The parliamentary elections in Armenia, which will be held on June 7, are approaching. Nikol Pashinyan’s election program, which treats Armenia as a “crossroads of the world”, may lead to a financial collapse amid a conflict with the EAEU. Columnist Lyubov Stepushova writes about the situation.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan bases the election platform of his Civil Contract party on two postulates: Armenia intends to remain a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and at the same time continue reforms according to European standards as long as possible.

“As soon as the time comes to make a choice, the people of Armenia will make that choice,” he said.

On the antithesis of the words of President Alexander Lukashenko “Who needs Armenia, where will it go” Pashinyan plays on the pride of Armenians. He demonstrates confidence that everyone needs Armenia, as it is becoming a “crossroads of the world”, “which is needed and East, and West, and North, and South.” This refers to transport corridors that pass through Armenia and will enable Yerevan to raise the economy on tariffs.

Let’s examine in detail what these corridors are.

1. International Transport Corridor (ITC) “North — South”. These cargo flows are provided by Russia and the EAEU, and it works.
2. The East—West Transport Corridor (TRIPP), or “Trump’s Peace Road”, formerly the Zangezur Corridor, which includes the restoration and construction of railway and automobile communication between the main territory of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Syunik and other regions of northern Armenia and further to Turkey.

The route runs in close proximity to the border with Iran, with which the United States, appointed by the governor, is in a state of permanent war, so investors are still “thinking.”

TRIPP itself is part of the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian Route), which connects China and Central Asian countries with Europe bypassing the territory of Russia. On this route, cargo delivery takes place through a constant change of transport (train — ferry across the Caspian Sea — train — car), which increases the cost of transit. In addition, the port infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, including the shortage of container ships and terminals, is not yet ready for a sharp increase in cargo traffic. Besides, Azerbaijan and Iran began to actively build a bypass route along the southern bank of the Araks River.

The availability of this ready-made alternative reduces the commercial attractiveness and monopoly status of TRIPP. And finally, while Armenia is in the EAEU, customs control at the border with Turkey will be difficult.

Thus, the “crossroads of the world” exists so far only hypothetically, a lot of money needs to be invested in it, which Armenia itself does not have, and the political situation in the region is very difficult. Nevertheless, Pashinyan behaves as if he is the “king of the mountain.” He warned Russia and Belarus, without naming them directly, that Armenia is no longer the country that can be frightened by rising prices for potatoes and gas. Not having the courage to attack Moscow, he is constantly attacking Minsk, which allegedly “activated its agent” in order to “bind Armenia again, as it was before 2018.”

Everything is going to ensure that after a while the Armenians start asking: “What are we for?” Let’s try to answer.

There is such a good Russian saying — “you have to walk on your own.” Armenia buys from Russian gas at $ 177.5 per thousand cubic meters and then charges taxes on this amount (VAT and others). As a result, the tariff set by the Armenian regulator (the Commission for the Regulation of Public Services of the Republic of Armenia, CRU) for the population grows to $ 400 per thousand cubic meters.

The share of Gazprom (Gazprom of Armenia) in this tariff is also there, but it is not the net profit of the company. These are the costs of internal services for the operation of main gas pipelines and low-pressure distribution networks, for gas accounting, dispatching and technological maintenance of networks and compensation for losses in the delivery of fuel over mountainous terrain (gasification of Armenia is 95%). These shares are set by the CROWE, and if Gazprom Armenia wants to raise the price of gas, the company cannot do it itself — it is obliged to submit an application to the CROWE, which makes the final decision.

Russia has already issued a warning to Armenia, supplies of Armenian mineral water and cognac have been stopped, but this does not frighten Pashinyan.

He is sure that Russia will tolerate his rudeness, as it needs a military base in Gyumri. But Armenians need it no less — as the main deterrent against potential aggression from Ankara and Baku. The West cannot give such guarantees without having a common border with Armenia.

Russia also has leverage besides gas. The decline in production in the food, alcohol and tobacco industries of Armenia is estimated by experts at 30% with the closure of transport routes in Russia.

By the beginning of 2026, due to changes in trade rules and a drop in re-export volumes, the Russian-Armenian trade turnover had almost halved (to $6.4 billion). The complete closure of trade channels will lead to a sharp shortage of liquidity in the Armenian banking sector and a drop in the dram exchange rate.

However, such losses did not stop Ukraine from a destructive course. Armenia, literally, decides its future fate on June 7.

Read more: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/05/28/on-june-7-armenia-will-decide-its-fate-either-with-russia-or-along-the-path-of-ukraine

by Rachel Frazin

President Trump said this week that he wants to help U.S. energy companies “gain access” in Central Asia, saying an agreement with Armenia is in the works.

“Soon, the United States and Armenia will break ground together on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which will transform the South Caucasus, and help our wonderful American Energy Companies gain access from Central Asia all the way to the United States,” Trump wrote in a Truth Social post Wednesday evening.

His post did not specify which companies he was hoping to assist or what type of energy they will produce, but his administration has been particularly friendly to fossil fuels.

In his post, he also praised Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, saying that Pashinyan has his “COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement for Re-Election.”

Trump said Secretary of State Marco Rubio had advanced deals between the two countries.

Armenia has no proven reserves of oil or gas, according to the International Energy Agency, which has described the nation’s hard coal deposits as “modest.”

However, nearby Azerbaijan and Georgia do have oil and gas reserves.

Much of the Trump administration’s foreign policy has involved attempts to open up access to foreign resources, including energy. In Venezuela, for example, Trump has repeatedly emphasized his interest in getting the South American country’s vast oil reserves. In Ukraine, Trump has pushed for access to minerals.

