Kazakh foreign minister sends congratulatory message to Ararat Mirzoyan

Politics17:57, 7 August 2026
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Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev has sent a congratulatory message to Ararat Mirzoyan on his reappointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, according to the Armenian Foreign Ministry.

In his message, Kosherbayev expressed confidence that the strategic partnership between Armenia and Kazakhstan would continue to strengthen across all areas, thanks to the strong bonds of friendship that have linked the Armenian and Kazakh peoples for centuries, the mutual understanding between the leaders of the two countries, and close cooperation between their foreign ministries.

The Armenian government submitted its resignation on August 2, when the first session of the parliament formed following the June 7 parliamentary elections in Armenia began. Under the Armenian Constitution, the government is required to submit its resignation to the president on the day the newly elected parliament holds its first session.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed the government’s resignation on August 2, and it was submitted to the Presidential Office. The president accepted the government’s resignation, after which the Civil Contract party, which secured a majority in the newly formed parliament, nominated Pashinyan for prime minister. On that basis, the president reappointed him as prime minister.

On August 3, at Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal, President Vahagn Khachaturyan also appointed the ministers and deputy prime ministers. Ararat Mirzoyan was reappointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

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Cyprus will continue to support deeper Armenia-EU cooperation: Kombos congratu

Politics18:30, 7 August 2026
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Cypriot Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos has sent a congratulatory message to Ararat Mirzoyan on his reappointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, according to the Armenian Foreign Ministry.

“I highly value the excellent relations between our two countries and remain committed to further strengthening our partnership, both bilaterally and in international fora. The Republic of Cyprus remains firmly committed to supporting Armenia’s efforts to promote regional peace, stability and cooperation. I would like to assure you that we will continue to support the deepening of cooperation between Armenia and the European Union, as well as Armenia’s efforts to forge closer ties with the European family, in line with the aspirations of the Armenian people,” the Cypriot foreign minister said in his message.

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Polish foreign minister congratulates Ararat Mirzoyan

Politics18:45, 7 August 2026
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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has congratulated Ararat Mirzoyan on his reappointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia. Sikorski announced this in a post on X.

“Congratulations to Ararat Mirzoyan on his reappointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. I wish you every success. Poland will continue to support Armenia in implementing democratic reforms and deepening its close cooperation with the European Union,” the Polish foreign minister wrote.

The Armenian government submitted its resignation on August 2, when the first session of the parliament formed following the June 7 parliamentary elections in Armenia began. Under the Armenian Constitution, the government is required to submit its resignation to the president on the day the newly elected parliament holds its first session.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed the government’s resignation on August 2, and it was submitted to the Presidential Office. The president accepted the government’s resignation, after which the Civil Contract party, which secured a majority in the newly formed parliament, nominated Pashinyan for prime minister. On that basis, the president reappointed him as prime minister.

On August 3, at Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal, President Vahagn Khachaturyan also appointed the ministers and deputy prime ministers. Ararat Mirzoyan was reappointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

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Ruben Rubinyan is world’s youngest parliament speaker

Armenia18:41, 7 August 2026
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The Inter-Parliamentary Union has announced on its official website that Ruben Rubinyan has become the world’s youngest parliament speaker following his election, according to the website of the National Assembly of Armenia.

Rubinyan was elected Speaker of the National Assembly during the first session of the ninth-convocation National Assembly, which began on August 2.

Ruben Rubinyan was born on March 8, 1990.

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Officials review progress of Armenia’s €120 million tourism infrastructure in

Economy14:02, 7 August 2026
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Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan and Tourism Committee Chairperson Lusine Gevorgyan held a meeting with representatives of the World Bank and the Armenian Territorial Development Fund.

According to a readout from the ministry, the meeting focused on the progress of the Tourism and Regional Infrastructure Improvement Program (TRIP), as well as on issues related to improving its implementation mechanisms and enhancing the flexibility and efficiency of its processes.

Emphasizing the program’s role in developing tourism and modernizing regional infrastructure, the sides reaffirmed their readiness to continue close cooperation to ensure the effective implementation of the planned measures.

The TRIP program envisages an investment of €120 million for the development of tourism clusters in Goris, Areni, Jermuk, Yeghegis, Dvin, Gyumri, and Dilijan. The program aims to promote wine, health, adventure, cultural, educational, and eco-tourism while enhancing Armenia’s tourism appeal and the competitiveness of its regions.

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Armenia’s growing number of large families: Statistics, one couple’s story and

JAM News
Aug 7, 2026
  • Gayane Asryan
  • Yerevan

In recent years, more young families in Armenia have chosen to have a third or even fourth child. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, around 8,300 third and subsequent children were born in 2018. By 2023, that figure had risen to more than 12,400, before easing slightly to around 12,000 in 2024. Overall, the number of third and subsequent births increased by about 45% between 2018 and 2024. Full-year data for 2025 are not yet available, although figures up to September show that 8,070 third and subsequent children had been born.

