Armenia ENTERS U.S.–Iran War? Tehran Supplies Deadly F-35 KILLER System To Ne

Daily Motion
May 27 2026
Armenia ENTERS U.S.–Iran War? Tehran Supplies Deadly F-35 KILLER System To Neighbouring Nation
Is Armenia quietly becoming Iran’s newest military partner against the United States?

New footage and reports suggest that an advanced Iranian air-defense system — known as the Majid AD-08, also called the “F-35 Killer” — has been spotted in Armenia for the first time during military parade rehearsals in Yerevan.

The system is a mobile, short-range air-defense platform designed to target drones, helicopters, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft using infrared and electro-optical tracking instead of radar.

Iranian media has described it as a highly effective counter to stealth aircraft, including the U.S.-made F-35 fighter jet.

The timing of this development comes shortly after reports of intense Iran–U.S. conflict, where Tehran claimed breakthroughs in air-defense capabilities during a prolonged regional war.

Military analysts suggest Armenia’s growing interest in Iranian systems may be linked to its past battlefield challenges against drone warfare and shifting alliances in the South Caucasus region.

As tensions rise between global powers, the appearance of Iranian defense systems in Armenia has triggered speculation about a potential strategic realignment in the region.

Neither Iran nor Armenia has officially confirmed a transfer, but the visuals from Yerevan are already raising major geopolitical questions.

Is this simply a defense upgrade… or the beginning of a deeper Iran-Armenia military alignment?

#Armenia #Iran #USA #F35 #AirDefense #MajidAD08 #BreakingNews #MilitaryNews #Geopolitics #Caucasus #DefenseNews #IranArmenia #WorldNews #StealthFighter #MiddleEast

~HT.318~PR.462~GR.538~VG.HM~

Eleveight AI Launches Armenia’s First Blackwell-Powered AI Factory

PR Newswire
May 27 2026

News provided by

Eleveight AI 

May 27, 2026, 08:01 ET


Armenia just became home to one of the most advanced AI data centers in the world and the first of its kind in the entire region.

YEREVAN, ArmeniaMay 27, 2026 /PRNewswire/ — Eleveight AI has launched a GPU-native AI Factory in Gagarin, powered by NVIDIA Blackwell B300, the latest AI GPU. This marks the first deployment of this architecture in Armenia and the South Caucasus, representing an investment of up to $120 million in the project’s first phase and positioning the region as an emerging node in the global AI infrastructure landscape.

The facility is engineered to scale to 35MW, designed to deliver large-scale compute capacity for AI workloads. As demand for high-performance infrastructure accelerates globally, the project positions the South Caucasus as a viable, cost-efficient alternative to traditional AI compute markets.

This development comes amid a broader move toward “sovereign AI,” where countries and regions seek localized control over compute, data, and model development. In this context, Armenia, with its regional efficiency, offers a viable infrastructure base, combining lower energy costs, zero chemical footprint, and available technical talent, while improving international connectivity. All of these will result in attracting AI workloads that would traditionally concentrate in the US or Western Europe.

At the core of this AI factory is the NVIDIA Blackwell B300 architecture, designed for large-scale generative AI workloads. Compared to previous GPU generations, the system delivers significantly higher throughput per unit and improved energy efficiency, enabling faster model training cycles and lowering cost per compute operation. Eleveight AI’s interconnected GPUs place the data center in the category of supercomputer-class AI infrastructure.

AI infrastructure is becoming a geopolitical asset. Our goal is to position Armenia as a serious participant in this global shift, not just as a user of AI, but as a place where it is built, trained, and deployed. In our next phase, we are considering expansion into markets across Central Asia and Europe” said Arman Aleksanian, Co-Founder and CEO of Eleveight AI.

The launch is part of a broader ecosystem forming in Armenia. Yerevan State University has introduced a GPU-based research system, while national initiatives such as Firebird AI are expanding the country’s computational capacity. Eleveight AI is dedicating 20 percent of its total compute capacity to Armenian universities, research institutions, and non-commercial organizations under partnership terms. Together, these efforts signal a coordinated push to establish Armenia as a regional hub for AI research and deployment, with the advanced data center providing commercial-scale infrastructure to support both local and international teams.

Website: https://eleveight.ai

Photo – https://mma.prnewswire.com/media/2985287/solarpanels.jpg

SOURCE Eleveight AI

Russia warns Armenia: Choose EU and lose favourable energy terms

Commonspace.eu
May 27 2026

Russia has warned Armenia that it may suspend or terminate a bilateral agreement governing natural gas, petroleum products, and uncut diamonds if Armenia continues to deepen ties with the European Union. The 2013 agreement outlines terms under which Russia indefinitely eliminated export duties on shipments of petroleum products, natural gas, and diamonds to Armenia.

On Monday (25 May), Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev issued a threat to Armenia’s Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure, the Russian business daily Kommersant reported, citing a copy of the letter it reviewed.

“The Russian Embassy has officially forwarded a letter…stating that if the process of accession to the EU continues, the Russian side will suspend or unilaterally terminate the Agreement on Cooperation in the Supply of Natural Gas, Petroleum Products and Rough Diamonds,” Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, told the RIA news agency.

If the agreement is eliminated, Armenia would face supply chain challenges, according to analysts, as the country is heavily dependent on Russian commodities. Russia supplies 85% of Armenia’s gas, at least 62% of its petroleum products, and 50% of its imported diamonds.

Moscow is attempting to influence Yerevan ahead of the 7 June parliamentary elections. In addition to social media campaigns against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Russia has imposed trade restrictions against Armenia. 

Ties with Moscow have frayed in recent years as Yerevan has sought to deepen its ties to Brussels and Washington. Moscow earlier this month accused Armenia of being drawn into what it described as the EU’s “anti‑Russian orbit”.

