June: 2, 2026
On May 25, during his pre-election campaign, Nikol Pashinyan announced that after the parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 7, extraordinary elections should be held in Gyumri together with the people of Gyumri and “people’s power will be established in Gyumri”.
Vardevan Grigoryan, a former deputy of the National Assembly of Gyumri according to him, the Gyumri people have already made their choice last year, it is very difficult to deceive the Gyumri people.
“Gyumri has the experience of choosing the right direction, if you look at the results of the elections, you will see that Gyumri made a mistake in its choice in very few cases. In some cases, the elected deputy or other official could not live up to the expectations of the people of Gyumri, in all other cases, the people of Gyumri made the right choice.
As for the issue of organizing new elections in Gyumri after the national elections, which Nikol Pashinyan is talking about, then it cannot be within the limits of the law. If they do something like this, they should do everything within the limits of the law.” of 168.am Vardevan Grigoryan said in a conversation with
According to him, today the people of Gyumri are not dissatisfied with the work of the Gyumri municipality, because the municipality works well. If the head of the community Vardan Ghukasyan was not arrested, but was free, it would be better for Gyumri.
Speaking about the participation of Gyumretians in the upcoming elections, Vardaevn Grigoryan said that Gyumretians have always been active, and he believes that participating in these elections is no exception.
“I think you have seen the activity of Gyumri people at all events during this period, this also speaks of their future activity.
As for post-election developments, in my opinion, post-election developments are inevitable. There will be similar developments if Nikol Pashinyan is re-elected or not.
If Nikol Pashinyan is not re-elected, he will not leave his seat easily, the post-election developments will be hotter in that case,” emphasized Vardevan Grigoryan.
Let us remind that the elections of the 9th convocation of the National Assembly will be held on June 7, in which 19 political forces will participate.
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If Armenia leaves an area for North-South transit of Eurasia tram
June: 2, 2026
168TVof “Trigger” the guest of the program Andrey Klimov is a member of the Bureau of the Supreme Council of the ruling United Russia party.
During the program, the upcoming elections in Armenia, the issues of external influence on internal political processes, the current state of Armenian-Russian relations, the perspectives of cooperation within EAEU and Armenia’s relations with the European Union were discussed.
Special attention was paid to the situation around Nagorno Karabakh, transport corridors and the struggle for logistics routes in the South Caucasus, as well as the role of external players in the region.
Hayk Derzyan
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168: Եթե Առաջին Անգամ Ինձ Լսեր, Կկորցնեինք 3 Շրջան, Եվ Պատերազմը Կկանգներ Ֆիզ
Հունիս 2, 2026
«Պրեսսինգ» հաղորդաշարում Սաթիկ Սեյրանյանի հյուրը ազգային բարերար, «Ուժեղ Հայաստան» կուսակցության վարչապետի թեկնածու Սամվել Կարապետյանն է:
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RFE/RL – Armenian Church Head Again Rules Out Resignation
Catholicos Garegin II, the supreme head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, made clear on Tuesday that he will not resign even if he is arrested by the Armenian authorities seeking to depose him.
“We will never take such a step under pressure,” he told a news conference organized for several media outlets. “We have vowed and will remain true to our vow to defend the rights of our church. We will not allow a wrong precedent which could be destructive for our church and our nation with its consequences.”
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s Civil Contract party has added a pledge to oust Garegin to its campaign manifesto for the Armenian parliamentary elections slated for June 7. The church’s Mother See in Echmiadzin has condemned the “unlawful” move. Armenian opposition leaders and other government critics likewise view it as another violation by Pashinian of a constitutional provision guaranteeing the independence of the ancient church.
Pashinian began pressuring Garegin to resign in June last year shortly after the Catholicos accused Azerbaijan of committing ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh and illegally occupying Armenian border areas during an international conference in Switzerland. Three Armenian archbishops and one bishop were arrested in the following months on different charges strongly denied by them. Three of them were moved to house arrest early this year.
Around the same time, a law-enforcement agency indicted six other bishops and Garegin himself but refrained from arresting them. The accusations levelled against them stem from Garegin’s January 27 decision to defrock another bishop, who is involved in Pashinian’s controversial campaign.
Garegin said on Tuesday that he would not bow to the government pressure and would fight for justice will “all possible means” in case of his arrest.
“If we fail, as was the case with our other clergy, we are also ready to bear that unjust punishment and decision with that commitment,” he said. “But our position will not change. We will remain faithful to our sacred vow, our service, our nation and homeland, faithful to the defense of the church’s autonomy.”
Pashinian has used different lines of attack on the church during his nearly yearlong campaign. He said until December that Garegin and other top clerics at odds with him must go because they had secret sex affairs in breach of their vows of celibacy. He then began accusing them of meddling in politics and spying for a foreign country, presumably Russia.
In a weekend statement, the Catholicos urged all Armenians to vote in the upcoming elections “so that the law, justice and truth, love and solidarity, and mutual respect prevail and human rights and dignity are respected in our country.” He did not endorse any of the parties or blocs running in the polls. Analysts believe that a high voter turnout would bode ill for Pashinian’s reelection.
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Can Armenia’s Democracy Prevail?
Unconditional Western support for the incumbent prime minister could backfire.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan acknowledge the crowd after an event in Gyumri, Armenia, on May 5.French President Emmanuel Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan acknowledge the crowd after an event in Gyumri, Armenia, on May 5. Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images
After last month’s victory for democracy in Hungary, where voters ousted longtime Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Armenia appears to be the next battleground in the global contest between autocracy and democracy—though the contours of that conflict look a little different in Yerevan.
Armenia’s parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 7, presenting a test for whether the post-Soviet state’s current leadership will allow the country to remain on a democratic path.
It is hardly surprising that U.S. President Donald Trump is taking the wrong approach to the battle. Rather than pressing for free and fair elections, he is unconditionally backing the incumbent prime minister, who has increasingly sought to tilt the electoral playing field in his favor. However, it is deeply disappointing that European governments are following suit, abandoning the democratic process in the name of countering Russian influence efforts.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rose to power in 2018 on the promise of democratic renewal after the country’s self-styled Velvet Revolution, and he has deepened Armenia’s ties with the West. Yet today he faces uncertain prospects: A February poll predicted Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party would take between 20 and 30 percent of the vote. Seventeen parties and two electoral alliances are competing in the June elections.
With 30 percent of voters undecided, according to the February poll, the election could go in any direction. If no contender produces a “stable parliamentary majority”—on its own or in coalition—within six days of the results, the vote will go to a second round. In that case, opposition parties could team up to beat Pashinyan.
Strong Armenia, a party recently founded by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, has emerged as the strongest challenger. It is polling a distant second to Civil Contract, according to the February poll. Strong Armenia is seen as friendlier to the Kremlin than Civil Contract. However, there are also pro-Western candidates among the opposition.
