A senior adviser to U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff met with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian in Yerevan on Wednesday for talks that focused on the planned creation of a U.S.-run transit corridor passing through Armenia.
The Armenian government gave few details of Pashinian’s talks with Aryeh Lightstone. It said they discussed unspecified “issues related to the implementation” of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project. The TRIPP would run along Armenia’s border with Iran and connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey.
The two men expressed confidence that “as a result of the resolution of technical issues, practical steps in that direction will be even more visible in the near future,” the government said in a statement. It did not elaborate.
Lighthouse held a separate meeting with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan earlier in the day. According to the Armenian Foreign Ministry, they both “emphasized their interest in implementing the project on the ground in the shortest possible time frame.” The U.S. Embassy in Yerevan issued no statement on the talks as of Wednesday evening.
Lighthouse was accompanied by Konstantin Sokolov, a Russian-born American entrepreneur who was recently appointed by the U.S. State Department as chairman of a $200 million fund tasked with facilitating the TRIPP. Sokolov has business interests in Armenia that include a major stake in one of the country’s three mobile phone operators.
A U.S.-Armenian agreement signed in early June calls for the creation of a joint venture that will manage for at least 49 years a railway, a road, energy supply lines and other infrastructure to be built along the corridor. The U.S. government will own 74 percent of the TRIPP Development Company (TDC) that will receive “exclusive land use rights, development rights, related permissions, and all other rights” necessary for the transit arrangement.
Iran remains opposed to the TRIPP, fearing that it could lead to U.S. security presence along the Armenian-Iranian border and undermine Armenian control of it. The Iranian ambassador to Armenia indicated on July 8 that Yerevan has still not addressed Tehran’s “very legitimate and logical” concerns. Pashinian made clear the following day that he remains committed to implementing the TRIPP project “as soon as possible.”
“We are ready to provide answers to all the questions preoccupying [Iran] so that all fears are dispelled,” he told reporters on July 30.
Levon Zurabian, an Armenian opposition leader who visited Tehran recently, said on July 26 that Iranian officials remain “very negative about the TRIPP.” Zurabian cited the unnamed officials as warning that “if we see it as a threat to our national security we will act the way we do in the Persian Gulf.”
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Government Seizure Of Tsarukian Asset Challenged In Court
- Naira Bulghadarian
A company owned by Gagik Tsarukian has asked an Armenian court to invalidate the expropriation of its large fitness center in Yerevan initiated by the municipal authorities amid a government crackdown on the jailed businessman and opposition leader.
Two days after Tsarukian’s arrest promised by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, the authorities unilaterally rescinded on July 8 a long-term lease agreement on land in the city center occupied by the Multi Wellness center. They went on to seize the property itself. Armenia’s State Committee for Real Estate Cadaster formally transferred its ownership to the municipality on July 14. The government agency gave no reason for the extraordinary decision.
The Multi Wellness management wants the court to annul both decisions described by it as illegal. Mayor Tigran Avinian’s office has so far declined to present legal grounds for the unprecedented asset confiscation. Avinian, who is a senior member of Pashinian’s Civil Contract party, has personally announced the seizure on social media.
Multi Wellness was among dozens of Tsarukian-owned firms raided and effectively shut down by law-enforcement officers on July 6. Later in July, courts allowed the Armenian government to take over the largest of them — a cement plant and a brandy distillery — pending verdicts on prosecutors’ demand to confiscate Tsarukian’s assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Pashinian pledged to nationalize the cement plant located in the southern town of Ararat when he campaigned for the June 7 parliamentary elections in which Tsarukian’s Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK) was one of the main opposition contenders. He has since repeatedly pledged to imprison and “dispossess” Tsarukian as well as the leaders of two other key opposition groups.
Tsarukian is accused of defrauding Iranian business partners. He strongly denies the accusations. The current executive director and a former chairman of his Multi Group holding company were arrested as part of the same criminal case on Wednesday.
Several other business executives working for the BHK leader were arrested earlier. They include the director of the Yerevan-based Ararat Brandy-Wine-Vodka Factory, who is facing tax evasion charges also levelled against Tsarukian.
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RFE/RL – Armenian Government Continues Foreign Borrowing
- Mkrtich Karapetian
The Armenian government is due to formally approve on Thursday $320 million in new foreign loans secured by it, adding to the country’s public debt that has more than doubled during Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s rule.
The government will mainly use the two long-term loans allocated by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to finance its budget deficit projected at 536 billion drams ($1.47 billion) this year. The deficit should fall to below 5 percent from 5.5 percent recorded last year.