Source: commonspace.eu with Reuters and Meduza


Iran Exports “Silent” Majid AD-08 Air Defense System to Armenia: First Foreig

May 27 2026

Iran’s first overseas deployment of the Majid AD-08 short-range  air defense system introduces a new passive battlefield capability into Armenia’s evolving force structure, signaling expanding Tehran–Yerevan defense cooperation and raising fresh questions over military balance in the South Caucasus.

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Iran has transferred its indigenously developed Majid (AD-08) short-range air defense system to Armenia ahead of the country’s May 28 Republic Day commemorations, with Iranian-made launch vehicles and missile units publicly identified during rehearsals in Yerevan’s Republic Square, marking the first known operational deployment of the platform beyond Iranian territory and signaling Tehran’s growing confidence in exporting combat-relevant domestic defense technologies.

The emergence of the Majid system on Armenian soil carries implications extending far beyond ceremonial military display because Yerevan has now become the first confirmed foreign operator of an Iranian passive air-defense platform, introducing a new variable into South Caucasus force-posture calculations while deepening an Iran-Armenia security relationship unfolding against an increasingly polarized regional strategic environment.

Iran’s export of the Majid AD-08 represents more than a conventional defense transaction because it demonstrates Tehran’s willingness to convert domestically fielded military systems into instruments of regional influence projection capable of extending Iranian strategic presence without direct force deployments

The appearance of Majid launchers during Republic Day rehearsals effectively transforms a national military ceremony into a geopolitical signaling event, publicly revealing an evolving defense alignment likely to draw close scrutiny from regional intelligence and security establishments.

Armenia consequently becomes the first foreign state to operationally field a system increasingly associated with Iranian narratives surrounding passive targeting, anti-stealth warfare concepts and next-generation infrared engagement architectures.

The transfer emerges amid a rapidly evolving South Caucasus security environment where Armenian defense planners have accelerated procurement diversification efforts following strategic lessons and capability gaps exposed during successive Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts.

For regional military planners, the introduction of Iranian passive air-defense architecture raises questions extending beyond simple inventory expansion toward battlefield survivability, sensor concealment and the tactical implications of emission-free engagement systems.

The system’s arrival in Armenia additionally reinforces a broader Iranian strategy aimed at transforming wartime-developed platforms into exportable defense products capable of generating long-term political influence and strategic partnerships.

The development unfolds as Azerbaijan continues expanding defense cooperation with Israel and Türkiye, thereby increasing the geopolitical significance of Tehran’s military engagement with Yerevan and potentially altering regional security perceptions.

Iranian-aligned narratives have further amplified Majid’s international profile by claiming the system participated in a 2026 engagement involving an American F-35 during hostilities over Iran, elevating the platform from a localized air-defense asset into a subject of broader anti-stealth warfare debate.

While Western reporting separately acknowledged that an F-35 sustained damage from hostile ground fire, attribution remains unresolved, underscoring the need to distinguish verifiable operational facts from competing narratives emerging from modern information-centric conflict environments.

The Majid AD-08 represents a departure from conventional SHORAD doctrine because its combat architecture prioritizes passive thermal acquisition rather than radar-dependent target tracking, introducing a battlefield dynamic where survivability increasingly favors invisibility over raw missile reach.

By integrating electro-optical and infrared sensor arrays capable of identifying thermal anomalies without transmitting detectable emissions, the system compresses the decision cycle available to hostile aircraft while complicating conventional suppression and electronic warfare planning.

Iranian specifications indicate the system can identify targets at approximately 15 kilometers and engage threats within an eight-kilometer envelope and six-kilometer altitude ceiling, creating a compact but potentially disruptive defensive bubble around high-value assets and maneuver formations.

Such architecture introduces an operational environment in which aircraft radar-warning receivers and electronic support suites may remain effectively blind until missile launch has already occurred.

This capability potentially undermines long-established Western suppression doctrines because modern SEAD and DEAD missions traditionally depend on locating hostile radar emissions before conducting kinetic or electronic neutralization.

Rather than exposing itself through active target illumination, the Majid relies upon battlefield concealment and thermal tracking, reducing opportunities for anti-radiation weapons and emitter-hunting tactics.

Its imaging infrared seeker reportedly employs thermal pattern-recognition logic rather than older heat-source tracking methodologies, allowing the missile to discriminate targets with greater precision under cluttered operational conditions.

Fire-and-forget engagement architecture further transfers terminal guidance responsibilities entirely to onboard systems after launch authorization, reducing operator workload and minimizing post-launch exposure windows.

The combination of passive sensing, autonomous guidance and rapid mobility creates a tactical model increasingly attractive to militaries confronting adversaries possessing superior airpower and electronic warfare capabilities.

That operational logic explains why passive sensor ecosystems are rapidly becoming central components of next-generation layered air-defense doctrine across contested theaters.

The Majid system entered international strategic discourse following Iranian claims that the platform participated in damaging an American F-35 during combat operations over Iran in 2026.

Iranian-aligned narratives asserted that the missile bypassed traditional stealth advantages by exploiting infrared emissions generated by propulsion systems rather than attempting radar-based acquisition against low-observable airframe geometry.

According to those claims, thermal signatures generated by engine exhaust and heated airframe sections represented vulnerabilities largely unaffected by radar cross-section reduction measures.

Footage released by the IRGC allegedly depicted launch activity and subsequent engagement effects connected to the reported encounter over central Iranian airspace.

Separate Western reporting acknowledged that an F-35 sustained combat damage from hostile ground fire before conducting emergency recovery procedures at a regional facility.

However, no independently verifiable evidence has publicly identified the specific weapon system responsible for producing the damage.

