Armenia revokes license of tycoon and opposition figure Tsarukyan’s casino

OC Media

June 23 2026

The operating license of the Shangri La casino, owned by eccentric tycoon and opposition figure Gagik Tsarukyan, has been revoked by the Armenian government. The move was the latest blow against Tsarukyan as he and other opposition figures continue to face pressure following the victory of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in the parliamentary elections earlier in June.

Tsarukyan, a flamboyant billionaire, owns a variety of businesses and also heads the Prosperous Armenia party, which fell just shy of reaching the 4% threshold to join parliament.

In addition to his almost completed project to install the world’s tallest Jesus Christ statue, Tsarukyan said in May he would construct a giant Noah’s Ark monument in Armenia.

Narek Karapetyan placed under travel ban after Strong Armenia demands vote annulment

In comments about the revocation of the Shangri La operating license, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan said financial discrepancies in the gaming machine counters had been discovered after an inspection earlier this year.

Separately, just days after the election, Tsarukyan was placed under investigation on charges of large-scale tax evasion.

The announcement followed reports in Armenian government-affiliated media that Tsarukyan had attempted to leave the country on Tuesday through Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport, but was prevented from doing so.

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Armenia and Azerbaijan agree landmark internet deal as peace process continues

EuroNews

June 23, 2026
Copyright AP Photo
By Nadira Tudor & Peter Barabas
Published on 23/06/2026 – 17:06 GMT+2

Armenia and Azerbaijan’s leading telecom companies agreed to a joint internet transit project as both countries move forward together after decades of war, boosting regional connectivity.

Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a major agreement to transit internet traffic through their territories, marking a new step in the peace process between the former rivals.

The agreement is expected to diversify regional connectivity routes, enhance reliability and resilience in the South Caucasus, and support infrastructure development in Eurasian telecom networks.

In nearly identical statements, each operator said that “being the leading transit operator in the region,” they are “expanding the number and geography of countries supplying international Internet traffic”.

Telecom Armenia said it is thus “ensuring transit through its own infrastructure to Azerbaijan,” while AzerTelecom said it “ensures the transit of internet traffic to Armenia using its own infrastructure.”

Both companies said that “such agreements are aimed at diversifying connection routes in the region, further increasing the reliability of telecommunication networks and developing cooperation in the field of telecommunications.”

AzerTelecom, a leading backbone internet provider in the region, has announced it is developing the so-called Digital Silk Way project, which will establish a new digital corridor between Europe and Asia, including a fibre-optic cable beneath the Caspian Sea, to connect multiple regions and improve global data exchange capacity.

Meanwhile, in another sign of developing Azerbaijani-Armenian cooperation, another shipment of over 400 tonnes of fertilisers was delivered from Russia to Armenia on Tuesday via Azerbaijan’s transit routes.

In total, more than 14,000 tonnes of diesel and over 4,000 tonnes of petrol have been exported from Azerbaijan to Armenia, while over 32,000 tonnes of grain, more than 7,000 tonnes of fertiliser, and smaller quantities of aluminium, buckwheat and anthracite have passed from Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijani territory.

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Von der Leyen plans Armenia visit to show support for pro-EU government

Politico

June 23, 2026

Commission chief’s trip underscores Brussels’ backing for Armenia’s Western turn after a landmark election that dealt a blow to Russian influence in the region.

BRUSSELS — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is preparing to travel to Armenia next week, according to three people familiar with the plans.

The EU delegation, which will also include Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, will visit Armenia in a high-profile show of support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan after his pro-European party secured a decisive victory in the country’s June parliamentary election.

The July 1 visit, the plans for which have not yet been finalized, comes as Pashinyan seeks to cement Armenia’s shift away from Moscow and deepen ties with the European Union following a vote widely viewed as a referendum on the country’s geopolitical future.

“We have seen the country under intense and consistent pressure from Russia; a visit would send a strong signal of support, following on from the concrete support already delivered,” said one EU official working on the prospective trip, granted anonymity to speak frankly, as were the other people with knowledge of the planned trip.

They added it would send the message that “Europe is here for you.”

