Armenia could quit Russia’s NATO-equivalent alliance and economic union if Mo

Hambik Zargarian
EuroMaidan
Apr 5 2026

Armenia’s parliament speaker, Alen Simonyan, said on 4 April that his country would exit both Russia’s collective security alliance and its economic union if Moscow raised gas prices, News.am reported. Simonyan said he does not expect the scenario to materialize, citing a “very good, productive, and fruitful” follow-up conversation between the leaders. 

The warning comes after the 1 April meeting between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian ruler Putin, at which Putin hinted at possible gas supply problems if Armenia continues its EU pivot. The statement is the latest indicator of Armenia’s accelerating drift from Russia’s orbit — a shift years in the making, rooted in Moscow’s refusal to intervene during Azerbaijan’s 2020 and 2023 offensives in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Putin’s gas hint, Simonyan’s answer 

At the 1 April meeting in Moscow, Putin hinted that Armenia could face gas supply problems if it moves closer to the EU. 

“Gas prices in Europe exceed 600 dollars per 1,000 m³, whereas Russia provides gas to Armenia at 177.5 per 1,000 m³,” he told Pashinyan, adding that “the disparity is vast, the difference is substantial.”

The Armenian PM reiterated on the same day that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — Russia’s military alliance covering Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan — at all levels, calling the decision sufficient for now.

Commenting on the Pashinyan-Putin meeting, Simonyan said such gas price discussions are not new. 

“If they make that decision, Armenia will make its own decision and withdraw from the CSTO, from the Eurasian Economic Union,” he said at a briefing before an extraordinary session of the ruling Civil Contract party. He added that Armenia has done nothing against Russia and does not intend to, but “will defend the interests of the Republic of Armenia.”

Simonyan said he does not think it will come to an exit, pointing to the productive conversation between the leaders after the Putin-Pashinyan meeting. 


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Peskov: Armenia decided Karabakh status, not Russia

Kanayan Tamar
Big News Network
April 6 2026

PanArmenian.Net
6th April 2026, 11:38 GMT+11

PanARMENIAN.Net – The decision on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was made by Armenia’s authorities, and Russia has no involvement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

“The only thing President Putin and Russia want is that, when discussing this issue, there should be no unnecessary references to us. Russia has absolutely nothing to do with this,” he said in an interview with Vesti journalist Pavel Zarubin, Interfax.ru reports.

Azerbaijan has expressed dissatisfaction that the Russian side continues to refer to the Karabakh issue, which it considers “exclusively an internal matter of Azerbaijan,” according to a statement by the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry.

It states that Baku has conveyed, through diplomatic channels, its position to the Russian presidential administration, government, and Foreign Ministry regarding “the inadmissibility of using the Karabakh issue for political speculation, as well as expectations to cease such actions,” APA reports.

“Despite this, the topic continues to appear in the official political discourse of the Russian side. Thus, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in an interview with the Vesti TV channel, while discussing Russian-Armenian relations, again commented on the question of which side – Russia or Armenia – first recognized the Karabakh region as part of Azerbaijan.

…The fact that the Karabakh region is an integral part of Azerbaijan is based not on any country’s decision, but on history, international law, and justice, which was once again confirmed and definitively consolidated as a result of the 44-day war in 2020 and the one-day anti-terrorist measures in 2023.

We would like to once again remind the Russian side that no country, including the Russian Federation, has ever questioned Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including the Karabakh region.

We reiterate our expectation to the Russian side that issues related to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty will not become a subject of public discussion at a time when Russian-Armenian relations are going through a complex phase,” the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said.

At a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, President Vladimir Putin stated:

“The most sensitive issue to this day – we understand this, we often talk about it – is everything related to Karabakh. We constantly return to this topic. And we know that both you and your colleagues have had, and continue to have, questions and certain dissatisfaction regarding the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). We constantly revisit this issue. But I think it is also obvious that after you recognized in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, CSTO intervention in this process, which has taken on an intra-Azerbaijani character, would have been absolutely inappropriate in this matter concerning Karabakh’s reintegration, if we consider it part of Azerbaijan. This is not an assessment – I am not saying whether this is good or bad – but from the point of view of organizing peaceful life, I believe it probably made sense,” Putin said.

Source: PanArmenian.Net

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Inside Armenia’s underground wellbeing retreat where asthma patients seek rel

Manouk Vasilian
EuroNews
April 6 2026

Once state-funded, the centre now faces possible closure after the government withdrew support, saying the treatment lacks scientific evidence.

Deep beneath Armenia’s capital, a Soviet-era salt mine turned wellbeing hospital has become the unlikely centre of a growing debate over alternative medicine and modern healthcare.

Visitors descend 235 metres underground into the Republican Centre of Speleotherapy in Yerevan, where treatment consists not of medication but of breathing mineral-rich air inside huge salt caves believed to ease respiratory illness.

Speleotherapy – from the Greek word spḗlaion, meaning “cave” – is a form of alternative respiratory therapy based on spending extended periods in underground environments such as salt mines.

The clinic opened in 1987 and for decades operated as part of Armenia’s public healthcare system. But in 2019, the government cuts its funding, saying the treatment did not meet the evidence-based standards required under the country’s new universal healthcare reforms.

Since then, the centre has been fighting to stay open, even as patients continue travelling long distances in search of relief.