As I saw on a visit to Armenia in March, Pashinyan is pulling out all the stops to prevent his party’s defeat, using tactics from the autocratic playbook. His government has arrested opposition members and detained critical journalists. The prime minister is also undermining the independence of the judiciary and making unprecedented interventions into the workings of the Armenian Apostolic Church.
Pashinyan already dominates political coverage by Armenia’s state-run media and is increasingly deploying state resources to surveil and hound the opposition. Vague crimes such as “hooliganism”—a classic Soviet-era offense—are being resurrected to silence critics. State employees, teachers, and even students have been deployed to telegraph support for the ruling party.
There is a geopolitical backdrop to this election. In 2023, Azerbaijan launched a lightning offensive in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, violating a 2020 cease-fire. The enclave had been largely controlled by its ethnic Armenian residents since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. After Russia brokered a new cease-fire in 2023 that heavily favored Azerbaijan, 120,000 ethnic Armenians were forcibly displaced from their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Having lost Nagorno-Karabakh on his watch, Pashinyan is eager to put the issue behind him. He began attacking the national Armenian Apostolic Church for taking up the cause of these displaced people; the church also seeks the release of at least 19 Armenians detained in Azerbaijan. Pashinyan’s position—ostensibly in the name of peace—is likely dictated by Armenia’s weak military position, but it has sparked opposition that could shape the election.
Karapetyan, the leader of Strong Armenia, is an entrepreneur and philanthropist. Last year, he was arrested on the thin pretext that his public opposition to Pashinyan’s attacks on the national church represented a threat to overthrow the government. While in custody, Karapetyan launched Strong Armenia.
One might expect the European Union, if not Trump, to oppose Pashinyan’s electoral manipulation as a violation of democratic principles. That is what happened in Hungary, where challenger Peter Magyar prevailed despite Trump’s active support for the autocratic Orban. The EU’s defense of democracy in that case, conditioning billions of euros in subsidies on respect for the rule of law, made a difference.
Yet Pashinyan has figured out how to neutralize any European objection to his suppression of opposition voices: He claims to be combating Russian influence, and European leaders are buying it.
In Ukraine, European governments are not only fighting Russian aggression but also defending Ukrainian democracy. In Armenia, they seem interested only in opposing Russia. Armenia was among the post-Soviet states that retained a close relationship with Moscow. That began to waver after the Kremlin, preoccupied with the Ukraine war, stoppedprotecting the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet Russia still wants Armenia in its camp.
Russia has potential allies in this election. Strong Armenia seeks to bolster ties with the Kremlin, noting Russia’s large role in the Armenian economy and the two countries’ traditional military relationship. Armenia Alliance, another opposition party organized by former Armenian Prime Minister and President Robert Kocharyan, also seeks closer ties with Moscow. Both parties are critical of what they see as Pashinyan’s abandonment of Nagorno-Karabakh.
But while Western governments fixate on the Russia threat, they are paying little attention to Pashinyan’s own attacks on Armenia’s democracy. Rather than proceeding neutrally to thwart Russian disinformation amid the election or to stymie other Russian tricks, these governments seem to have accepted at face value Pashinyan’s narrative that he is the pro-Western candidate. They are pushing not for free and fair elections but for a particular electoral outcome.
Trump has been the most brazen in his support of Pashinyan. He sent U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance to Armenia in February to promote Washington’s peacemaking between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The peace deal that Trump helped engineer last August, which has not yet been implemented, is controversial because it would grant Azerbaijan unimpeded commercial access through Armenian territory (part of the sycophantically named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity). In Armenia, that concession is widely viewed as rewarding Azerbaijan’s military adventurism. Vance used his trip to explicitly endorse Pashinyan for reelection.
European governments have barely been more subtle. The European Political Community, a 47-state group organized by French President Emmanual Macron after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, met in Armenia on May 4. The stated purpose of the summit was to defend Armenia’s sovereignty and bring the country closer to the EU. However, opposition leaders viewed the summit being held on the eve of the elections as tantamount to an endorsement of Pashinyan. Macron underscored this message by calling Pashinyan “very impressive.”
The EU is also deploying a mission to Armenia before the June vote to fight “hybrid threats,” a term often used to describe Russian influence operations. The bloc is making no comparable effort to combat Pashinyan’s attacks on democracy. At a summit in Armenia on May 5, the European Union highlighted the importance of democracy in the country but made no mention of the threats posed by Pashinyan.
European governments should know better than to equate Pashinyan’s pro-Western rhetoric with respect for democracy. Yet they seem willing to continue nudging the country in a pro-Western direction without much regard for how its leader is undermining what the West is supposed to stand for.
That is cynically short-sighted. The means do not justify the ends when they are blatantly contradictory. If Western commitment to democracy is seen as merely rhetorical, readily abandoned for geopolitical calculations, it encourages leaders worldwide to offer their own rationalizations for forsaking democracy.
Armenia is at risk of being saddled with an elected autocrat. So soon after European pressure helped to redeem democracy in Hungary, European governments should not abandon democracy in Armenia despite Trump’s indifference.
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Issues of War and Peace Gain Top Billing in Armenia’s Election
What is happening?
Armenia is holding general elections on 7 June, the country’s first such poll since 2021 and the traumatising military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh that followed two years later. In 2023, after a series of offensives by neighbouring Azerbaijan, Armenian forces lost control of the mountainous enclave they had held since the 1990s. The entire ethnic Armenian population of the territory, more than 100,000 people, fled. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has since undertaken dramatic – and not universally popular – steps to acknowledge the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and to make peace with Azerbaijan, while also seeking to normalise its relations with Türkiye.
It is little surprise that issues of war and peace stand at the top of every party’s electoral program. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party has placed the message that he has brought peace to Armenia at the heart of its campaign. His opponents argue that he has made the country weaker by offering undue concessions to Azerbaijan. The election also has taken on geopolitical hues, with the government’s moves to distance Armenia from its traditional ally Russia, and edge toward closer ties with Europe, the U.S. and Türkiye, coming in for a barrage of criticism from the opposition, which favours repairing relations with Russia.
Though there is some evidence that the Kremlin has attempted to sway voters, officials and local analysts downplay the extent of any such effort by Moscow so far.
The high stakes have attracted an unprecedented amount of international involvement. U.S. Vice President JD Vance visited Armenia in February, while the European Union has sent a mission ahead of the election to help the government fend off what it claims to be the threat of Russian disinformation and interference. Though there is some evidence that the Kremlin has attempted to sway voters, officials and local analysts downplay the extent of any such effort by Moscow so far. Some observers argue that what Russian meddling has occurred is getting far too much outside attention. The opposition and watchdog groups go further, insisting that all the Western concern about Russia, including the dispatch of the EU mission, amounts to no more than an electoral ploy by the ruling party aimed at discrediting its adversaries.
