July 30, 2026
On October 15 of last year, more than 10 priests of Aragatsot Diocese were invited to the investigative bodies of Yerevan for questioning. On the same day, a search was made in the presbytery of the diocese and the presbyter of the diocese was detained for 2 months.
Even at that time, the lawyers representing the interests of the priests stated that the case has nothing to do with the crime.
The law enforcement officers searched the apartments of many of the priests invited to the investigative bodies, phones were confiscated, including the phones of their family members.
The law enforcement officers had also entered early in the morning at that time Priest Vrtanes Baghalyan, spiritual pastor of St. Hovhannes Church in Byurakan to search the apartment, but they did not find anything, instead, they took the phones of the clergyman and his family members.
168.am–Fr. Vrtanes inquired from priest Baghalyan whether the phones were returned, is there an explanation from the law enforcement officers about what they have been looking for in the phones for almost a year?
“In that case, I myself was called to the investigative body as a witness, that I was present at the events in Aragatsotn Diocese, while I was not a priest of the diocese at that time, I was in Gugarats Diocese. In other words, after the elections of 2021, I was appointed to spiritual service in the diocese. I was called as if I had been directed by Reverend Mkrtich during the elections, but I was not on duty in the diocese at that time, moreover, I did not have time physically to participate in the 2021 elections,” noted Father Vrtanes.
He said that the law enforcement officers returned his daughter’s seized phone, but changed the password to access the phone, as a result, they are currently unable to use the phone, moreover, they received the phone from the investigative body with a non-working battery.
“Until now, the law enforcement officers have not returned my phone, they have kept my phone for so long without any reason. I told the law enforcement officers the password of my phone, they could check the whole phone in 10-15 minutes. Without a court notice, they first call for an investigation, confiscate my phone and don’t return it for almost a year. Imagine the frivolous environment created by them,” added the priest.
According to the clergyman’s observation, it seems that the law enforcement officers are not looking for anything in his phone, they just took it, because there is no secret information in his phone that could be “upset”.
“I have been serving in the diocese of Aragatsotn for 4 years, under the guidance of Bishop Mkrtich. He did not give us any instructions, on the contrary, he was a straitjacket for us in many cases. With his neutrality and paternal attitude, the bishop has been a supporter and helper for us in the spiritual service, what the law enforcement officers unreasonably assume did not happen. But until this moment, they forbid the reverend to go to the Presbytery and diocesan churches, to meet with us, in the event that we have the status of a witness. All of our priests in the diocese need the holy father’s advice on our way of service, but they do not allow us to meet with him.
You all remember that last year on December 18, during the invasion of the Mother See, I had an acute heart attack. If the reverend was free, he could have helped me with many questions. But I continue to serve in the high altitude zone, despite my health problems, because theoretically today they are not allowed to meet and talk with the reverend. The spiritual life of the diocese has been illegally obstructed,” emphasized priest Vrtanes Baghalyan.
Our interlocutor also added that until now Hovhannavank is occupied, the clergy of the church, Mr. Sargis and Mr. Manuk, cannot enter the church, because the disorganized priest is sitting there. People want to get married and baptized in that church, but they don’t want that ceremony to be performed by a disorganized priest. The police, which should have just kicked out the disorderly priest from the sanctuary owned by the Mother See, is supporting one more thing in order to keep the church occupied.
“Everyone knows that these processes against us are groundless, even the judges know that all this is frivolous, because it has never happened that the inner life of a spiritual structure was discussed by a secular court.
Until now, the people who broke into the Mother See have not been convicted, nor the group of drunken hooligans who tried to attack the Mother Cathedral, nor their leaders. “Let’s hope that the structure of the head of the CC, which is supported by our taxes, will return the telephones to us,” emphasized Reverend Vrtanes Baghalyan.
It should be noted that the Reverend Mkrtich remained in prison for about 5 months, in February his preventive detention was replaced by house arrest, and then in May, by administrative control.
According to the accusation, Reverend Mkrtich used his official powers to “obstruct the right to vote and forced priests of the diocese to participate in opposition gatherings.”
Let’s remind that these actions of Aragatsotn Diocese were carried out within the framework of the proceedings initiated on the basis of the statement made by Stepan Asatryan, the former spiritual pastor of Hovhannavank, on the air of Public TV. Ter Aram announced that in 2021 he was forced to participate in political gatherings.