An unusual medical retreat beneath the earth

Armen Stepanyan, a 63-year-old mechanical engineer from the Siberian city of Kemerovo in Russia, has returned to the caves every year for more than a decade to treat severe asthma. “I’ve had asthma since I was 37. It got really bad at some point, and nothing would help. I went to a sanatorium for treatment, but that didn’t help either, so eventually I came here.”

He describes the therapy as life-changing: “I thought it was salvation. After that, I came to Yerevan every year, except for the coronavirus year. This is already the 13th time I’ve come to these caves for treatment.”

Inside the tunnels, patients rest in rows of beds, exercise, or sit together in group therapy sessions while doctors monitor their breathing and lung function. The underground environment is shielded from allergens, pollution and temperature fluctuations.

Doctor Anush Voskanyan has worked at the clinic since it opened nearly four decades ago. “The Republican Centre of Speleotherapy is located at a depth of 235 metres, deep in the salt mines. Our hospital was founded about forty years ago, and I’ve been working here since its creation. We treat mainly patients with bronchial asthma, allergic diseases, especially respiratory allergies, and skin allergies.”

She says the conditions underground are key to the treatment’s effects: “The air here is ionised, and the temperature is constant year-round, 19–20°C, and doesn’t fluctuate constantly. This is due to the depth down the earth’s crust. Radiation is reduced to zero here.”

“There are no surface magnetic radio waves, noise, dust, or allergens, and thanks to all these factors, we obtain the healing effect,” she adds.

An old medicine under scrutiny

Supporters argue that speleotherapy has long been part of healthcare traditions across eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where natural environments such as mineral springs and mountain sanatoriums were widely used to treat chronic illness.

However critics argue there is still not enough large-scale scientific research proving the treatment actually works, and Armenian health officials say that with limited healthcare budgets, priority has to go to treatments supported by stronger evidence.

The withdrawal of state support has sharply reduced patient numbers and placed the centre’s future in doubt.

“Our centre is currently facing a crisis, as we no longer receive government funding. The centre is at risk and may be forced to close down completely. As a result, patients are unable to receive treatment due to the lack of government support. We hope that investors will come forward and that the centre will be revived,” Voskanyan says.

The government is now trying to privatise its share in the facility, raising hopes that private investors or medical tourism could potentially help keep the underground clinic open.

Check out the video above to see inside the underground retreat. https://www.euronews.com/video/2026/04/06/inside-armenias-underground-wellbeing-retreat-where-asthma-patients-seek-relief



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Heading west

Ekmekjian Janet
Emerging Europe
April 6 2026
AnalysisApril 6, 2026
Emerging Europe Staff

Armenia’s economy is thriving as it loosens ties with Russia and looks towards Brussels. That may be no coincidence.

It was, even by the standards of what passes as Kremlin diplomacy, an extraordinary piece of theatre. On April 1, Vladimir Putin sat across from Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s prime minister, and told him bluntly that membership in both the EU and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was impossible. He dangled the price of Russian gas (177.50 US dollars per thousand cubic metres, against more than 600 US dollars in Europe) as a reminder of what Yerevan stood to lose. Pashinyan did not flinch. When the time comes to choose, he replied, the citizens of Armenia will make that decision.

The exchange would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Armenia was, for three decades after independence, firmly within Moscow’s orbit: a member of the EAEU and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), host to a Russian military base, dependent on Russian gas and arms. What changed everything was Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the Karabakh region in 2023. Russia, Armenia’s nominal security guarantor, did nothing. Pashinyan has not forgiven this, and nor have ordinary Armenians. The country suspended its CSTO membership in 2024. Its parliament passed an EU accession law in March 2025. And this March Pashinyan stood before the European Parliament in Strasbourg and declared that Armenia’s path led to Brussels.

The economy, meanwhile, is giving him cover. The World Bank’s latest economic update, published in March, paints a picture of robust health. Economic activity grew by 7.6 per cent year on year in January, powered by an 18.7 per cent surge in construction and a 25.2 per cent jump in mining. Retail expanded by 7.9 per cent. Tourist arrivals were up 28.6 per cent. The financial system looks solid: the capital adequacy ratio stands at 20.3 per cent and non-performing loans at just 1.3 per cent. A budget surplus equivalent to 0.9 per cent of projected annual GDP was recorded. Gross reserves reached 5.5 billion dollars at the end of February, enough to cover 4.1 months of imports.

Dig beneath the headline figure and the story gets more interesting. Exports and imports both fell sharply in January (by 13.5 and 11.2 per cent respectively), largely because the re-export boom in precious stones and appliances that accompanied Russia’s war in Ukraine is winding down. Strip those categories out and exports actually rose by eight per cent. Armenia’s economy, in other words, is weaning itself off the sanctions-arbitrage windfall that briefly inflated its trade figures in 2022 and 2023. Mining exports (up 43 per cent) and a fast-growing technology sector are picking up the slack. Tech now accounts for roughly seven per cent of GDP, and the number of active high-tech companies surged from around 8,000 in 2024 to more than 10,700 in 2025. A 500 million US dollars partnership between Firebird, an American AI cloud start-up, NVIDIA and the Armenian government to build an AI computing facility may sound fanciful for a country of three million. But Armenia has deep roots in mathematics and semiconductor design stretching back to the Soviet era.