By Eurasianet

By Hripsime Hovhannisyan 

(Eurasianet) — Armenia will hold parliamentary elections on June 7 under circumstances that may seem disadvantageous for the governing Civil Contract Party. Recent surveys indicate that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s public support has fallen to around 32 percent in vote intention among all respondents, rising to 38 percent among likely voters, a sharp decline from the support he enjoyed after the 2018 Velvet Revolution.

This erosion of trust was reflected, in part, in the March 2025 municipal elections in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city, where the Civil Contract party failed to secure a governing majority. 

Public dissatisfaction appears closely linked to several unresolved policy issues. The proposed peace agreement with Azerbaijan, brokered last August in Washington, remains deeply divisive, with the most recent polling showing public opinion almost evenly split, with 44 percent in support and 41 percent opposed. At the same time, Russia has intensified its efforts to shape Armenia’s political and information environment, employing methods similar to those observed earlier in Moldova and Georgia. 

Despite these pressures, Pashinyan continues, for now, to lead most pre-election projections. This creates a central paradox in the 2026 contest: an unpopular prime minister remains the frontrunner largely because the opposition appears even weaker and divided. 

Ultimately, the election will determine whether Armenia continues to distance itself from Moscow or moves back into Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Several factors explain the paradox of the upcoming elections, though none of them is decisive on its own. The first is the structure of Armenia’s electoral system, which strongly favors the largest political force in a fragmented field. Under the current election rules, a party can convert a relatively modest share of the vote into a dominant parliamentary position if its competitors remain divided.

With Civil Contract polling at around 32 percent in the most recent polls, most opposition parties remain clustered near the electoral threshold of 5 percent. Their support is dispersed across multiple platforms, limiting their ability to challenge the ruling party effectively. Even if several opposition groups were to reach 8-10 percent individually, they would still struggle, in aggregate terms, to surpass Civil Contract.

A second constraint on the opposition is reputational. Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, both former presidents who continue to dominate the main opposition networks, register consistently low levels of public trust. Both remain closely associated with the pre-2018 political order, and that legacy continues to shape voter perceptions. Survey data suggest that around 60 percent of Armenians distrust both the government and the opposition. Among those who express a preference, however, Pashinyan still outperforms his rivals by a wide margin. This reflects less a vote of confidence than a pragmatic calculation: many voters appear reluctant to return to figures they associate with the old system. 

Beyond the traditional opposition, Samvel Karapetyan was for a while widely seen as representing a potential wildcard. The Russian-Armenian billionaire and owner of Electric Networks of Armenia entered the political arena in mid-2025 after being detained on charges related to alleged attempts to destabilize the government. Karapetyan is not closely linked to the pre-2018 elite, and his profile differs in important ways from that of established opposition figures. But Pashinyan’s government appears to have successfully blunted his ability to influence the election’s outcome. 

Karapetyan was the force behind the formation in late 2025 of a pro-Russian opposition bloc called Strong Armenia. The bloc nominated him as its prime ministerial candidate in early 2026, but he was deemed ineligible due to the fact that the Armenian constitution prohibits dual citizens from running for a parliamentary seat. Karapetyan holds Russian and Cypriot citizenship in addition to having an Armenian passport. 

The Pashinyan-dominated parliament subsequently amended the electoral code in ways that have hampered Strong Armenia’s ability to campaign. And in late May, Armenia’s Investigative Committee announced an investigation into Narek Karapetyan, Samvel’s nephew and a leading Strong Armenia candidate, over allegations of concealing Russian citizenship, which is a disqualifying status under Armenian constitutional law.

According to an investigative report published May 19 by an exiled Russian media outlet, The Insider, Samvel Karapetyan has ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service, known as the FSB. The report also published evidence that the Kremlin is engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to influence the Armenian election’s outcome in ways that favor Russian interests.

Since April 2025, Kremlin-linked disinformation networks have increasingly targeted Armenia’s political space. Moscow has reportedly tasked Sergei Kiriyenko, who previously oversaw influence operations in Moldova and Georgia, with coordinating efforts in Armenia. The effectiveness of these initiatives, however, remains unclear.

The Moldovan experience suggests that even substantial Russian investments in information campaigns do not necessarily guarantee success when domestic institutions are resilient and Western partners are engaged. In December 2025, Armenia requested additional EU support in this area, and Brussels agreed to expand its anti-disinformation assistance. 

Beyond the information campaign, Russia retains significant economic leverage. It accounts for a large share of Armenia’s foreign trade and continues to supply natural gas at preferential rates. In reality, however, overt economic pressure can prove counterproductive by reinforcing Pashinyan’s narrative of the need for external diversification.

In the absence of a unified opposition or a broadly credible alternative, Pashinyan seems likely to retain power. As long as opposition forces remain fragmented, any runoff scenario would probably favor the incumbent over former presidents whose public support remains limited.

The deeper challenge, however, is one of legitimacy. Armenia may emerge from the election governed either by a prime minister with minimal popular backing or by opposition figures who also command little public trust. In either case, the next government is likely to face constraints in asserting a strong mandate.

This matters beyond Armenia itself. The country occupies a strategically sensitive position in the South Caucasus and has traditionally been a Russian foothold in the region. A Pashinyan victory would likely consolidate Armenia’s gradual integration with Western institutions, including closer ties with the EU and the United States, as well as continued engagement in the peace process with Azerbaijan. An opposition victory could, at least in the short term, redirect this trajectory.

Either outcome points to a period of governance marked by limited public confidence at a time when Armenia must make far-reaching strategic choices.

• Hripsime Hovhannisyan is a policy analyst specializing in South Caucasus affairs. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has been actively conducting research on the region, with a focus on Armenia’s political landscape and regional dynamics.