The program was submitted to the Prosecutor’s Office by the NGO “Union of Informed Citizens”.
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168: Unilateral revision of obligations on the South Caucasian railway
July 30, 2026
In case of a unilateral review of obligations regarding the South Caucasian Railway (SCR), Russia will have the right to demand compensation from Armenia. Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. Maxim Reshetnikov responded to Pashinyan’s words
The main points of the statement.
- The South Caucasian Railway is not a free asset of a Russian company, but an enterprise in which more than 30 billion rubles have been invested.
- Pashinyan’s words are also an occasion to remind about the significant advantages that Armenia’s economy receives due to EAEU membership and, in particular, trade with Russia. During the EAEU membership, Armenian exports to the Union countries increased from $240 million to $3.2 billion, and more than 80% of traditional Armenian exports (food, agricultural products, and alcohol) are supplied to EAEU countries. Entering alternative markets requires long-term restructuring of production chains and involves high commercial risks.
- If we evaluate these deliveries from the point of view of the economic impact on the market from the rest of the Union, their importance cannot be called significant. Armenia’s share in Russia’s gross trade with the world does not exceed 0.9%.
- Armenia saves $120 million annually due to low Russian gas prices. In addition, if the country loses access to the EAEU market, exports to the EU countries will decrease by more than 60%.
Air University examines lessons from the Nagorno-Karabakh wars
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, Ala. —
Understanding modern warfare requires more than studying battles. It requires examining the political decisions, military investments and alliances that shape conflicts long before combat begins.
That was the focus of a recent Air Force Global College lecture at Air University, where Augustine Meaher IV, associate professor of security studies, examined the three Nagorno-Karabakh wars to illustrate how decades of strategic decisions influenced military operations and reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus.
Through historical analysis and discussion, Meaher challenged students to look beyond battlefield outcomes and consider how national policy, diplomacy, force development and technological change influence military success.
“The Soviet Caucasus were strewn with autonomous oblasts and republics, as well as enclaves and exclaves,” Meaher said. “None as contentious or as fought over as Nagorno-Karabakh.”
Beginning with the final years of the Soviet Union, Meaher traced the origins of the conflict through three major wars that culminated in Azerbaijan’s restoration of control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Rather than recounting individual battles, he focused on the strategic decisions that shaped the conflict over more than three decades.
Following the 1994 ceasefire, Armenia and Azerbaijan pursued different approaches to national security. Armenia became increasingly reliant on external security guarantees, while Azerbaijan invested in its armed forces, expanded defense partnerships and modernized its military capabilities.
“The balance of power in the Caucasus gradually shifted,” Meaher said. “Armenia became increasingly reliant on Russian protection while Azerbaijan, growing rich from its oil reserves, learned from the Turks and bought high-quality military equipment from Israel and Turkey.”
When large-scale fighting resumed in 2020, Meaher highlighted how Azerbaijan integrated intelligence, unmanned aircraft, precision fires and maneuver into a coordinated campaign.
“Azerbaijan made heavy use of drones to systematically isolate and destroy enemy positions,” Meaher said.
The discussion emphasized that technology alone does not determine the outcome of a conflict. Meaher described how doctrine, leadership, organization and sustained investment influence the effectiveness of military capabilities once they are employed.
The lecture also examined the role of alliances and security guarantees throughout the conflict, including Armenia’s reliance on Russia and the regional implications of Moscow’s response during the 2020 war.
“Russia’s refusal to intervene in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war indicated that power had dramatically shifted in the Caucasus and beyond,” Meaher said. “Russia’s inability to ensure security to a friendly state was noted throughout its near abroad.”
Meaher concluded by examining how Armenia has continued to adjust its security relationships following Azerbaijan’s restoration of control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and the broader regional changes that followed decades of conflict.
The lecture demonstrated how historical case studies can help military professionals understand the relationship between strategy, national policy and military operations. By studying contemporary conflicts, Air University students examine how decisions made before a crisis can influence outcomes once forces enter the battlefield.
As America’s Airpower University, Air University operates as an integrated enterprise that connects education, research and engagement to develop Airmen, Guardians, Department of the Air Force civilians and joint leaders. Through expert faculty, operationally relevant scholarship and professional military education, the university forges expert joint warfighters and contributes to solving operational problems for the Joint Force.
