EuroVoix
June 3 2026
Eurovision Young Musicians
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The Kremlin explained the fate of Armenian cognac
Eurasia Daily
June 5 2026
The Kremlin explained the fate of Armenian cognac
Boris Titov, special Representative of the President of Russia for relations with international organizations, on the sidelines of the SPIEF said that the Russian market will be able to replace Armenian cognacs in case of any restrictions on their import. Details are provided by TASS.
According to Titov, our country will find an alternative without any problems, while Armenia will obviously suffer significant losses.
“Russia will definitely survive,” said Titov, who is also the owner of the Abrau-Durso group of companies.
At the end of May, the Rosselkhoznadzor imposed temporary restrictions on the import of a number of agricultural products from Armenia. First, fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, greens and strawberries were banned, then cherries, cherries, apricots, peaches, plums, nectarines and grapes. Later, the list was supplemented with seed crops, eggplants, potatoes and dried fruits. Cognac, it seems, is next in line.
More details: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/06/05/the-kremlin-explained-the-fate-of-armenian-cognac
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Turkish Press: Armenians’ choice may set course of ties with Türkiye
Daily Sabah, Turkey
June 5 2026
June 5 2026
Armenians’ choice may set course of ties with Türkiye
by Emine Gider
Armenians head to the polls Sunday in a closely watched election that could determine the future of normalization efforts with Türkiye and Azerbaijan while shaping the country’s geopolitical orientation between Russia and the West, experts say
Armenia on Sunday will hold parliamentary elections, the first since Azerbaijan’s Karabakh victory under incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and a crucial vote in which the nation will also decide on the tone of rapprochement with Türkiye.
Like its neighbor Türkiye, Armenia looks to balance alignments with Asia and the West. At Sunday’s parliamentary elections, the Caucasus country may test this balance, as well as its normalization with Türkiye. It will be the first election for the prime minister since Azerbaijan retook Karabakh in a decisive 2023 military victory and a vote that will follow a growing pace of rapprochement with Ankara. Experts argue that Armenia’s upcoming elections have the potential to reshape political dynamics in the Caucasus, making them a matter of strategic importance for regional and international stakeholders.
“Armenia’s upcoming elections have the potential to influence the strategic balance in the South Caucasus,” Sinan Demirtürk, an assistant professor at Gazi University and the chair of the Türkiye Policy and Strategic Research Foundation (TURPAV), told Daily Sabah.
Armenia is counting down to parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7 as the country continues efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The election will determine Armenia’s next prime minister.
Armenian voters are set to head to the polls on Sunday to elect a new parliament and next prime minister.
According to Demirtürk, Armenia has historically been positioned as a military and political partner of first the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union in the region.
“From a historical perspective, Armenia has long been integrated into Russia’s geopolitical strategy in the South Caucasus,” he said, arguing that Moscow continues to view Armenia as a key component of its regional security architecture, making Armenian elections an issue with implications extending beyond domestic politics.
The election is taking place amid ongoing debates over Armenia’s foreign policy orientation, including discussions about reducing dependence on Russia and deepening engagement with the West. Political observers say the vote could mark a turning point for the country’s future direction.
One of the factors drawing significant attention to Armenia’s parliamentary elections is Pashinyan. Known for his active use of social media, Pashinyan has remained at the center of public debate due to his efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as well as his outspoken statements and political initiatives.
While widely regarded as the frontrunner in the race, Pashinyan is also among the most heavily criticized political figures in the country. He has advocated both the normalization of ties with Türkiye and Azerbaijan and closer relations with Western countries.
“The outcome of the elections will not only affect Armenia’s internal political trajectory but could also have broader consequences for regional dynamics, particularly relations involving Russia, Azerbaijan and other actors in the South Caucasus,” Demirtürk noted.
Armenian voters will choose among 17 political parties and two electoral alliances in a parliamentary election widely viewed as a test of the country’s future geopolitical orientation, as debates continue over closer ties with either Russia or the West.
Pashinyan and his ruling Civil Contract Party remain the frontrunners, according to recent opinion polls. However, analysts say that even if Pashinyan’s party finishes first, it may fall short of securing enough votes to govern alone.
One of Pashinyan’s main challengers is Russian Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who leads the Strong Armenia alliance.
Drawing attention to the normalization of trade, transportation and border cooperation between Türkiye and Armenia while addressing long-standing historical and political disputes through bilateral agreements, “The goal is to create a more stable framework for border security and regional logistics,” Demirtürk said.