Experts cite a range of reasons why families choose to have larger families. Conversations with parents of three or more children suggest there is no single explanation, but the most common responses include: “Two children didn’t feel enough“, “We wanted a child of the opposite sex“, and “We were thinking about the country’s future.”


  • ‘Parent hour’ and flexible schedules: Armenia changes labour code
  • Why are Armenian women marrying foreigners more often? Stories of three families
  • Paternity leave in Armenia: a growing cause
  • Young Armenians prefer living independently as parents encourage it

“We planned to have a large family, regardless of state support”

Vanuհi and Tigran married in 2013. For seven years, they were unable to have children. Eventually, they turned to in vitro fertilisation (IVF). In 2021, they became parents to triplets – a girl and two boys.

“We were asked how many children we wanted. We could have chosen one or two. But we decided to take the risk and become parents of triplets, even though we knew the risks were higher,” Vanuhi says.

According to Vanuhi, both she and her husband grew up in large families. From the outset, they wanted a big family of their own – at least three children and, ideally, as many as six.

“I received so much love and care from my brothers and sisters that I found it hard to imagine a family with just one or two children. My parents are no longer alive, but I feel stronger and more complete because I have my brothers and sisters,” says Tigran Hovakimyan.

The couple raised the triplets on their own, without relying on grandparents or other relatives. When the children turned three, they started nursery. Then came another surprise: Vanuhi became pregnant with their fourth child.

Vanuhi says they were astonished, as doctors had told them they had virtually no chance of conceiving naturally.

“We now have four young children. We both work and can provide them with good food, clothes and opportunities for leisure. We also receive state benefits. Because we had triplets, the government counts each of them as a third child and pays 50,000 drams (about $137) per child each month. We now receive an additional 50,000 drams for our fourth child, as well as 30,000 drams (about $82) because my wife is temporarily unable to work while on maternity leave,” Tigran explains.

He says that part of the money is deposited into savings accounts opened in the children’s names, while the rest is spent on their activities and recreation. The family has bought a large inflatable swimming pool for the garden of their home, as well as bicycles, and the children also attend paid extracurricular classes and sports clubs.

The couple are also setting aside modest savings to help ensure all four children can receive a good education.

“You know, many families have children because of state benefits or other government support. We don’t judge them, but our story is different. We always planned to have three or more children without relying on state assistance. It wasn’t something that influenced our decision. In the early years of our marriage, both my wife and I worked several jobs at the same time so that we could afford to buy a large house, hoping one day we’d have a big family,” Tigran says.

“If we were still paying off a mortgage, we would probably depend on the child benefits that families receive until their children turn six,” Vanuhi adds.

How state encourages higher birth rates

In 2022, Armenia introduced a state support programme under which families receive a monthly payment of 50,000 drams ($137) for a third and each subsequent child until the child reaches the age of six.

By 2025, more than 45,000 children were covered by the scheme.

Under a separate programme, the state repays part of a family’s mortgage principal following the birth of a child. The subsidy amounts to:

  • up to 500,000 drams ($1,377) for a second child,
  • up to 1 million drams ($2,754) for a third child,
  • up to 1.5 million drams ($4,132) for a fourth child.

The scheme applies to mortgages that meet certain social eligibility criteria and is regarded as one of the government’s key measures to encourage higher birth rates.

In addition, amendments to Armenia’s Labour Code that came into force in 2026 introduced new benefits for working parents. In particular, parents with children under the age of 12 are now entitled to a “parental hour” – a shorter working day without any reduction in pay:

  • parents with one or two children can finish work 30 minutes earlier;parents with three or more children are entitled to a one-hour reduction in their working day.

The benefit can be used by either the mother or the father.

Families also receive a one-off payment of 500,000 drams ($1,377) for every child, including their first.

More recently, the government approved a new housing programme for families raising six or more children under the age of 18, an initiative proposed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

“Under this programme, large families will be able to purchase property or build a detached house in any regional community in Armenia with 100% state funding,” ministry spokesperson Gayane Karagezyan said.

The programme does not cover property purchases in Yerevan, however, reflecting the government’s policy of promoting balanced regional development.

“More targeted measures are needed”

Demographer Rubina Grigoryan says the government’s efforts to encourage larger families have produced some results. While the increase in births is evident, she believes it is still not enough.

“New, more targeted programmes are needed. They should be tailored separately for Yerevan and the regions. They should also go beyond financial assistance. The recently introduced ‘parental hour’ is one example of an effective incentive. I believe more should be done to expand access to nurseries and kindergartens. Just look at how many private childcare centres cater for children under the age of two. If the state increased the number of places in public childcare facilities, more women would consider having additional children.”

Grigoryan says attitudes towards large families have also become more positive in recent years. They are not only receiving greater state support but are also more valued by society.