The distinction remains strategically significant because combat narratives involving fifth-generation aircraft increasingly function as instruments of perception warfare alongside conventional military operations.

Should the Majid ultimately prove responsible, the engagement could represent the first known successful surface-to-air missile strike against an operational F-35 platform.

If the claim remains unverified, Tehran nevertheless achieved an informational effect by framing passive infrared systems as potentially credible anti-stealth counters.

The resulting ambiguity illustrates how modern conflicts increasingly blend kinetic engagements with strategic messaging campaigns designed to shape perceptions of technological superiority.

Armenia’s acquisition of the Majid system reflects a broader restructuring effort driven by strategic lessons emerging from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts and shifting confidence in traditional security arrangements.

Military planning assumptions inside Yerevan experienced substantial disruption following battlefield outcomes that exposed vulnerabilities in force posture, alliance expectations and air-defense resilience.

Those experiences accelerated a procurement diversification strategy aimed at reducing long-term dependency upon Russian military systems and defense-industrial support mechanisms.

Recent rehearsal footage additionally revealed Chinese-origin CH-4 Rainbow unmanned systems, reinforcing evidence of Yerevan’s expanding supplier network.

The Majid transfer therefore appears integrated into a wider force modernization effort rather than representing an isolated procurement initiative.

Reports involving a previously disputed US$500 million defense package, equivalent to approximately RM1.9 billion, have consequently regained analytical relevance following the system’s public appearance.

That reported package allegedly included platforms such as Arman, Third Khordad and Fifteenth Khordad air-defense systems alongside unmanned assets.

Armenian authorities previously dismissed those reports as fictitious, creating uncertainty regarding the scope and sequencing of potential acquisitions.

The public emergence of Majid units nevertheless confirms that at least portions of previously disputed reporting aligned with observable battlefield realities.

For regional intelligence communities, the transition from denial toward visual confirmation now increases scrutiny surrounding additional undisclosed procurement activities.

The transfer carries significance beyond Armenia because South Caucasus competition increasingly intersects with wider Middle Eastern and Eurasian geopolitical fault lines.

Iran has historically viewed Azerbaijan-Israel defense cooperation through a strategic lens involving intelligence proximity, force access and northern security vulnerabilities.

Türkiye’s expanding military alignment with Azerbaijan further intensifies Iranian concerns regarding regional force posture and strategic encirclement.

Armenia consequently provides Tehran with a geographically positioned partner capable of reinforcing influence without requiring direct military deployments.

The introduction of Iranian-produced air-defense systems therefore carries signaling value extending beyond the number of launchers transferred.

Military exports frequently function as long-term strategic instruments because they establish recurring requirements involving training pipelines, logistics support and doctrinal integration.

Future sustainment requirements may therefore institutionalize recurring defense interaction between Armenian and Iranian military structures.

Such relationships often evolve beyond procurement into operational familiarity, creating influence through dependency rather than coercion.

For Tehran, export visibility additionally reinforces narratives surrounding indigenous defense-industrial resilience despite sanctions pressure.

Regional observers may therefore interpret the Majid deployment as evidence of Iran transitioning from battlefield consumer toward increasingly confident defense exporter.

Majid’s battlefield relevance increasingly resides in its imaging infrared architecture rather than headline missile performance specifications.

Unlike early-generation infrared seekers that pursue isolated heat points, imaging infrared technologies construct thermal pictures capable of distinguishing target characteristics.

That distinction potentially enhances target discrimination while improving survivability against decoys and countermeasure environments.

Analysts suggest advanced image-processing functions may enable template recognition features based on stored thermal profiles.

Such capabilities can potentially improve infrared counter-countermeasure performance against traditional flare-based defensive tactics.

The launcher’s electro-optical sensor turret reportedly enables persistent passive surveillance across broad operational sectors without exposing its position.

Several technical assessments additionally suggest possible integration of Western-derived optical technologies within the sensor architecture.

Public imagery consistently highlights multi-aperture sensor configurations that appear optimized for broad-spectrum observation and target acquisition.

The missile itself reportedly measures 2.67 meters in length, weighs approximately seventy-five kilograms and reaches speeds approaching Mach 2.

Collectively, these characteristics suggest a design philosophy prioritizing mobility, concealment and reaction speed rather than extensive engagement range.

The first overseas deployment of Majid transforms the system from a domestic battlefield asset into a broader instrument of geopolitical signaling.

Iran now possesses a visible example demonstrating indigenous military technology achieving foreign adoption despite decades of industrial restrictions and sanctions pressure.

Defense exports frequently serve as indicators of institutional confidence because states rarely internationalize platforms lacking perceived operational credibility.

The Armenia transfer therefore suggests Tehran believes the system possesses sufficient maturity for external deployment and long-term support obligations.

Future export opportunities may emerge among states seeking lower-cost alternatives to Western or Russian air-defense ecosystems.

Passive systems may prove particularly attractive to militaries confronting technologically superior adversaries possessing advanced electronic warfare capabilities.

For smaller armed forces, survivability increasingly depends upon concealment, mobility and tactical unpredictability rather than expensive prestige platforms.

Majid reflects that evolving philosophy by emphasizing battlefield invisibility and engagement ambiguity over large-scale kinetic dominance.

Whether Iranian claims regarding F-35 engagements prove accurate ultimately remains less significant than the strategic perceptions already generated.