Such developments could further reduce Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, particularly following Azerbaijan’s victory in the Karabakh conflict and the changing regional security environment, according to Demirtürk.
“The concern in Moscow is that deeper regional integration could gradually diminish Russia’s military and political leverage in the region.”
Recent normalization efforts mark the most active and tangible phase since the 1990s in Turkish-Armenian relations, which have long been at a minimum. As of early May, the process has moved toward frequent diplomatic contacts and a focus on confidence-building measures, including direct technical projects such as the joint restoration of the ancient Ani Bridge, which stands on the border between the two.
Demirtürk remarked that a victory by Pashinyan could accelerate ongoing regional normalization efforts and expand transportation and trade connectivity across the South Caucasus.
“If Pashinyan remains in power, agreements reached between Armenia and its neighbors could pave the way for new transit routes linking Türkiye with Central Asia,” he stressed.
Türkiye and Armenia have signed a deal for the joint restoration of the ancient Ani Bridge on the border during a visit in May by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz to Yerevan. Yılmaz was the highest-ranking official since former President Abdullah Gül to visit Armenia. His visit is more significant, though, as Yerevan and Ankara explore more ways to further cooperation and eventually, fully normalize their relations.
“In that context, Armenia could become an important transit hub alongside projects such as the proposed Zangezur Corridor, particularly through the development of road and railway infrastructure.”
He also said greater regional connectivity could contribute to broader social and political normalization among countries in the region.
“Improved transportation links and economic integration would likely be accompanied by a gradual easing of tensions and increased people-to-people contact.”
Since 2020, Türkiye and Armenia have held a string of talks at various levels to explore the way forward in relations. Most recently, delegations from the two sides met in Kars of eastern Türkiye to discuss the revival of a railway between the two neighbors.
Earlier, direct passenger and cargo flights were launched mutually. Ankara and Yerevan also approved the opening of the Alican border crossing to citizens of third countries and diplomatic passport holders. Before Yılmaz’s visit, Pashinyan met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last June in Istanbul.
Azerbaijan, Armenia affairs
The process aimed at achieving lasting peace and normalizing relations between South Caucasus countries Azerbaijan and Armenia is set to continue in 2026, building on concrete diplomatic, political and economic steps taken over the past year
The year 2025 marked a period of intensified engagement between the two former Soviet nations, with contacts expanding from political dialogue to confidence-building measures on the ground.
A major breakthrough came on Aug. 8, when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan met in Washington under U.S. mediation and signed a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to ending decades of conflict. On the same occasion, the foreign ministers of both countries initialed a peace agreement, underscoring a shared determination to advance toward full normalization.
Pointing out the cruciality of Armenia’s upcoming elections that are being closely observed by both global powers and regional actors, “As for Azerbaijan, Baku continues to adhere to the fundamental principles of international law and does not interfere in Armenia’s internal affairs,” Najiba Mustafayeva, an assistant professor at the Bahçeşehir University, stated.
“However, the prospect of revanchist opposition forces coming to power is viewed as a potential threat to the peace process,” she continued.
“The future of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace agreement will be shaped to a large extent by the outcome of the elections,” Mustafayeva warned.
She underlined that some opposition groups have campaigned on revisiting the terms of the peace agreement initialed by the parties in Washington last year and have sought to revive rhetoric surrounding the now-resolved Karabakh issue.
“From Baku’s perspective, attempts to reopen discussions on the Karabakh question or renegotiate the framework of the peace agreement could undermine regional stability and complicate efforts to achieve a lasting settlement between the two countries.”
Sargis Khandanyan, a member of the ruling Civil Contract Party and chair of the Armenian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, recently said that his party would seek to advance the signing and ratification of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan while maintaining existing economic cooperation initiatives.
Khandanyan also condemned incidents involving the burning of Turkish and Azerbaijani flags in Yerevan.
“There can be no more absurd way of delivering a political or diplomatic message to a country than by burning its flag,” he said.
“The peace process currently underway reflects a convergence of interests between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” Mustafayeva noted.
“For Baku, the most important issue is the extent to which Armenia continues to adhere to the peace agenda, and the elections are expected to provide a clearer indication of that commitment.”
Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have taken steps aimed at fostering mutual trust. Azerbaijan eased restrictions on cargo destined for Armenia, contributing to the functioning of regional trade and transportation routes. The launch of Azerbaijani oil exports to Armenia was recorded as a notable milestone in economic relations and a shift toward pragmatic cooperation.