Manageable risks

Remittances tell a more complicated tale. Net non-commercial money transfers grew by 43.7 per cent in January, with Russia accounting for 52 per cent of inflows and the United States 38 per cent. Armenia remains tethered to Russian money, even as it drifts politically westward. Inflation, too, needs watching: it rose to 4.3 per cent in February, driven mostly by food prices (up 6.5 per cent). The central bank’s policy rate sits at 6.5 per cent, but food-price pressure in a country where groceries make up around 40 per cent of the consumption basket is not something any government can ignore before an election.

And an election is coming. Armenians go to the polls in June for parliamentary elections that will amount to a referendum on Pashinyan’s westward turn. Putin made his interest in the outcome plain at the Kremlin, expressing hope that ‘pro-Russian forces’ would be allowed to compete freely and noting that some of their representatives were in custody. He was referring to Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire arrested last year after calling for the government’s ouster. Pashinyan’s reply was characteristically pointed: Armenian law bars dual citizens from standing for office. Moscow’s preferred candidates are welcome to run, provided they choose Armenia over Russia first.

The EU, for its part, is rolling out the welcome mat. A 270 million euros Resilience and Growth Plan for 2024 to 2027 is already in place. A new Strategic Agenda was adopted in December 2025. In May, Yerevan will host both the eighth European Political Community summit and the first ever EU-Armenia summit. Visa liberalisation talks are under way. And the EU monitoring mission deployed along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border since 2023, modest in size but potent in symbolism, is a quiet reminder that Europe has skin in the game.

None of this makes the path smooth. Armenia is landlocked, shares no border with the EU, and gets its gas from Russia at a fraction of European prices. Georgia, its only plausible land corridor to Europe, has its own fraught relationship with Brussels. The World Bank projects growth will moderate to around 4.6 per cent in 2026 as the post-invasion sugar rush fades. And Russian interference in the June elections is likely.

Pashinyan appears to have decided that these are manageable risks. His message to Putin was polite but unmistakable: Armenia is a democracy where social networks face no restrictions, where there are no political prisoners, and where citizens (not foreign presidents) determine the country’s direction. The formal EU membership application has not yet been submitted. The trajectory, though, is plain enough. Armenia’s future, its prime minister reckons, lies in Brussels, not in a customs union designed in Moscow. The numbers, so far, suggest he might be right.

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Yerevan threatens to leave Russia-led blocs in latest diplomatic row with Mosc

Chatinian Lara
OC Media
April 6 2026

Armenia has threatened to leave Russian-led economic and security blocs in response to possible economic pressure from Russia. The two countries have been engaged in a contentious back-and-forth following a meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

During the meeting on 1 April, the sides discussed bilateral issues, as well as Armenia’s relations and ongoing projects with the EU and the US.

Although both Armenian and Russian officials assessed the talks positively, developments in the aftermath suggest cracks and deeper tensions in the bilateral relationship.

Even so, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that ‘understanding was demonstrated’ by the Armenian side regarding the concerns expressed by Russia. Lavrov added that the development of relations remains to be seen.

Separately, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk issued another warning, saying that if Armenia joins the EU, there would be no flights between Armenia and Russia, considering that ‘there is currently no air travel with EU countries’.

Overchuk had previously accused Armenia after the meeting of coming ‘very close to the point where we will have to restructure our economic relations with this country’.

Shortly after, Russia announced ‘stricter requirements’ on the import of Armenian products.

Russia applies ‘stricter requirements’ for Armenian goods following tense Pashinyan–Putin talks

Armenia threatens to withdraw from the EAEU and CSTO

In response to comments suggesting that the Russia had given Armenia ultimatums during the Pashinyan–Putin meeting, Yerevan has suggested it could leave the Russian-led security and economic blocs, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CTSO), if economic pressure from Russia continue.

Asked about the threats last Saturday, Armenian Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan noted that such conversations ‘have been going on for years’.

‘If they make such a decision, Armenia will also make its own decision and will withdraw once and for all from the CSTO, and the EAEU, and from the remaining structures as well’, Simonyan said. He further assessed this as unlikely, noting that following the tense public statements, Pashinyan and Putin had ‘a very good’ and ‘very effective’ conversation.

During the talks, Putin underscored the impossibility of being in a customs union with the EU and the EAEU. He additionally addressed gas prices, highlighting the significant discount Armenia receives from buying Russian energy.

‘The price of gas in Europe exceeds $600 per 1000 cubic meters, and Russia sells gas to Armenia for $177.5 per 1000 cubic metres’, Putin said.

Similarly to Simonyan, Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan expressed confidence that gas prices would not change, because ‘Armenia is needed by its partners so that it remains both in the CSTO and in the EAEU’.

‘If Armenia is not supposed to receive those benefits, then why should it remain in that union? A process of joining another union will begin, and it will happen in a more accelerated manner’, Papoyan said.

He also questioned the benefits the CSTO provided to Armenia, at the same time highlighting Armenia’s value as a member, serving as a passage for goods to the bloc.

Following Armenian official statements, on Monday, Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka suggested that CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov visit Armenia to speak with Pashinyan and ‘learn their position on the future’ regarding Armenia’s membership.

Armenia had ‘frozen’ its membership in the CSTO in February 2024, citing its refusal to aid Armenia in the face of Azerbaijani attacks in 2021 and 2022.