Armenia’s acquisition may therefore represent not merely an arms transfer but an early indicator of a wider competition over passive anti-stealth warfare concepts.

https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/iran-majid-ad08-armenia-air-defense-first-foreign-deployment-south-caucasus-security/

U.S. and Armenia advance Trump’s TRIPP corridor as Yerevan accelerates drift

EU Alive
May 27 2026

Senior Russian officials, including Dmitry Medvedev, have accused Pashinyan of leading Armenia down a “sorrowful path” akin to Ukraine’s

EUalive with partner mediaMay 27, 202606:00

The United States and Armenia have signed a major framework agreement to develop the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a flagship project in President Donald Trump’s economic diplomacy playbook, while Yerevan continues its strategic pivot away from Moscow.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, visiting Yerevan, joined Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in signing the deal, which advances a 43-kilometer road and rail corridor through southern Armenia linking Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave. Rubio called it “the most important step to date” toward a route designed to deliver peace and prosperity through economic connectivity. Additional agreements on restoring broad strategic partnership and cooperation in critical minerals were also signed.

The TRIPP project stems from a landmark August 2025 White House agreement between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, witnessed by Trump. Armenian officials, including Mirzoyan, have welcomed the initiative as “truly beneficial” for the country, with construction expected to begin in 2026.

Armenia’s geopolitical realignment

The TRIPP corridor and deepened U.S. partnership underscore Armenia’s accelerating drift from Russia. Long dependent on Moscow for security via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and economic ties through the Eurasian Economic Union, Yerevan grew disillusioned after Russia’s limited support during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh wars and its focus on Ukraine.

Pashinyan’s government has frozen CSTO participation, bought Western arms (especially from France), strengthened EU and NATO-adjacent ties, and now positioned the United States as a key player in the strategically vital transit route – sidelining earlier Russian proposals that would have given Moscow greater control.

Moscow’s warnings

Russia has reacted with sharp warnings. Senior officials, including Dmitry Medvedev, have accused Pashinyan of leading Armenia down a “sorrowful path” akin to Ukraine’s. Moscow has threatened economic retaliation – higher gas prices, restricted market access, and complications for the large Armenian diaspora in Russia – while labeling the moves a “huge mistake” that makes Armenia a “hostage to Western geopolitical games.”

Despite retaining a military base in Gyumri and significant energy leverage, Russia’s influence in Armenia is visibly declining. The TRIPP agreement effectively replaces previous Russian-centric corridor plans, further weakening Moscow’s foothold in the South Caucasus.

Strategic implications

For Armenia, TRIPP offers infrastructure investment, transit revenue, jobs, and a chance to reduce reliance on Russia while normalising relations with Azerbaijan. For Washington, it represents a success in transactional diplomacy that diversifies regional connectivity away from Russian and Iranian influence.

Challenges remain significant: Armenia must carefully manage sovereignty concerns, border security, and potential Russian backlash. Domestic opposition and regional tensions with Azerbaijan and Turkey add complexity.

If successful, the Trump Route could become a model of turning historical conflict into shared economic interest. However, the speed of Armenia’s westward shift and Moscow’s growing irritation suggest the project will test whether economic incentives can truly outweigh traditional security dependencies in the volatile South Caucasus.

Moscow’s latest battle with the West is its most bizarre yet

The Telegraph, UK
May 27 2026

Armenia’s power struggle unfolds into allegations of psychedelic leadership, Russian influence and secret affairs

If you believed everything its leaders say about each other, you would conclude Armenia is doomed.

Its prime minister is accused of being a magic-mushroom-chewing lunatic. His challenger is denounced as a billionaire Kremlin spy. The powerful head of the Armenian Church – the third man in this political saga – is alleged to be a Moscow-backed schemer with a secret love-child.

Once a Soviet backwater, Armenia now finds itself at a strategic Eurasian crossroads, the potential missing link in the only major overland trade and energy route between Asia and Europe that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

For a nation still traumatised by genocide and territorial loss, that sudden geopolitical importance is both an opportunity and a curse.

As Armenians prepare to vote in a general election next week – the latest front line in the shadow war between Russia and the West – the cost of that new prominence has become painfully clear.

The country is awash with Kremlin-linked disinformation. According to Bot Blocker, an anonymous collective of Russian dissident tech analysts, Armenia is facing the second-largest state-backed disinformation campaign in modern European history, beaten only by last year’s failed attempt to unseat Moldova’s pro-Western president Maia Sandu.

The group says it has identified hundreds of fabricated videos targeting Nikol Pashinyan, whose ruling Civil Contract Party wants closer ties with the West and greater distance from Moscow.

Early claims that the prime minister was a child trafficker who embezzled funds to buy mansions abroad have since mutated into allegations that he has reached a secret deal with Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, to launch a war against Russia after the election.

Yet the misinformation often pales beside the vitriol hurled by the candidates themselves. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the feud between Mr Pashinyan and his chief rival Samvel Karapetyan, a circus-owning billionaire whom the prime minister accuses of being dispatched by the Kremlin to drag Armenia back into Moscow’s orbit.

The oligarch who came in from the cold

A little more than a year ago, Mr Karapetyan was barely involved in Armenian public life. He had spent the past three decades mostly in Moscow, Dubai and Monaco, building a Russia-focused retail and logistics empire reportedly worth £3bn.

Much of that fortune came from lucrative contracts linked to Gazprom, one of the principal pillars of Vladimir Putin’s patronage system.

He returned to Armenia last year after his father’s death. Within weeks, he was under arrest.

A major benefactor of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Mr Karapetyan had inserted himself into an escalating conflict between the prime minister and the religious establishment.

Relations between Mr Pashinyan and Karekin II, the Catholicos of All Armenians, have been poisoned since Armenia’s catastrophic defeats by Azerbaijan in 2020 and 2023, which culminated in the loss of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and the flight of its 120,000 ethnic Armenians.

Breaking with the Church’s traditional political neutrality, Karekin demanded the prime minister’s resignation. Mr Pashinyan retaliated by accusing the Catholicos of corruption, violating his vow of celibacy and turning the Church into a vehicle for Russian influence.