According to Demirtürk, if Pashinyan remains in power, ongoing bilateral agreements could further strengthen regional connectivity and expand Armenia’s role as a transit route.
The country could become an increasingly important transportation hub alongside the proposed Zangezur Corridor, with the potential development of new road and railway links facilitating trade and movement across the region.
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Elections in Armenia: Between East and West
Italy – June 5 2026
by Vladimir Rozanskij
The vote on 7 June in Yerevan is set to resolve the turbulent domestic political situation, either ushering in a new phase oriented towards Europe or bringing the country back under Russian control, whilst seeking to avert civil war between the various factions of the Armenian people. Meanwhile, the current Prime Minister Pashinyan has indicated that he intends to meet Putin immediately after the vote.
Yerevan (AsiaNews) – Armenia is set to go to the polls on Sunday 7 June for parliamentary elections that are being watched very closely, not only within its borders. The country has in fact long been torn by a bitter divide between its current leadership, which looks to the West, and its opponents who criticise its handling of negotiations with Azerbaijan and – more generally – the cooling of historic relations with Moscow.
On the eve of the election, the current Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – the favourite in the polls – has announced that he intends to meet Vladimir Putin immediately after the vote, in a meeting agreed during a recent telephone conversation on the occasion of Pashinyan’s birthday on 1 June, during which “various outstanding issues” were discussed. Previously, the Russian president had made statements suggesting that, should Armenia pursue integration with the EU, it would then have to terminate its free trade agreement with Russia, repeal documents relating to technical regulations and phytosanitary standards, and forfeit other benefits granted to the country by virtue of its membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Previously, the Russian side had warned Armenia of a possible termination of the 2013 gas agreement, and the agency Rosselkhoznadzor had consequently begun restricting the supply of Armenian products to Russia. At the same time, several Armenian imports into Russia – including fruit, vegetables and alcohol – were blocked, on the grounds of ‘inadequate health standards’, after Putin himself had pointed out that ‘Armenia’s GDP depends on trade with Russia’.
Putin’s threats were accompanied by various statements from senior figures in Moscow’s political establishment, such as those by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov regarding the “possible development of the situation in Armenia along the lines of that in Ukraine”, where conflict had erupted in 2014 precisely because of the Ukrainians’ desire to forge economic agreements with the European Union. Yerevan has in fact expressed a desire to integrate with Europe, whilst still being a member of the EAEU, and this choice could provoke a reaction similar to that which led to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The tension with Russia mirrors that within Armenia itself, a country historically very close to Moscow, due to its defence against Turkish claims following the genocide of the early 20th century. All of Armenia’s leaders have always been heavily dependent on the Kremlin, whilst Pashinyan had, from his youth, opposed the leadership in Yerevan, which he accused of corruption. In 1999, he spent a year in prison for refusing to pay a fine of around ,000, imposed for criticism in the newspaper he founded, Oragir, of the then foreign minister Serzh Sargsyan, who later became president of the republic between 2008 and 2018, after serving as prime minister.
Having become one of the main figures of the opposition, Pashinyan organised protests following the referendum imposed by Sargsyan to extend his term of office further, eventually becoming prime minister in 2018 with the new Civil Agreement party. Over the past eight years, he has therefore sought to free Armenia from its dependence on Russia, and has had to deal with the crisis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, which had been dragging on since the early post-Soviet years. After 44 days of war, during which Russia refused to intervene, effectively facilitating the Azerbaijani military campaign, an armistice was signed with Baku in November 2020, without ever reaching a genuine peace agreement.
Now the chickens are coming home to roost: Pashinyan has now re-established a constructive relationship with Azerbaijan, breaking away entirely from Russia and taking advantage of US mediation, which envisages the opening of the ‘Trump Peace Corridor’ as a final solution that would effectively exclude the Russians from the trade routes of the South Caucasus. The Armenian Apostolic Church, led by its Catholicos Karekin II, has taken a stand against the Prime Minister; the Prime Minister would like to see him resign on grounds of “immorality” and corruption, and the Church is represented by the pro-Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, leader of the opposition to the government. Sunday’s vote is set to resolve the turbulent situation, either ushering in a new phase of Armenian politics oriented towards Europe or bringing the country back under Russia’s control, whilst seeking to avert civil war between the various factions of the Armenian people.
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Nikol Pashinyan: Drummer PM steering Armenia away from Russia
The New Indian Express
June 5 2026
June 5 2026
Nikol Pashinyan: Drummer PM steering Armenia away from Russia
When war with Azerbaijan erupted in 2020 over the breakaway region of Karabakh, the then polished politician with a soft handshake and a bashful smile transformed almost overnight into a bellicose military leader.