“However, many of these families may face difficulties once their children grow older, particularly with the costs of education and other financial pressures. State support is available only until children reach the age of six. After that, families seem to be left without much assistance. This is something policymakers should also address. As for the recent rise in birth rates, I see one particularly significant factor. The increase in births between 2021 and 2023 was largely influenced by the aftermath of the Karabakh war. Many families decided to have children after the war, each for their own reasons – from a sense of responsibility towards those who died to a desire to help build a stronger country for the future,” Grigoryan says.

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Armenia begins shift from Russia towards EU – but finish line remains distant

JAM News
Aug 7, 2026
  • Arthur Khachatryan
  • Yerevan

Against this backdrop, the European Union pledged to “stand by Armenia”. EU leaders have already announced tens of millions of dollars in financial assistance and opened the bloc’s markets to Armenian goods that had suddenly ceased to meet Russian quality standards. More importantly, Brussels has expressed interest in further deepening ties with Yerevan, while Armenia’s re-elected leadership says the election results demonstrate the public’s desire to continue along the country’s European path.

Parliamentary elections in Armenia are over, but the political—and geopolitical—debate continues. Many viewed the vote as a de facto referendum on the country’s future orientation: Russia or the European Union.During the election campaign, Moscow imposed restrictions on imports of Armenian food products, a move widely interpreted in Armenia as an attempt to influence public opinion. Contrary to some expectations, Russia not only kept those trade restrictions in place after the election but tightened them.

JAMnews reviewed the latest developments and spoke to analysts with opposing views. Residents of Armenia also shared their opinions on how they believe the country should shape its future.


  • ‘Moscow will only push Armenia out of Russian-led blocs’: Reaction to Russia’s foreign intelligence claim
  • Armenia debates new mechanisms to tackle vote-buying
  • New EU mission in Armenia to help address post-election risks
  • Pashinyan: ‘Russia wants either exclusive ties or nothing’

How Armenia’s pivot took shape

Few people remember now, but immediately after the 2018 “Velvet Revolution”, led by then-opposition figure and now Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, he insisted that his government would not pursue any geopolitical realignment. At the time, Armenia was already a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Years later, speaking from podiums in both Europe and Yerevan, the same Pashinyan has declared Armenia’s aspiration to join the European Union.

So what happened in between? Over the past several years, the entire security architecture of the South Caucasus has unraveled, triggering a snowball effect. Initially, relations between Yerevan and Moscow developed without major friction. Then came the 2020 Karabakh war. Armenia was defeated and ceased to be the guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh’s security. Formally, Yerevan had no grounds to hold Moscow responsible in 2020. Nagorno-Karabakh was not part of Armenia, and the agreements signed between the two countries applied only to Armenia itself, not to the unrecognised entity.

However, events then took an unexpected turn.

Over the following two years, Azerbaijan launched several military operations on Armenia’s internationally recognised territory. Yerevan appealed to its allies in the CSTO for assistance, but received neither military support nor even a political assessment of the situation.

The allies responded that it was first necessary to establish where exactly the escalation had taken place, arguing that the Armenia-Azerbaijan border had not been formally delimited. Pashinyan replied sharply:

“To say that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is to claim that the Collective Security Treaty Organization has no area of responsibility. And if there is no area of responsibility, then there is no organisation.”

Since then, Yerevan, finding itself alone in the face of what it viewed as an external security threat, has frozen its participation in the CSTO and turned increasingly towards Europe. According to some analysts, the price of that shift was Armenia’s official recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. In return, the European Union deployed a civilian monitoring mission to Armenia, which helped stabilise the situation along the border with Azerbaijan. Armenia also secured the EU’s political backing.

Retiree Andrey Karapetyan shares his views on European integration. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan/JAMnews.

Shift gathered pace

These developments on the ground were inevitably followed by political change. The entire Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiation process shifted to Western platforms—an outcome few had anticipated. Since the conflict began in the 1990s, Moscow had served as the principal mediator and facilitator of the peace talks.

Following the events of September 2023, when Azerbaijan’s one-day military operation prompted the entire Armenian population to flee Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia effectively lost its influence in the region.

At the same time, Russia also lost its standing among much of Armenia’s population, no longer being viewed as a friendly state.

Although Russia formally remains Armenia’s strategic ally, many Armenians have not forgotten that Russian peacekeepers effectively acted as bystanders, failing to fulfil their mission of protecting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following the CSTO’s refusal to defend Armenia’s territorial integrity, relations between Moscow and Yerevan cooled even further. The Armenian leadership also adopted a more outspoken tone towards Russia, both in its rhetoric and in its actions.

At the same time, contacts between the Armenian government and its European partners intensified. Brussels allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to support political and economic reforms in Armenia, as well as strengthen the country’s borders. France also began supplying Armenia with military equipment. The culmination of these developments came on 17 October 2023, when speaking at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared:

“The Republic of Armenia is ready to be as close to the European Union as the European Union considers possible. Our joint statement with President von der Leyen says: ‘In these difficult times, the EU and Armenia stand shoulder to shoulder.’”

