Stefan Hedlund
Reading time: 11 min
Armenia’s warming relations with Europe, Turkiye and Azerbaijan are both a product and a driver of fading Russian influence in the South Caucasus.
n a nutshell
- The EPC Summit showcased political transformations in the South Caucasus
- Armenia has lost faith in Russia and is turning firmly toward Europe
- Relations with historical foes Turkiye and Azerbaijan are also warming
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Geopolitics in the South Caucasus has long been rooted in a tension between two centers of gravity. One is represented by the North-South Transport Corridor that links Russia with Iran, and the other by the emerging east-west corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or simply the Middle Corridor, that links China with Europe. The relative importance of each corridor for the South Caucasus is fundamentally shifting, to the detriment of Russia. Although Moscow retains clout in Georgia, across the remainder of the region its influence is waning fast. By far the best illustration may be found in Armenia.
EPC highlights Armenia’s westward pivot
Long considered one of Russia’s closest allies, Armenia is part of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, has participated in Russian military drills and hosts the largest Russian military base outside the Russian Federation. However, its loyalty to the Kremlin is being supplanted by its strong desire to join Europe. Armenia drove home this message in early May when it hosted the 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) in its capital, Yerevan.
In and of itself, the EPC is not overly important. Founded in 2022 in response to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its mission has been to maintain a united European front against Russia and Belarus. When it met for its first summit in Prague, in October 2022, the heads of 44 European countries participated, together with the presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council. On May 4 of this year the summit gathered the leaders of 47 European countries (with the addition of microstates San Marino, Andorra and Monaco). Both times, the gathering excluded Russia and Belarus.
The decision to meet in Yerevan offered a powerful reflection of how geopolitical realities are being transformed. Up until a few years ago, Georgia was the primary focus for European and American policy making in the South Caucasus. Slated for membership of the European Union, it was a leading member of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. Following the rigged parliamentary election in October 2024, and the subsequent increasingly authoritarian stance of the Georgian Dream government, its standing has deteriorated substantially. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has been considered highly problematic in terms of human rights abuses. As such, it was logical that Armenia would be chosen to take Georgia’s place.
This said, the decision to meet in Yerevan was not by default but rather due to a fundamental transformation of Armenian relations with its immediate neighbors and with Europe. The key feature was the resolution of the long war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for control over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mainly Armenian-inhabited enclave within Azerbaijan. The endgame played out in 2023, when Azerbaijani forces routed the Armenian defenders, causing a mass exodus of Armenian civilians. Importantly, the Russian peacekeepers that had been deployed to keep the two sides separated opted to stand aside and watch.
Feeling it had been betrayed by its Russian guarantor, the Armenian government opted to accept the humiliating defeat and engage in peace negotiations with Azerbaijan. When those negotiations resulted in a peace agreement, the road was clear for the country to chart a new course away from Russia. In addition to undertaking legislative preparations for membership in the EU, it has taken steps to soften its relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkiye. The latter is especially important. If relations between Ankara and Yerevan can be normalized, and the border can be opened, Armenia will no longer be dependent on Iran for a lifeline.
Armenia joins Europe in support for Ukraine
When the EPC convened in Yerevan, it was the first time that it met in Armenia. To Russian President Vladimir Putin it must have been deeply disturbing to have to watch the meeting being co-chaired by the prime minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and the president of the European Council, Antonio Costa. Even worse for Russia was that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was invited to give an opening speech.
Read more on the South Caucasus:
- Russia’s waning influence in the South Caucasus
- Georgia – a strategic outlier in Russia’s regional retreat
- U.S. eyes greater influence in the South Caucasus
In another first, a non-European country was invited to the event. Speaking as a guest, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney used the occasion to reiterate his emphasis on the need for middle powers to stand up in defense of the rules-based international order. In a stab at United States President Donald Trump, he projected a new vision: “It is my strong personal view that the international order will be rebuilt, but it will be rebuilt out of Europe.” Presenting Canada as the “most European of non-European countries,” he said he would work to deepen relations with Europe on matters like the war against Ukraine. In his speech, President Zelenskiy also noted that the Yerevan summit symbolized the shared values of Canada and the European Community.
For Ukraine, the meeting was important in providing an opportunity for President Zelenskiy to have a personal meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Following the electoral defeat of the government of Viktor Orban, the dawn of new Hungarian foreign policy and more cooperative relations between Kyiv and Budapest, hopes are that relations between Ukraine and Slovakia – which have been strained particularly over the Druzhba oil pipeline – will also improve. Thanking Prime Minister Pashinyan for giving him this opportunity, President Zelenskiy expressed confidence that reciprocal visits to Kyiv and Bratislava will pave the way to better relations.