The trip has other repercussions for Brussels, as the College of Commissioners meeting scheduled for July 1 has been canceled, according to two of the officials. As a result, several legislative proposals that had been due for adoption have been delayed or otherwise affected. Among them are the Commission’s Public Procurement Act, a planned overhaul of EU tendering rules, as well as initiatives on the defense single market, innovation and livestock farming, as POLITICO first reported. The Commission has not yet announced a new date for these files.

Next week’s trip will be von der Leyen’s second to Armenia in less than two months. The Commission president was in Yerevan in May for the European Political Community summit, which Armenia hosted, before taking part in the inaugural EU-Armenia summit.

This year’s Armenian election was the first since Russian forces began to abandon their posts in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2022, where they had been deployed as “peacekeepers” following a war two years earlier. The region, inside Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, had been controlled by its ethnic Armenian population since a conflict in the 1990s. The entire population fled in the wake of an Azerbaijani offensive to retake the territory.

Since then, Pashinyan has accelerated Armenia’s turn toward the West, suspending participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance, and expressing interest in eventual EU membership.

Pashinyan won a third term and retained his parliamentary majority despite reported efforts by Moscow to influence the vote. The campaign was overshadowed by allegations of election interference and vote-buying, with Armenian authorities arresting more than 40 people over an alleged scheme that reportedly involved figures linked to opposition parties.

Brussels has stepped up political and financial support for Armenia as relations with the Kremlin have deteriorated.

Last week, the EU confirmed it would provide €34 million to help offset the impact of new Russian restrictions on Armenian exports and support efforts to diversify trade toward European markets. The bloc has also deployed a civilian monitoring mission along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.

Jacopo Barigazzi, Francesca Micheletti and Aude van den Hove contributed reporting.


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Literal Bridge Building: Turkey and Armenia

June 22, 2026
Amid tensions with Russia, Armenia is pursuing a full rapprochement with Turkey.
a:hover]:text-red” st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;border-width:0px;border-style:solid;border-color:currentcolor;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:2rem”>By Emil Avdaliani
June 22, 2026

The last time Turkey’s border with Armenia was open, Bill Clinton was the US president and Boris Yeltsin was his Russian counterpart. Jurassic Park was packing movie theaters, and the iPhone was more than a decade away. 

So any plan to restore ties between the two marks a historic moment. On June 8, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan expressed confidence that Armenia and Turkey would soon achieve full normalization of relations and that tangible progress had already been made. 

This follows Turkey’s decision in May to lift restrictions on bilateral trade with Armenia. Previously, goods shipped from Turkey to Armenia were first registered as exports to a third country and then re-exported to Armenia. New regulations will allow goods to be sent from Turkey to Armenia through a third country and in the opposite direction; the final destination or point of export can now be designated as “Armenia/Turkey”. 

This is a notable change given the fact that diplomatic relations between the two countries ruptured in 1993 because of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. Turkey stood by its Azerbaijani ally and closed the border. Despite a few diplomatic efforts in subsequent years, relations have remained limited.  

Things began to change right after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, when Baku regained some territory. Armenia felt betrayed by its supposed ally, Russia, which had refused to intervene, and sought to improve relations with Turkey. Rapprochement, it believed, would diversify Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia, and might also dilute the Ankara-Baku axis.  

The process developed over the next few years, with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan meeting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2022 and again last year. 

Yet, the real acceleration in relations has come over the past few months, coinciding with the deterioration of Russo-Armenian relations. On March 11, Turkish Airlines launched direct flights on the Istanbul-Yerevan-Istanbul route. In April, a meeting of the working group on the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway was held in the Turkish city of Kars. On May 4, Pashinyan announced a deal to rebuild the medieval Ani border bridge, and on May 23, the opening of the Akhalkalaki (Georgia)–Kars (Turkey) railway for the supply of goods between Armenia and the European Union.

The momentum behind the ongoing rapprochement is expected to strengthen. That was underlined by June’s parliamentary elections in Armenia, where Pashinyan and his party, Civil Contract, took 64 seats in the 105-seat National Assembly. His electoral campaign was based on the idea of further expanding relations with neighbors, including Turkey and Azerbaijan, and potentially building deeper ties. 

In a sign of the warming environment, Erdoğan congratulated Pashinyan on his election and added that the Armenian premier’s “vision of long-term peace and stability in the region and ensuring the necessary cooperation in this area will be successfully realized”. This contrasted with Russia’s reaction to the election results — Moscow offered no congratulations, signaling its unhappiness with the outcome and with Pashinyan’s policies.  

The Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is therefore directly linked to Russia’s changing position in the South Caucasus. Since the all-out war in Ukraine began, Moscow’s power in the region has notably declined. China, the EU, the US, and, not least, Turkey, all have increased their economic and political engagement with the South Caucasus countries. Ankara is particularly successful given its geographic proximity and economic leverage. For Armenia, it offers an alternative trade route to Europe that does not pass through Georgia, to its north. 

The pace of improving relations between Ankara and Yerevan will be contingent upon how quickly and efficiently Armenia and Azerbaijan improve their relationship and sign a comprehensive peace treaty settling all outstanding issues.  

Yet, even if this is a slow process, the peace treaty is likely to be agreed, and will signal another major geopolitical development in a region when Russia’s once-close ally is diversifying its foreign policy and economic ties. 

Ultimately, the war in Ukraine distracted the Kremlin. Armenia is not alone among Russia’s neighbors in using this moment to pursue alternatives to the old dependency.  

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.


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The Kremlin has made a statement about the situation around Armenia

Oreanda, Russia

June 23, 2026
OREANDA-NEWS In the situation with Armenia, Russia sees attempts to strike at integration associations to which Moscow is a member. 

“We see persistent attempts by adherents of the rules—based order to strike at integration associations in which our country is directly involved,” the presidential aide said.

He noted that at the same time, ideas are being instilled about the possibility of reviewing the history and geography of peoples who have lived side by side for centuries and helped each other. Ushakov called such ideas illusory.

At the same time, the Russian presidential aide spoke about the possible visit of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Moscow. He said that at the moment the Kremlin has no specifics on this issue.

https://www.oreanda-news.com/en/v_mire/the-kremlin-has-made-a-statement-about-the-situation-around-armenia/article1594675/

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Armenia’s Election Was Stolen on Schedule. The West Is Calling It Clean.

ViseGrad 24

June 23, 2026

Western observers certified the vote, but allegations of intimidation, electoral manipulation, and political bias continue to cast a shadow over Armenia’s future.

David A. Grigorian


Six weeks ago, I warned that Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary election was already being stolen. I take no satisfaction in having been right. I am in Yerevan now, and I have watched the theft completed up close.

A Victory Declared Before the Votes Were Counted

Start with the number the government would rather you skip. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract was declared the winner with 49.8 percent – short of a majority of the Armenians who actually voted, and short of the two-thirds supermajority he needs to deliver the constitutional changes Baku and Ankara demand of him. A leader whose approval is among the lowest of any sitting world leader nonetheless emerged with 64 of 107 seats. The machinery, not the electorate, produced that result.

Consider how it began. At about two o’clock on the morning after polls closed, with the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) having processed barely 10 percent of ballots, drawn mostly from the small rural precincts where his support runs highest – Pashinyan declared victory. The returns still outstanding were the ones he had most reason to fear: Yerevan, the capital, and Gyumri, the second city, which broke heavily for the opposition. The early counts pointed toward a result in which the two main opposition parties combined would outpoll him. He did not wait for them. He announced a win the data did not support and, in doing so, handed the Commission (led by a former ruling party member) its assignment, produce numbers to justify the claim. That is not winning an election; it is usurping power.

An Election That Could Never Be Lost

This was never a normal election. By Pashinyan’s own admission, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh was “a calculated sacrifice”, and under Armenia’s constitution, deliberately surrendering sovereign territory is an act of treason. A leader who loses power here does not retire to write his memoirs; he faces a reckoning, and very possibly a court martial. For Pashinyan, June 7 was not a contest to be won but a sentence to be avoided. That is the real reason he could not allow it to be free.

Intimidation, Arrests, and Electoral Manipulation

The irregularities are real and they are documented – in the recounts now underway, in the criminal cases opened on election night, in the gaps between the tallies signed at the precincts and the figures the CEC later posted. Those numbers will be litigated for weeks. But to argue the election only on the arithmetic is to concede the smaller ground. An election is not stolen at the ballot box alone. It is stolen in the days before it by a sustained, well-documented campaign of arrests and intimidation of opposition activists.