The government and the Armenian Central Bank have already borrowed some $500 million since November. Their combined debt stood at roughly $6.5 billion when Pashinian came to power in 2018. It has reached $14.6 billion since then despite strong growth in tax revenue touted by the authorities.
The sharp increase has been driven by the government’s more expensive internal borrowing as opposed to low-interest loans provided by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. Armenian opposition figures regularly cite it in their criticism of the government’s economic policies.
Pashinian and other government officials have downplayed Armenia’s increased debt burden, arguing that it is equivalent to about half of Gross Domestic Product, down from 60 percent in 2021. The IMF forecast in 2025 that the debt-to-GDP ratio will rise in the coming years.
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Parliament Speaker outlines key threats to Armenia’s security
Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan has said that the threats to Armenia’s security include the fact that peace with Azerbaijan is not yet fully institutionalized, the closed border with Türkiye and the absence of diplomatic relations, as well as the insufficient diversification of the country’s economic, security, and energy ties.
Speaker Rubinyan made these remarks in parliament in response to a speech by Kristine Vardanyan, an MP from the opposition Armenia faction, and to her question regarding the sources of the current threats facing Armenia.
“Our threats come, first and foremost, from Azerbaijan. We have peace with Azerbaijan, but that peace is not yet irreversible and has not been fully institutionalized. In other words, the absence of comprehensive peace with Azerbaijan is unequivocally and indisputably a threat to the security of the Republic of Armenia,” Rubinyan said.
According to the Speaker, the closed border with Türkiye and the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries also constitute a threat.
“We face a threat from Türkiye because having a closed border with an immediate neighbor is, at the very least, an economic threat, while the absence of established diplomatic relations is, at the very least, a diplomatic threat,” Rubinyan said.
Rubinyan also listed the insufficient diversification of Armenia’s economic and security partnerships, energy supply sources, and transit routes among the country’s security vulnerabilities.
He said that the key difference between the government’s approach and that of the opposition is that the government seeks to neutralize these threats and find solutions to them.
“We recognize the threat and want to eliminate or neutralize it. We saw that there was no peace, and we achieved peace. Now we see that it is not yet irreversible and not 100 percent institutionalized, and we want to make it irreversible and institutionalize it,” Rubinyan said.
Addressing Armenia–Türkiye relations, he noted that Yerevan is working through negotiations to open the border and normalize bilateral relations.
“We see the closed border with Türkiye, and we recognize that it is a threat to our businesses and to Armenia in general. We are negotiating to reach a solution, and in the process we are moving forward step by step,” Rubinyan said.
Rubinyan criticized the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, arguing that the party does not seek to neutralize these threats but instead exploits them for political purposes.
According to Rubinyan, everyone in Armenia understands that unresolved relations with Türkiye and the lack of fully institutionalized peace with Azerbaijan are threats.
“There is no one in Armenia who does not understand that unresolved relations with Türkiye are a threat, or who does not understand that the absence of fully institutionalized peace with Azerbaijan is a threat,” he said.
Rubinyan also addressed Russia’s restrictions on imports of Armenian products, urging Kristine Vardanyan to clearly state her position on the issue.
He asked whether the opposition faction believes that Armenian products actually fail to meet the standards of the Eurasian Economic Union and whether, for example, the restrictions imposed on Jermuk mineral water are justified.
“If you believe that our products do not violate any standards, then please tell us: is it an act befitting a partner to impose economic restrictions on goods that comply with all standards? Are we not dealing with an act of pressure here, and does that pressure not itself pose a threat—for example, to our sovereignty?” Rubinyan asked.
The Speaker called on Kristine Vardanyan to provide direct and clear answers to these questions in her speech, emphasizing that discussing them constitutes a substantive political debate.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Central Bank of Armenia: exchange rates and prices of precious metals – 05-08-
The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 5 August, USD exchange rate down by 0.87 drams to 366.14 drams. EUR exchange rate up by 0.06 drams to 422.56 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate down by 0.0219 drams to 4.5041 drams. GBP exchange rate down by 0.21 drams to 493.12 drams.
The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.
Gold price up by 547 drams to 48078 drams.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Armenian PM receives Senior Adviser to U.S. Special Envoy for Peace Missions
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has received Aryeh Lightstone, Senior Adviser to the U.S. Special Envoy for Peace Missions.
According to the Information and Public Relations Department of the Prime Minister’s Office, Pashinyan highlighted the role of the United States, particularly that of President Donald Trump, in establishing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. He stressed that a stable and positive atmosphere had developed in the region since August 8, 2025.
Pashinyan also emphasised the importance of advancing the agreements reached and expressed satisfaction with the progress made in their implementation.