In the waning days of the campaign U.S. President Donald Trump made an enthusiastic endorsement of Pashinyan, and European officials have openly expressed their preference that Civil Contract come out on top. A Pashinyan victory would also be welcomed in Baku and Ankara, but Turkish and Azerbaijani officials have tried to keep their support quiet, given the high chance that it could backfire among Armenian voters suspicious of their long-time foes’ intentions. Meanwhile, opposition parties and independent media have decried alleged attempts by the authorities to stifle the opposition ahead of the vote and exploit the levers of state power to boost the ruling party.
These controversies notwithstanding, Pashinyan and his allies appear poised to prevail. Polls show Civil Contract with a commanding lead in the field of nineteen total parties and coalitions, and local analysts expect the ruling party once again to win a large majority in parliament, which is elected on a purely proportional basis. The margin will matter, though: as a condition for signing a peace agreement, Azerbaijan has demanded that Armenia change its constitution. A referendum to do so would require a two-thirds majority vote in parliament, meaning that if Civil Contract fails to meet that threshold the authorities will be unable to call a plebiscite, leaving prospects for the peace process in the balance.
How have Armenia’s military defeats by Azerbaijan affected bilateral relations and the electoral campaign?
The campaign is taking place at a moment of unprecedented change in Armenia’s relations with its neighbours and partners. Following its military defeats by Azerbaijan, Yerevan is seeking to normalise its ties with Baku. The two sides began negotiating an end to their conflict in 2021, before the full takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in early 2025 announced they had hammered out the text of a framework peace agreement. But Azerbaijan says it will withhold its signature until Yerevan removes provisions from the Armenian constitution that amount to an indirect territorial claim to the enclave. In August 2025, the talks got a major boost when Trump invited Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the White House. There, he announced an agreement to resolve one of the biggest sticking points between the sides: establishment of a transportation corridor connecting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakchivan to the rest of the country via southern Armenia. This new project, called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – consisting of road, rail and pipelines – is the backbone of a broader effort to connect the economies of the two countries (as well as that of Türkiye) to reduce the chances of future conflict.
The denouement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict also opens the door for Armenia to normalise its relations with Türkiye. Yerevan and Ankara have appointed envoys to prepare for normalisation and intensified contacts at many levels; in June 2025, Pashinyan made the first official visit by an Armenian leader to Türkiye since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia’s highest priority is opening its borders: closed frontiers with Türkiye and Azerbaijan have stunted its economy since the 1990s. Türkiye is ready to open its border with Armenia but has until now deferred to its close ally, Azerbaijan, which wants Ankara only to do so when the peace agreement is signed. Knowing how important the border issue is to Yerevan, Baku fears it will lose its most powerful lever in talks with Armenia once the frontier is open. While Ankara is reportedly losing patience with Baku’s demands for patience, there is little sign yet that Turkish officials are willing to go over their Azerbaijani allies’ heads.
In parallel, Armenia has been pursuing a broader shift in its foreign policy.
In parallel, Armenia has been pursuing a broader shift in its foreign policy. Russia has long been Armenia’s main security guarantor, but Armenian officials and its public became disillusioned with Moscow after it failed to rescue Yerevan from any of the military defeats it has suffered at Azerbaijani hands over recent years. Yerevan has been seeking to diversify its foreign partners, most notably by reaching out to European countries, the EU and the U.S. In March 2025, Armenia’s parliament adopted a resolution to launch the process of joining the EU, though – notwithstanding encouraging statements by European leaders – actual accession remains a distant prospect at best.
The opposition decries these shifts in Armenia’s foreign outlook. Civil Contract is facing three main challengers, all of which have been critical of Pashinyan’s approach to matters of war and peace. The largest opposition force, according to polls, is Strong Armenia, a new party headed by Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. Two smaller forces, the Armenia Alliance led by former President Robert Kocharyan and Prosperous Armenia, led by populist businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, also have a reasonable chance of winning seats in parliament.
Pashinyan has taken to calling these groups the “three-headed war party” during the campaign, claiming that war could reignite with Azerbaijan if any of them come to power. The trio of opposition parties, though, are vague about what they would do vis-à-vis Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Türkiye. They stop short of calling for retaking control of Karabakh; Kocharyan has blamed the enclave’s loss on Pashinyan’s estrangement from Russia, but also said the most that can be hoped for now is that the Karabakh refugees’ right of return is respected. Karapetyan, too, has acknowledged that circumstances do not allow for Karabakh to regain its de facto independence. He says the effects of TRIPP will be mixed for Armenia, and argues that it should have another backer besides the U.S. Kocharyan has taken a harder line on TRIPP, saying it serves only foreign (Azerbaijani, Turkish and U.S.) interests. Tsarukyan’s campaign focuses on economic issues, though he has also been critical of Pashinyan’s foreign policy. At any rate, none of his three main opponents have put forth a convincing alternative to Pashinyan’s approach.
For his part, Pashinyan is campaigning explicitly on bringing peace to Armenia, as painful as its territorial losses have been for many Armenians. His campaign symbol is an outline of the map of Armenia, representing what he calls the “real Armenia”. By this, he means the idea that Armenians should concern themselves primarily with events inside Armenia’s recognised national borders, rather than the wider “historical Armenia”, referring both to Karabakh and parts of eastern Türkiye where large numbers of Armenians used to live. The “real Armenia” narrative seeks to underpin the logic of normalisation with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, as well as undermine domestic opponents, who invoke nationalist laments for “lost territories” to rally voters against him. It also helps dilute the influence of Armenian diaspora groups, who see these issues as central – and have long been thorns in Pashinyan’s side.
It is unclear how voters will respond to these duelling visions of Armenia’s security. Despite the traumatic losses of the past few years, many Armenians also resented the burdens that Karabakh placed on them and now appear to prefer moving on. Following the exodus from Karabakh in 2023, some in pro-Pashinyan circles worried that the refugees might pose a political challenge to the government, but that has not come to pass. While over 30,000 of the refugees have become citizens and are now eligible to vote, they remain a marginal constituency in an electorate of over one million. In addition, polls show that Armenians are much less anxious about security than they were a year ago and now see economic issues as their top concern. Still, misgivings about Pashinyan’s approach are visible as well: the same polls show more Armenians oppose TRIPP than support it. While Russia is significantly less popular among Armenians than it was before 2020, and Europe far more so, those trends have reversed somewhat in recent years, with Russia gaining popularity and Europe losing it since 2024.
What are the geopolitical stakes and what is the role of external players, especially the EU and Russia?
As Armenia has embraced stronger ties with Europe, Russia has been looking on with concern. Russian officials have called into question the benefits of European integration for Armenia and issued veiled threats about the costs of spoiling relations with Moscow. While Armenia has taken pains to remain in Russia’s good graces, and Pashinyan remains a frequent visitor to Moscow, there are rumblings of discontent within the Kremlin. When Pashinyan went to the Russian capital in April, President Vladimir Putin pointedly mentioned the advantageous price at which Russia sells natural gas to Armenia, implying that it could rise. Putin also told Pashinyan that “pro-Russian” candidates should be allowed to participate in the election, and mentioned that some such figures were in prison. It was a clear reference to Karapetyan, who was arrested in June 2025 after vocally supporting the Armenian Apostolic Church – which is close both to the political opposition and to Moscow – in its conflict with Pashinyan, and remains behind bars. (His nephew, Narek Karapetyan, has been the de facto leader of his campaign since then).