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There is more. On direct orders Pashinyan issued during the televised debate of party-list leaders the night before, a fringe party aligned with him petitioned the CEC, barely thirty-six hours before polls opened, to strip the largest opposition party, Strong Armenia, of its very right to compete. The Commission threw the case out for lack of evidence, but that a sitting prime minister would move, on live television, to delete his strongest rival from the ballot tells you the spirit in which this election was run.

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Understanding the Evolving Geopolitical Landscape in Armenia After the Electio

June 23, 2026
Understanding the Evolving Geopolitical Landscape in Armenia After the Elections

Background

Armenia held its parliamentary elections on June 7. This time, the elections have grabbed global attention. The reasons behind this were the changing foreign policy direction, including a shift away from Russia, the normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, along with polarisation in Armenian society and domestic reforms led by the ruling Civil Contract Party, headed by PM Nikol Pashinyan.

In recent years, especially after Baku’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Armenia has distanced itself from Russia. Yerevan froze its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). At the same time, Armenia made concerted efforts to strengthen ties with the EU. On 26 March 2025, the Armenian parliament adopted the EU Integration Act, which officially endorsed Armenia’s EU accession. The bill calls on the Armenian government to begin the process of joining the EU, making the European integration of Armenia formally part of Armenian legislation.[1]

Post-Karabakh War, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan invested significant political capital in a negotiated peace agreement with Azerbaijan and a normalisation process with Turkey. In this regard, the outcome of these elections was expected to shape how the government in Yerevan would further navigate its relationships with Baku, Moscow, and Brussels.[2] The western narrative primarily labelled these elections as a deciding factor in determining Armenia’s foreign policy direction- whether towards Russia or the West.

Pashinyan, who has been in power since 2018, declared victory after exit polls showed his party securing more than 50% of the vote. Ruling party’s success came despite Pashinyan’s domestic support falling from 54% in 2021 to around 30% today, according to polls.[3] In the final result, the Civil Contract Party secured 49.8 per cent of the votes, while the pro-Russian Strong Armenia running on a pledge to maintain Armenia’s traditionally close ties to Russia secured 23.2 per cent. The pro-Russian Strong Armenia party has also called on Armenia’s election commission to annul the parliamentary election result due to “voting irregularities”. The opposition alliance’s Aram Vardevanyan stated that “the petition was submitted, alleging that the victory claimed by incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s governing Civil Contract party should not be allowed to stand, despite the huge margin”.[4]

Consequences of Pashinyan’s Re-election

The opposition parties expressed strong objections to the election results. Six opposition parties issued a joint statement rejecting the official results of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections. They argued that the voting was marred by systemic violations that undermined the integrity of the electoral process. The statement, signed by the Strong Armenia Alliance, Armenia Alliance, Prosperous Armenia Party, Bright Armenia Party, Armenian National Congress, and National Democratic Pole, asserts that “the official results do not reflect the true will of the Armenian people and cannot serve as the basis for forming a legitimate government that enjoys the confidence of the majority of citizens”. The opposition parties cited that the ruling regime has used widespread administrative resources, obstruction of opposition campaign headquarters, political persecution of opposition figures and activists, and abuse of state and pro-government media resources.[5]

These parties also warned that responsibility for any future escalation of the political situation in Armenia rests with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his government. As mentioned already, the Strong Armenia party appealed to the apex court to annul the election results or to call a second round of voting. They were arrested by the authorities. They also denounced the arrests of opposition politicians as an assault on democracy. Several other opposition parties followed suit, accusing the ruling party of forcing public-sector workers to vote for it and bribing other voters.[6]

This tug-of-war between the ruling and opposition parties in Armenia has further polarised public opinion in the country. They have been wanting Yerevan to reduce its dependence on Moscow, but at the same time, the bad memories of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the exodus of millions of Armenians from the region back to mainland Armenia will still haunt the people. There is a possibility of questioning the decision to normalise relations with Baku and Turkey.

Challenges Ahead

There are three primary challenges that Nikol Pashinyan faces right now. First, to control the opposition parties and their constant political accusations of elections being rigged. Secondly, to reduce economic dependence on Moscow. And thirdly, normalise relations with Baku by signing the peace treaty, which requires a constitutional amendment. The Civil Contract party lacks the two-thirds majority needed to initiate the constitutional referendum that would finalise the peace deal. This implies that Pashinyan has to cooperate with the pro-Russia politicians who are being arrested and vilified. In this scenario, there are uncertainties about the potential referendum on constitutional amendment.