Lightstone conveyed congratulations from President Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Pashinyan’s reappointment as Prime Minister of Armenia.
He expressed confidence that, under Pashinyan’s leadership, Armenia would continue the consistent implementation of its priorities and take steps aimed at strengthening democracy.
The two sides discussed issues related to the implementation of the TRIPP project and expressed confidence that, once the technical issues are resolved, practical steps in this direction would become even more visible in the near future.
They also exchanged views on other issues of mutual interest.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Vahagn Aleksanyan elected Deputy Speaker of Parliament
Vahagn Aleksanyan, a lawmaker from the Civil Contract faction, has been elected Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia.
In a secret ballot, 62 lawmakers voted in favour of Aleksanyan’s candidacy, while 27 voted against.
Anna Grigoryan, leader of the Armenia faction, had previously announced that her faction would not participate in the vote.
The National Assembly has three deputy speakers, one of whom is nominated from among the opposition factions.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Fourteen railway wagons of wheat to be sent from Russia to Armenia via Azerbai
Fourteen railway wagons loaded with wheat will be sent from Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan.
According to APA, the wagons carrying the wheat will depart from Bilajari railway station on August 6.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Alen Simonyan congratulates newly elected members and leadership of Armenia’s
Former National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan has congratulated the newly elected members of Armenia’s ninth-convocation National Assembly, his colleagues from the Civil Contract faction, and the newly elected parliamentary leadership on their election.
He announced this in a post on his Facebook page.
“I wish you effective work for the benefit of the Republic of Armenia and the well-being of our people,” Simonyan wrote.
Ruben Rubinyan has been elected Speaker of the ninth-convocation National Assembly. Hayk Konjoryan and Vahagn Aleksanyan have been elected deputy speakers.
The National Assembly has three deputy speakers, one of whom is nominated from among the opposition factions. The opposition deputy speaker will be elected at the National Assembly’s sitting on August 6. The candidate is Aram Vardevanyan of the Strong Armenia faction.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Russia Lost Armenia. So Did Iran.
Au4 2026
Russia Lost Armenia. So Did Iran.
August 4, 2026
By: Kamran Bokhari
Armenia’s upcoming constitutional referendum could become a problem for Tehran, which would like to see Armenia and Azerbaijan at odds.
Russia’s bid to reassert its grip on the South Caucasus is failing—and the reverberations extend well beyond Moscow. Iran has all but lost its northern flank to a US-Turkey-Azerbaijan axis, and it has no answer. Even as they remain targets of Iranian attacks, the Arab Gulf states are increasingly eyeing the Trans-Caspian region as a lever of counter-pressure against the Islamic Republic. What was once a Russian and Iranian sphere of influence is fast becoming a corridor for their rivals.
The Ukrainian strike on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea on July 31 expanded Kyiv’s campaign beyond the battlefield by targeting the logistics underpinning the Russia-Iran partnership. By projecting force into the Caspian basin, Ukraine challenged what Moscow and Tehran regarded as a secure corridor for military cargo and dual-use goods.
More broadly, the incident underscored the growing convergence of the European and Middle Eastern theaters, as Iran’s support for Russia made it a more direct target of Ukrainian retaliation. The strike also raised the prospect that the Caspian Sea could become another contested arena linking the Ukraine War with the broader regional struggle involving Iran.
The Iranian regime’s information operations project an image of triumph—having nominally “survived” its confrontation with the United States and Israel—but the strategic picture tells a different story. Russia, badly weakened by the war, can no longer anchor the northern buffer Iran once relied upon, leaving the Islamic Republic’s northern flank dangerously exposed. To its south, hostility with the Gulf Arab states has reached unprecedented intensity, especially after the collapse of the June 17 Memorandum of Understanding, when Washington resumed airstrikes on Iran following Tehran’s July 8 attack on three tankers.
Since then, the United States has launched multiple rounds of strikes on Iran, steadily expanding its target set from military facilities to bridges, airports, and electrical infrastructure. Tehran has responded by widening the conflict itself—striking a power and desalination facility in Kuwait and hitting a military base in Jordan on July 17 that killed three US service members.
Iran’s Houthi proxies also fired missiles at Saudi Arabia on July 13 and launched its own ballistic missile at a US military base on July 17. The deteriorating security situation has drawn nuclear-armed Pakistan more directly into the crisis: Islamabad has warned Tehran that any further attacks on Saudi territory—whether by Iran or the Houthis—would trigger Pakistan’s obligations under the mutual defense pact it signed with Riyadh in 2025.