However, Armenian officials, including Pashinyan, appear to be more inclined towards leaving the CSTO, rather than ‘unfreezing’ Armenia’s membership. In an interview with RFE/RL last Friday, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan stated that Armenia was ‘practically out of the CSTO’.

‘I do not see any possibility that Armenia will return, and the remaining steps should be taken when necessary and at the appropriate time’, Kostanyan said.

Armenia appears to reject Russia’s aid to tackle hybrid threats

In the same interview, Kostanyan also responded to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, who recently expressed Moscow’s readiness to assist Armenia in tackling hybrid attacks, citing its resources and capabilities.

‘Russia has other resources too, the same “Matroshka” and “Storm” networks. We would be happy to receive information from them, for example, how these Telegram bots connected to them work’, Kostanyan said.

The two bot networks, affiliated with Russia, were launched in 2023. Records indicate they have been active in Armenia, Moldova, France, Germany, and other countries.

Kostanyan further accused Russia of often being more interested in the continuation of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict rather than finding a resolution to it.

‘It has shown over the years that it is often more interested in the existence of conflict than in the presence of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan’, Kostanyan said.

Zakharova’s statement followed remarks by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in March.

Responding to a question about the possibility of requesting similar support from Russia to tackle hybrid attacks, as they did from the EU, Mirzoyan noted: ‘If Russia has its own experience in combating hybrid attacks and is ready to share it, we are not against it. Let them share it, and we will see what kind of experience it is’.

Mirzoyan says hybrid attacks against Armenia can be partly ‘traced’ to Russia

The Nagorno-Karabakh question and CSTO mechanisms

On Monday, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry responded to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s recent comments where he said ‘the question of Karabakh’s ownership is in no way related to Russia; that decision rests with the Armenian authorities’. Peskov had made the remark following Putin’s meeting with Pashinyan.

Baku noted that ‘no country, including Russia, […] has ever questioned the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh region’. It also urged that ‘issues related to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty will not become a subject of public clarification at a time when Russian–Armenian relations are complex’.

Addressing Armenia’s frozen status in CSTO, Putin repeated previously debunked claims in the meeting, insisting that following Pashinyan’s government’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague in October 2022, ‘the CSTO’s intervention in this process […] was simply absolutely wrong in this matter’.

Armenia had only appealed for CSTO assistance following the Azerbaijani attack on Armenia in September 2022. In his response during the meeting with Putin, Pashinyan insisted that in 2022, ‘CSTO mechanisms should have been activated, but they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO’.

He also said that before Armenia’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, ‘the top leadership of Russia […] twice publicly announced this’.

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Lukashenko: “The situation in Armenia is complicated”

Nahapetian Zhanna
MediaMax, Armenia
April 6 2026

Yerevan /Mediamax/. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated today that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “needs to be very careful and correct while dealing with Armenia.”

According to BELTA, at a meeting with CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov, Alexander Lukashenko noted:

 

“You know, Armenia doesn’t seem to support the CSTO, but at the same time, it remains a member. We need to be very careful. Armenia is in a complicated situation in this regard, especially during the election period. Therefore, we need to be very careful and cautious in our relations with Armenia.”

 

“If you had visited Armenia and held discussions with the prime minister, the president, and the secretary of the Security Council to understand their position on the future, it would have been nice,” the president of Belarus said, addressing Taalatbek Masadykov.

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Lukashenko urges CSTO to be more careful with Armenia

Garo Vardanian
EurasiaDaily
April 6 2026
Lukashenko urges CSTO to be more careful with Armenia

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) needs to be very careful in working with Armenia. This was announced today, April 6, by President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at a meeting with CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov.

Lukashenko recalled that along with certain achievements in the CSTO, there are also problematic issues, which he has repeatedly openly talked about, including at international meetings and events. The Belarusian leader called the relationship with Armenia one of such issues requiring special attention.

“We need to be more correct and careful in our work with Armenia. You know that Armenia does not seem to support work in the CSTO, but at the same time remains in Organizations. You have to be very correct. The situation in Armenia is difficult in this regard, especially during the electoral period (parliamentary elections are scheduled in the summer – EADaily). A very difficult situation. Therefore, we need to be very careful and careful in our relations with Armenia,” he said.

In this regard, Lukashenko considers it important to organize meetings at the level of the CSTO Secretary General and the leadership of Armenia.

“Especially now, in this acute electoral period, when the Armenian leadership will speak honestly and frankly about the situation, including on the CSTO track… If you would visit there and talk with the Prime Minister, the president, the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council, find out their position for the future, it would be nice,” the Belarusian leader said.

Recall that Belarus and Armenia is a member of the CSTO. However, they are due to the close ties between Minsk and Baku- Yerevan has almost completely frozen political contacts with the Belarusian authorities.

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Armenian PM’s Moscow pushback plays to a domestic audience pre-election

Ara Felekian
Intellinews
April 6 2026
By Clare Nuttall in Glasgow April 6, 2026

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s unusually blunt comments to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week indicate he was playing as much to a domestic audience ahead of the June general election as at recalibrating ties with Armenia’s long-time ally. 

During an April 1 meeting at the Kremlin, both leaders struck a formally cordial tone, emphasising continued cooperation. Yet beneath the surface, the joint press conference revealed widening differences over Armenia’s political direction, its democratic processes and its evolving foreign policy.

