Russia Uses Controlled Pressure on Armenia Following Elections
Executive Summary:
- Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Russia for the first time since winning Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6. High-level Russian officials, however, have not recognized Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s parliamentary election victory while criticizing Armenia’s elections.
- Yerevan’s continued pursuit of peace with Baku, normalization with Türkiye, and closer ties with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States could erode Russia’s remaining military, political, and economic leverage in the region.
- Moscow is likely to rely on controlled political, media, and economic pressure—including energy leverage and support for opposition forces—rather than broad sanctions on Armenia, seeking to preserve influence while discouraging Armenia’s further integration with the West.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made his first visit to Russia following the country’s June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6 (Prime Minister of Armenia, July 6). In addition to attending the plenary session of the INNOPROM 2026 International Industrial Exhibition in Yekaterinburg, he met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin (Prime Minister of Armenia; The Moscow Times, July 6). The visit comes after senior Russian officials—including President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova—have yet to congratulate Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract Party on its victory in the parliamentary elections (Al Jazeera, June 8).
Russian dissatisfaction extends well beyond its silence and refusal to congratulate Pashinyan. Echoing the strong criticism and protests voiced by Armenia’s opposition parties regarding alleged organized electoral fraud and political and security-related pressure exerted by the Armenian government, Zakharova also sharply criticized the conduct of Armenia’s parliamentary elections. She stated, “The parliamentary elections in Armenia were held under conditions of unprecedented pressure on the opposition and Western interference, primarily on the part of the European Union.” She added, “During the electoral process, Yerevan openly violated the principles and procedures governing the conduct of free elections” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 8).
The parliamentary elections in Armenia may signify the continuation and consolidation of the country’s foreign policy trajectory that Yerevan has pursued since May 2018 following the Velvet Revolution (see EDM, May 3, 2018). The principal features of this trajectory include reducing tensions and moving toward peace with Azerbaijan; normalizing relations with Türkiye; gradually distancing itself from Russia—including the possibility of withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); expanding engagement with the Western world, particularly the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States; and implementing the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik Province (see EDM, April 2, August 5, 2024, March 25, April 22, May 11, 22, June 3, 16, 22, July 20).
These trends do not align with Russia’s geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus. Armenia has traditionally been a strategic ally of Russia. Since Pashinyan came to power in May 2018, however, the country has taken a significant distance from Russia (see EDM, June 3, 2022, January 10, 2024, January 28, February 6, 2025, May 12). If, following Pashinyan’s victory in the recent parliamentary elections, Armenia were to withdraw from the CSTO and the EAEU, Russia would lose main points of leverage in the South Caucasus. Given that neither Azerbaijan nor Georgia is a member of these two Russia-led regional organizations, Moscow would effectively lose its two principal military-security and economic-commercial pillars in the South Caucasus. With the evacuation of Russian military bases from Armenia, the presence of Russian military forces in the South Caucasus would become limited only to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see EDM, May 2, 2024, May 27)). Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO could pave the way for the expansion of the country’s cooperation with NATO. At the same time, its exit from the EAEU would lead to closer cooperation between Armenia and the European Union (see EDM, June 16).
Armenia’s parliamentary elections became—much like the elections held in recent years in Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Eastern European countries—a choice between Russia and the West for Armenian voters (see EDM, April 15, June 5, June 15). A repeat of the results of the April Hungarian elections in Armenia within such a short period of time was another blow to Russia’s influence. The fall of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government—Russia’s closest partner within the European Union—after 16 years represented one of the most significant setbacks to Russia’s strategy in Central Europe in recent years (see EDM, May 7).
Russia’s preferred outcome in Armenia’s parliamentary elections was likely the victory of Armenian nationalist and conservative political forces, particularly the Strong Armenia Alliance led by Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian-Russian businessman, or the Armenia Alliance led by former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan (see EDM, June 5). Such an outcome would have enabled Armenia to return its foreign policy to its pre-2018 orientation, under which the country, alongside states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, was regarded as one of Russia’s close and traditional allies.
Under these circumstances, it appears that Russia is waiting to see the outcome of the continuing protest strategy pursued by Armenia’s opposition parties. The joint statement issued by five opposition political parties condemning the ruling of Armenia’s Constitutional Court upholding the election results, as well as the protests against the detention of prominent opposition figures, including Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of the Prosperous Armenia Party, may have led Russia to conclude that Armenia’s political situation remains unstable (Armenian Weekly, July 7, 9).
The opposition parties may choose to boycott the new Armenian parliament while, at the same time, protests by their supporters continue on the streets of Yerevan (Caucasian Knot, July 14). Under such circumstances, Moscow could argue that a segment of Armenia’s political community has not accepted the election results. In this context, the absence of congratulatory messages from Russian officials may be part of a broader strategy aimed at calling Pashinyan’s political legitimacy into question. The most desirable scenario for Russia appears to be the creation of a prolonged war of attrition, in which street protests, legal challenges, parliamentary boycotts, and media pressure continue simultaneously. In such a situation, Pashinyan would remain prime minister from a legal standpoint, but he would continuously face challenges to his political legitimacy, making it more difficult to sustain his pro-Western orientation and to further distance Armenia from Russia.
Russia’s subsequent steps will depend on its response to Pashinyan’s practical course of action, particularly about Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO, the closure of Russian military bases, and its potential exit from the EAEU. Under such circumstances, Russia would likely employ a combination of more punitive measures and economic pressure against Armenia, including the gradual increase of natural gas prices; the imposition of technical or customs restrictions on certain Armenian goods; the reduction of Russian investments; the application of informal restrictions on Armenian migrant workers in Russia; and political and media support for domestic opposition groups (see EDM, June 5; Armenpress, July 21).
This model can be described as controlled pressure. Moscow likely does not want to push Armenia completely toward the West by imposing excessive pressure. Amid its competition with the West, Moscow appears to prefer to preserve its remaining levers of influence in Armenia. Broad sanctions could have the opposite effect by further increasing anti-Russian sentiment among the Armenian public. In the energy sector, they could push Armenia toward alternative gas sources from Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan (see EDM, November 20, 2024, March 25, May 5, 19). In the transit sector, they could lead to Armenia’s deeper integration into the Middle Corridor. They could allow European countries, the United States, India, Iran, and the People’s Republic of China to become involved in infrastructure projects such as railways, telecommunications, and electricity networks, as well as in financial and banking markets (see EDM, August 12, September 24, October 15, 2025, January 22, March 31, May 22, June 3, July 20). All these considerations will likely compel Russia to apply controlled pressure on Pashinyan’s government to change or adjust its policies.
Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine also plays a factor in Russia’s position abroad. Russia’s involvement in the war against Ukraine and the extensive sanctions imposed on Russia by the West have played a role in Russia’s flexibility toward Azerbaijan and Türkiye, as well as in the reduction of Russia’s focus on the South Caucasus (see EDM, May 20, July 7, 22, October 27, 2025, February 2, April 22). If the war against Ukraine ends in any form, Russia’s return to the geopolitical dynamics of this region would become highly likely, placing greater pressure on Armenia under Pashinyan’s leadership.
If relations between Moscow and Yerevan enter a phase of severe tensions following the elections, an increase in gas prices and indirect economic pressures could be considered a relatively likely scenario. Comprehensive and official economic sanctions against Armenia, however, appear less likely in the short term, and such a scenario would become more plausible only if Armenia formally withdraws from the CSTO and the EAEU. Until then, Russia is likely to prefer using political and media pressure, as well as energy leverage, to exert influence without destroying its channels of communication with Armenia.
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