AFP
YERAVANA: Armenia’s drum-playing social-media-savvy leader Nikol Pashinyan, on course for re-election on Sunday, has spent years navigating a fraught balancing act between Russia and the West, drawing accusations of creeping authoritarianism while in office.
The 51-year-old ex-journalist rose to power on the back of a 2018 peaceful street revolution and has built much of his political appeal on a carefully cultivated image of accessibility.
For supporters, Pashinyan remains the same man of 2018: the maverick who walked hundreds of kilometres across Armenia to challenge a corrupt post-Soviet elite, sleeping in the open and speaking to crowds from benches, rooftops and courtyards.
“For me, the most important change that occurred is that the government and the people of Armenia love each other,” he told voters during the campaign, saying Sunday’s election should become “the day of victory for our love.”
But, eight years on from the revolution, the mood around Pashinyan is divided.
When war with Azerbaijan erupted in 2020 over the breakaway region of Karabakh, the then polished politician with a soft handshake and a bashful smile transformed almost overnight into a bellicose military leader.
He regularly addressed the nation on television with impassioned war cries, calling on Armenians to “unite and break the enemy’s backbone” and saying there can be no diplomatic solution to the conflict.
Two military defeats later, Karabakh lost and hosting 100,000 ethnic Armenian refugees, Pashinyan now portrays himself as the only man who can secure long-term peace.
The conflict also pushed him to look for new allies, loosening Armenia’s dependence on traditional backer Moscow — angering the Kremlin — while deepening ties with the EU and the United States.
Polls suggest Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party has a comfortable lead.
Authoritarian methods
Before coming to power, Pashinyan was a seasoned campaigner against the country’s Russia-friendly leadership.
He spent more than a year in hiding after being accused of provoking riots following the 2008 presidential election, when 10 people died in clashes between police and supporters of the defeated opposition candidate.
He surrendered in 2009, was jailed until 2011, and then elected to parliament the next year.
Activists and analysts say Pashinyan’s record in office has not been the clean-cut democratic reformer many imagined in 2018.
Critics accuse him of using the courts, police and bureaucracy to pressure his opponents — including the powerful Armenian church.
“The state of democracy in Armenia can be described as a gradual transition from populism to authoritarian methods of governance,” said analyst Gevorg Pogosyan.
“The prisons are overcrowded with people persecuted for their political views,” said another analyst, Vigen Hakobyan.
Pashinyan has compared opposition leaders to “mafia bosses” who “should work in penal colonies.”
‘I love you’
On the campaign trail, he has travelled on a bus across Armenia, stopping to greet supporters with his trademark phrase: “Hello, beloved people. So, how are you, how are things?”
Between stops, he broadcasts live from the bus, showing himself eating local snacks — part of a constant stream of social media content aimed at showing he has not retreated behind the walls of power.
“I love all of you,” he recently wrote on Instagram, celebrating that his videos — often showing him just sitting in his office with popular music in the background — had racked up 100 million views.
This year he formed a band, in which he plays the drums — holding concerts in Yerevan and out in the country to loyal supporters.
In a display of performative diplomacy in May, Pashinyan picked up the sticks as visiting French President Emmanuel Macron took to the microphone to sing a power ballad by French-Armenian singer Charles Aznavour.
The made-for-TV moment was a clear sign of who Europe wants to stay in power.
Born in 1975 in the northern town of Ijevan, Pashinyan studied journalism at Yerevan State University in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
He was expelled — he says for his political activity, though the university said for absences.
In previous campaigns, he brandished a hammer as a symbol of political confrontation.
This time, hand hearts have become his emblem.
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The hidden front: How disinformation is targeting Armenian voters
France 24
June 5 2026
June 5 2026
The hidden front: How disinformation is targeting Armenian voters
On the ground
Issued on: 05/06/2026 – 11:04
Share
One ballot box, two competing battles: In Armenia, voters are heading to the polls to decide the future direction of their country. But beneath the political campaigns lies a far more insidious warfare. Analysts warn that a massive, coordinated network of foreign disinformation – much of it tracing back to Russia – is systematically weaponising the deep-seated trauma of recent wars. FRANCE 24’s team on the ground reports.