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TRIPP Plays Role in Reordering of Eurasian Trade Routes
July 28, 2026
TRIPP Plays Role in Reordering of Eurasian Trade Routes
TRIPP Plays Role in Reordering of Eurasian Trade Routes
Executive Summary:
- Civil Contract’s victory in Armenia’s elections reinforced its pro-Western stance and its peace talks with Azerbaijan, enabling the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and its integration with the Middle Corridor via Central Asia and South Caucasus.
- Armenia can become a key transport hub, improving Türkiye–Azerbaijan connectivity and deepening peace ties while boosting its economy. Georgia may face rivalry to its transit routes, but its Black Sea ports will ensure deep integration into the expanded network.
- If successfully realized, TRIPP could foster greater economic interdependence, support regional peace and stability, and contribute to the emergence of a more interconnected South Caucasus and wider region.
Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections were not only a vote for Armenia’s future geopolitical trajectory between the West and Russia. They were also a vote for the future path of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process (see EDM, June 5, 17, 22). The development of transit corridors through the South Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a major component of the ongoing peace process (see EDM, May 22). Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-Western Civil Contract party’s victory in the parliamentary elections maintained Armenia’s trajectory toward peace and the West.
The West has expressed support for Armenia’s democratic pursuits and the peace process with Azerbaijan both before and after the elections (see EDM, May 11, June 3). The latest demonstration of this support was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Yerevan on July 2. She unveiled solid economic measures that will help Armenia become more economically resilient (European Commission, July 2; see EDM, July 20). On July 16, the Armenian government approved a draft law for the ratification of the Framework Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between Armenia and the United States for the TRIPP project. According to Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, the agreement “further elaborates on the agreed details and areas of cooperation” consistent with the Washington Declaration signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the United States on August 8, 2025, and a document defining the implementation of TRIPP signed by the U.S. State Department and Armenian Foreign Ministry on January 13 (see EDM, August 12; Armenpress, July 16). The Washington Declaration included the opening of new transport and communication channels, including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik Province (Yerevan Today, August 9, 2025).
The electoral victory of pro-Western forces in Armenia opens a window of opportunity for the major infrastructure project connecting Azerbaijan and Armenia for the first time in decades. The configuration of South Caucasus trade, energy transit flows, and geopolitical influence will be dependent on TRIPP’s realization (News Armenia, November 17, 2025)
TRIPP created a framework where transport and energy transit corridors will function under Armenian jurisdiction, guaranteeing uninterrupted operation of the route between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Before the TRIPP framework was agreed upon in Washington, the route was referred to as the Zangezur Corridor in Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan, this corridor is a direct tie between two separated territories of the country, while for Armenia, it had been a concern of its sovereignty over Syunik (News.am, September 6, 2024). Zangezur can be considered a physical landline, while the TRIPP connectivity project is political and commercial. The latter is a reconceptualized Zangezur corridor. TRIPP means creating the whole system of infrastructure, including railway, motorway, energy-carrier routes, digital networks, and logistical hubs. According to the abovementioned declarations, the development of TRIPP must be executed with the participation of the United States and mutually determined third parties (Business Media, July 17).
TRIPP will increase trade, cargo turnover, and transactional costs and will further strengthen the trade route between Europe, Türkiye, South Caucasus, and Central Asia while bypassing Russia. Circumventing Russia is already a heavy political component, as it will allow trade with less dependence on the politically charged and unpredictable Russian route amid its war against Ukraine. TRIPP will also play an important role in the political integration of the South Caucasus. Its realization will foster peace and normalization not only in Armenian–Azerbaijan relations, but in Armenian–Turkish relations as well (Kavkasia, May 4; see EDM, May 22).
TRIPP is not a stand-alone megaproject. It forms part of a broader regional connectivity framework. It will be linked to the Middle Corridor, an east–west trade corridor connecting the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye (Ankasam, May 15).
For Armenia, the opening of new transport routes will represent the largest economic transformation the country has experienced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. TRIPP will break the land blockade Armenia has faced since the early 1990s as a result of the First Karabakh War. The new transport corridor will position Armenia at the crossroads of major regional trade flows. This shift would make Armenia, and Syunik province in particular, an increasingly attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Armenia will diversify its foreign economic relations, decrease its dependence on a limited number of trade partners, and create multiple jobs. As peace takes hold and stability endures over time, Armenia’s appeal to international investors is likely to grow steadily, gradually transforming Armenia into a dynamic economic corridor (Anadolu Ajansı, June 9).
