe and its Islamist past. And many analysts link
the January 2007 assassination of respected Armenian Turkish journalist
Hrant Dink to the isolationism and rising nationalism that European
attitudes have produced. That nationalism was fueled by a recent EU
decision to freeze segments of Turkey’s admission negotiations after
the country’s refusal to open its ports to Nicosia’s ships. Although
Turkish Cypriots themselves have largely stayed out of the fray,
Cyprus has again come to the fore as a symbol of all that Turkey
stands to lose as it stumbles westward.

Support among the Turkish public for EU membership has now fallen to
an all-time low, in part because of the ways in which the EU allows
the Republic of Cyprus to use its membership. But it should be no
surprise that the same EU that allowed a divided Cyprus to enter as
a political anomaly is now using that anomaly to put obstacles in
the way of Turkey’s EU bid.

LAWFARE IN THE NEW CYPRUS

After the opening of the Green Line, many Turkish Cypriots traveled to
the south to claim advantages available to them as technical citizens
of the Republic. Many acquired EU passports, while others began to
work or to use the south’s better-equipped medical facilities. Still
others sent their children to the English School, an institution
established in the early British colonial period that was intended to
quell nationalist fervor by producing an elite that would be loyal
to the Crown. Ironically, many politicians who played an important
role in the island’s division, including Denktaþ and former Greek
Cypriot president Glafkos Clerides, emerged from that school.

The school has a history of producing graduates who have gone on to
study in the best universities in Britain and who have subsequently
become community leaders. It should not be surprising, then, that
almost 70 Turkish Cypriot families chose to send their children to
the school, as soon as they gained access. As with all such gestures,
this was heralded as a step in the direction of bicommunal harmony
and reconciliation, and by all reports students in the school managed
well together until an incident in early December that shocked and
worried both communities.

Although reports are contradictory, it appears that a 12-year old
Turkish Cypriot boy took offense when he saw a Greek classmate wearing
a cross. Reportedly, they argued, possibly fought, and the Turkish
Cypriot boy became angry and spat on the ground. The right-wing
Greek Cypriot newspapers Simerini and Machi printed inflammatory
stories claiming that the Turkish boy spat on the cross and that the
school implemented a ban on religious symbols. The furor that resulted
culminated when about 20 masked Greek Cypriot youths dressed in black
entered the school from outside and attacked five Turkish Cypriot
boys. The boys’ Greek classmates intervened and little serious damage
was done, but the shock has rippled throughout the island. Reports
linked the youths to neo-Orthodox fascist organizations with ties
to Greece and names such as "Golden Dawn" (Chrisi Avgi). Such
organizations have been increasingly visible since the opening
of the Green Line, so far with only isolated incidents involving
Turkish Cypriots.

At the same time, many Cypriots discuss the rise of these organizations
and the English School incident as the predictable outcome of policies
that have divided the communities since the ceasefire line opened. The
most divisive of such policies has been the Republic’s implicit and
explicit sanction of lawsuits over property that have created much
ill will between the communities. In November 2004, the decision of
one Greek Cypriot refugee to bring a lawsuit against a British couple
who had built a villa on his property in the north sparked a series
of such cases that also encompassed Turkish Cypriots. Soon Turkish
Cypriots opened their own suits, mostly for the expropriation of their
properties by the government in the south. Ironically, it was the open
Green Line and the Republic’s EU entry that allowed this litigation
to take place, since decisions may be appealed to European courts and
enforced by EU law, if enforcement remains impossible in Cyprus. Not
surprisingly, the Greek Cypriot refugee won his case against the
British couple, and that case has now been remanded to Britain,
where he hopes to seize the couple’s property there.

Only a few days before the English School incident, President
Papadopoulos announced the passage of a law that criminalizes the sale
of Greek Cypriot property in the north, in the unrecognized Turkish
Cypriot state. Following the division of the island in 1974, Turkish
Cypriots had settled in abandoned Greek Cypriot properties, and the
government in the north eventually issued titles that allowed them to
sell those properties. Now such sales have become criminal offenses,
subject to five years in prison. The use of such legal mechanisms,
encouraged and made possible by the Republic’s EU membership, is an
instance of what has come to be known as "lawfare," or the continuation
of conflict by legal means. Clearly, that legal battle is escalating.