In the years that followed, Pashinyan repeatedly stated that Armenia would seek EU membership. The parliamentary elections held in June and their outcome only reinforced the government’s determination.

“Last year, we adopted a law launching the process of accession to the European Union, which, I would remind you, was initiated by civil society. I believe this provides an additional incentive to give new momentum to our democratic and institutional reforms so that we can achieve EU standards as quickly as possible.

This is our main intermediate goal because we understand that no country can become a full member of the European Union without meeting its standards. Therefore, our primary task is first and foremost to comply with EU standards. […]If we are admitted to the European Union, we will be happy. If we are not, we will still benefit, because Armenia will have become a country that meets European standards, with all the positive consequences that entails,” Pashinyan said at the time.

System administrator Artak Gaboyan shares his views. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan/JAMnews.

Russia pushes back

At the start of the crisis in Armenian-Russian relations, Moscow responded relatively cautiously to Yerevan’s efforts to move closer to Europe. The Kremlin sought to avoid further destabilising the situation, citing Armenia’s difficult historical circumstances. Even Armenia’s effective suspension of its participation in the CSTO did not result in a fundamental reassessment of bilateral relations.

However, Moscow appeared to change its approach in the run-up to the parliamentary elections held in June.

One of the defining moments came during Pashinyan’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow in April, when the Russian president openly asked him to allow pro-Russian political forces to participate in the elections. He was primarily referring to Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. However, as Karapetyan holds citizenship of several countries, not only Armenia, Armenian law bars him from serving as an MP or becoming prime minister. Pashinyan reportedly made this clear to Putin.

The Kremlin nevertheless continued to support pro-Russian political figures while also taking more concrete steps. Russian regulators began imposing restrictions on imports of Armenian products. Initially, the measures targeted specific companies and categories of goods, but they were later expanded to cover almost all agricultural produce from Armenia.

Businessman Suren Margaryan shares his views. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan/JAMnews.

The situation continued to escalate. Armenian officials began openly accusing Moscow of attempting to interfere in the country’s internal affairs and engineer a change of government.

At the same time, international media reported on alleged hybrid attacks against Armenia. Reuters also published a report alleging that the Kremlin had devised a plan to bring 100,000 Armenian citizens into the country to vote for pro-Russian political forces.

Following the elections, Moscow has stepped up its calls for Armenia to decide, once and for all, which direction it intends to take. Russian officials have specifically called for a referendum on whether the country should pursue integration with the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), arguing that choosing the EU would require Armenia to leave the EAEU.

“No one is pushing Armenia out of the EAEU. They themselves have said they want to join the European Union. They need to make a choice. And the sooner that choice is made, the better it will be for everyone,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Overchuk said.

This culminated in a joint statement by the EAEU member states calling for Armenia to hold a referendum on whether the country should remain in the EAEU or pursue EU membership.

Armenia says time is not right for referendum

In response to Moscow’s demands, the Armenian authorities say they have no plans to hold a referendum or withdraw from the EAEU—for now. The key word is “for now.” Yerevan intends to remain a member of the EAEU until there is a realistic prospect of joining the European Union. Moreover, under the EAEU’s founding rules, Armenia cannot be expelled from the bloc without its consent.

However, holding a referendum on EU membership appears to be a realistic prospect in the longer term. Opinion polls also suggest such a referendum could succeed. Since the 2020 war, Russia’s popularity in Armenia has declined markedly, while support for European integration has continued to grow.

According to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in May 2026, 75% of Armenians support the country’s accession to the European Union, while 58% say they would vote in favour of joining the bloc in a referendum. The findings point to a sustained decline in trust in Russia and growing pro-European sentiment among the Armenian public.

Photographer Mane Sergoyan shares her views. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan/JAMnews.

What do experts say?

Which direction should Armenia take? That is arguably the country’s defining question today. Does Armenia have the capacity to make a definitive choice in favour of the European Union? How might Russia respond if it does? And what security risks could such a shift entail?

Political analyst Robert Gevondyan says Yerevan is pursuing a diversification of its foreign policy, a goal repeatedly articulated by the country’s leadership. In his view, this aligns with the interests of Armenia’s European partners.

“Armenia is already receiving a certain level of support, particularly through its cooperation with France. It is possible that, in the future, security cooperation will expand to include other countries, although there is not yet enough information at this stage to identify them. At the same time, it should be remembered that the EU operates under NATO’s security umbrella. While Armenia is not currently seeking rapid accession to the Alliance, if it succeeds in developing close ties with individual EU member states, it could gain access to additional opportunities as an indirect beneficiary of NATO’s resources,” he said.

Is Armenia ready to become part of the European Union today? Gevondyan argues that the question itself is misplaced, as every country must go through a lengthy accession process before joining the bloc.