Video by:
Taline OUNDJIAN
Olivia BIZOT
Watch the video at
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Elections Amidst Tension: Armenia’s Political Turmoil
DevDiscourse
June 6 2026
Six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party were arrested before the elections, spotlighting Armenia’s complex relations with Russia. The arrests reflect internal tensions as the nation navigates its foreign alliances, with the ruling party leading in polls. The election tests peace initiatives with Azerbaijan and highlights Russian influence claims.
Key Takeaways
AI Summary
- Armenian authorities detained six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party just a day before the elections.
- The arrests target the party led by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is under house arrest facing charges of inciting governmental overthrow.
- The elections are seen as a test of Armenia’s diplomatic balance between Moscow and the West amid Russian export restrictions.
- Polls show Prime Minister Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party leading, while civil society groups express concerns over potential Russian disinformation campaigns.
In a dramatic electoral twist, Armenian authorities detained six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party just a day before the pivotal elections, as state media reported. The surprising arrests were made without public reasons, targeting a party under billionaire Samvel Karapetyan’s leadership, who himself faces charges.
Karapetyan, placed under house arrest for allegedly inciting governmental overthrow, denies the accusations as politically charged. The elections emerge as a litmus test of Armenia’s diplomatic balance between Moscow and the West, with Russia imposing export restrictions in response to Yerevan’s evolving Western ties.
Polls indicate Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party holds a lead over Strong Armenia. Civil society groups have voiced concerns over potential Russian disinformation campaigns, while Armenian authorities, including the Central Election Commission, approved legal proceedings against the detained candidates.
(With inputs from agencies.)
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Armenia Vote Could Reshape Ties With Moscow, West
Newsmax
June 6 2026
Armenia’s parliamentary elections Sunday will be a vote on its geopolitical future as incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan seeks closer relations with the European Union and the United States despite longstanding ties with Russia that have been championed by his critics.
Many analysts favor Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party to retain control of the parliament, but with many opposition parties running on pro-Russia platforms, the Caucasus nation’s place on the international stage has been thrown into the spotlight.
In the months ahead of the election, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have warned Armenia that joining the EU could come at the expense of massive economic damage by disrupting Armenian trade ties with Moscow and its allies.
“These are the first elections in Armenia’s history where geopolitical orientation has become a decisive issue,” Mikayel Zolyan, an analyst and former member of the Armenian Parliament, told The Associated Press from Yerevan.
“Until now, Armenia has remained within Russia’s sphere of influence, and this was taken for granted, but now, for the first time, this is being called into question,” Zolyan said.
Relations between Moscow and Armenia soured in 2023 after Azerbaijan took control of the entire Karabakh region.
The mountainous region had been controlled for decades by ethnic Armenian forces backed by Armenia, part of a long conflict between the neighboring countries.
Armenian authorities accused Russian peacekeepers deployed to the region of failing to stop Azerbaijan’s onslaught.
Moscow, busy with the conflict in Ukraine, has rejected the accusations, arguing its troops didn’t have a mandate to intervene.
“It turned out that Russia’s image as a guarantor of Armenian security was not based in reality, and it all collapsed after the Karabakh war,” said Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan.
Pashinyan has begun cautiously weakening ties with Moscow, joining the International Criminal Court in 2023 and suspending its participation in the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2024.
Armenia also officially declared its aspirations to join the EU and hosted the European Political Community summit in Yerevan in early May.
A convincing win in the parliamentary vote would give Pashinyan a mandate to continue the trend and finalize a deal with Azerbaijan.
Western nations have sought to show some of the advantages that closer ties could bring.
In August, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to sign an agreement declaring an end to their decades-long hostilities and including provisions for the creation of a new transit corridor between Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan.
An agreement in February could pave the way for a U.S. company to build a new nuclear reactor in Armenia.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also has said that Europe is ready to invest in Armenia’s energy industry and its “booming digital scene.”
Trump has endorsed Pashinyan and called him a “great friend” and a leader who is making his country “strong, wealthy, and very secure!”
Much of Armenia’s opposition is still dominated by pro-Russia groups and many are also against normalizing relations with Azerbaijan.
Key opposition figures have called for Pashinyan to stand down over the loss of Karabakh.
Nineteen political forces, including two blocs and 17 parties, are taking part in the elections.
Pashinyan’s main rival is the Strong Armenia Party, which wants closer business ties with Russia and accuses Pashinyan of attempting to spark a war with Moscow.
The party is led by Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is on trial for calling for the overthrow of Armenia’s government. He denies the charges.
Other potential contenders include former President Robert Kocharyan, who leads the Hayastan bloc and has accused Pashinyan of “seriously undermining” relations with Russia.