The row has triggered the deepest church-state crisis in the modern history of a country that describes itself as the world’s first Christian nation.

Mr Karapetyan was detained after publicly backing the Church and vowing to defend it “in our way”, words the authorities interpreted as a threat to overthrow the constitutional order.

“All I meant was that I hoped to mediate the conflict,” he told The Telegraph in the grounds of his mansion in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, where he is under house arrest. “An hour later, this house was surrounded by hundreds of officers and I was arrested.”

For seven months he was held in the underground detention cells of Armenia’s national security service, the successor agency to the Soviet KGB. His arrest transformed a man better known as the proprietor of the country’s electricity grid, biggest pizza chain and leading circus into a political figure.

To supporters angered by Mr Pashinyan’s attacks on the Church, his pivot towards the West and his attempts to reconcile with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Mr Karapetyan became a martyr.

He has rapidly eclipsed Armenia’s older pro-Russia opposition figures despite the awkward detail that, as a dual Russian and Cypriot citizen, he cannot currently serve as prime minister – a constitutional barrier he says will be removed once his newly formed Strong Armenia Party enters office.

He insists he entered politics to protect the Church from persecution.

“The government has intensified its attacks on both the Church and the Armenian national identity,” he said. “It has arrested bishops and archbishops. My concern is that he will seek to arrest the Catholicos as well.”

Church, state and deep state

Some say the real picture is less noble.

“The Church has historically aligned itself with whoever holds power,” said Artur Sakunts, a prominent Armenian human rights activist. “Under Soviet rule it was closely tied to the KGB. Before the 2018 pro-democracy revolution, it stood with the authoritarian regime. Since then it has remained close to Putin.”

Particular scrutiny has fallen on the Church’s Moscow branch, headed by Karekin’s brother, Archbishop Ezras, who in 2023 blessed commanders of the Arbat Battalion, a notorious Armenian mercenary unit fighting for Russia in Ukraine.

Ukrainian intelligence alleges that Mr Karapetyan helped finance the battalion, a claim he denies.

Last year Armenian authorities also claimed to have foiled a plot involving the Arbat Battalion and senior clergy aimed at overthrowing the government.

Mr Pashinyan portrays both the church leadership and Mr Karapetyan as a Kremlin-backed “fifth column” working against Armenian sovereignty – an accusation both men reject.

“I am simply a patriot,” Mr Karapetyan said. “It is this government that undermines democracy at the behest of foreign forces, not me.”

Some analysts believe the Russian threat is exaggerated.

The Kremlin discredited itself in Armenia when Russian peacekeepers stood aside during Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh despite Moscow’s own security guarantees. Many Armenians have never forgiven what they see as a betrayal.

“Russia’s standing in Armenia has fallen sharply,” says Thomas de Waal, of Carnegie Europe, the Brussels-based think tank. “Its options in Armenia are limited. The old pro-Russian parties are discredited and Karapetyan’s movement still lacks a compelling vision.”

Polls suggest Mr Pashinyan’s party will still emerge as the largest force. But his popularity has declined sharply since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, while some accuse him of growing increasingly authoritarian and portraying all dissent as pro-Russian.

“What we are seeing is less about Russia than about personalities,” said Richard Giragosian, the director of the Regional Studies Centre, an Armenian think tank. “Pashinyan is pursuing a vendetta against a church leader who is not especially popular among his own bishops, many of whom resent his political activism.”

The feud has often descended into outright farce.

Last year, priests loyal to Karekin accused the prime minister of being uncircumcised, implying he was secretly Muslim and therefore aligned with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Mr Pashinyan responded by offering to show the Catholicos his penis.

Nor has the prime minister always helped himself. While campaigning in March, he berated a displaced woman from Nagorno-Karabakh and her young son on the Yerevan metro after they refused to wear his party badges, wagging his finger in their faces, mocking them for fleeing the war and ignoring their pleas for him to leave them alone.

Such incidents have strengthened claims that he is increasingly erratic.

Earlier this month, Mr Karapetyan – whose party has promised a Ministry of Sex to address demographic decline and ensure “there are no unsatisfied women” – alleged that the prime minister had ordered a ton of hallucinogenic mushrooms from China to help him through official meetings. Mr Pashinyan denies the accusation and is suing.

Given the geopolitical stakes, Armenia’s election matters enormously. But it is also spectacularly unedifying – something the Kremlin will no doubt find immensely gratifying.

“In many ways, the greatest threat to Pashinyan is not Russia,” says one Western diplomat. “It is Pashinyan himself.”

Armenia to take over Karapetyan’s shares in Electric Networks of Armenia

OC Media
May 27 2026

The Armenian government will initiate its takeover of Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan’s shares in the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), the country’s main power grid operator.

The government will do so through a mechanism allowing it to nationalise companies if they override public interest.

The news was announced on Tuesday by the ENA’s state-appointed temporary manager Romanos Petrosyan, a member of the ruling Civil Contract party.

Petrosyan cited the 25 May deadline established by the Armenian Administrative Court during which the shareholders of the ENA ‘were expected, based on a proposal by the Armenian government, to transfer 100% of the company’s shares in a manner agreed with the government’.

He noted that no transfer of shares took place within the established timeframe, and citing relevant legislation, Petroyan announced that the Armenian government ‘will initiate the process of declaring the shares of ENA as being of overriding public interest and proceeding with their alienation (nationalisation)’.

Armenian authorities have not disclosed the sum offered in exchange for the ENA, which, according to documents obtained by RFE/RL, was ֏23.3 billion ($59 million), ‘on the condition that Karapetyan returns to the company the dividends he received over the past 10 years, amounting to ֏23.158 billion ($60 million)’.