After landmark summits of the EU and the European Political Community in Yerevan in early May, Putin suggestedthat Armenia should formally decide whether it wants to be on Russia’s side or Europe’s. As the election draws near, Russian regulators have blocked or created obstacles for several Armenian imports, a common Kremlin tactic to apply pressure on states with which it is unhappy.
The first EU-Armenia summit … served as a show of support to [Armenia’s Prime Minister] Pashinyan ahead of the election.
Foreign intervention on the ruling party’s side has been no less direct. Fears that Russia might seek to influence Armenia’s vote prompted the EU to send a pre-election team to Yerevan to advise the Armenian government on combating such manipulation. At the request of the Armenian government, Brussels is planning a longer-term mission aimed at boosting Armenia’s ability to combat foreign disinformation, illicit financing flows and other “hybrid” threats. The first EU-Armenia summit, held on 4 May, served as a show of support to Pashinyan ahead of the election. At the gathering, senior European officials promoted the ruling party, prompting objections from the opposition and watchdog groups. The UK also has deployed a team to Pashinyan’s office to advise the campaign, and France and the U.S. are providing physical security for Pashinyan. Meanwhile, Vice President Vance directly endorsed Pashinyan in a February visit to Yerevan.
The Armenian government has welcomed the assistance, and Armenia’s intelligence service and senior officials have warned of foreign attempts to influence the election. They have been careful, however, not to name Russia publicly. In conversations with Crisis Group, Armenian officials downplayed the threat from alleged Russian attempts to influence the vote. Local analysts believe that while Russian leaders are unhappy with Pashinyan, they can live with him, given that he has shown desire to maintain fluid relations with Moscow. Pro-Russia sentiment in Armenia may be rising from the doldrums, but it is no longer a strong political force.
Azerbaijan and Türkiye also favour a Pashinyan victory, worrying that if the opposition parties were to come to power, they would slow down or halt the normalisation processes. For obvious reasons, though, they have kept their preferences mostly to themselves, except for a comment by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressing hope for a Pashinyan win that was seized upon by Armenia’s opposition. While some speculated that they might take action to bolster Pashinyan ahead of the vote – such as releasing Armenian prisoners held in Azerbaijan, compromising on the question of the Armenian constitution or agreeing to at least a partial opening of the Armenia-Türkiye border – they have done no such thing.
What are the stakes for the peace process?
Given the lack of strategic options for Armenia following its repeated military defeats by Azerbaijan, there seems to be little the opposition could do to relitigate the results of those conflicts. The bigger risk is to the constitutional referendum that, for now, represents a crucial hurdle for the peace process. Azerbaijan has demanded that, before it signs the peace agreement, Armenia must remove language in the constitution’s preamble, which refers to a 1990 declaration of independence that called for reunification of Armenia with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, then part of Soviet Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan argues that this wording amounts to a territorial claim that is incompatible with peaceful relations between the two states. Pashinyan has agreed to adopt a new constitution without that language, and the Armenian authorities are planning to hold a referendum in 2027 on a new constitution. But it is not clear that Civil Contract will win the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament that it needs to call a referendum on the issue. While the main opposition forces have not made explicit their position on the plebiscite, they are likely to oppose it.
A failure to hold the referendum would have unpredictable consequences for the peace process. It is possible that Pashinyan could find another way to amend the constitution, but Azerbaijani officials have said they want a referendum so that it is clear Armenian society endorses renunciation of the territorial claim. Many fear that a popular vote presents a big risk: even if Armenians are not interested in further conflict, they may be loath to go to the polls to support a position they feel Azerbaijan is pushing onto them. The chances a referendum would fail are considerable. While Azerbaijani officials have said they would regard that outcome as a sign Armenians are not interested in peace, it is less evident how they would respond if Pashinyan wins, but without the two-thirds majority needed to call a plebiscite. Some in the region suggest that this scenario might in fact be the best way to move the peace process forward: if Pashinyan were to score a convincing victory but still fall short of a two-thirds majority, Baku could see value in making progress on other elements of normalisation, like a partial opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, while agreeing to delay the constitutional changes until a more propitious moment.
What should be done?
Whether they have made their preferences known or not, external powers should avoid interfering in the election’s conduct and support whichever constellation of forces takes office. All outside states should respect Armenia’s intentions to build good relations with Europe and the U.S. while maintaining friendly ties with Russia, rather than pushing Yerevan into a binary choice about its geopolitical orientation. Armenia’s foreign partners should encourage a democratic process and discourage the authorities from putting political pressure on the opposition. Concerns have arisen in this regard, as police have arrested dozens of officials from opposition parties, including Karapetyan. While Armenia’s friends are eager to support Pashinyan’s foreign policy, they should avoid doing so in ways that could encourage the ruling party’s anti-democratic impulses, on the understanding that a sustainable peace process and reasonably balanced foreign policy require buy-in from across Armenia’s political spectrum.
Azerbaijan for its part should recognise the constraints Armenia’s government is under because of the country’s democratic process. It should not interpret failure to hold a constitutional referendum as a rejection of peace. Baku should continue its constructive engagement with Yerevan to ensure progress in the peace process regardless of the election results, working toward a full renunciation by both sides of territorial claims on the other.
All Armenian political forces should, after the election, recommit to the serious work that has already been done toward building normal relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The opposition should avoid inflaming regional tensions for the sake of short-term domestic political advantage. In the event that opposition parties wield a degree of power after the election, they should work with Pashinyan to advance normalisation for the good of Armenia. In turn, Pashinyan and his allies, in the likely event they return to office, should work to convince the country’s entire population, including those who support their political adversaries, of the value of peace with Armenia’s neighbours.
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New Book Examines ‘The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Constitutionalis
LONDON/NEW YORK—Bloomsbury Press announced the publication of the late Dr. Garabet K. Moumdjian’s “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1895-1908.” The book is part of the series “Armenians in the Modern and Early Modern World” edited by Bedross Der Matossian (University of Nebraska, Lincoln).
What was the nature of the relationship between the Young Turks, whose members would go on to form and lead the Committee of Union and Progress, which would carry out the Armenian Genocide beginning in 1915, and the Armenian revolutionaries of the late Ottoman Empire?
Based on rich Armenian, Ottoman, British, and other archival documents and periodicals, this book reveals the complex dynamics and relations that Armenian organizations, most notably the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, maintained with the Young Turks between 1895-1908, when relations shifted from mutual suspicion to closer collaboration.