Putin used the occasion to signal concern over Armenia’s internal political climate ahead of the vote, highlighting the role of pro-Russian figures. “In Armenia we have many friends, many, we know that. Many Armenians live in the Russian Federation… we consider it more than 2mn people,” he said. “And there are many political forces that have a pro-Russian position.”

He added pointedly: “We would very much like all these political parties, political figures to be able to participate in this internal political work during the elections. Some, I know, are in places of detention, despite the fact that they have a Russian passport. That is your decision, we do not interfere, but we would like them to be able to participate, at least, in this internal political process.”

Pashinyan responded with a firm defence of Armenia’s democratic credentials, pushing back against what appeared to be an implicit criticism of his government. “As for our domestic political processes… Armenia is a democratic country, and we almost always have political processes,” he said. “In fact, twice a year we hold municipal elections… I want to say that we have citizens who think that there is too much democracy in Armenia. But this is a matter of principle for us.”

On the question of whether Russian citizens can participate, he said: “Only those citizens who have exclusively Armenian passports can participate in these elections… with all due respect, but persons with Russian passports… cannot be either candidates for deputies or candidates for prime minister.”

He also highlighted freedoms in Armenia, which contrast with the recent clampdown in Russia. “Social networks are 100% free in our country, there are no restrictions at all,” he told the Russian president. Addressing Putin’s remarks on detained figures, Pashinyan added that there are no political prisoners in Armenia. 

The unusually direct rebuttals, delivered in Moscow, were a departure from the more cautious language Yerevan has traditionally used with its strategic partner, and the timing is unlikely to be coincidental.

With parliamentary elections approaching in June, Pashinyan faces a complex political landscape shaped by the aftermath of Armenia’s defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which resulted in the enclave’s return to Azerbaijani control. Since then, he has pursued a peace process with Azerbaijan, and a gradual but unmistakable shift away from Russia’s orbit.

His Civil Contract party remains the frontrunner, but support has been eroded by territorial losses and domestic controversies, including a bitter confrontation with the Armenian Apostolic Church. Opposition blocs with closer ties to Moscow have sought to capitalise on this discontent, accusing the government of conceding too much to Azerbaijan and pursuing unrealistic Western ambitions.

While the political contest does not fall neatly along pro-West versus pro-Russian lines, divisions over the nature of Armenia’s relationship with Moscow are increasingly central. None of the main political forces advocate a complete rupture with Russia, widely still seen as a key partner, but they differ sharply on how much autonomy Yerevan should assert.

That debate is unfolding alongside a broader change in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. Since the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has moved to diversify its foreign relations. Long dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, Yerevan has stepped up engagement with the European Union and the United States, while seeking to redefine ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Differences over this trajectory surfaced clearly in Moscow. Putin adopted a cautionary tone on Armenia’s growing links with the EU. “We see that Armenia is discussing developing relations with the European Union. We are completely calm about this,” he said. “We understand that any country seeks maximum benefits from cooperation with third countries.”

However, he warned: “Being in a customs union with the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union is impossible. It is simply impossible by definition… this isn’t even a political issue, but a purely economic one.”

Pashinyan acknowledged the tension but signalled that Armenia would continue its balancing act. “As long as it’s possible to combine these agendas, we will do so,” he said. “And when processes develop to the point where a decision must be made, I am confident that the citizens of the Republic of Armenia will accept it.”

At the same time, he sought to reassure Moscow: “Our relations with the Russian Federation have never been and never will be in question, because these ties and relations are very deep and non-negotiable.”

Security tensions, however, remain unresolved. Armenia has effectively frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military alliance, after it failed to intervene during military clashes with Azerbaijan.

Putin linked that inaction to Armenia’s own political decisions. “After you accepted in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, the CSTO’s intervention… was simply absolutely wrong,” he said.

Pashinyan reiterated his frustration. “We have never hidden our problems with the CSTO,” he said. “In 2022 we had a specific situation… and, in my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have been activated, but they were not activated.” As a result, Armenia has stepped back from the bloc: “We are not currently participating in the work of the CSTO for a simple reason: we are still unable to explain to our people… why the CSTO did not respond, despite the obligations that exist.”

The dispute reflects a deeper erosion of trust that began during the war with Azerbaijan, when Russia did not provide the level of support many Armenians expected. That perception has fed a gradual shift in public opinion.

Recent polling by the International Republican Institute suggests a growing openness to a Western orientation, particularly among younger voters, though most Armenians still favour maintaining balanced relations with both Russia and the West. The latest poll from the institute showed that almost half of Armenians want Yerevan to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy, though most also want to maintain relations with Russia. 

External pressure is also becoming a factor. Armenian authorities have warned of possible foreign interference ahead of the election, with intelligence officials citing attempts to mobilise diaspora communities.

The European Union stepped in at the Armenian government’s request, agreeing to deploy a specialised team to help Armenia counter potential hybrid threats. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said the bloc had already observed disinformation patterns similar to those seen elsewhere. “The European Union will do everything to be there for you,” she said, adding that support would focus on “detection, analysis and response to foreign interference”.

The situation echoes developments in other post-Soviet states. Moldova has moved to exit the Commonwealth of Independent States as part of its push towards EU integration. 