Although President Papadopoulos dismissed the November attack on
the Turkish Cypriot boys as the work of "brainless thugs," Turkish
Cypriot president Talat saw it as a natural outcome of Papadopoulos’
own policies. "Whatever face you show to your people, that’s how
they’ll behave," Talat noted in an address that month. "If you design
a law that includes Turkish Cypriots living in Greek property, and if
you declare that Turkish Cypriots are criminals and say that you’re
going to put them in jail, how would you expect the Greek Cypriot
people to behave?"

The escalation of tensions has everyone on edge, waiting for an
explosion. Only a day after the English School incident, Turkish
Cypriots crossing to the south reported that Greek Cypriot police at
the ceasefire line refused to accept their identity cards from the
self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, insisting that
they would be able to cross only with Republic of Cyprus identity
cards. Many Turkish Cypriots had acquired those cards, along with EU
passports, when the ceasefire line opened; others refused to do so
on principle. By the following day, this "policy" had changed, and
Turkish Cypriots were able to cross. Unfortunately, it is precisely
such whims that in the past have proven so divisive.

EXTREME MAKEOVER?

What has become strikingly clear in all of this is that the political
use of EU membership has only encouraged the rise of a militant
nationalism that leaves no room for compromises such as federation.

Before the opening of the Green Line, many activists and analysts
still hoped for the development of a multicultural, civic nationalism
in the island that would entail loyalty to a federal state. But
at a recent conference on nationalism in Nicosia, a number of
Cypriot scholars openly discussed the demise of Greek and Turkish
nationalisms in the island and the emergence of Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot nationalisms that express identification with the
island while rejecting its cultural or political unity. Certainly,
the communities are divided by the interests that those loyalties
serve, and by the ways in which the transnational configuration of
the EU has given new impetus to local longings.

In Turkish folk literature, the clownish Nasrettin Hoca is a staple
figure, and there are hundreds of stories and anecdotes about his
misguided foolishness. In one such story, Nasrettin Hoca finds a
stork, whose beak and legs he proceeds to amputate in order to make it
resemble a "real" bird. The phrase, "Kuþa benzettým" ("I made it look
like a bird") refers to the ways in which one may destroy something
with one’s good intentions.

The stumbling of the EU into the Cyprus morass unfortunately calls to
mind the stork’s sad story. The island has certainly become a more
and more European "bird," with a booming economy in the south and
all the superficial signs of "Europeanness," such as Gucci boutiques
and chic outdoor cafes. Turkish Cypriots, too, have benefited,
especially economically and educationally, if at a slower pace than
their wealthier, recognized neighbors. But there has been much lost
politically. In contrast to the years prior to the Republic’s EU
entry, Greek Cypriot politicians have now begun to proclaim that
they will not "give up" the Republic, despite previous avowals to
support a federal solution that would have dissolved it. Even Turkish
Cypriots, who had supported a federal solution, appear to be drawing
back from it, retreating into a protection of what is already in
hand. That retreat also by necessity entangles Turkey, whose troops
in the island are the only thing giving Turkish Cypriots a position
from which to bargain. And so one can only wonder what sort of "bird"
the island may resemble when its makeover is complete.

ml

–Boundary_(ID_vEBtXvgxcu8x21p13BgQ6A)–

http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022507.ht

Armenia Passes Dual Citizenship Law

ARMENIA PASSES DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW

Interfax News Agency
Russia & CIS General Newswire
February 26, 2007 Monday 3:20 PM MSK

The Armenian Parliament approved a dual citizenship law in the third
and final reading on Monday, an Interfax correspondent reported.

Under the law, Armenian citizens can hold the citizenship of another
country and foreigners can hold Armenian citizenship.

The law also simplifies the process for awarding Armenian citizenship
to persons of Armenian descent or to foreign nationals who have made
a special contribution to the country.

Yerevan, Baku To Discuss Karabakh In Europe In Mid-March

YEREVAN, BAKU TO DISCUSS KARABAKH IN EUROPE IN MID-MARCH

Interfax News Agency
Russia & CIS General Newswire
February 26, 2007 Monday 2:14 PM MSK

Another meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers,
during which negotiations on the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict are
expected to continue, will be held in mid-March, the Armenian Foreign
Minister Vardan Oskanian said.

"Currently, international mediators are preparing our meeting with
the Azerbaijani counterpart, which is expected to be held in mid-March
in a European capital," Oskanian said at a press conference on Monday
in Yerevan.

He said the Karabakh talks are being held as usually.

For his part, the Poland’s Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga, who also
participated in the press conference, said that Warsaw was ready to
provide any assistance to the settlement of the problem of Nagorno-
Karabakh.

"It will help establish safety and develop cooperation both in the
South Caucasus region and worldwide," she said.