Armenia’s warming relations with historical foes
Aside from the summit’s role in providing a platform for such important geopolitical transformations, it also showed that Armenia is reaping the rewards of a policy of confidence building in relations with Turkiye. During the summit, Prime Minister Pashinyan had a meeting with Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz – whose presence represented the first high-level Turkish visit to Armenia since that of President Abdullah Gul in 2008 – in which they agreed to restore the medieval Ani Bridge. The bridge spans the Arpacay River, which currently marks the Armenian-Turkish border, and during the 13th and 14th centuries it suffered multiple waves of invasions and earthquakes, leaving it destroyed. The decision to rebuild is a signal that the border between the two countries, which has been closed since 1993, may be reopened.
The Ani Bridge in Arpacay Canyon, at the border of Turkiye and Armenia. In a highly symbolic move, the two countries have agreed to rebuild the bridge. © Getty Images
The main gain for Turkiye in upgrading its relations to Armenia lies in access to the Zangezur Corridor, a 42-kilometer stretch of land in southern Armenia that borders Iran and separates Azerbaijan proper from its Nakhichevan exclave. While the war over Nagorno-Karabakh was still raging, the corridor was closed and Turkiye was forced to conduct trade with countries in Central Asia via Iran. As part of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan it will now be reopened. Although the route will be subject to Armenian law, and the land will remain sovereign Armenian territory, good relations between Ankara, Baku and Yerevan will help it develop into an important transport artery.
The opening of the Zangezur Corridor also benefits Azerbaijan, boosting not only its already thriving relations with Europe but also its relations with Ukraine, as a non-Russian source of energy. Baku has recently begun supplying natural gas to Ukraine, Austria and Germany, and soon to the Czech Republic as well.
As the main loser from these developments, Russian reactions to the meeting in Yerevan were overwhelmingly negative. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the meeting had offered a platform for “anti-Russian statements” that were “inconsistent with the spirit of relations” between Armenia and Russia. President Zelenskiy having been allowed to make derogatory remarks about the then upcoming Russian Victory Day celebration on Red Square, without comment from the host, was met with sheer outrage, causing the Armenian ambassador to Moscow to be summoned for an explanation.
Thinly veiled threats were also issued about rapprochement with Europe. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed a hope that the Armenian leadership would not forget that dealing with Brussels comes at a price: “The experience of other countries shows that such overtures to the West rarely end well for the states involved.” Upping the ante even further, President Putin suggested that a referendum should be held on Armenia’s plans to join the EU, warning about the stakes at hand: “We all see what’s happening with Ukraine now. But where did it all start? With Ukraine’s attempt to join the EU.”
Scenarios
Most likely: Armenia cements its Western orientation
The most likely outcome is that Armenia not only cements its relations to Azerbaijan and Turkiye but also becomes the prime focus for European efforts to build influence in the South Caucasus. Armenians confirmed they are ready to work more closely with the EU in early June, when they reelected the government of Prime Minister Pashinyan.
This represents a decisive shift in political orientation and in connectivity, favoring the Middle Corridor across Central Asia to Europe while downgrading the International North-South Transport Corridor between Russia and Iran, a move that will constrain Russian shipping across the Caspian Sea.
Hurdles do remain. Armenia has a legacy of dependence on trade within the Eurasian Economic Union and on energy deliveries from Russia and Iran. Both dependencies may be phased out, but it will be complicated and it will take time. Pro-Russian groups in opposition will be sure to exploit such complications.
The Russian military presence is even more daunting. Although Russian border guards and peacekeepers have been withdrawn, the base at Gyumri is still active, holding 3,000 to 4,000 Russian troops, together with MiG-29 fighter jets and S-300 air defense systems. Having been renewed in 2010, the bilateral agreement on this base is set to last until at least 2044. The Armenian government has no intention of demanding that it be closed, but will insist on Armenian legal superiority. Although it is possible that such challenges cause Armenia to veer off course and return to Russia’s embrace, the odds are strongly in favor of it remaining on course toward Europe.
Less likely: The U.S. capitalizes on the TRIPP corridor
A less likely scenario is that the U.S. capitalizes on its claims to have ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. What is mainly at stake here is a projection of the opening of the Zangezur Corridor as an American project, labelled as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The peace agreement that was signed at the White House on August 8, 2025, did include exclusive rights for the U.S. to develop the corridor for 99 years. Yet, it is questionable how much weight this stipulation holds, given that the project is entirely under Armenia’s legal jurisdiction.
Although the peace summit in Washington was labeled by American sources as “historic,” and as the fruit of American diplomacy, crediting President Trump for the long labors of the three main parties involved – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkiye – is a bit of a stretch. Furthermore, the U.S. campaign against Iran has undermined its clout in the South Caucasus.
Least likely: Russia claws back regional influence
The least likely scenario is that Russia manages to claw back its prior position as regional hegemon. Factors that make this feasible include the presence of strong pro-Russian opposition groups in Armenia, the Kremlin’s continued control over the Georgian government and an increasing level of support for Iran across the South Caucasus.
In addition to cooperation on drones and other weapons, Moscow has thrown Tehran a lifeline by offering to route Iranian oil exports via the Caspian Sea into the Russian pipeline network. Although this does provide an added headache for the U.S., it is not likely to have much regional impact. The emerging alliance between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkiye is now too strong for Russia to infiltrate in a major way.