“No country is ever fully prepared to begin the integration process overnight. By the time Armenia is ready, it will effectively already be part of Europe. States usually go through a long period of integration, during which they implement reforms across various sectors, align with European standards, improve product quality and reach agreements on mutual trade. This process takes years. Armenia is ready to embark on that journey. At the same time, it is impossible to reconcile EU requirements and the conditions for trading with the West with the standards and requirements that exist within the EAEU. We are only at the beginning of a long road.”

Journalist Marianna Mkrtchyan shares her views. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan/JAMnews.

“Armenia is still a long way from joining the European Union. But the current trajectory could already result in serious losses—not only economically, but also in terms of the country’s sovereignty,” argues political commentator Hayk Khalatyan, founder of the Analytical Centre for Strategic Studies and Initiatives.

Khalatyan also argues that the Armenian leadership will ultimately be unable to sustain its current course of deepening ties with the European Union while remaining a member of the EAEU:

“Pashinyan’s challenge now, after the elections, is to try to normalise relations with Moscow. He will be expected to take concrete steps demonstrating that he is abandoning his previous foreign policy course. But that would effectively mean turning his back on the powerful external actors who helped him remain in power. The question, then, is which path he will choose: to turn his back on the West and Turkey, or continue down the path of confrontation with Russia and the gradual breakdown of bilateral relations. I very much doubt that Pashinyan will abandon his Western partners and move towards normalising ties with Russia. He would like to preserve the policy he has pursued in recent years—reaping the economic benefits of EAEU membership while, in practice, steadily distancing Armenia politically from Russia. But we are now seeing that Moscow is no longer willing to tolerate that approach.”

Human rights activist and film director Hovhannes Ishkhanyan shares his views. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan.

At the same time, relations between Brussels and Moscow remain deeply confrontational, with some political and security circles even discussing the possibility of a future conflict between Russia and the West.

Whatever the outcome, Armenia is now adapting to a new geopolitical reality while facing Russian trade restrictions. The country is seeking to redirect its exports towards European markets and diversify its trade partners. If it succeeds, Yerevan will remove what many see as its last major economic dependency on Russia.

Yasha Solomonyan, chairman of the Armenian Association of Professional Guides, shares his views. Video and editing: Arman Gharajyan/JAMnews

With the support of the Russian Language News Exchange

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Workshop dedicated to Istanbul’s Armenian printers opens in Yerevan

Mediamax, Armenia
Aug 7, 2026

Workshop dedicated to Istanbul’s Armenian printers opens in Yerevan

A two-day workshop titled Istanbul’s Armenian printers opened at the Matenadaran on August 7, 2026. The event offers a new historical perspective on the pivotal contributions of Armenian printers, type-makers, and craftspeople in Istanbul to the development of Ottoman print culture from the late eighteenth century onwards.

The workshop’s partners are Matenadaran – the Mesrop Mashtots Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, and the ISType platform.

“By combining technological and archival approaches, our speakers highlight the enduring legacy of Istanbul’s Armenian printers in shaping typographic and visual traditions not only in the Ottoman Empire but also far beyond its borders, from South Asia to Europe,” said workshop organizer and art historian Erin Piñon.

The workshop has brought together researchers from universities and academic centers around the world. Presentations in the first session focused on the work of Armenian printers Bogos Arabian, Ohannes Muhendisyan, and other Armenian type designers in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire. Speakers noted that their innovations in punchcutting, metal type production, and printing technologies largely shaped the visual identity of Arabic, Armenian, Persian, Turkish, and South Asian languages and laid important foundations for modern mechanical typesetting.

In the second part of the workshop, the speakers presented 19th-century Armenian illustrated publications published in Istanbul, exploring the interplay of movable type, engraving, and lithography, as well as drawing special attention to the restoration of the neglected creative heritage of the Istanbul-Armenian miniaturist and illustrator Stepan Agayian.

Photo: Mediamax

On August 8, a special exhibition will showcase rare multilingual publications produced by 19th-century printing houses in Istanbul, bringing together publications from the Matenadaran collections, public libraries in Yerevan, and private collections.

Photo: Mediamax

“This is the largest exhibition to date dedicated to the work of Bogos Arabian and Ohannes Muhendisyan. It will feature Armenian, Arabic, Persian, and Turkish publications that have never been shown together before,” Erin Piñon noted.

 

Gaiane Yenokian
Photos by the author

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WCC expresses deep concern on current situation affecting Armenian Apostolic C

World Council of Churches
Aug 7, 2026

World Council of Churches (WCC) central committee moderator Bishop Dr Heinrich Bedford-Strohm and WCC general secretary Rev. Prof. Dr Jerry Pillay expressed deep concern regarding the current situation affecting the Armenian Apostolic Church.

“WCC, as a global fellowship of churches, affirms the vital role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the spiritual, cultural, and historical life of the Armenian people and in the wider Christian family,” said Bedford-Strohm and Pillay. “As WCC, we express our  concern about undue interference in inner church matters.”

