The convergence of three major diplomatic events in Yerevan-the summit of the European Political Community (EPC), the first-ever Armenia-EU summit, and the state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron from May 4th to 6th -marks a moment of exceptional geopolitical density. This alignment is a rare coincidence of multilateral and bilateral engagements that together signal both a transformation in Armenia’s foreign and security policy trajectory and a recalibration of Europe’s role in the South Caucasus.
The presence of approximately 45-50 leaders-including non-EU European states such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland, and EU institutions-anchored the summit within the broader European security agenda. The participation of Prime Minister Mark Carney-marking Canada’s first-ever participation in the EPC-as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte further underscored the platform’s gradual expansion beyond a strictly European framework, positioning it as an emerging bridge between European and wider Euro-Atlantic political and security coordination.
EPC as a Platform for Diplomatic Engagement and Signaling
By the time of the Yerevan summit, the EPC had evolved into a forum where multiple layers of European politics intersect-Ukraine, the Middle East, energy diversification, connectivity, and resilience against hybrid threats. Beyond its institutional framing, the Yerevan summit created a space for intensive bilateral engagements reflecting broader geopolitical dynamics across Europe and its periphery. The presence of leaders shaping Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine anchored the summit in the continent’s central security challenge while enabling coordination beyond formal negotiation frameworks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy engaged directly with European partners to secure continued political, military and financial support in an ongoing conflict.
As host, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a series of bilateral meetings, including with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reinforcing Armenia’s effort to recalibrate its foreign policy orientation. The attendance of Albin Kurti, despite the absence of Armenia’s formal recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, and his bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan-following several high-level meetings in recent years-reflects a level of political engagement that amounts, in practice, to de facto recognition.
The summit also created opportunities for renewed engagement among actors whose interactions have been strained in recent years. The participation of Irakli Kobakhidze in a European summit, including his meeting with President Zelenskyy, signaled a cautious re-engagement following a period of strained relations with both the EU and Ukraine. During his visit to Brussels in March 2026, PM Pashinyan urged EU officials to re-engage with Georgia, underscoring that Armenia’s European trajectory is closely tied to Georgia as its primary gateway to Europe. The presence of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her meetings drew protest from Minsk.
The presence of Cevdet Yılmaz, Vice President of Türkiye-in a format typically reserved for heads of state and government-reflected the sensitivity of Turkish-Armenian relations and the lack of full normalization, which remains contingent on developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.
The presence of Cevdet Yılmaz, Vice President of Türkiye-in a format typically reserved for heads of state and government-reflected the sensitivity of Turkish-Armenian relations and the lack of full normalization, which remains contingent on developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. Latest steps-including the announcement of cooperation for the restoration of the Kars-Gyumri railway and progress on the reconstruction of the Ani bridge-point to movement in Türkiye-Armenia engagement. Finally, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s participation by videoconference pointed to the unfinished Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, which precluded his in-person attendance in Yerevan.
Taken together, these interactions illustrate how the EPC operates not only as a symbolic gathering, but as a functional diplomatic space where multiple tracks of engagement-security coordination, political signaling, and regional dialogue-intersect. This dimension is essential for understanding its growing relevance in a fragmented geopolitical environment.
From Prague and Granada to Yerevan: EPC Role for Armenia
The Prague summit-the first meeting of the European Political Community-marked a turning point. Held just weeks after Azerbaijan’s major September 2022 offensive against Armenia within its internationally recognized borders, it hosted the quadrilateral meeting between Nikol Pashinyan, Ilham Aliyev, Emmanuel Macron, and Charles Michel, reaffirming mutual recognition of territorial integrity. It also led to the deployment of a short-term EU CSDP civilian monitoring mission, which later evolved into the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA).
The second-Granada summit in 2023 took place after the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan, which was criticized by French leadership, as well as by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. In response French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna’s announcement about the decision to start defence cooperation with Armenia during her visit to Yerevan, Baku did not attend the meeting. Granada meeting consolidated European political support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while Azerbaijan subsequently sidelined France and the EU from the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.