While the inclination toward the west is evident, it would be wise if PM Pashinyan manage to balance the east and the west. He envisions Armenia acting as a regional economic hub once the Donald Trump-backed TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) corridor is built. This corridor will connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan’s exclave between Armenia and Turkey. Armenia is expected to benefit from transit through its territory. But its economy remains closely linked to Russia. Around 40 per cent of Armenian exports go to Russia, and it has benefited financially from Russian businesses and citizens relocating since Russia went to war against Ukraine. While diversification is possible through Western partners and regional states, it would take years for Armenia to stabilise economically after a decoupling with Russia.[7]

Navigating these challenges requires combative instincts and a farsighted, balanced geopolitical approach. On one hand, Nikol Pashinyan has to deal with growing opposition from the pro-Russian parties. At the same time, moving away from Russia economically may give a big jolt to the country’s economy. There is another risk that Europe’s leaders may question whether Nikol Pashinyan is a fully democratic leader if he continues to arrest and convict opposition leaders. For the time being, Europe’s main agenda in Armenia is to counter Russian influence. But in the long term, European states may adopt a cautious stance and become sceptical of Pashinyan’s respect for the rule of law, pluralism and civic freedoms. They might step up their support for Armenian civil society to ensure a guaranteed check on the drift towards one-man rule.[8]

Will Pashinyan be Able to Balance the Geopolitical Tightrope?

PM Nikol Pashinyan’s win in the parliamentary elections should not be interpreted as a mandate for breaking ties with Russia. It’s a lot tougher than it looks. Moscow still maintains a military base in Gyumri, and Yerevan still remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). At the last meeting of the EAEU Heads of State in Astana in May 2026, a joint statement by the EAEU leaders was adopted. The EAEU leaders demanded that Armenia hold a referendum on whether to join the EU or leave the EAEU as soon as possible. Moscow has already cleared its position when PM Pashniyan met Putin in April that Yerevan has to choose either the EU or the EAEU. This is the most difficult choice that Pashniyan has to make now. Considering the examples of other countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, which have applied for EU membership and are still waiting, Yerevan’s decision to join the EU may also take time or fail to bear fruit. In this situation, the right thing to do is to gradually diversify economic relations away from Russia, while keeping the EU aspiration on hold. EAEU benefits cannot be immediately substituted by European countries.

On hard security issues, Armenia might continue exploring partnerships with European countries. It may suspend its CSTO membership or may be expelled by the CSTO itself. Despite widespread narratives about the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and elsewhere, Moscow retains significant leverage over Yerevan through trade, energy, military, intelligence, labour migration, and cultural connections. Pashinyan has not fully severed its ties with Moscow. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains substantial and exceeds that of many other post-Soviet states. As a result, Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.[9]

Implications for India

After PM Pashinyan won the elections, PM Modi also congratulated him. India and Armenia have a civilisational and historical relations dating back millennia. Due to the lack of a direct land route, the bilateral trade remained below potential. However, given the changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus, India has revised its policy toward the region in recent years. Mainly because of the Azerbaijan-Turkey and Pakistan nexus in the region, which has an indirect security concern for India. Armenia became the defence partner for New Delhi. According to expert estimates, both countries concluded contracts totalling US$1.5 billion, with the total volume of weapons purchases by Armenia from India reaching US$600 million by the start of the 2024-25 financial year.[10] Both countries have also been working toward diversifying the relations beyond the defence.

As it stands, the region’s geopolitics is changing rapidly; India should also revisit its policy toward the South Caucasus. New Delhi must consider the evolving dynamics of Armenia’s relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even Russia. India’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey are complex, while its relations with Russia are the most politically trusted. In this context, New Delhi must work towards diversifying its relations with Yerevan and should not keep them limited to just defence partnership.

Conclusion

Post-re-election of Nikol Pashinyan, the geopolitics in the South Caucasus is bound to change. There are a few things to observe. Yerevan’s aspirations for EU accession, managing ties with Russia and the EAEU, normalising relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and whether it will gain full support from the Armenian population. And lastly, if the USA and European countries continue to pursue their engagement with Armenia seriously for broader developmental goals rather than just to counter Russian influence. India should also closely monitor developments in the region and thus make its move carefully.