Even Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev defied Russia over its annexation of parts of Ukraine’s Donbas region, when he publicly refused to recognise the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in Ukraine as independent republics.  

In Armenia, the balancing act is particularly delicate. Russia remains deeply embedded in the country’s economy and infrastructure, and millions of Armenians live and work in the Russian Federation.

By publicly asserting Armenia’s sovereignty and democratic credentials, Pashinyan appears to be appealing to voters who favour a more independent course, while still stopping short of a full break with Russia.


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Armenia And Former Soviet Republics To Choose Between European Union And EAEU/

Albert Nalbandian
Eurasia Review
April 6 2026
 April 6, 2026  0 Comments

By Kester Kenn Klomegah

Armenia, a former Soviet republic, and Russia were members of the Soviet Union, and were strictly guided by rules and regulations. After the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, the republics have legitimacy to their severeignty and territorial integrity. But that has not been the case. Kazakhstan operates a liberal economic system, so are other republics including Armenia. These republics, mostly have a tough time and, to some extent, control from Russia.

At a tense meeting in early April with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Vladimir Putin issued an ultimatum to its neighbour Armenia over maintaining closer ties with European Union (EU). 

“We see that there is a discussion in Armenia about developing relations with the European Union,” Putin said at the meeting with Pashinyan, adding that Moscow treats it “absolutely calmly”. But it should be obvious and honestly stated upfront that membership in a customs union with both the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union is impossible,” Putin told Pashinyan as recorded on camera.

The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) created in 2015 includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and it is meant to enable the free movement of goods, capital and labour among its members. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and others have an increasing interest to get closer with trade and establish a working mutual economic cooperation with the EU, with Pashinyan even declaring an intention to join the 27-member bloc in the future.

During the meeting at the Kremlin, Putin followed up on Moscow’s gas supplies to Armenia, saying that Russia now sells gas to its neighbour at a “substantially” lower price than the EU does. “Gas prices in Europe exceed 600 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, whereas Russia provides gas to Armenia at 177.5 per 1,000 cubic metres,” he told Pashinyan, adding that “the disparity is vast, the difference is substantial.”

The Case of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan, one of the Russian neighbours and former Soviet republics, also opens its doors for a broader external expansion. Given its geographical location and combined with current political reforms aim at transforming the its economic from the Soviet system to a more modernized system infused with western culture of life, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has chosen multi-vector policies, consistently advocating for more openness and improving necessary conditions for attracting foreign business and investors to participate in the various economics sectors and including the cultural and educational sectors.

Declaring that the creation of a fair Kazakhstan as its main goal, Tokayev has emphasized that the foreign policy course must also aim at protection of national interests, strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation with all interested states, international peace and security. As part of promoting multi-culture and friendly society, Kazakhstan has seriously made in-bound tourism as one of its priority spheres, so it has established a visa-free regime for citizens of 54 countries, including the European Union and OECD member states, the United States, Japan, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand.

Kazakhstan has a GDP of $179.332 billion and an annual growth rate of 4.5%. Per capita, Kazakhstan’s GDP stands at $9,686. It’s increased role in global trade and central positioning on the new Silk Road gave the country the potential to open its markets to billions of people. Further to this, it joined the World Trade Organization in 2015.

According to some reports, Kazakhstan has an abundant supply of accessible mineral and fossil fuel resources. Development of petroleum, natural gas, and mineral extractions has attracted most of the over $40 billion in foreign investment in Kazakhstan since 1993 and accounts for some 57% of the nation’s industrial output (or approximately 13% of gross domestic product).

 The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030, as announced and was made public, the document outlines the following main points: 

– An open, predictable and consistent foreign policy of the country, which is progressive in nature and maintains its endurance by continuing the course of the First President – the country at a new stage of development;

 – Protection of human rights, development of humanitarian diplomacy and environmental protection;

 – Promotion of the country’s economic interests in the international arena, including the implementation of state policy to attract investment;

 – Maintaining international peace and security;

 – Development of regional and multilateral diplomacy, which primarily involves strengthening mutually beneficial ties with key partners, for example: Russia, China, the United States, Central Asian states and the EU countries, as well as through multilateral structures – the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Kazakhstan is the world’s largest landlocked country, located in Central Asia and partly in Eastern Europe. It declared independence on 16 December 1991, thus becoming the last Soviet republic to declare political independence. Nursultan Nazarbayev became the country’s first President. Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare independence after Soviet’s collapse in 1991. With population approximately 25 million, Kazakhstan strictly recognizes its political freedom, national interest and territorial sovereignty.

Comparing EU with EAEU

The European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU/Eurasia Union) are distinct regional blocs with major differences in scope, purpose, and scale. The EU is a deeply integrated economic and political union of 27 democratic, mostly Western European nations, while the EAEU is a Russia-led economic union focusing on trade among post-Soviet states, featuring smaller GDP and less political integration. 

Here are Key Differences:

Membership & Leadership: The EU includes 27 mostly Western/Central European countries (e.g., Germany, France). The EAEU consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

Economic Scale: The EU’s economy is significantly larger—roughly four times larger in GDP than the EAEU (approx. $19.4 trillion vs. $4.8 trillion in 2024).

Integration Level: The EU is both a monetary (for most) and political union with strong democratic institutions, shared policies, and a common market. The EAEU is primarily an economic union focused on free movement of goods, labor, and capital, but it lacks the deep political integration of the EU.