Based on this, RFE/RL concluded ‘if the owner returns the dividends he received to the company, the government’s offer for the ENA shares would amount to ֏142 million ($360,000)’.

The ENA is owned by Karapetyan’s Tashir Group. The tycoon, who is currently under house arrest, was detained in June 2025 after making public statements siding with the Armenian Apostolic Church amid its confrontation with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

At the same time, Pashinyan announced that the time had come to nationalise the ENA.

Explainer | Who is Samvel Karapetyan, the Russian–Armenian billionaire whose empire is under siege

Katrapetyan’s Strong Armenia Alliance, established following his detention, is considered to be Pashinyan’s Civil Contract’s main challenger in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 7 June.

In November 2025, Armenia’s Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) voted to revoke the ENA’s electricity distribution licence, based on several serious violations identified by Petrosyan, the state-appointed interim manager of ENA.

According to legal amendments rushed through parliament in summer 2025, shortly after Karapetyan’s detention in June, if the ENA loses its licence, the grid must be recognised as a ‘publicly overriding interest’ and have its value assessed. The current owner, Tashir Group, would then be compensated for the takeover.

Tashir Group had initiated international arbitration, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation over what it describes as unlawful interference in its investment in Armenia’s power sector.

Russia reportedly threatens to end tax-free gas exports to Armenia if EU path

OC Media
May 27 2026

Russia has reportedly sent Armenia a letter warning it could cut off the tax-free supply of gas, petroleum products, and uncut diamonds if Yerevan proceeds with its EU accession efforts, the Russian pro-government media outlet Kommersant reported on Tuesday, citing a copy of the letter it had obtained. For its part, Armenia has denied it received the letter, while Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan reiterated Yerevan has ‘absolutely no desire to create tensions in Armenia–Russia relations’.

The alleged letter was sent by Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilyov to the Armenian Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure, which told the Armenian state-run outlet Armenpress on Wednesday that no such letter had been received.

Under a 2013 agreement, Russia began supplying gas, petroleum products, and uncut diamonds without export duties, an agreement which the alleged letter said would be ended. Moreover, Armenia would be required to pay compensation, or ‘recognise unpaid amounts as its state debt to Russia’. It is unclear if the wording meant that Armenia would have to pay export duties on all such goods it imported from Russia since 2013, likely a significant sum.

Armenia’s efforts to join the EU, which have mostly been on paper as of now, ‘do not correspond to the nature of the partnership built on the basis of respect and mutual benefit over decades between the governments and business entities of our countries and the practical actions repeatedly taken by the Russian Federation to meet the critical needs of Armenia on a preferential basis’, Tsivilyov wrote in the purported letter.

On Wednesday, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said he had no information about the alleged cancellation threat, and instead said it was a ‘commercial issue’ with the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.

Leaked documents show Russian plans to unseat Pashinyan, ties between Karapetyan and Putin

In the run-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections on 7 June, Russia has been increasing its pressure campaign against the country, while simultaneously issuing escalating rhetorical threats about the alleged consequences of Armenia’s geopolitical shift westwards.

Meanwhile, Yerevan has repeatedly reiterated it has no intention of severing its ties with Russia, but instead seeks positive relations with both the West and Russia.

Mirzoyan echoed this sentiment in a press conference on Tuesday, saying, ‘We have absolutely no desire to create tensions in Armenia–Russia relations, in political dialogue, or in economic ties — neither bilaterally nor within multilateral platforms of cooperation such as the [Eurasian Economic Union], the [Commonwealth of Independent States] and elsewhere’.

‘All issues that have arisen or may arise — and problems emerge from time to time in any relationship — we hope and are committed to discussing in a healthy, constructive and partnership-based atmosphere in order to find solutions’.

Notwithstanding the olive branches from Yerevan, Russia has continued to make inflammatory statements to Armenia — not all of which were limited to economic issues.

On Tuesday, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council Sergei Shoigu criticised Armenia’s non-participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and falsely claimed the internationally recognised territory of Armenia had never been attacked.

In 2021 and 2022, Azerbaijani forces attacked Armenian territory and occupied around 200 square kilometers of ground, which it still holds today.

Shoigu also falsely said that Armenia had not requested assistance from the CSTO at the time, which it was treaty-bound to provide but declined to approve.

The refusal of the body to come to Armenia’s defence led to Yerevan’s decision to freeze its participation in the CSTO.

Armenia at a crossroads: Elections, peace, and the limits of international gua

Commonspace.eu
May 27 2026

This commentary was prepared by Mr Narek Minasyan for the 8th issue of the Armenia Election Monitor 2026 newsletter.

Less than a week remains until Armenia’s parliamentary elections. The campaign is in full swing, political forces are attacking one another in increasingly harsh terms, investigations into hybrid attacks against Armenia appear almost daily, and statements interfering in Armenia’s internal affairs continue to come from Moscow.

The June 7 elections are arguably the most geopolitically significant in Armenia’s modern history. Their outcome will shape the country’s trajectory for years. Campaign narratives suggest that Armenian voters will effectively answer several strategic questions: whether to continue normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey or revise existing understandings; whether to deepen ties with the EU or strengthen dependence on Russia; whether to continue democratic reforms or return figures associated with the previous political system.

According to an IRI survey conducted in mid-May, Armenians’ top concerns are national security and border issues, the economy and unemployment, and peace. Unsurprisingly, the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process has become the central issue of the campaign. Against this backdrop, political and expert circles are again debating the idea of “guaranteed peace” and international security guarantees.

The debate is not new. Since the launch of peace treaty negotiations in 2022, the Armenian government has repeatedly emphasized the need for “international support” and “international legitimacy.” At the time, negotiations were mediated simultaneously by the EU, Russia, and the United States, while Nagorno-Karabakh had not yet been emptied of its Armenian population.