For Azerbaijan, the successful implementation of TRIPP would deliver economic gains. By establishing a direct transport link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan exclave, the corridor would enhance connectivity while reducing transit times and costs. Greater integration into regional transport networks, particularly into the Middle Corridor, would reinforce the country’s economic resilience. The project will encourage investment in logistics centers, customs facilities, and industrial zones along the route. Over time, these developments will create jobs, support regional economic growth, and improve the efficiency of Azerbaijan’s logistics sector, further consolidating Baku’s position as a leading transportation and commercial hub in the South Caucasus (AZERTAC, September 24, 2025).
Georgia became a connecting link between Europe, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia amid Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s blockade of Armenia. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway all run through Georgian territory. Realizing TRIPP, however, could lead to problems for Georgia. If a portion of the goods from Azerbaijan and Central Asia are moved via Armenia and Nakhchivan, then the BTK railway will have diminished cargo turnover. With its Black Sea ports, Georgia will still have an important role in transit routes. Additionally, if Georgia develops its Black Sea infrastructure such as the Anaklia Black Sea port and continues to upgrade its transport infrastructure, it will solidify its key role in the new, wider transport infrastructure (Sputnik Georgia, December 5, 2025; see EDM, July 16).
Türkiye is one of the beneficiaries of TRIPP (see EDM, May 22). The route would deepen Ankara’s economic and political engagement with the South Caucasus and Central Asia, supporting its strategic objective of expanding its influence throughout the Turkic world and immediate neighborhood (see EDM, April 28, May 19, 21). TRIPP would further enhance Türkiye’s role as a key bridge between Europe and Asia and strengthen its position within the Middle Corridor. The project will generate economic benefits through increased trade, investment, and transit revenues. At the same time, improved regional connectivity would advance Türkiye’s ambition to serve as a major transportation and energy hub linking Europe with the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the PRC.
The outcome of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections created favorable conditions for the advancement of TRIPP and the broader normalization process in the South Caucasus. TRIPP can reshape regional trade patterns and strengthen connectivity across Eurasia. Enduring mistrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan, domestic political uncertainties, and the risk of renewed tensions, however, could complicate implementation. If successfully realized, TRIPP could foster greater economic interdependence, support regional peace and stability, and contribute to the emergence of a more interconnected South Caucasus and wider region.
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Pashinyan talks Russian import bans, possible EU referendum in first call with
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has spoken to Russian President Vladimir Putin, marking the first time the two leaders have talked, albeit on the phone, since the Armenian parliamentary elections in June that saw Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party notch another term in power. Ahead of the election, Russia stopped short of openly supporting the opposition but made it clear the Kremlin desired Pashinyan’s defeat, and has not publicly congratulated him on his victory in the almost two intervening months.
The official Russian readout of the call, held on Monday, said it had been initiated by Armenia.
The remaining details from the Russian side were brief, simply stating Putin had reiterated Armenia should hold a referendum on attempting to join the EU or maintaining membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
The Armenian readout provided more information about the talks, noting that Pashinyan had focused on ‘problems emerging in bilateral economic relations’.
Regarding Putin’s demands, Pashinyan ‘emphasised that holding a referendum is practically possible only after Armenia submits an official application to the European Union for EU membership and makes the topic substantive’.
Separately, Pashinyan raised the issue of the wave of Russian restrictions on Armenian imports that began before the election and continue to this day, saying the measures ‘contradict the Armenia-Russia legal framework and the regulations of the EAEU’.
Russia has banned the import of a wide range of Armenian products, including alcohol, dairy, flowers, fruits, vegetables, mineral water, fish, and others.
While Russia continues introducing new restrictions, Deputy Russian Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk has claimed that Russia did not ‘introduce any restrictions for Armenian imports at all’, calling it ‘usual normal work’.
Other Russian officials have said they would replace Armenian products in the Russian market with Azerbaijani goods.
On Tuesday, Putin also had a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, but neither the Russian nor the Azerbaijani readouts of the conversation mentioned Armenia or any connected issues.
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Pashinyan spoke with Putin and responded to demands to hold a referendum on Ar
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time since the June parliamentary elections. The parties discussed bilateral relations, economic issues, and the prospects for Armenia’s European integration. This was reported by the Armenian government’s press service. At the same time, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the parties allegedly emphasized the need to hold a referendum in Armenia as soon as possible on the country’s integration into the European Union.