Adding to the tensions, Reuters reported on July 17 that Pakistan and Kuwait are discussing a broader defense partnership that could include troop deployments, fighter aircraft, and air defense cooperation in exchange for expanded energy ties and investment.
Confident messaging aside, Iran is being squeezed from every direction—and the outcome of Armenia’s June 7 national election is one more piece of that deteriorating picture. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s victory in the elections represents a clear popular rejection of his Kremlin-aligned opponents—and a significant failure for Moscow’s effort to install friendlier leadership in Yerevan. It is also, by extension, a defeat for Tehran, whose regional partnerships have relied heavily on the same axis of resistance to Western and Turkish influence that Pashinyan’s electorate just repudiated.
However, the election is a beginning, not an endpoint. What comes next will determine whether Armenia’s gradual westward drift becomes irreversible. It will also shape whether a durable peace with Azerbaijan finally takes hold. Just as importantly, it will test whether the United States can translate this moment into lasting influence in a region that Russia has long considered its backyard and that Iran has long counted on as a strategic landbridge. Washington and its Gulf allies should pay close attention and actively encourage Yerevan to move forward.
Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won roughly 49.8 percent of the vote, securing 64 seats in the new 105-seat National Assembly. While it retained its governing majority, Civil Contract lost seven of the 71 seats it previously held. The opposition immediately rejected the results, began mobilizing its supporters, and filed a legal challenge, which Armenia’s Constitutional Court rejected on July 4, upholding the results.
The process has unfolded against a delicate diplomatic backdrop. On July 6, Pashinyan made his first foreign trip since the election, traveling to Russia to meet Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Mishustin signaled that Moscow is watching the new government closely—a pointed reminder of the stakes given the campaign’s pro-Western tilt. The Kremlin will likely continue seeking ways to exacerbate any divisions among the Armenian electorate, with efforts focused on stopping any attempts to amend the country’s constitution.
With its electoral proxies defeated, Russia’s next objective is to prevent Pashinyan from pushing through a constitutional amendment, which is needed for finalizing the 2025 peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Here, the arithmetic gets complicated. Civil Contract fell short of the two-thirds supermajority required for constitutional changes. That gap really matters. The preamble to the current Armenian constitution references the country’s 1991 Declaration of Independence, issued when the USSR collapsed and Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with other states in the South Caucasus and Eurasia, became independent.
The preamble includes language about the reunification of Armenia with “Nagorno-Karabakh.” This is the Russian place name. This territory was internationally recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan, as stated in 1993 UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884, and has become the focal point of a bitter dispute between the two countries, one that stands to be resolved now, provided they can move forward with a peace agreement.
The main issue with the Armenian constitution, as it currently stands, is that any agreement signed by Pashinyan’s government may not bind future governments if they choose to reinterpret the constitutional provisions and once again make territorial claims on Karabakh. Without revisions to the constitution, the agreement will be just a temporary arrangement, and not the basis of permanent peace.
With a strong popular mandate behind him, Pashinyan has the political standing to present a constitutional referendum as a national endorsement of peace—if he can secure the votes.
Six seats short of a supermajority, Pashinyan’s most viable route is not to seek wholesale cooperation from the opposition, which is almost certainly out of reach. Instead, he is likely to work on building a narrow, issue-specific coalition around the provisions tied to the peace agreement. By framing the amendments as technical prerequisites for international normalization rather than partisan concessions, he lowers the political cost of supporting or at least abstaining for pragmatic opposition deputies. Even a handful of defections from non-aligned blocs could bridge the gap.
This is where Washington comes in. The Trump administration could provide critical diplomatic cover, using its relationships with both Yerevan and Baku to reinforce the logic of constitutional adjustment as part of the broader settlement linked to the “Trump Route” connectivity framework. Supporting Armenia’s constitutional process isn’t just good regional diplomacy—it directly serves US strategic interests at a moment when both Russia and Iran are comparatively constrained in the South Caucasus. Anchoring peace, infrastructure development, and institutional reform within a Western-backed regional order would entrench American influence in ways that will outlast any single administration.
The opportunities are real: a resolution to one of the post-Soviet world’s most intractable frozen conflicts, a more prosperous and stable Armenia, and proof that unresolved Soviet-era disputes can be settled rather than inherited indefinitely. Moscow is already working to prevent it all. Tehran is watching nervously. The question is whether Washington will work just as hard to make it happen.
Kamran Bokhari, PhD, is a senior resident fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and a senior director at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington. A strategic forecaster, Bokhari teaches Eurasian geopolitics at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. Dr. Bokhari is the author of Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/russia-lost-armenia-so-did-iran
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