References

[1] Csongor Körömi, ‘Armenian parliament adopts law to launch EU membership process’, Politico, March 26, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-adopts-law-launch-european-union-accession-process/
[2] ‘Outcomes of the Armenian Parliamentary Elections, Implications for Armenia-EU Relations’, German Council on Foreign Relations, June 10, 2026 https://dgap.org/en/events/outcomes-armenian-parliamentary-elections
[3] Kathryn Armstrong and Rayhan Demytrie, ‘Armenia’s pro-West government wins election despite Russian pressure’, June 8, 2026. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgel990n51o
[4] ‘Pro-Russian opposition party calls for Armenian election result annulment’, Al Jazira, June 12, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/12/pro-russian-opposition-party-calls-for-armenian-election-result-annulment
[5] ‘Six Armenian Political Forces Reject Election Results, Say Official Data Does Not Reflect People’s Will’, Oragark News, June 14, 2026. st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;outline:none”>[6] Ibid.
[7] Matija Šerić, “Battle For Armenia: Yerevan Between Moscow And Washington – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, June 19, 2026. https://www.eurasiareview.com/19062026-battle-for-armenia-yerevan-between-moscow-and-washington-analysis/
[8] ‘Armenia’s westward turn overshadowed by personal rule, Civicus lens,’ June 18, 2026 https://lens.civicus.org/armenias-westward-turn-overshadowed-by-personal-rule/
[9] Sanshiro Hosaka, ‘Armenia After the Election: Diversification Without Decoupling from Russia’, International centre for Defence and Security, June 18, 2026. https://icds.ee/en/armenia-after-the-election-diversification-without-decoupling-from-russia/
[10] Nvard Chalikyan and Benyamin Poghosyan, “Geopolitical Aspects of the India-Armenia Partnership”, APRI Armenia, December 18, 2024. https://apri.institute/the-geopolitical-aspects-of-the-india-armenia-partnership/

(The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance… More >>

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Home of opposition Armenia Alliance MP searched amidst post-election recrimina

OC Media

June 23 2026

The home of opposition MP Ishkhan Saghatelyan, from former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance party, has been searched as part of what the country’s Investigative Committee said is a criminal case. The Tuesday morning raid was the latest in a string of ongoing investigations into suspected wrongdoing by Armenia’s opposition following the victory of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in the parliamentary elections earlier in June.

The Investigative Committee did not specify on what grounds the search was being conducted, simply telling the state-run media outlet Armenpress that, ‘investigative and procedural actions are being carried out within the framework of a criminal proceeding’.

Shortly after the election, Saghatelyan had criticised Pashinyan for declaring victory before the official results were announced, claiming it amounted to ‘nothing more than attempts to pressure the Central Electoral Commission [CEC] and seize power’.

A number of other opposition figures have faced various forms of pressure since the election, including travel bans and the opening of investigations.

On 17 June, the CEC approved a request by the Prosecutor General’s Office to revoke Kocharyan’s parliamentary immunity, paving the way for expected criminal charges to be filed over abuse of official authority and money laundering over a 2004 transaction.

Two days later, Kocharyan filed a lawsuit to dispute the lifting of his immunity.

Pashinyan dismisses Karapetyan’s plans to consolidate opposition forces

Separately, fellow opposition figure Narek Karapetyan filed his own lawsuit against the Investigative Committee, demanding the body retract its allegations that he ‘concealed’ his foreign citizenship while registering as a parliamentary candidate, which constitutes an obstacle to acquiring the status of a public official.

The two legal disputes come as the Constitutional Court prepares to hear challenges to the results of the parliamentary elections.

According to the final results, the ruling Civil Contract party will hold 64 seats in parliament, while Strong Armenia secured 29 seats and the Armenia Alliance won 12. The opposition Prosperous Armenia party led by tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan failed to pass the 4% threshold required to enter parliament, receiving only 3.9893% of the vote after a controversial decision by the CEC.

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A partner post from the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.

eurasianet

June 23, 2026

A partner post from the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.