However, after the involuntary displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians amid the inaction of Russian peacekeepers and the weak international response, official Yerevan gradually revised its approach. The idea of external guarantors increasingly appeared unrealistic, and the negotiation process became more bilateral in nature.

Today, the ruling “Civil Contract” party argues that peace has effectively been established and is now entering a phase of institutionalization. According to this view, lasting peace depends less on outside guarantees than on creating a mutually beneficial system between the parties.

Opposition forces, likely to cross the electoral threshold, argue the opposite. Former president Robert Kocharyan has stated: “Peace does not depend on Nikol Pashinyan, Civil Contract members, Robert Kocharyan, Trump, or anyone else. Guaranteed peace means the application of international mechanisms, beyond Aliyev’s will,” Kocharyan stated.

Narek Karapetyan of the “Strong Armenia” party argues: “Our peace treaty must have more than one guarantor. Having more than one guarantor is the only serious guarantee of long-term peace. Paper is a highly variable thing in negotiations with the Turks, while guarantors are constant,” Karapetyan said.

Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of the “Prosperous Armenia” party, has emphasized: “All the preconditions exist. We need to reach agreements with 3–5 powerful states. There must be connections, familiarity, and relationships in order to have guaranteed peace, so that not even a fly can pass through our territory,” Tsarukyan emphasized.

Yet these forces present the idea of “international guarantees” largely without specifics. No detailed roadmap has been proposed explaining how such guarantees would function in practice, what mechanisms would enforce them, or how violations would be punished. In many cases, arguments rely more on references to political connections or negotiating skills than on concrete institutional proposals.

Without entering the election debate itself, the issue of international guarantees nevertheless deserves sober analysis. History offers examples where external guarantees contributed to stabilization and trust-building, such as in Cyprus or Bosnia and Herzegovina. But there are also notable failures — from Srebrenica to Syria. Perhaps the clearest example is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Two decades later, Russia violated those commitments and launched a full-scale war against Ukraine.

Peace agreements do not function in a vacuum. Their durability depends on the broader balance of power and the state of international relations. The key question, therefore, is not whether international guarantees are desirable in theory, but whether they are realistic under current geopolitical conditions.

Several factors complicate the discussion.

First, the post–World War II international order is steadily eroding. Principles such as territorial integrity and the non-use of force have repeatedly been violated without effective collective response — in Armenia, Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere. Under such conditions, reliance on external guarantees has obvious limits.

Second, advocates of “guaranteed peace” rarely explain how such a system would operate. Under what mandate would guarantors act? What mechanisms would enforce compliance? What happens if guarantors fail to fulfill their commitments? Without answers, discussions about guarantees risk becoming political slogans rather than policy proposals.

Third, the question of potential guarantors remains unresolved. Russia, the United States, the EU, and even China are sometimes mentioned, but involving multiple guarantors is difficult even theoretically amid rising global tensions. There is also a risk of repeating the experience of the OSCE Minsk Group, whose effectiveness was ultimately paralyzed by geopolitical rivalries.

In practice, apart from Russia, no major power has expressed readiness to assume a direct guarantor role in the Armenia–Azerbaijan process. Yet Moscow’s credibility as an impartial guarantor has been seriously undermined by recent developments and by its increasingly visible preference for Azerbaijan, driven by Baku’s greater geopolitical and economic importance.

Finally, one essential reality is often overlooked in Armenian debates: a peace treaty is a bilateral agreement. If Azerbaijan rejects external involvement, international guarantees cannot become a reality. Baku’s recent rhetoric strongly suggests opposition to any third-party role. Moreover, if Armenia attempts after June 7 to reintroduce the issue of guarantors, Azerbaijan may interpret it as an attempt to revise already agreed principles and derail the process itself.

Under current global conditions, the classical model of “international guarantees” functions only in a very limited way. Rather than pursuing externally guaranteed peace, it may be more realistic to focus on confidence-building measures, monitoring mechanisms, and direct reciprocal obligations capable of making renewed conflict increasingly costly for both sides.

Source: Mr Narek Minasyan is an associate expert at the Armenian Council, where he focuses on global and regional security issues.  

https://www.commonspace.eu/commentary/armenia-crossroads-elections-peace-and-limits-international-guarantees

Armenia’s election: Voters to decide on Pashinyan’s peace agenda

Chatham House, UK
May 27 2026

Armenians face a febrile campaign but feel the benefits of improved security since hostilities with Azerbaijan ended.


Laurence Broers

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

On 7 June Armenia will hold one of its most pivotal elections since regaining independence in 1991. The vote arrives as the country is poised between a painful redefinition of its identity and a still uncertain horizon of opportunity.  

In 2023 Armenia definitively lost the territory of Mountainous Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The struggle to control the region was a driving force of Armenia’s 1990s national independence movement, and its loss deprived Armenian nationalism of a key foundation. Yet the loss of Karabakh has also loosened Russian control over Armenian foreign policy, demonstrating Moscow’s declining power in the South Caucasus and the limits of its patronage.  

Under the banner of a ‘Real Armenia’ – rather than one with ambitions for wider borders – incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party are campaigning for a final peace accord with Azerbaijan. They hope to end four decades of conflict with a final renunciation of territorial claims and Armenia’s integration into regional connectivity. Pashinyan has also recalibrated Armenia’s foreign policy with a widely discussed ‘pivot’ to the West – a move which has led to warnings of a ‘Ukraine scenario’ from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The opposition to Pashinyan includes blocs seeking to rehabilitate ties with Russia, and smaller parties with little chance of passing the threshold to enter parliament. Polls put Civil Contract ahead of its nearest rival, the ‘Strong Armenia’ bloc led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, with a plurality of voters onside.