Put in the context of the worsening conditions for Ottoman-Armenians in the eastern provinces of the empire, the book reveals the internal debates of the ARF about collaboration with Young Turk cadres in an effort to improve conditions for their people, as well as the role that Armenian revolutionaries played in CUP calculations and aims for toppling the regime of Sultan Abdulhamid. The book thus reveals the complex and gradual development of relations between the groups before the outright anti-Armenian policies of the CUP would culminate in the Armenian Genocide. It also reveals the ARF’s commitment to the constitutional project and the difficult choices it faced in pursuing those aims.
“Essential reading to understand political and security conditions in the Ottoman Armenian provinces in the years prior to the Constitutional Revolution. Moumdjian provides critical insight into the interactions and cooperation between Armenian and Turkish revolutionaries,” said Dikran M. Kaligian, author of “Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule: 1908-1914.”
“Long at the center of polemical debate, relations between the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Young Turks remain a defining problem of late Ottoman history,” said Varak Ketsamanian, American University of Beirut. “Drawing on a rich body of previously untapped archival sources, Armenians and Young Turks offers a decisive and much-needed reinterpretation. Focusing on the years 1895 to 1908, Moumdjian reconstructs a relationship marked by both strategic convergence and profound ideological divergence.
“United in their push to restore constitutional rule, Armenian and Young Turk revolutionaries nonetheless advanced competing meanings and visions of the empire’s future. Through a meticulous analysis of internal deliberations and inter-organizational negotiations, this compelling book reveals the difficult and fraught choices that shaped this fragile alliance and traces the paths that led to its collapse, ultimately culminating in rupture and catastrophe,” Ketsamanian added.
Bedross Der Matossian reflected on his close intellectual connection with Dr. Moumdjian, noting their shared roots as Marashtsis from the Middle East and their common interest in Ottoman Armenian history. After encouraging Moumdjian to submit his manuscript to the “Armenians in the Modern and Early Modern World” series, he received a strong peer review and began revising the work. Tragically, Moumdjian passed away on March 29, 2023, before completing the project. A year later, his wife, Nayeri Moumdjian, expressed her wish to see the manuscript published. With her support, Dr. Der Matossian enlisted Dr. Mehmet Polatel to revise and expand the text and Dr. Tamar Boyadjian to edit and refine the manuscript.
“Although Dr. Moumdjian did not live to see the publication of his book,” said Der Matossian, “his scholarship and memory endure through this work. The book is dedicated to his wife, Nayeri, and their sons, Hagop and Purag,” he concluded.
Copies of “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1895-1908” are available for purchase on Bloomsbury’s website. Enter code GLR AT8 at checkout for 35% off.
Garabet K. Moumdjian was an independent historian and an Ottomanist. He obtained his Ph.D. in 2012 from UCLA under the supervision of the late Prof. Richard Hovannisian. His dissertation, “Struggling for a Constitutional Regime: Armenian-Young Turk Relations in the Era of Abdul Hamid II, 1895–1909,” examined the complex dynamics of Ottoman-Armenian political relations.
Over the course of his career, Moumdjian served as Principal of the Armenian Mesrobian School and Vice-Principal of the Vahan and Anoush Chamlian School. He also taught Armenian History at California State University, Northridge; the University of La Verne; UCLA; and Glendale Community College. In addition, he taught at the Ferrahian School and authored multiple Armenian history textbooks that continue to educate new generations.
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As EU Mulls More ‘Support’ For Armenia, U.S. Says Russia ‘Not Happy’ with U.S
Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan sign a strategic agreement regarding TRIPP at Zvartnots Airport on May 26
Ahead of Sunday’s elections in Armenia, the European Union on Tuesday promised to help Yerevan as Russia extended its products bans on Armenia, while the United States said Moscow wanted Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to lose for his pro-U.S. posturing.
Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan had a conversation with EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos on Tuesday. According to the foreign ministry, the two discussed “mechanisms for boosting EU-Armenia trade” as Moscow continued to ban key imports from Armenia.
Kos “reiterated the EU’s solidarity with Armenia in the face of growing economic coercion by Russia,” according to the Armenian foreign ministry statement.
“We are looking into ways to increase EU support for Armenia in the short term,” the EU official wrote on X. “We will also accelerate our work bolstering trade and energy links to and within the South Caucasus, supporting Armenia’s economic links with its immediate neighborhood.”
Moscow has reacted angrily to Yerevan hosting the European Political Community summit in Armenia last month. However, when Pashinyan met with two top EU officials, Antonio Costa and Ursula von der Leyen, a day after the summit, they did not promise additional economic aid to Yerevan.
The Russian embargo could hit Armenia’s agricultural industry as most of the bans imposed by Moscow are for fruits and vegetables that are imported to Russia and make up a great portion of 35.8 percent of Armenia’s trade last year.
Armenia’s agriculture industry is the cornerstone of the country’s economy, employing more than 28 percent of the country’s workforce, according to Armenia’s International Trade Administration.
While campaigning on Tuesday, Pashinyan said that his government has already found new export markets in Europe, without elaborating. Armenia’s trade with the EU accounts for 11.7 percent of its entire trade portfolio.
Meanwhile, while speaking at a congressional hearing on Capitol Hill on Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Russia was unhappy with growing U.S. involvement in Armenia.
“I think Russia is not happy with U.S. involvement in Armenia,” Rubio said during the hearing.
Speaking about American engagement in the South Caucasus, Rubio stated that the United States sees growing opportunities in the region that could benefit both U.S. interests and regional countries, including Armenia and Azerbaijan.
“To the benefit of American companies and American interests, but also to the benefit of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other regional countries. I would also argue, by the way, and just to point out, and I don’t mean this again, I think this is pretty well understood in the open source reporting, the Russians are less than happy about our engagement there. I think there’s evidence that they would like the current prime minister to lose his election as a result of this growing relationship with the United States,” Rubio added.
“To be clear, we’re not there to infringe on Armenian sovereignty. We’re not asking them not to be friends with other countries. We just want to be able to have a relationship with them that’s built not just on peace. Peace is important, but that’s just the beginning. The benefit of American companies,” he emphasized, making it clear that initiatives advanced by the U.S. seek to advance U.S. companies’ interests throughout the Eurasian region, by using Armenia as a gateway.
Rubio also said that the U.S. wants to further strengthen cooperation with Armenia through expanded political and strategic relations.
President Donald Trump endorsed Pashinyan for the upcoming elections on Thursday.
“Nikol has my full and unconditional support for his reelection on June 7, 2026,” Trump said on his Truth Social, emphasizing that Pashinyan would advance the Trump administration’s interest economically and politically in the region.
“Soon, the United States and Armenia will break ground together on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which will transform the South Caucasus, and help our wonderful American Energy Companies gain access from Central Asia all the way to the United States,” Trump said in his endorsement post on May 28.
Last week, Rubio also briefly visited Armenia, where he and Mirzoyan signed a series of agreements on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, as well as document on Armenian mining.