According to a statement from the Armenian government, Pashinyan raised the issue of restrictions on the supply of goods of Armenian origin to Russia during the conversation. He stated that such measures contradict the existing legal framework between the two countries and the rules of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and called on Moscow to resolve the situation.
The Kremlin reported that the conversation took place at the initiative of the Armenian prime minister. According to the Russian side, Putin referred to the joint statement by the leaders of the EAEU countries, adopted on May 29 in Astana, and stressed the need to hold a referendum in Armenia to determine the country’s future foreign policy course—whether to move toward the European Union or to maintain membership in the EAEU.
Pashinyan noted that holding such a referendum will only be possible after Armenia officially submits its application for membership in the European Union, which will make this issue subject to practical consideration.
The prime minister also assured that the Armenian government is ready to resolve all contentious issues with Russia through open, constructive, and friendly dialogue.
The results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia, held on June 7, have effectively determined the country’s foreign policy course and the prospects for its relations with Moscow, the EU, and the U.S. At the same time, Russia is doing everything in its power to halt Yerevan’s rapprochement with the West.
- In the June elections in Armenia , the party received the most support “Civic Contract,” led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which received 49.7% of the vote.
- Prior to the elections, Russia imposed a series of trade restrictions against Armenia. However, in mid-June, the European Union provided Armenia with 34 million euros to mitigate the impact of these Russian restrictions on the private sector.
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Turkish Press: Pashinyan: Armenia’s EU referendum awaits formal bid
YEREVAN
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on July 27 told Russian President Vladimir Putin that a referendum on his country’s accession to the EU is possible only after Yerevan submits an official bid to join the 27-member union.
“Prime Minister Pashinyan emphasized that holding a referendum is practically possible only after Armenia submits an official application to the European Union for EU membership and makes the topic substantive,” a statement by Pashinyan’s office said after a phone call between Pashinyan and Putin.
The statement said Pashinyan’s remarks came with regards to the topic of holding such a referendum in Armenia, which it said is also written in a joint statement adopted after a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) leaders meeting in May.
Following the EAEU meeting in the Kazakh capital Astana on May 29, the Russian president, as well as the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, said in a joint statement that they shared the need to hold a nationwide referendum in the South Caucasus nation on EU accession or continued EAEU membership “as soon as possible.”
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Armenia’s AI Bet Is Not Chip Manufacturing. It Is Compute Sovereignty
July 28, 2026
Armenia’s AI Bet Is Not Chip Manufacturing. It Is Compute Sovereignty
SEO DIGITAL PROS
July 28, 2026
Armenia is not a big country. It’s not a wealthy country. It’s not a famous country. And yet, it has become not only a consumer of different AI products akin to Clideo subtitles generator for video editing, or giants like OpenAI, but also entered the headlines of global news for several reasons, not the least of which is politics. Another reason is tech advances, precisely, the alleged ‘manufacturing of chips for NVIDIA’. The latter is a big name, which you surely recognize, so let’s discuss the situation in detail.
First and foremost, news started circulating that NVIDIA was somehow “making chips in Armenia.” But clarifications are in order. Armenia is not becoming a chip fabrication country in the Taiwan sense. NVIDIA Blackwell chips are not going to be manufactured in Hrazdan or Yerevan; NVIDIA says Blackwell GPUs are manufactured using a custom TSMC 4NP process, which places the core chip-production story firmly inside the existing global semiconductor supply chain, not inside Armenia.
Armenia is trying to do something else: become a regional AI compute hub, built around imported high-end NVIDIA infrastructure, U.S.-approved chip transfers, local telecom and energy capacity, and a growing argument that smaller countries need sovereign access to AI computing power.
The centerpiece is Firebird, a U.S.-based AI cloud and infrastructure company operating between San Francisco and Yerevan. Armenia’s Ministry of High-Tech Industry says the first phase of the Firebird AI center near Hrazdan is scheduled around 2026 and involves a $500 million investment, more than 6,000 NVIDIA Blackwell GPUs, 18 MW of capacity and up to 110.6 exaflops of FP4 Tensor compute. The government presents the second phase as far larger: approximately $4 billion in total investment and more than 41,000 additional GPUs, a scale that, if delivered as described, would place Armenia unusually high on the global AI-compute map for a country of its size.