Russia, which has a military base in Armenia, has warned that Yerevan’s Western turn could have dire political and economic consequences.
Putin has compared Armenia’s course to that of Ukraine in thinly veiled threats and has suggested Russia’s conflict with Ukraine started with its attempts to join the EU.
In recent weeks, Russia has introduced new restrictions on Armenian produce after citing sanitation violations, banning Armenian flowers, certain types of cognac and wine, eggplants, potatoes, dried fruits, fish, and more.
Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian-led customs union, was placed under formal review during a members’ meeting in Kazakhstan in May, with threats to suspend it completely by December.
During the Kazakhstan summit, the governments of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan also demanded Armenia hold a referendum on whether it would remain in their group or seek EU membership.
Pashinyan has rejected the need for such a vote.
Armenian government statistics show 38% of Armenia’s exports went to countries within the Eurasian Economic Union in 2025, the vast majority heading to Russia.
In comparison, just 8% of trade went to the EU.
The Russian measures prompted von der Leyen to announce Thursday that the 27-nation bloc would send 50 million euros ($58 million) to support Armenia.
In a statement, she said Russia is “weaponizing” economic relations and its ban on imports was “nothing short of economic coercion.”
Russia could exert further pressure on Armenia because it controls a significant portion of the country’s energy and infrastructure and supplies cheap gas.
“It’s completely unrealistic to say that Armenia can somehow overcome Russian influence in a short period of time,” analyst Zolyan said.
Armenia’s civil society also is concerned by what they have described as Russian-backed disinformation campaigns ahead of the vote. Moscow denies any interference.
Daniel Ionnisyan, head of the Union of Informed Citizens, an independent election watchdog, told the AP that his organization has documented instances of Russian interference through social media campaigns, cyberattacks, vote buying, and bribery of journalists.
That echoes findings of a delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which visited Yerevan in May and said foreign interference included illicit political financing, cyberattacks, economic coercion, and direct attempts to manipulate the electoral process.
“These hybrid tactics aim not only to sway public opinion but to secure long-term geopolitical leverage over Armenia,” the delegation said.
Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.
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In Armenia, the CEC refused to remove the main pro-Russian bloc from elections
Nasha Niva
June 6 2026
June 6 2026
In Armenia, the CEC refused to remove the main pro-Russian bloc from elections
On June 6, the Central Election Commission of Armenia, a day before the parliamentary elections, refused to remove the opposition bloc “Strong Armenia”, led by the Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. This was reported by the Armenian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Radio Azatutyun).
Rally of “Strong Armenia” in Yerevan. Photo: Sputnik
The pro-European “Republic” party filed a statement regarding the disqualification of the political bloc. Its representatives cited criminal cases related to alleged voter bribery and concealment of property interests during the election campaign.
In turn, representatives of “Strong Armenia” rejected all accusations, calling them baseless. According to them, no proven violations of electoral law were presented.
After a two-hour review, the CEC unanimously rejected the demand to annul the bloc’s registration. The commission stated that the arguments presented by supporters of “Strong Armenia”‘s removal were based mainly on assumptions and did not provide sufficient grounds for such a decision.
Nevertheless, legal problems persist around “Strong Armenia” ahead of the elections. It is reported that six candidates from the bloc were arrested on charges of money laundering and other offenses. Furthermore, a criminal case was initiated against Narek Karapetyan, the leader of the election list, who is accused of concealing Russian citizenship.
Parliamentary elections in Armenia will take place on June 7. The main opponent of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party is the “Strong Armenia” bloc, which advocates for closer ties with Russia and emphasizes the importance of economic and military cooperation between the two countries.
In recent years, Armenia has been actively developing relations with the European Union. In early 2025, the country’s authorities launched a process related to potential EU membership. However, the Armenian leadership still emphasizes that an official application for accession has not yet been submitted, and the question of a referendum on this topic is not yet on the agenda.
Against the backdrop of the election campaign, the European Commission previously expressed concern about possible attempts of external influence on political processes in Armenia. In turn, the leadership of the European Union declared its support for the country in its cooperation with European structures.
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Armenia’s ‘Trump Route’ Widens The Fault Line Between Washington, Tehran, and
Scheer Post
June 6 2026
Vali Kaleji for The Craddle
On the eve of Armenia’s crucial parliamentary elections on 7 June, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during a brief visit to Yerevan on 26 May, signed three highly significant agreements in a meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.
These included the “Framework Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the United States of America on Strategic Cooperation Concerning the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP),” the “Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Armenia and the United States,” and the “Republic of Armenia–United States of America Framework For Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths.”