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Asbarez: Increased Arrests of Government Critics Ahead of June Parliamentary E
Reports of Fear, Intimidation and Political Reprisals; Allegations of Foreign Interference
The Armenian government has expanded its arrests of government critics for alleged speech-based offenses ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections, said the International Observatory for Democracy in Armenia. During its second fact-finding mission in the country, IODA also documented claims of foreign interference in the elections; repeated instances of the misuse of state resources for electioneering by the ruling “Civil Contract” party; and extensive reports that voters, particularly government employees, fear reprisals for supporting opposition candidates.
IODA’s second fact-finding mission, from May 22 – 27, included a delegation of international experts, including international human rights lawyers Philippe Kalfayan, Sarah Leah Whitson and Diana Kearney, and former Canadian member of parliament Bryan May. In addition to meetings in Yerevan, where it met with the Corruption Prevention Commission, the group traveled to Hrazdan, Sevan, Ijevan, Dilijan, Vanadzor, Spitak, and Gyumri to meet with local representatives of political parties, lawyers, election observers, and civil society groups. IODA also sought meetings with Civil Contract representatives but did not receive a reply, and sought meetings with the Constitutional Court, the Investigative Committee, and the Human Rights Defender’s Office (Ombudsman) but was unable to secure a meeting with them.
“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is responsible for the troubling conditions in the country, including not only the prosecutions of critics, but also the hostile election atmosphere marked by his verbal attacks on ordinary citizens expressing their opinions,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, IODA Board Member. “The government has a duty to ensure that every Armenian citizen feels safe and free to criticize the prime minister and challenge the government’s policies, regardless of how offensive it finds the criticisms.”
Expanded Arrests of Government Critics
In addition to the concerns raised following IODA’s first fact-finding mission, the group documented several new instances of arrests of critics of the government, in several cases on vague, speech-based offenses under the penal code.
On March 29, Pashinyan visited Saint Anna church in Yerevan during a crowded service; plainclothes security personnel pushed worshipers aside to make room for him.The pushing led to a verbal dispute, which escalated into a physical scuffle. Security forces detained and criminally charged 18-year-old high school student twin brothers Davit Minasyan and Mikayel Minasyan, as well as Gevorg Gevorgyan. Gevorgyan later stated that he had been detained for “looking at Nikol Pashinyan in the eyes” inside the church. They charged Davit with hooliganism and using violence to interfere with official political activity, Mikael with assisting him, and Gevorgyan with organizing the entire episode.
Later that day, police searched the Minasyans’ apartment, but according to defense counsel, no item relevant to the investigation was found. Significantly, the Minasyan brothers and Gevorgyan did not know each other. Judge Mnatsakan Martirosyan, long accused of politically motivated decisions, released Mikael and Gevorg on March 31, with bail of 5 million AMD (US $13,585) each, along with a travel ban, but on April 1 ordered Davit held in pre-trial detention for two months. Due to his deteriorating health condition, security forces transferred him to a medical facility multiple times. The judge released him on April 14, 2026, subject to a travel ban, while the investigation remains ongoing.
On May 12, security forces arrested blogger Artak Avetisyan in Yerevan and charged him initially with hate speech but subsequently with hooliganism after he called Prime Minister Pashinyan a “traitor” during a live broadcast. He remains detained.
On May 16, Armen Hovhannisyan, a resident of Artashat, reportedly died by suicide while in police custody in a Yerevan psychiatric facility. Security forces had detained him on suspicion of tearing down a Civil Contract election poster and accused him of obstructing campaigning, but had not formally charged him. Following signs of psychological distress, they transferred him to a psychiatric institution under police supervision, where he later reportedly died by hanging. Authorities subsequently announced a criminal investigation into the incident but to date have announced no findings.
On May 18, security forces arrested Artsakh refugee and activist Artur Osipyan following a heated verbal confrontation with Pashinyan. A judge ordered him held in pre-trial detention for two months. The prosecutor has charged him with inciting violence, hooliganism, and obstruction of campaigning. Authorities also cited a Facebook post in which Osipyan allegedly threatened the Prime Minister and called for violence against him.
“The government has no business prosecuting people who challenge it just because it may not like the criticism. Nor should the government be suppressing legitimate political debate by claiming that it reflects the equivalent of a ‘plot to overthrow the regime’,” said Bryan May IODA Board Member. “A heated election is no excuse for the government to shirk its obligation to protect free and vigorous political speech and refrain from using its prosecutorial authority to silence critics.”
Although international human rights law demands the protection of political speech by all sides, lawyers and representatives of opposition political parties expressed dismay that the prosecutor’s office had failed to prosecute similar alleged “hate crimes” and other speech offenses by government supporters despite complaints they had filed, suggesting that these prosecutions are also selective. IODA reiterates its earlier recommendation that parliament should amend the penal code to abolish vague, speech-based restrictions, such as “hooliganism” or “calling for the overthrow of the government,” which are rife for abuse and subvert the free speech rights of Armenian citizens.
Misuse of State Resources by Ruling “Civil Contract” Party
The ruling party, Civil Contract, appears in a number of instances to have misused state resources to support its electioneering for the upcoming elections. In particular, pro-Civil Contract employees of educational institutions appear to have mobilized students and teachers to support the ruling party’s activities, despite legal prohibitions on the participation of public employees in political campaigning while acting in their official capacity. There is no evidence that the government has investigated these cases.
On May 13, numerous school principals and teachers from Aparan and nearby villages reportedly participated during working hours in a Civil Contract rally in Aparan attended by the prime minister. According to eyewitnesses, school administrators removed students from classes so they could greet the prime minister, and provided them with flags, and issued detailed instructions regarding students’ appearance and clothing, including recommendations that girls wear braided hairstyles. Students from the Tsaghkashen village school were allegedly provided with Civil Contract T-shirts.
On May 15, Arman Tatoyan, leader of the “Wings of Unity” party, published an audio recording of Lusine Grigoryan, a lecturer at Armavir Regional State College and a member of the “Civil Contract” faction of the Armavir Council of Elders, ordering the college students to participate in a “Civil Contract” campaign event and saying she herself had been ordered to organize it. Although the Deputy Minister of Education later stated that Grigoryan was a mere librarian acting without authority and had been reprimanded, the government made no broader investigation into possible institutional involvement or coercion.
On May 21, representatives of several educational and cultural institutions were reportedly involved in campaign activities during a “Civil Contract” campaign event attended by the prime minister in Verin Artashat village of Ararat Province. At Verin Artashat Secondary School, classes ended earlier than scheduled so that students could attend the rally. Teachers and the school principal, Shushanik Hakhnazaryan, also participated. The acting director of the Artashat Charles Aznavour Cultural Center, Ninel Gabrielyan, and cultural center employee and choreographer Tiruhi Soghomonyan, reportedly organized children from the center to attend the event. The “Akanates” observation mission subsequently filed administrative complaints for these apparently prohibited activities.