Bedford-Strohm and Pillay extended hope and prayers that the conflict will be resolved in a way that will foster the flourishing of the whole Armenian people. They added, “We uphold the Armenian Church and its people in prayer and support during this time.”

https://www.oikoumene.org/news/wcc-expresses-deep-concern-on-current-situation-affecting-armenian-apostolic-church

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Contested memories and everyday statehood in Armenia: translocal narratives of

New Eastern Europe
Aug 7, 2026

Armenia is currently undergoing a seismic change in how society relates to the state. While high politics remains an important factor, a growing number of citizens are starting to actively judge governments on their ability to improve everyday life.

August 7, 2026 – Anna Vardanyan –  Analysis

Armenia is navigating one of the most consequential periods in its post-Soviet history. The legacies of the Armenian Genocide, the Nagorno-Karabakh wars, and the 2023 exodus of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh continue to shape how citizens view the state, its institutions, and its ability to provide security and justice. Following the June 2026 parliamentary elections, debates over political legitimacy have become increasingly intertwined with questions of memory, identity and national belonging.

State legitimacy in Armenia is not determined by elections or constitutional authority alone. It is built – or eroded – through people’s everyday experiences with public institutions, local governance and official narratives. These perceptions are further shaped by actors beyond Armenia’s borders. Diaspora communities, international organizations, foreign governments and transnational media all influence public debate and competing visions of Armenia’s future.

Journalists, civil society representatives, displaced communities, and other local voices offer a window into how legitimacy is understood and contested in a rapidly changing political landscape. Their experiences reveal that trust in the state is continuously negotiated through lived experience, collective memory and transnational connections, making legitimacy an evolving social process rather than a fixed institutional condition.

State–society legitimacy after the 2026 parliamentary elections in Armenia

Armenia’s parliamentary elections, held on June 7th 2026, became an important test of state legitimacy in a post-conflict society still grappling with the consequences of the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the 2023 forced displacement of more than 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, ongoing peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, and a changing geopolitical orientation toward closer cooperation with the European Union.

According to the Central Electoral Commission, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 49.7 per cent of the vote, retaining its parliamentary majority. At the same time, the Strong Armenia Alliance and the Armenia Alliance became the main opposition forces. Several established parties failed to pass the electoral threshold. The results reflected continued support for the government’s reform agenda but also revealed persistent political polarization and competing visions of Armenia’s future.
International observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) concluded that voters were offered a genuine political choice within a professionally administered electoral process conducted under an overall sound legal framework. At the same time, observers reported a highly polarized campaign, unequal opportunities for contestants, allegations of misuse of administrative resources, pressure on some public sector employees, and foreign interference during the campaign, recommending further reforms to strengthen electoral integrity.
Public debate following the elections extended beyond the conduct of voting itself. Media coverage, civil society organizations, and political actors focused on broader questions of government performance. These included post-conflict recovery, border security, judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, economic stability, and assistance for displaced families from Nagorno-Karabakh. These issues shaped public perceptions of whether state institutions continued to meet citizens’ expectations.

Opposition parties challenged aspects of the campaign and electoral process through legal mechanisms, questioning the fairness of political competition while pursuing institutional avenues to contest the results. Although these challenges did not alter the constitutional outcome, they reflected continuing disagreements over democratic governance rather than rejection of electoral institutions themselves.

Independent journalists and domestic election-monitoring organizations played a central role in documenting alleged irregularities, scrutinizing campaign financing, monitoring compliance with electoral law, and providing platforms for competing political perspectives. Organizations such as the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly–Vanadzor, Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center, and other civic groups continued to monitor electoral processes and advocate for greater accountability and transparency.
International actors also influenced domestic perceptions of electoral legitimacy. Assessments by the OSCE/ODIHR, the European Union, and other international partners generally recognized the elections as competitive while encouraging continued democratic reforms and stronger institutional safeguards. These external evaluations became part of Armenia’s domestic political debate, illustrating how legitimacy is increasingly shaped through interactions between national institutions, civil society, and international actors.

The 2026 parliamentary elections therefore demonstrated that electoral legitimacy in Armenia extends beyond the formal declaration of results. While constitutional procedures confirmed the legal authority of the new government, public confidence continued to depend on the state’s ability to address security concerns, displacement, economic challenges, and democratic reform in the aftermath of conflict.

Memory, statehood and legitimacy

For many Armenians, trust in the state has been shaped less by constitutional debates than by a succession of national crises. The memory of the Armenian Genocide, the 2020 war, the nine-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, and the mass displacement from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 have become benchmarks against which political leadership is judged. As Benedict Anderson observed, shared historical narratives help define national identity – but in Armenia those narratives are reinforced by recent lived experience.

The humanitarian collapse of 2023 brought these questions into sharp focus. Within a week, more than 100,000 Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, making it one of the largest and fastest population movements in the region’s modern history. Many arrived after days without reliable food, medicine or fuel. This all followed months of restrictions on the Lachin Corridor that the International Court of Justice had ordered Azerbaijan to unblock.