Moreover, Fotyga said that during her visit Armenia and Poland had
signed a cooperation memorandum, according to which Poland would
assist Armenia to integrate within the European institutions.

In particular, Fotyga said, Poland can provide assistance to Armenia
under the EU-Armenia individual partnership program.

State Department Regular News Briefing

STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING

Congressional Quarterly
Feb 26 2007

SPEAKER: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS SEAN MCCORMACK

[parts omitted]

QUESTION: Sean, I wanted to ask a question about the letter over the
Hill (ph) on behalf of the Azerbaijani community of the United States
to Secretary Rice. The community commemorates tragic (inaudible)
events, Azerbaijani side calls it a genocide.

I believe the community hopes for more active role of the U.S. in
resolution of Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict.

QUESTION: Do you have response to that letter yet?

MCCORMACK: I understand that there was a letter delivered and that
the United States deeply regrets the tragic events that transpired in
Khojali 15 years ago and condemns all such attacks on civilians. We
send our condolences to the families and friends of the victims of
that tragedy.

In order to prevent any further loss of life, it is vital that a
peaceful and just solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict be found
as soon as possible.

The United States recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and
remains committed to helping facilitate a negotiated settlement as
one of the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.

QUESTION: On the same subject, the situation on the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan is on the U.N. General Assembly agenda this
year. Do you know what would be the position of the United States
during this discussion?

MCCORMACK: We’ll have to get back to you. I’m not aware off the top
of my head what that would be.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

RA National Assembly Adopts Package Of Bills Containing Provisions O

RA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS PACKAGE OF BILLS CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Noyan Tapan
Feb 26 2007

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 26, NOYAN TAPAN. At the February 26 sitting RA
National Assembly with 66 votes in favor, 5 opposed and 1 abstained in
second reading and completely adopted a package of bills containing
provisions on dual citizenship. Members of United Labor Party (ULP)
faction were against the bill. Like the first reading the faction
motivated its negative position by government’s rejecting the
proposal being of principle importance for the faction. It related
to stipulation of prohibition on appointment of dual citizens to
posts of government head and members, which was not accepted by the
government. Member of RPA faction Samvel Nikoyan was the only one
to vote as abstained. 18 out of registered MPs did not take part in
voting, including members of Ardarutiun (Justice), Orinats Yerkir
(Country of Law) factions, as well as some independent and RPA
member-MPs. The members of the National Unity faction were absent
from the sitting. The adopted package of bills as compared with the
variant discussed at the special sitting had been changed a little. As
the main reporter, RA Justice Minister David Haroutiunian stated
before voting, as a result of political agreement reached with RPA
faction it was stipulated that the persons being citizens of RA and
at the same time of another state who are registered in Armenia will
have the right to take part in votings during elections. Citizens
not having registration will be deprived of right to take part in
voting. The citizens of RA who have citizenship of another state
cannot be nominated and registered as candidates for RA President and
NA deputy. The package also stipulates that hecenforth RA elections
will be held only in RA territory.

The legislative package also stipulates some provisions related to
dual citizens’ conscription. In particular, a citizen of another state
having adopted RA citizenship is released from compulsory military
service, if before adopting RA citizenship he has served for at least
12 months in armed forces of another state or has done alternative
military service in another state, except the states determined by
RA government, for at least 18 months. RA citizen who has adopted
citizenship of another state is not released from compulsory military
service irrespective of the fact, whether he has served in another
state or not. Dual citizens are not released from mobilization and
training. The package also determines liability for not informing RA
government’s authorized body in the term established by the law in
case of adopting or being granted citizenship of another state. Each
able-bodied person not having RA citizenship, having turned 18 can
apply for receiving RA citizenship if he has permanently lived in
RA over the past three years, can speak Armenian and is familiarized
with RA Constitution.

Milder requirements are determined for a person having married
RA citizen or having a child being RA citizen, whose parents or
one of them has formerly had RA citizenship or was born in RA
and applied for receiving RA citizenship within three years after
turning 18. The persons of above mentioned category have the right to
apply for receiving RA citizenship if they are familiarized with RA
Constitution. This also regards a person who is Armenian by origin,
i.e. has Armenian ancestors, as well as a person who has renounced RA
citizenship after January 1, 1995, according to his own application. A
simplified order operates for the latters, which is conditioned by the
fact that a ban on dual citizenship was determined by the Constitution
adopted in 1995, as a result of which part of RA citizens had to
renounce RA citizenship.