Opposition party members interviewed by IODA provided numerous, detailed accounts similar to these events, suggesting that such practices were not isolated incidents but part of a broader trend in multiple regions during the campaign period. In addition, they repeatedly alleged that tax authorities, law enforcement agencies, and other state-controlled institutions pressured or intimidated opposition-affiliated individuals, business owners, local community leaders, and public-sector employees to end their support for opposition parties, but did not provide specific evidence. They cited threatened inspections, criminal or administrative proceedings, loss of employment, and other forms of institutional pressure as contributing to a climate of fear and self-censorship, discouraging open political participation and support for opposition parties. IODA was not able to verify individual cases supporting these allegations.
Fear and Intimidation of Voters, Voting Suppression
The elections are taking place amid an atmosphere of serious political polarization among voters, persistent reports of fear and intimidation by government officials, and overarching concerns about foreign influence in the elections. In at least ten interviews, members of political opposition parties reported voters expressing fear and intimidation as the primary reason they were avoiding participating in political rallies, being seen with opposition candidates, or even voting. In particular, they repeatedly cited fears expressed by municipal and government employees – teachers, police officers, and utility workers in particular – that their superiors at work would penalize them or ask them to resign if they appeared to be supporting opposition parties. In addition, every member of the opposition questioned reported that they believe they are being surveilled by state agencies. This included allegations of phone wiretapping and bugged campaign offices.
Observer organizations, such as an interim report by Eyewitness/Akanates, also detailed several cases in which political actors and private employers allegedly used workplace leverage to mobilize employees for campaign activities or influence their political participation. Reported incidents included the organized transportation of employees to rallies, pressure to attend campaign events, and alleged threats related to employment status or promises of financial incentives tied to electoral support. These allegations involved companies and political actors associated with multiple parties, including “Civil Contract,” “Prosperous Armenia,” “Strong Armenia,” and “For the Republic.” Domestic observer organizations referred several cases to law enforcement authorities.
Prime Minister Pashinyan’s aggressive and abrasive interactions with voters, documented in now viral videos, emerged repeatedly as a factor contributing to voters’ fears and a climate of intimidation against government critics. Much of his violent rhetoric has targeted Armenian refugees from Artsakh, drawing on popular resentment at the costs of the war to Armenian citizens.
On March 22, during a campaign event in the Yerevan metro, Pashinyan approached a forcibly displaced woman from Nagorno-Karabakh, Armine Mosiyan, and her child, offering them a pin featuring the map of the Republic of Armenia. After Mosiyan refused and explained her reasons, Pashinyan continued arguing with her despite her repeated requests that he refrain. He raised his voice, pointed his finger at her, and stated that billions earned by Armenian citizens had been spent on sustaining Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, calling the woman and other Artsakh refugees “runaways.” Pashinyan eventually issued a partial apology. Nevertheless, pro-government media outlets continued targeting Mosiyan after the incident, further amplifying concerns about hostility toward displaced Artsakh Armenians.
At a May 18 Civil Contract rally in Yerevan’s Arabkir district, obstetrician-gynecologist Arpine Soghoyan approached Pashinyan, criticized his policies and noted that her brother, Col. Hrant Papikyan, a high-ranking Armenian military officer/medic, remains missing in action in Artsakh. Pashinyan responded by shouting at her, associating her with opposition leaders, and threatening to make her “kneel” like he would make them kneel. As she attempted to leave, he then grabbed her hand and pulled her back, demanding that she listen to him, while his supporters shouted over her and prevented her from speaking. Later that day, responding to public criticism, Pashinyan stated: “I did not threaten the woman. I threatened Robik [Robert Kocharyan], and I am threatening him now as well. I am saying I will finish him off [slay] — I will.”
On May 18, during a contentious exchange, Pashinyan responded to criticism from Artur Osipyan (who was subsequently arrested, as noted above) with a tirade directed at displaced Artsakh Armenians, referring to Artsakh political figures and refugees as “bastards” and “scumbags,” while suggesting they had no place in Yerevan unless they adopted “the mentality of Armenian citizens.” Video footage showed Pashinyan saying to Osipyan:
Get lost, you fool. Let the pseudo-elites of Karabakh get out of here and leave. Who are these people? Get out entirely. You smashed your head into the wall — you should have gone and died in place of our children, you thieving animals. They came talking about the Karabakh issue. If the Karabakh issue mattered, you should have gone and died. Why are you alive? Why are you alive, you scum? Why didn’t you die? Why is Shahramanyan alive? Why are your so-called National Assembly members alive?
“Pashinyan’s rhetoric humiliating and stigmatizing displaced Armenian refugees from Artsakh is harmful and dangerous, inciting public hostility and contributing to the country’s polarization,” said Diana Kearney, IODA Board Member. “Pashinyan should display respect and civility to all people in Armenia, rather than attempt to generate votes by inflaming tensions.
Allegations of Foreign Influence
The most dominant feature of the political debates taking place across the country appear to revolve around competing allegations of foreign influence, foreign allegiance, and voter manipulation. This includes allegations of covert campaigns to flood public spaces with pro or anti-government messages, as well as alarmist claims about the policies that would follow the victory of competing political parties. Recent media reports have included purported leaked documents allegedly originating either from Russian or Armenian sources, detailing propaganda strategies, coordinated information campaigns, and political risk assessments concerning both government and opposition actors. At the same time, the information environment has become increasingly saturated with manipulative and often unverifiable content disseminated across social media platforms, Telegram channels, and online media outlets. This includes misleading narratives, selectively edited materials, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and suspected AI-generated or AI-manipulated content targeting both the ruling party and opposition figures alike. While the authenticity and credibility of some of these reports and materials have been factually contested, they nevertheless continue to shape the broader electoral environment and political discourse.
A number of civil society groups expressed particular concern about a Russian government plot to bribe and pressure Armenian voters in Russia to travel to Armenia to vote for the “Strong Armenia” party, which the ruling party accuses of being backed by the Russian government. Armenia ’s Foreign Intelligence Service first issued claims about this plot on March 10, 2026, stating that Russia’s Federal Security Service was pressuring Armenian businessmen to pay 80,000 Armenian voters to travel to Armenia to support Strong Armenia. Civil Contract officials linked the allegations to the “Strong Armenia” party and its leader, Samvel Karapetyan.
At least one civil society group monitoring the elections said they had independently documented 80 cases of Armenians in Armenia reporting that their relatives in Russia were being offered transport, promised assistance getting Russian passports, and subjected to pressure to travel to Armenia to vote for the Strong Armenia Party. However, IODA did not receive any direct evidence of such a plot and in particular any evidence linking such a plot to the Russian government.
U.S. and European officials have also weighed in on the election in Armenia, publicly endorsing Pashinyan. Most recently, on May 28, President Donald Trump issued a tweet strongly endorsing him. Likewise, during the EPC Summit in Yerevan, earlier in May, French President Emmanuel Macron openly acknowledged and defended his political support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, stating during a press conference that he “undertakes this support” and openly backs Pashinyan and his political course.