Geopolitics & Values: The EU is built on shared democratic values and legal frameworks (EU law). The EAEU is often seen as a political tool for Russia to retain influence over post-Soviet states.

Conflicts & Stability: EAEU members are closely tied to Russia, which has created tensions in the post-Soviet space, especially following the war in Ukraine. The EU has increasingly become a preferred partnership for Eastern European nations over the EAEU. 

According to the Kutafin Law Review, in essence, the EU is a deep political and economic integration project, whereas the EAEU is a smaller, trade-focused, post-Soviet initiative.

Exchanging Thoughts Over Political Sovereignty

The Armenian leader made it clear that when the time comes to make a choice, it will be solemnly made by the citizens of Armenia, without any interference. “And when the processes reach the point where it will be necessary to make a decision, I am sure that we, I mean the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision,” Pashinyan told Putin, not mincing words.

With its long-standing influence in the South Caucasus fading and what appears to be the Kremlin’s ongoing intent to have a say in Armenia’s political decision-making, Putin told Pashiyan that Moscow hopes pro-Russian forces will be allowed to compete freely in Armenia’s parliamentary elections set for June.

Without mentioning names, Russia’s president claimed that some of their representatives have been put in custody, saying, “Some are in detention despite having Russian passports.” Putin, however, referred to Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who was arrested last year after calling for the ouster of the government.

Pashinyan, also without naming Karapetyan, noted that Armenian law requires political candidates to hold exclusively Armenian citizenship, adding that “no restrictions” are being imposed on political opposition under such circumstances. “Persons with Russian passports, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, cannot be either a candidate for deputy or a candidate for prime minister,” Pashinyan explained to Putin.

Pashinyan firmly stated to Putin that “Armenia is a democratic country”, where the political processes are ongoing at all times. “In fact, twice a year we hold municipal elections, which are also very politicised, because as a result of our political reforms, people there also vote for or against political parties,” Pashinyan said.

The Armenian prime minister, then, referred to the internet outrage in Moscow and the Kremlin-introduced restrictions on the popular Telegram messaging app. “Our social networks, for example, are 100% free, with no restrictions at all,” Pashinyan told Putin on camera, and added that, unlike Russia, there are no political prisoners in Armenia, stating that “in the general context, to be honest, we do not have participants in political processes in places of detention.”

“We have citizens who think that there is too much democracy in Armenia. But this is a matter of principle for us,” Pashinyan said.

Yerevan’s Balancing Act

Armenia’s relations with Russia have grown increasingly strained after Azerbaijan fully reclaimed the Karabakh region in 2023. Decades of bloody conflict ended as the two former bitter rivals embarked on a historic peace process, launching an economic revival in the region amid new stability in the South Caucasus. In 2024, Armenia suspended its membership in the Russia-led Yerevan Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) after Moscow failed to support Yerevan during the 2022 Karabakh escalation.

“In my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have been activated (in 2022),” Pashinyan told Putin, adding that “they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO.” He confirmed that Armenia is currently not participating in the CSTO for what he described as a “simple reason”.

“We are still unable to explain to our people, our citizens, why the CSTO did not respond, and did not respond despite the obligations that exist under the Collective Security Treaty,” the Armenian leader told Putin.

Putin called Armenian concerns “certain grievances” as he argued that Moscow’s decision not to intervene was on Yerevan and Russia did not see a point in stepping in. “It is obvious that after you accepted in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, the CSTO’s intervention in this process, which has acquired an intra-Azerbaijani nature, was simply absolutely wrong in this matter,” Putin told Pashinyan.

“This is not an assessment, I am not saying that this is good or bad, from the point of view of organising peaceful life, I think that, probably, it made sense,” the Russian president added. “Here we simply need to look for ways to further strengthen relations. But it seems to me that here too we need to finish here,” Putin concluded.

Since reaching an agreement to put an end to almost four decades of a bloody conflict in Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been working on normalising and strengthening their bilateral relations, as well as the cooperation in the region, with one exception. Russia has been notably absent from the Karabakh peace process, both during and after the agreement was reached, and both Yerevan and Baku have been distancing themselves from Moscow while jointly redirecting their foreign policy focus toward the EU and the US.

Tracking the Argumentative Sequence

In this analysis, tracking the argumentative sequence, with notable precision, the difference between European Union and Eurasian Union, sometime referred to as ‘Greater Earasian Union’ are noted.

In whichever either case, Armenia is a sovereign republic, has its own right to determine the political system of governance, the parameters of economic development, and shape its own diplomacy directions with external partners without any restrain or restrictions. Armenia operates within the constitutional framework, and the Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has the mandate from the electorate of Armenia. The choice of political sovereignty and foreign relations are stipulated in the constitution. 

Russia’s political regulatory architecture, the system of restraints and mechanisms of instructing directives, are optional but not necessarily compulsory. The logic that any former Soviet republic must only maintain membership with Eurasia Union, and not at the same time to both is rather illogical, particularly when Russia is a staunch advocate of ‘multipolarism’ which ascribed to flexible and broad practice, openness, to global integration. An argument for making choices based on restrictions does not, precisely, fit into the context of global unity, new liberal architecture, and emerging multipolarism.