Washington’s election-season endorsement
Rubio’s brief visit, which lasted only about an hour at Yerevan Airport, was a clear signal of US support for Nikol Pashinyan’s government ahead of Armenia’s pivotal parliamentary elections on 7 June.
Over the past several years, Pashinyan’s administration has gradually distanced itself from the Russian Federation and Moscow-led regional institutions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and, more recently, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while seeking closer ties with the EU, NATO, and the US.
In this context, the US secretary of state, who traveled to Yerevan two weeks before the elections, expressed strong support for Pashinyan and his team, stating: “You (Ararat Mirzoyan), the prime minister, and your team are paving the way to a brighter, more independent future for Armenia.”
US President Donald Trump also wrote in a post on Truth Social:
“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, of Armenia, a great friend and Leader, is making his Country strong, wealthy, and very secure! Nikol completely shares my vision of PEACE and PROSPERITY for Armenia and the entire South Caucasus region…. Nikol has my COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement for Re-Election on June 7, 2026.”
Armenia also hosted the Eighth Summit of the European Political Community on 23 May, which constituted another indication of western support for Pashinyan’s government.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such support will ultimately translate into an electoral victory for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party over its nationalist and conservative opponents. A recent example is Hungary, where the visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance to Budapest and his participation in an election rally alongside Prime Minister Viktor Orban failed to prevent Orban’s defeat in the parliamentary elections after 16 years in power.
The Trump Route takes shape
The three agreements signed during Rubio’s visit to Yerevan – particularly the TRIPP Agreement – should be viewed as a continuation and complement to the peace agreement signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan at the White House on 8 August, 2025, under the mediation of Trump.
Under that agreement, direct connectivity between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory was endorsed not under Baku’s preferred designation of the “Zangezur Corridor,” nor under Yerevan’s preferred concept of the “Crossroads of Peace,” but rather under a new title: the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), or simply the “Trump Route.”
The TRIPP Agreement, consisting of 11 articles, sets out the legal and operational framework governing this transit route. Pursuant to Articles 1 through 4, a joint venture known as the TRIPP Development Company (TDC) is to be established.
Under the agreement, 74 percent of the shares and controlling interest in the company will be held by US entities operating under the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), while Armenia will retain a 26 percent ownership stake.
Furthermore, under Article 6, Armenia commits to granting the joint venture exclusive land-use and development rights along the designated TRIPP implementation areas for an initial period of 49 years. The agreement also provides for a possible extension of an additional 50 years by mutual consent, in which case Armenia’s ownership stake in the TDC would increase to 49 percent.
Armenia has further undertaken to bear all financial costs associated with land acquisition and the removal of any encumbrances or third-party claims affecting the project areas. At the same time, the agreement explicitly affirms that the Republic of Armenia retains full sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legal and executive jurisdiction over all areas and projects associated with TRIPP within its sovereign territory.
The implementation of this agreement – much like the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the ongoing process of Armenia–Turkiye normalization – will depend heavily on the re-election of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party in the 7 June parliamentary elections. Should Armenia’s nationalist and conservative political forces emerge victorious, the political terrain could change significantly.
Strongly critical of Pashinyan’s policies regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, these nationalist and conservative groups maintain hardline positions toward both Azerbaijan and Turkiye. They have traditionally enjoyed closer relations with Iran and Russia while maintaining a cautious and carefully calibrated distance from the west.
Consequently, a change in government could have profound implications for the future of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, Armenia–Turkiye normalization, and the implementation of TRIPP.
Tehran Sees More Than a Corridor
It was therefore hardly surprising that, amid Armenia’s highly polarized and politically charged atmosphere in the run-up to the crucial parliamentary elections, Rubio’s unexpected and brief visit to Yerevan was met with strong criticism from opposition forces.
Opposition parties and political groups in Armenia argue that the large-scale “Trump Route” project is, in essence, the same transit corridor long sought by Azerbaijan under the name of the “Zangezur Corridor” and strongly supported by Ankara.
Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, leader of the influential Armenia Alliance, expressed deep concern over the strategic implications of the agreement, stating:
“I think that the ‘TRIPP’ project is a very strong propaganda move by the US, the aim of which is to create tension between Iran and Armenia, because after that, Tehran will definitely have distrust…This is also a ‘blow’ to Russia.”