Real Story Behind Infrastructure
The confusion is understandable because the word “chips” is everywhere in this story. U.S. export approval was required. NVIDIA Blackwell GPUs are central to the project. Dell Technologies is involved on the server side. The U.S. and Armenia also signed an AI and Semiconductor Innovation Partnership MOU on August 8, 2025, which the U.S. International Trade Administration describes as covering secure semiconductor supply chains, integrated-circuit and electronics development, AI commercialization and Armenia’s position under the U.S. export-control framework. That sounds close to “chip production,” but it is not the same thing as building fabrication plants. In practical terms, Armenia’s emerging role is closer to AI infrastructure, cloud services, electronics/IC development, engineering talent and semiconductor-adjacent R&D than mass semiconductor manufacturing.
Moreover, NVIDIA now frames major AI infrastructure as AI factories, i.e., systems that manufacture intelligence rather than physical goods. Its GB300 NVL72 platform, for example, is a rack-scale system combining 72 Blackwell Ultra GPUs and 36 Arm-based Grace CPUs in a liquid-cooled architecture designed for training and inference at very high density. Dell, one of the infrastructure partners in this broader market, describes its PowerEdge XE9712 with NVIDIA GB300 NVL72 as a rack-scale enterprise AI platform, built for high-output reasoning inference and improved throughput. In other words, Armenia’s project is not about making the chip; it is about hosting the machines that make large-scale AI development possible.
Independent regional reporting supports this reading. Eurasianet reported in November 2025 that U.S. regulators approved the transfer of advanced NVIDIA chips for Armenia’s AI hub, while also noting Dell’s PowerEdge server role and the political importance of the approval process. OC Media, citing Bloomberg, reported that the project involves a 100 MW data center using NVIDIA Blackwell chips and Dell AI servers, with the first phase expected in 2026. OC Media also reported that part of the significance lies in export controls: Armenia had previously been affected by U.S. restrictions on exports of high-performance AI chips to certain countries, making approval a strategic as well as commercial milestone.
Why Armenia Wants AI Compute So Badly
For Armenia, the strategic logic is clear. The country already has a serious technology base relative to its size, especially in software engineering, mathematics, electronic design automation and diaspora-connected entrepreneurship. Synopsys Armenia, for example, describes its local operation as covering R&D and product support for electronic design automation, design for manufacturing and semiconductor IP, with more than 1,000 employees across Yerevan and Gyumri. That does not make Armenia a chip-manufacturing giant, but it does mean the country has long been more connected to the semiconductor value chain than casual observers may assume.
The Firebird project attempts to add a missing layer: massive compute. Talent without computers becomes dependent on foreign cloud providers. Research without GPUs remains theoretical. Startups without local access to advanced infrastructure may build around someone else’s platform, pricing and policy limits. That is why the phrase “compute sovereignty” fits the Armenian case better than “chip production.” The argument is not that Armenia can replace existing semiconductor powers. The argument is that access to AI infrastructure is becoming a national development issue, the way broadband, energy grids and transport corridors once were.
There is also a public-sector AI layer. Armenia has signed a cooperation agreement with Mistral AI, and Mistral’s own customer page says the partnership with Armenia’s Ministry of High-Tech Industry focuses on AI assistants, public services and government functions, with attention to open and adaptable models that fit Armenia’s language, infrastructure and use cases. That makes the country’s AI push less like a single data-center announcement and more like a broader attempt to connect infrastructure, public services, startups, universities and international partnerships.
The Hard Part Comes After the Announcement
However, there are obstacles on the way. The factories of AI require a massive amount of energy, capital and are politically charged. A 100 MW data centre would consume as much electricity as a city of around 120,000 people, and could consume significant cooling capacity, but Armenia’s Ministry of High-Tech Industry claims that the Firebird centre is fitted out with a closed loop water-cooling system that only requires a water change every few years. This is the case of Armenia’s own energy situation: U.S. International Trade Administration reports that Armenia has an adequate current electricity generating capacity with rising consumption and is still relying on a combination of nuclear, hydro and thermal generation.