Public confidence in the Armenian state quickly became linked to its practical response rather than official rhetoric. Government data showed that around 100,000 displaced people received emergency financial assistance, more than 73,000 households benefitted from housing support, and over 16,000 displaced children were enrolled in Armenian schools within weeks.

Yet humanitarian agencies warned that the emergency response was only the first step. As displaced families settled across Armenia, the focus shifted to affordable housing, access to employment, mental health and psychosocial support, education, and long-term integration. The UNHCR noted that the housing market was already under severe strain, while sustainable accommodation, livelihoods, and mental health support remained among the most pressing unmet needs. This underscored the gap between emergency assistance and durable solutions.

These experiences reshaped public debate. For many displaced families, confidence in the state was shaped by everyday interactions with public institutions – registering for assistance, securing housing, accessing healthcare, and finding employment – rather than by official statements alone. An inter-agency Rapid Needs Assessment conducted by the UN, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF and the Armenian government identified access to cash assistance, housing, health services, livelihoods, and education among the most immediate concerns of newly displaced households. Subsequent IOM assessments also highlighted the need to strengthen refugee registration systems while expanding employment opportunities, healthcare, and mental health support as key factors for long-term integration. The crisis also mobilized Armenian diaspora organizations, which raised millions of US dollars in humanitarian assistance and lobbied foreign governments. At the same time, international media and human rights organizations amplified scrutiny of developments on the ground.

Scholars including Laurence Broers, Nina Caspersen and Thomas de Waal have argued that in conflict-affected societies legitimacy is negotiated through lived experience as much as through formal institutions. Armenia illustrates this vividly: citizens increasingly evaluate the state not only by its legal authority but by its ability to provide security, respond to crises, and restore confidence after war and displacement.

Contested memory in Armenia and the South Caucasus

The political meaning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has remained deeply contested in Armenia. The First Nagorno-Karabakh War was widely remembered by many Armenians as a struggle for self-determination and national survival, becoming closely associated with the consolidation of post-Soviet statehood. The defeat in the 2020 war, however, challenged this narrative and triggered a broader debate over the meaning of victory, loss and responsibility. Public discussions increasingly questioned not only military strategy but also the assumptions that had shaped Armenia’s security policy for decades.

The crisis also exposed competing interpretations of the past and present among political actors, veterans, journalists and civil society groups. Explanations of Armenia’s defeat in 2020 developed along two main lines. Some analysts emphasized the broader geopolitical and military imbalance, pointing to Azerbaijan’s increased defence spending, military modernization, and strategic partnership with Turkey as decisive factors behind the outcome. Others focused on Armenia’s internal vulnerabilities, including problems in military reform, strategic planning and political decision-making. Within Armenia, debates over accountability led to calls for a deeper investigation into the causes of the defeat. A parliamentary investigative commission was established in 2022 to examine the circumstances of the 2020 war, while analysts and civil society actors continued to debate issues ranging from military preparedness to governance failures.

These disagreements revealed that collective memory is not a fixed national narrative but an ongoing debate over what citizens expect from their state and political leaders.

The Armenian experience also reflects broader regional patterns. Thomas de Waal argues in Black Garden that the conflicts of the South Caucasus are sustained by mutually exclusive historical narratives in which each society emphasizes its own experiences of victimhood while often overlooking those of neighbouring communities. Similar dynamics can be observed in Azerbaijan, where official memory strongly emphasizes the displacement of Azerbaijanis during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and celebrates the restoration of territorial integrity following the 2020 and 2023 military victories. In Georgia, collective memory remains shaped by conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where questions of displacement, sovereignty and Russian intervention continue to influence political discourse and public perceptions of the state. Across the region, historical memory therefore functions simultaneously as a source of national cohesion and as a barrier to reconciliation.

Laurence Broers further argues that these memory cultures should not be understood as isolated national phenomena but as interconnected “translocal” processes in which narratives circulate across borders through media, diaspora networks, academic institutions, humanitarian organizations, and digital communication platforms.

Ultimately, memory in the South Caucasus is not only about the past. It shapes how citizens evaluate governments in the present – whether states can provide security, respond to crises, and offer a credible vision for the future.

Everyday statehood: how Armenians experience the state

In Armenia, trust in the state is increasingly shaped not only by elections, constitutional reforms, or foreign policy decisions, but also by everyday encounters with public institutions. The concept of “everyday statehood”, associated with scholars such as James C. Scott, highlights how citizens judge government authority through practical experiences: accessing services, receiving protection, and seeing whether institutions respond to their needs.

Since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, public expectations of the Armenian state have changed significantly. While national security remains a central concern, many citizens increasingly evaluate governance through transparency, accountability, public services and institutional effectiveness. The post-revolution government placed anti-corruption reforms, judicial changes and greater public participation at the centre of its agenda, raising expectations about the state’s ability to deliver meaningful reforms. These changes have been discussed in reports by the European Commission.