Many voters remain undecided. But in a mid-May poll, 45 per cent of these said they believed Armenia is moving in the right direction. Despite well-founded fears over information manipulation from abroad, Pashinyan’s progress is unlikely to be halted.

A public endorsement of peace

At a White House summit in August 2025 the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers initialled – but did not sign – a peace agreement in the presence of President Donald Trump. There have been no military fatalities since February 2024, and Azerbaijan and Turkey have both taken steps towards dismantling their long-standing blockade of Armenia.

This unprecedented progress remains provisional. Signing the agreement depends on Armenia’s adoption – at Azerbaijan’s insistence – of a new constitution with all references to Mountainous Karabakh removed. Adopting a new constitution will require a separate referendum after the election.

That makes this election effectively a preliminary referendum on the terms Pashinyan has negotiated and the trajectory he plans for Armenia.

Armenians certainly sense the improvement in security after a decade of near-continuous frontline violence, including defeat to Azerbaijan in 2020’s war, an Azerbaijani offensive on Armenia’s territory in September 2022, and Baku’s military incorporation of Karabakh in September 2023. The need to come to lasting terms with Baku is widely recognized. But the loss of Karabakh has left severe fractures in Armenia’s body politic.

These have surfaced during the campaign in unfortunate and ominous ways. Pashinyan has had a series of vitriolic encounters on the campaign trail with citizens challenging his peace narrative. And a video of masked men threatening violence against him has circulated online. Such threats are not taken lightly in a country that has witnessed repeated political violence, including the assassination of an entire tier of leadership in 1999’s parliament shooting.

Meanwhile, many in civil society are uncomfortable with what they see as an attempt by the government to enforce amnesia about the loss of Mountainous Karabakh and the mass displacement of its population. Indeed, some claim that government rhetoric spills into hate speech towards former Karabakh Armenians. Pashinyan and his supporters, however, see such claims as masking resistance to the terms of the peace with Azerbaijan.

This febrile atmosphere adds to accumulating worries over Armenia’s democratic trajectory, as polarization shapes an ‘all or nothing’ attitude to political allegiance. The tone of exchanges between the prime minister and a growing number of constituencies – parts of the opposition, the Armenian Apostolic Church and Karabakh Armenians – is fuelling concerns about the direction of Armenia’s political culture.

For example, in a heated exchange on the campaign trail, Pashinyan asked a Karabakh Armenian refugee why he was still alive, implying he should have stayed and died in Karabakh. The man was later arrested on a charge of hooliganism. Such demarches do not bode well for the stability of any future agreement.  

Even if ‘Real Armenia’ is accepted as a geopolitical reality, how it is going to deal with displaced Armenians and the legacy of Karabakh remains an open question – one that must ultimately be decided by Armenians themselves.  

A ‘pivot to the West’, or to the world?

Armenia’s geopolitics unfortunately work against a measured discussion of its democracy.

The 2018 ‘Velvet Revolution’ that swept Pashinyan to power consciously defined itself as a purely domestic affair, leaving Armenia’s alliance with Russia intact. But the final loss of Karabakh in 2023 released Pashinyan from the need to uphold this alignment. At the same time, it solidified the opposition’s belief that rapprochement with Moscow is the only way to prevent further calamity.

Much has been made of Armenia’s ‘pivot’ to the West. Indeed, many recent outcomes would have been unimaginable a few years ago, when the country was often perceived as a submissive Russian client.

The more that Europe sees Armenia as vulnerable to Russian pressure, the easier it will be to overlook shortcomings in Pashinyan’s democratic record.

Notably, the US has become a key peace broker, through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – a planned trade, communications and energy transit route running across southern Armenia between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan. Yerevan also hosted a European Political Community summit, alongside the first ever EU-Armenia summit, a few days before the election campaign began. Warm rhetoric of Armenia’s ‘European choice’ dominated the airwaves.  

Yet ‘pivots to the West’ also carry risks for Armenia’s democracy. The more that Russia perceives Armenia as a liability in a poaching game with the EU, the more it will commit to the rules of that game. That is risky for Armenia, given its significant dependencies on Russia for energy and food supply, and still substantial remittances from Armenian migrant workers in Russia.

Conversely, the more that Europe sees Armenia as vulnerable to Russian pressure, the easier it will be to overlook shortcomings in Pashinyan’s democratic record in hopes of upholding the ‘Western candidate.’

A choice between Russia and the West is also a reductive way of viewing of Armenia’s foreign policy options. Multipolarity is inherent to the South Caucasus, and increasingly evident in the foreign policies of its states. All three of the South Caucasus countries are converging on omni-alignment, seeking to become nodes in wider Eurasian connectivity flows.

Armenia has been upgrading its relations in multiple directions, including with the Gulf states, South Asia and China. And important ties with Russia remain: Yerevan’s membership of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a dead letter and unlikely to be revived. But its membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) still affords real benefits. And Russia remains Armenia’s single largest export market.

Polls show a majority of citizens in favour of Armenian EU membership. But that goal remains distant: Armenia’s membership of the EAEU, Georgia’s stalled EU candidacy, and the EU’s own preoccupation with the candidacies of Ukraine and Moldova are crucial structural constraints that should be remembered when talking about the current scope of any ‘pivot’ West.

With enlargement not on the table for now, Europe can help Armenia with quiet, consistent support, strengthening its institutions and the understanding that binary choices reduce Yerevan’s leeway.

Pashinyan’s ‘Real Armenia’ campaign implies an inevitable reckoning with the country’s geopolitics and capacities. An antagonistic political culture and a reductive approach to the country’s foreign policy choices could still undermine this painful yet necessary agenda.