Irakli Laitadze Jun 23, 2026

On June 7, Armenia held general elections with significant implications for both the country and the South Caucasus. Incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 49.81 percent of the vote. Although falling short of a majority, the result still enables Pashinyan to form and lead the new government. The victory of Civil Contract signifies a rupture with Russia’s sphere of influence and the institutionalization of a pro-Western course. The collapse of the pro-Russian opposition, despite unprecedented pressure from Moscow, indicates that Armenian citizens made a strategic choice in favor of genuine sovereignty and European integration. This choice is likely to produce long-term changes not only in Armenia but also in the security architecture of the South Caucasus.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia approached the June 7 elections amid intense geopolitical turbulence. The country stood at a crossroads between two incompatible trajectories: deeper Euro-Atlantic integration or a return to Russia’s sphere of influence. Understanding this choice requires examining developments in the recent past.

Following its defeat in the 2020 Karabakh War, Armenia lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The country was confronted with a harsh reality: Russia, its ally and partner within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), failed to defend Armenia during the conflict. As a result, Pashinyan’s government intensified the already ongoing process of deepening ties with the EU and the United States In March 2026, the Armenian parliament adopted a bill initiating the process of accession to the EU. Consequently, the elections effectively became a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation and security strategy.

Russia responded with increased pressure. The election campaign was effectively transformed into an open confrontation between Moscow and Yerevan. Russian officials publicly warned that continued pursuit of a pro-Western course could expose Armenia to a scenario similar to that experienced by Ukraine.

The regional dimension is equally important. The South Caucasus is a region where the interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, the U.S., the EU, and increasingly China intersect. Armenia has traditionally been a stronghold of Russian influence in the region: Russian forces are stationed at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, an aviation component is based at Erebuni Air Base, and Armenia remains a member of the CSTO. Yerevan’s drift away from Moscow represents more than the loss of an ally; it is a strategic setback that could reshape the regional balance of power. This explains why the stakes were far higher than those of a regular parliamentary election.

IMPLICATIONS:

Russia’s attempt to influence the election outcome was not only unsuccessful but also counterproductive. In addition to extensive use of bots, disinformation, and fake news, reports suggest that Moscow was covertly preparing operations aimed at preventing Pashinyan’s re-election, allegedly including scenarios involving his physical elimination.

Russian economic pressure was systematic and sustained. Moscow banned imports of Armenian Jermuk mineral water, halted sales of Armenian brandy and wine, and reduced imports of meat and fish products. On the eve of the elections, Russia sent an official letter signaling its intention to suspend exports of gas, oil, and diamonds. Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s federal veterinary and phytosanitary agency, also banned imports of Armenian tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, and dried fruits. To influence the vote, plans were reportedly discussed to organize travel to Armenia for around 100,000 Russia-based Armenians.

The pro-Russian camp was represented by two key figures: Samvel Karapetyan and Ruben Vardanyan. Both embodied an alternative to Armenia’s Western-oriented course. Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire and leader of the Strong Armenia electoral bloc, lived in Moscow until last year and, in addition to Armenian citizenship, held Russian and Cypriot citizenship. He allegedly maintains links with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). Since June 2025, Karapetyan has been under house arrest on charges of encouraging the seizure of state institutions. Moscow openly demanded his release and participation in the parliamentary elections, turning the issue into a political instrument of pressure on Yerevan.

Another key figure was Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire who left Moscow to become State Minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Arrested by Azerbaijani authorities while leaving Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin Corridor, he is currently serving a prison sentence in Azerbaijan (Meduza). Vardanyan became both a symbol of the lost Armenian Karabakh and a reminder of the failure of the pro-Russian course, which ultimately provided Armenia with neither security nor genuine independence.

The election results reflected the Armenian public’s increasingly negative attitude toward Russia. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia alliance received 23.29 percent of the vote, while the Armenia bloc, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, a veteran of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and a prominent advocate of close ties with Moscow, won 9.93 percent. Combined, the main pro-Russian forces secured only about two-thirds of the support received by Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.

Western countries, particularly the U.S., expressed unusually strong support for Nikol Pashinyan. On May 27, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly endorsed Pashinyan on Truth Social. The previous day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed several bilateral cooperation agreements, including a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter. On June 4, following a telephone conversation with Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that Brussels was preparing additional support measures for Armenia, including €50 million in financial assistance.