There is also a risk of execution. Firebird is young, the capital figures are big, the gap between an AI factory that has been announced and is fully leveraging and an AI compute hub that is fully utilized and commercially viable is huge. The project will require customers, a reliable power supply, cooling, network resiliency, export-control stability, and operational expertise and a local ecosystem that can absorb a part of the compute capacity. The Ministry reports that Team Telecom Armenia is installing next-generation fiber-optic infrastructure with up to 1 Tbps bandwidth, while according to OC Media, the project could include some portion of compute which would be allocated to domestic companies and the remaining compute that would be sold to U.S.-based companies operating in the region. What’s important about those details is that usage of the GPUs will impact local benefit – who will be getting them, at what price, and for what type of work.
The most accurate way to describe Armenia’s AI moment, then, is not “NVIDIA is producing chips in Armenia.” It is this: Armenia is trying to turn advanced imported chips into domestic strategic capacity. If Firebird, Dell, NVIDIA-linked infrastructure, U.S. export approvals, local telecom investment and public-sector AI partnerships come together as planned, Armenia could become one of the more unusual AI infrastructure stories of the next few years: a small, landlocked country using computers as a development strategy. The gamble is bold. Armenia is not trying to become the next chip fab. It is trying to become a place where the next generation of AI systems can be trained, hosted and commercialized.
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Putin presses Armenia to hold referendum on EU or Eurasian bloc membership
Nikol Pashinyan told the Russian president a vote was only possible once Yerevan had formally applied to join the European Union.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has pressed Armenia to hold a national referendum on whether to join the European Union or remain in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), during a telephone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on July 27.
According to a Kremlin readout, Putin reaffirmed his commitment to a joint statement adopted by the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in Astana on May 29. It said particular emphasis had been placed on the need for a nationwide vote “as soon as possible”.
Pashinyan’s office set out a different emphasis. It said the Armenian Prime Minister had told Putin that a referendum was “practically possible only after Armenia submits an official application” to the EU and the question acquired substance.
The Kremlin said the call had been made at the request of the Armenian side.
Armenia has not lodged a membership application with Brussels. Its parliament approved a law launching the accession process on March 26, 2025, which took effect the following month, and the Armenian Government has said the text does not constitute a formal bid.
Pashinyan also raised Russian curbs on Armenian exports, telling Putin they contradicted the legal framework governing relations between the two countries as well as EAEU rules. He asked Moscow to take steps to resolve the matter.
Russia’s agricultural watchdog Rosselkhoznadzor has restricted a widening list of Armenian goods since the spring, beginning with Jermuk mineral water and extending to alcohol, cut flowers, fruit and vegetables. From June 12 it barred almost all Armenian plant products and their transit to other EAEU states.
Moscow has cited phytosanitary breaches and the repeated detection of pests. Officials in Yerevan and Brussels have described the measures as politically driven.
The Astana statement warned that Armenian preparations for EU accession carried “serious risks” for the economic security of the bloc. The four governments are due to report in December on the consequences of suspending the EAEU treaty in relation to Armenia.
Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 49.8 per cent of the vote and 64 of the 105 seats in the June 7 parliamentary election, days after Russia recalled its ambassador from Yerevan over what it called steps towards rapprochement with the EU.
The EU held its first summit with Armenia in Yerevan on May 5. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen opened the bloc’s market to most Armenian exports on July 2.
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Armenia’s Prime Minister raises possibility of EU membership vote
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, during a conversation with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, suggested that a referendum on the country’s accession to the European Union could be held in the country, according to Armenian Radio Svoboda.
As the edition writes, yesterday, July 27, Pashinyan spoke with Putin for the first time after the parliamentary elections held in June.
According to a statement from the Armenian government, Pashinyan called on Moscow to take action regarding the restrictions Russia has imposed on the import of products from Armenia. He explained that the measures contradict bilateral agreements and the rules of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Meanwhile, in the Kremlin, presenting the details of the talks, it was reported that Putin emphasized to Pashinyan the need to hold a referendum on joining the European Union or continued membership in the EAEU as soon as possible.
The press service of the Armenian government says that Pashinyan told Putin the following: a referendum could happen, but only after the country officially applies for EU membership.
The media also note that Russia did not congratulate Pashinyan on his victory in the parliamentary elections.
What else is important to know
In March 2025, the Armenian parliament passed in the second reading a bill on European integration. This document called on the government to begin the accession process to the EU.
At the beginning of this month, the EU figured out how to save Armenia from Russian pressure. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the EU had abolished tariffs on almost 80% of Armenian exports. In addition, the country will receive financial assistance.
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