“The elections are taking place in a challenging environment of claims and counterclaims of foreign interference and manipulation, but little discussion about the domestic platforms and plans each party will offer the country if elected,” said Philippe Kalfayan, IODA Board Member. “What will matter most to voters is what Armenia’s newly elected government delivers to the people who live here, including respecting their civil and political rights, and defending national values and dignity.”
IODA is an independent, ad hoc analytical body that observes, documents, and assesses political and institutional developments relevant to democratic governance and civic space in Armenia. The Initiative does not conduct formal election monitoring or endorse political actors, and its mandate is distinct from accredited domestic and international observation missions. Guided by the principles of independence, non-partisanship, evidence-based analysis, and transparency, IODA provides objective, verified assessments through direct engagement and constructive dialogue with local stakeholders. Read more by clicking here.
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The opposition will take to the streets, Pashinyan will send his guards to arrest people
June: 2, 2026
If Armenia became economically and energetically dependent on Azerbaijan, which, in fact, Nikol Pashinyan is leading with his current policy, it may end with the absorption of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey and the destruction of Armenian statehood. 168 TVof Revue on the air of the program Aram Abrahamyan, editor-in-chief of “Aravot” daily, public speaker spoke about the National Assembly elections to be held on Sunday, possible post-election developments, manipulation of the Russian factor and threats to Armenia, stressing that Azerbaijan and Turkey remain the main threats to Armenia’s security.
The columnist of “Aravot” considers the approach of the current authorities that “Azerbaijan is the guarantor of Armenia’s security” to be more dangerous.
Aram Abrahamyan is skeptical that these authorities will succeed in replacing the Russian gas supplied to Armenia with Azerbaijani gas, because there is no infrastructure, but if it comes to that, the Republic of Armenia will eventually suffer the same fate that happened to the Armenian Artsakh in 2023.
“Azerbaijan can close the gas valve at any time.” You become dependent on the country that wants to absorb you, that wants to destroy Armenian statehood. If this continues, sooner or later we will actually join Azerbaijan and Turkey,” commented Aram Abrahamyan.
The interlocutor also makes remarkable predictions about the results of the parliamentary elections and possible post-election developments, noting that Nikol Pashinyan’s electorate and support among the population has clearly decreased.
The respected columnist calls on all conscious people to simply recall what Pashinyan and his teammates promised in the 2021 elections and what they are doing now. Remembering his editorial experience and the elections held in Armenia in the previous decades, the editor-in-chief of “Aravot” believes that Nikol Pashinyan will not manage to stay in Armenia for a third term, as the previous leaders of the country did not.
«I think that no one will manage to stay in Armenia for a third term, because people’s patience is running outAram Abrahamyan thinks.
The editor-in-chief of “Aravot” draws attention to the obvious election violations and anti-democratic processes that are already being recorded, the abuse of power and administrative resources by Pashinyan’s team, the persecution of oppositionists and the distribution of actual election bribes. Abrahamyan is convinced that if there are elections held under conditions of fair and equal competition, then Pashinyan’s party will not get a constitutional majority in the parliament. He considers the possibility of CP to get even a simple majority doubtful, but adds that in any case, Pashinyan will not give up his power just like that.
“I think that Pashinyan does not have the support that he had in 2021, and this support has also decreased because his main competitor is not Kocharyan. now there are also Samvel Karapetyan, Tsarukyan, Tatoyan, and if people have any awareness, then they should remember what they promised in 2021 and what they are doing now. Support has dwindled. I cannot say with percentages, but I can say with certainty that if there are fair elections, Pashinyan will not get a constitutional majority. He might get a simple majority, but that is also doubtful, therefore, he has to take some steps that are illegal, to draw numbers, to incite disagreements or by other means, because it is clear that Pashinyan will not give up his power just like that. Right now, the election campaign is not going on in fair and equal conditions, because opposition figures, opposition activists from “Strong Armenia” and other parties are constantly being arrested, that is, CP and opposition parties are not on equal terms. I don’t know if Macron or Ursula notice it or not,” the interlocutor says.
The editor-in-chief of “Aravot” predicts the following possible development, that if CP succeeds in getting 51 percent of the votes, the opposition forces will go to the streets, and then Pashinyan will send his “guards”, they will break people’s heads and announce: “The Russians wanted to stage a coup d’état and change the elected government.”
However, according to Aram Abrahamyan, the good news is that the regime formed by violence and lies will not be able to keep its power for long.
“The good news is that the government formed by such violence and lies cannot survive for 5 years. We already have this experience. such a government becomes very dependent on power structures, international structures and will not be able to hold power for long”– thinks Aram Abrahamyan.
In this context, he also refers to foreign interventions in Armenia’s political processes, distinguishing the open support of Western countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan to Pashinyan and Russia’s approaches. According to Aram Abrahamyan, Trump, Fidan, Macron say. “Pashinyan is our boy”, but Russia did not make such a statement that Moscow supports this or that candidate.
However, Aram Abrahamyan records that Russia is exerting pressure on Armenia, not so much with the aim of Pashinyan not remaining in power, but to make Pashinyan do what they want.
«It’s not like Trump, Fidan, Macron say that Pashinyan is our boy. Russians do not say that so-and-so is their candidate. I have not heard such an official statement from Russia. They are putting pressure on Pashinyan, knowing his character and reacting a little to the meeting of the leaders of European countries, the actual enemies of Russia, in Yerevan. But on the other hand, it is not the case that Pashinyan will not do what Russia says if he has to keep his seat. Armenia can become a Russian province during Pashinyan’s rule“, the interlocutor mentioned.
Aram Abrahamyan believes that Russia will continue to exert pressure on Armenia, regardless of the outcome of the elections, and it is not Nikol Pashinyan or Alen Simonyan who suffer, but the Armenian peasants and businessmen. According to Abrahamyan, the “real perashki eaters” – ordinary people – will suffer, and the authorities, who are dollar millionaires, pretend that they are “perashki” eaters, they have come out of the “people’s lap”.
“If you came out of the people’s bosom, then be kind enough to answer the people with your heart, not like this. If you say to someone, even the most recent criminal. “Why didn’t you die, why didn’t you die?” that is, “I prefer you to die”, then you cannot be a democrat,” the publicist added.
Speaking about Azerbaijan’s territorial demands towards Armenia and the readiness of the current government of Armenia to fulfill Azerbaijan’s demands, Aram Abrahamyan mentioned the following. “Pashinyan says that the issue of Tigranashen will be resolved as a result of border demarcation. I am terrified. What does that mean? Suppose we took Artsvashen and gave them Tigranashen, is that equal? Tigranashen is located on our North-South road, they can block that road at any time. I am horrified when they say such things. So, Azerbaijani narratives repeat themselves»։
Full interview in the video.
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