Journalists and civil society organizations have played a major role in shaping these expectations. Investigative media outlets have exposed corruption, examined military and governance failures, and brought local grievances into national debates (e.g. Hetq, CivilNet, Investigative Journalists NGO). Civil society groups have also become important partners in areas such as humanitarian assistance, legal support, democratic reform and community development. Organizations working with displaced communities after 2023, for example, helped document needs and advocate for better state responses. The Transparency International Anticorruption Center Armenia has maintained extensive records of these changes.

The experience of Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh illustrates how legitimacy is tested through daily interactions. For these communities, the state’s credibility has been measured through practical questions: whether assistance programmes function effectively, whether housing support reaches vulnerable families, whether administrative procedures are accessible, and whether authorities provide clear information about the future.

For residents living near conflict zones, the reliability of local services and the government’s ability to respond during crises often matter as much as broader national security policies. Interviews with residents of Tavush and Syunik show that border communities often view the state presence not only through military protection but also through the availability of reliable public services and local infrastructure.

Veterans and families affected by war similarly evaluate the state through concrete support systems, including healthcare, pensions, employment opportunities and recognition of sacrifice. Symbolic commemorations alone are often insufficient without corresponding institutional support.

Generational differences have become increasingly visible in how Armenians define legitimate statehood. While many older citizens, shaped by the Soviet collapse, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, and decades of security concerns, continue to emphasize territorial protection and national security, younger Armenians have increasingly connected state legitimacy with democratic governance, civic participation, economic opportunity and institutional accountability. Surveys of Armenian youth have highlighted strong interest in education, employment prospects, participation in decision-making, and a more accountable relationship between citizens and institutions.

Social media has transformed political debate in Armenia by creating a space where citizens, journalists, activists and officials directly contest competing interpretations of government performance. Platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and messaging applications have become important sources of political information and mobilization: an Internews survey found that social networks, blogs, vlogs and podcasts were among the main sources of political and social news for Armenians, while digital platforms were also used by activists to organize humanitarian initiatives after the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh displacement.

Ultimately, state legitimacy in Armenia is built not only in parliament or during elections but through thousands of everyday interactions between citizens and institutions. These experiences determine whether the state is perceived as responsive, capable, and worthy of public trust.

Translocal narratives: diaspora, international institutions and political mobilization

State legitimacy in Armenia is increasingly shaped through transnational networks linking domestic actors with diaspora communities, international organizations, and digital platforms. These interactions have become particularly visible since the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the forced displacement of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.

According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, an estimated seven million Armenians live in more than 100 countries worldwide, compared with Armenia’s resident population of fewer than three million. Diaspora organizations have long influenced Armenian politics through humanitarian assistance, investment, lobbying and advocacy, particularly on issues such as recognition of the Armenian Genocide and post-conflict recovery.

The September 2023 humanitarian crisis further demonstrated the political significance of these transnational networks. Within days of Azerbaijan’s military operation, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, creating one of the largest episodes of forced displacement in the South Caucasus in decades. The response extended far beyond the Armenian government: the United Nations coordinated an Emergency Refugee Response Plan involving 60 humanitarian partners, including 43 Armenian NGOs, while diaspora organizations in France, the United States, Lebanon and elsewhere launched parallel fundraising campaigns and humanitarian initiatives. At the same time, numerous diaspora organizations publicly questioned the Armenian government’s handling of the crisis and peace negotiations, revealing competing understandings of state responsibility rather than a single diaspora position.

International institutions have also become important benchmarks against which citizens evaluate governance. Since the entry into force of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2021, cooperation has expanded in judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, public administration, and democratic governance. Following the 2022 border escalation, the European Union deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, while the OSCE and the Council of Europe continue supporting electoral integrity, rule-of-law reforms, and human rights initiatives. These engagements have reinforced public expectations regarding transparency, accountability and institutional performance.

Digital communication has accelerated these translocal dynamics. Diaspora organizations, journalists and civil society groups increasingly use social media to coordinate humanitarian assistance, organize political campaigns, and influence public debate across borders. The same platforms have also become channels for misinformation and competing narratives surrounding the conflict, illustrating how digital media simultaneously strengthens civic mobilization and intensifies political polarization.

Together, these developments suggest that legitimacy in contemporary Armenia is no longer negotiated solely between citizens and state institutions. It increasingly emerges through interactions among domestic actors, diaspora communities, humanitarian organizations, international institutions, and transnational information networks, each shaping public expectations of governance, accountability and state responsibility.

This article was produced within the framework of the “Write East” programme of the Leibniz Research Network Central and Eastern Europe and during the author’s research stay at the Leibniz Centre for Modern Oriental Studies (ZMO), Berlin, Germany.

Anna Vardanyan is an Armenian political journalist and researcher specializing in defence, international relations, and security issues in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

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