In Iran, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid Baghaei also reacted to Rubio’s visit and the signing of the Trump Agreement, stating:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran’s position regarding security in the South Caucasus is clear and leaves no room for ambiguity. Iran welcomes the expansion of economic exchanges and the reopening of transportation and transit routes. However, given the United States’ long record of hostile conduct and intervention in various regions of the world, Iran harbors serious suspicions regarding Washington’s intentions and has explicitly expressed its opposition to any such destabilizing presence in the region.”
Although Iranian officials appear to have refrained from adopting a more explicit position at this stage – likely due to their understanding of Armenia’s sensitive electoral environment and a desire to avoid becoming directly involved in the country’s internal political rivalries – Iran, in strategic terms, sees little difference between the “Trump Route” and the “Zangezur Corridor” advocated by Azerbaijan and supported by Turkiye.
From Tehran’s perspective, both initiatives pursue objectives that extend well beyond the establishment of a mere transportation and transit link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory adjacent to Iran’s border.
Iranian policymakers believe that such projects could generate a number of significant security and geopolitical challenges, including potential risks to the 40-kilometer Iran–Armenia border, the Norduz (Iran) and Meghri (Armenia) border crossings and customs facilities, as well as the bilateral trade and transit network through which more than 80,000 trucks pass annually.
Moreover, there is little doubt that the implementation of the Trump Route, as part of the broader Middle Corridor and an emerging energy and transportation route linking Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus to Europe, would further accelerate Yerevan’s westward orientation.
Such a development could have far-reaching consequences, including Armenia’s eventual withdrawal from the CSTO and the EAEU. The cumulative effect of these developments could be a more profound shift in the geopolitical balance of the South Caucasus to the detriment of both Iran and Russia – a process that, in many respects, began with the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.
The 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran in June 2025 and the more recent 40-day war involving Israel and the US against Iran, from 28 February to 7 April 2026, have heightened Tehran’s sensitivity toward the Trump Route project and the prospective presence of US companies close to Iran’s northern border.
This concern is particularly pronounced given that, under the recently signed agreement, such a presence is not intended to be temporary. Rather, the arrangement envisages an initial concession period of 49 years, with the possibility of a further 50-year extension by mutual agreement, potentially resulting in a total duration of 99 years.
From Iran’s perspective, this would amount not merely to a transportation or infrastructure project, but to the establishment of a long-term American economic and strategic footprint in a highly sensitive geopolitical area adjacent to its borders.
For this reason, Kocharyan stated during his election campaign:
“Today, the United States is in a state of confrontation with Iran. Under such circumstances, how can anyone reasonably believe that handing control over the sensitive Armenia–Iran border area to an American company is a rational decision? Do you truly consider such a step normal and acceptable? How is Tehran expected to perceive and tolerate such an arrangement? I urge the authorities in Yerevan to place themselves, even for a moment, in Iran’s position and to view this security challenge from Tehran’s perspective.”
Moscow raises the cost
Russia’s response toward Armenia, however, has been noticeably sharper – at least at the present stage. Only a few days after Rubio’s visit, Moscow recalled its ambassador from Yerevan for consultations, citing the increasingly pro-western policies of the Pashinyan government.
In recent weeks, Russian officials have openly warned Armenia, particularly in connection with the possibility of its withdrawal from the EAEU, about potential consequences, including higher gas prices or the suspension of preferential energy arrangements, restrictions on imports of Armenian goods, limitations on the diamond and energy trade, and even a reassessment of certain areas of economic cooperation.
In essence, Moscow is concerned that its ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine may encourage Armenia – the only South Caucasus state that remains a member of both the EAEU and the CSTO – to leave these Russian-led institutions.
Given that neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan is a member of either organization, such a development would significantly diminish Russia’s economic, geopolitical, and military influence in the South Caucasus.
The implementation of the TRIPP Agreement and the construction of the Trump Route between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan face substantial political obstacles and will depend heavily on the outcome of Armenia’s 7 June parliamentary elections.
Should Armenia’s nationalist and conservative political forces prevail, the likelihood of the project being suspended or abandoned would be considerable.
Even if Pashinyan secures re-election, the implementation of the project is likely to provoke strong opposition from Iran and expose Armenia to potential retaliatory measures from Russia, particularly in the areas of natural gas exports and restrictions on Armenian imports.
Vali Kaleji is based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues and Iran’ foreign policy for Oxford Analytica in the UK, Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation, Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus (American Foreign Policy Council), the National Interest and the Middle East Institute in the United States, TRENDS Research & Advisory in the UAE, Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha, Qatar, and also Nikkei Asia.
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