The 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) was held in Yerevan on 4 May 2026, with the participation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The event served as a clear signal of Armenia’s emerging European orientation and identity. Almost simultaneously, Turkey partially lifted the trade restrictions on Armenia that had been in place since 1993. The easing of this economic embargo marks a significant step toward the normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations and has the potential to reshape the region’s economic architecture.

A stable, pro-Western Armenia would be better positioned to finalize a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and secure the full lifting of Turkey’s long-standing economic blockade. Under such circumstances, Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO could become a realistic prospect in the near future. This step would deprive Russia of the principal legal framework underpinning its military presence in Armenia, further accelerating the country’s geopolitical reorientation.

Armenia is expected to continue developing its relations with the EU while maintaining membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, as confirmed by Prime Minister Pashinyan. This reflects tactical pragmatism rather than an ideological compromise: Armenia remains dependent on Russian gas imports and on the large Armenian diaspora residing in Russia. Nevertheless, the country’s strategic orientation toward Europe appears to have been firmly established.

CONCLUSIONS:

The elections of June 7 may prove to be a point of no return in the history of post-Soviet Armenia. Despite political pressure, economic coercion, and extensive Russian involvement, Armenian voters endorsed a genuinely sovereign choice and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to a pro-Western path of development.

Russia suffered a strategic defeat, as neither Karapetyan nor Kocharyan succeeded in challenging the pro-Western majority of Armenian voters. The Kremlin’s unprecedented pressure, including threats of a “Ukrainian scenario” and the use of economic coercion, failed to weaken Pashinyan and his supporters. Instead, these measures contributed to their further mobilization and strengthened Pashinyan’s image as a defender of Armenian sovereignty and statehood.

The electoral victory of Civil Contract and its parliamentary majority provide Armenia’s pro-European course with a clear democratic mandate to advance further along the path of European integration.

Armenia is entering a phase of profound transformation in its security architecture, moving from dependence on Russia toward a more diversified and multilateral security framework. This realignment is likely to reshape not only Armenian domestic and foreign policy but also the broader balance of power in the South Caucasus. For the first time in the post-Soviet era, Armenia, and, to a lesser extent, the wider region, is beginning to move beyond the logic of Russian dominance. The date of June 7, 2026, may be remembered as the day Armenia chose its own future.

This article was originally published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and reprinted under a partner post arrangement with Eurasianet.

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Subsidizing 4 billion drams will not solve the problems: agronomist

Aysor, Armenia

June 23, 2026

The restrictions imposed by Russia on Armenian agricultural products remain in force, and their first negative consequences are already being felt by exporters of flowers, greens, and mulberries, agronomist Harutyun Mnatsakanyan said in an interview with Aysor.am.

According to him, mulberry exporters are facing particular difficulties, as Russia was the primary market for the product: “Demand for mulberries in other countries is not nearly as high.” 

Mnatsakanyan also noted that this year’s apricot harvest suffered significantly due to adverse weather conditions.

“There was hail, frost, and excessive humidity caused by heavy rains, all of which negatively affected the harvest. As a result, yields are quite low this year,” the agronomist said. 

According to his information, some batches of apricots have already been exported. 

“It was possible to export several hundred tons of apricots. Friends of mine exported about 200 tons to Lviv, and several truckloads were sent to Iran. I do not have information about the remaining volumes,” he said.

Commenting on the high prices of agricultural products, Mnatsakanyan argued that they are not entirely justified.

“Apricots are only now beginning to ripen, and prices will decline over time. As for other agricultural products, even I cannot explain why prices are so high. The Competition Protection Commission should look into the matter,” he said. 

The agronomist recalled that Armenia exports approximately $1 billion worth of agricultural products annually and warned that continued export restrictions could create serious challenges for the sector.

“If these restrictions remain in place, just imagine how critical the situation could become,” he emphasized.

Speaking about state subsidy programs, Mnatsakanyan said that annual support amounting to around 4 billion drams is insufficient to address the sector’s problems.

“That is roughly $10 million. Compared to an export volume of $1 billion, it amounts to only 1 percent. In the long run, such support will not solve any major issues; at best, it can somewhat ease the situation in the short term,” he said.

He added that, in addition to export-related difficulties, the agricultural sector continues to struggle with the consequences of natural disasters, including this year’s hailstorms and frosts, which caused substantial damage to crops.

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