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Opinion: ‘Russia ‘blackmails’ Armenia with threat of gas price hikes’

Arpi Talalian
JAM News
April 6 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a recent meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have been interpreted by Armenia’s expert community as a threat.

Putin said Moscow remains calm about Armenia’s desire to develop ties with the EU.
He also said Yerevan cannot expect to be a member of the European Union. It also cannot remain in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. He also stated that Yerevan cannot expect to be a member of both the European Union and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. He stressed that Armenia’s economy is growing steadily. He added that exports to EAEU countries have increased tenfold in recent years.

Putin also addressed energy issues. He warned that gas prices in Europe exceed $600 per 1,000 cubic metres. He added that Russia sells gas to Armenia for $177.5. He said this difference is significant.

“It is your decision in the end — the decision of your team and your experts — where, with whom, and on what basis to work,” Putin said.

The day after the meeting, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk also spoke on the issue. He said Armenian counterparts had “come close to a point after which we will have to structure our economic relations with this country differently”.

Armenian authorities say gas prices will not change. They argue that otherwise Armenia’s participation in the EAEU would lose its meaning.

They also do not rule out that, if gas prices change, Yerevan could leave Moscow-led structures. This includes both the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO military alliance.

At the same time, Armenian analysts say Russia would face losses if it took drastic steps against Armenia. They add that Yerevan could turn to alternative options, such as importing gas from Kazakhstan.

Reactions from Armenian authorities, as well as expert commentary, follow.

  • ‘Armenia’s security guarantor led us to slaughter’ — Nikol Pashinyan
  • ‘Russia trying to send tens of thousands of voters to Armenia’s elections’: debate in Yerevan
  • Opinion: Armenia would benefit from returning its railways to state control
  • Awaiting end of war in Ukraine: Russia’s intentions in South Caucasus

‘If gas prices change, Armenia will leave the EAEU and CSTO‘

Armenian journalists asked representatives of the ruling party whether Moscow had adopted an ultimatum-style tone towards Yerevan.

In response, National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan said Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke with Putin “from the position of an independent, sovereign state”. He added that discussions about prices for Russian goods and gas are not new and have continued for many years.

Simonyan said that if a decision is made to change prices, Armenia will decide to leave Russia-led integration blocs — the CSTO and the EAEU.

However, he does not believe the situation will reach that point. He also said that after their public statements, the two leaders held a “very good” conversation:

“We discussed this, and I will repeat: we have done nothing against Russia, we are doing nothing, and we are not going to do anything. At the same time, we have defended and will continue to defend Armenia’s interests.”

Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan expressed confidence that gas prices will not change, as partners need Armenia to remain within Russian-led structures:

“Partners need Armenia to remain both in the CSTO and in the EAEU. And if Armenia is not meant to benefit, then why should it stay in this union? [In response] a process will begin in another union — and it will accelerate.”

Commentary

Political analyst Ruben Meghrabyan said:

“The conversation between Pashinyan and Putin showed that Russia views gas as one of its levers of pressure on Armenia. We remember how Serzh Sargsyan was ‘brought in’, and as a result Armenia became a victim of trafficking into the so-called EAEU bloc — a structure we still cannot free ourselves from. Gas was one of the reasons back then as well.

This refers to 3 September 2013, when Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsyan announced in Moscow that the country would join the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union. The decision came as a shock. Before that, Armenia had been negotiating an Association Agreement with the EU. Armenian analysts openly said at the time that Russia forced Sargsyan to commit to joining the Customs Union, which later evolved into the EAEU.

Armenia must resist this. The idea of transporting Kazakh gas to Armenia and Europe via Azerbaijan is quite promising.

This would make gas even cheaper for Armenia, since consumption in the country is not that high.

Armenia’s energy system does not depend heavily on gas. Gas is mainly used for fuelling cars, heating homes and cooking.

And now Putin has decided to blackmail us with gas, comparing it to the current price of 600 euros in Europe, amid a sharp market surge.

What should Armenia do? It must resist all of this. There should be no retreat in connection with this new Russian package of measures from 3 September [referring to the events of 3 September 2013], which Russia is now promoting.”

Civil society representative Daniel Ioannisyan said:

“Some groups in Armenia try to create the impression that Armenia lives off Russia like a parasite, and that if we fail to please the Kremlin, everything will collapse. That is not true. It is a false narrative promoted on Moscow’s instructions.

The reality is that if Russia blocks imports of Armenian goods or raises gas prices for us, Russia will also suffer.

If Russia takes such drastic steps, we could, first, leave the CSTO military alliance and remove the Russian military base from Gyumri. That would deal a major reputational blow to Russia. The whole world would see how much the former superpower has weakened.

We could also leave the EAEU. This would close a channel for importing certain Western goods through Armenia that are important for Russia’s economy.

It is important to note that customs duties paid to Armenia for goods imported through the country do not remain here.We transfer about 98.7% of them to other EAEU member states. Yes, they would lose that money as well.

In addition, the Russian economy and consumers would lose access to affordable food products from Armenia, which would further worsen rising prices in Russia. Not to mention ‘smaller’ steps such as shutting down Russian TV channels or nationalising railways.

If Russia significantly raises gas prices for us, we can buy gas from other countries. Russia would lose revenue from gas sales, just as it has already lost major income from gas exports to Europe.

I am not saying these scenarios are favourable or beneficial for us. But they are not beneficial for Russia either — and they are not masochists.”

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