In his opening remarks in the Yerevan meeting, Nikol Pashinyan highlighted the role of EPC in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, and described peace between the two countries as effectively established. In his speech by videoconference, Ilham Aliyev underlined Azerbaijan’s steps toward enabling trade with Armenia, including the lifting of restrictions on transit cargo. At the same time, he harshly criticized a European Parliament (EP) resolution adopted days earlier on democratic resilience in Armenia. While its main purpose is to express support for Armenia ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections and to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), implying Russian influence, it also reaffirmed support for the rights and return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, called for the protection of Armenian cultural and religious heritage by Azerbaijan, and demanded the release of Armenian detainees. Aliyev accused the EP of “obsession” with Azerbaijan, applying double standards and attempting to sabotage the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process-rhetoric that functions as part of broader cognitive warfare to legitimize the actions leading to the abolition of Nagorno-Karabakh and to deflect international criticism-and announced the suspension of all relations between Azerbaijan’s parliament and the EP. While Nikol Pashinyan did not respond in his capacity as host and chair of the session, Roberta Metsola defended the legitimacy and independence of the EP.
As a small state, Armenia used the opportunity to enhance its agency and visibility by hosting a high-level multilateral forum.
The Yerevan summit marked a qualitative shift in Armenia’s positioning. As a small state, Armenia used the opportunity to enhance its agency and visibility by hosting a high-level multilateral forum. It moved beyond being primarily an object of diplomacy to becoming a platform for European political dialogue. The fact that the summit was held despite the ongoing conflict in neighboring Iran also reflected a degree of confidence among European leaders that Armenia was a sufficiently stable and secure venue for such a high-level political forum.
Armenia-EU Relations: A Pragmatic Path to Integration
The first Armenia-EU summit, held immediately after the EPC summit, gave political and strategic structure to a relationship that has been deepening in recent years. The adoption of the parliamentary bill launching Armenia’s EU integration process in its National Assembly in spring 2025, followed by agreeing on the EU-Armenia Strategic Agenda in December 2025, provided a framework for advancing Armenia’s European aspirations.
This evolution has accelerated since 2022, as EU engagement in Armenia extended into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework. This was first reflected in the deployment of EUMA and further reinforced by assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF). A recent step came in April 2026 with the decision to establish a new EU civilian mission-the EU Partnership Mission in Armenia (EUPM)-focused on strengthening Armenia’s resilience to hybrid threats, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).
The summit resulted in a comprehensive 44-point Joint Declaration covering the main areas of Armenia-EU partnership, from political dialogue and support for Armenia’s sovereignty to economic cooperation, connectivity, and people-to-people ties. Progress on visa liberalisation-reflected in the first report under the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan-signaled tangible movement toward closer integration with the European space.
Infrastructure and regional links have become more structured, culminating at the summit in the Armenia-EU Connectivity Partnership. It provides a framework for cooperation in transport, energy, digital technologies, and modernisation of border crossing points. The initiative was accompanied by the call for investments in Armenia and the signing of letters of intent to deepen cooperation with Armenian companies and foundations. It also positioned Armenia within the EU’s Global Gateway approach, linking it more directly to European markets and infrastructure networks, and strengthening its economic integration. In her remarks, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen highlighted Armenia’s potential to become a “key regional transport hub,” linking Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. She also underlined that EU-Armenia cooperation “is grounded in common values, a shared vision for the South Caucasus, and full respect for sovereign choices.”
Armenia’s European trajectory is approached pragmatically: even if EU membership is not ultimately granted, alignment with European standards is itself presented as a strategic gain for Armenia.
Taken together, these developments point to the consolidation of a multidimensional partnership through which Armenia is moving closer to the EU across political, economic, and institutional domains. As Pashinyan has suggested, Armenia’s European trajectory is approached pragmatically: even if EU membership is not ultimately granted, alignment with European standards is itself presented as a strategic gain for Armenia.
France’s Strategic Role in Armenia’s Sovereignty and Europeanization
The state visit of Emmanuel Macron to Armenia, in parallel with the EPC and Armenia-EU summits, underscored France’s central role in advancing Armenia’s sovereignty and European trajectory. It formalized the Armenia-France Strategic Partnership that had, de facto, already taken shape since the end of 2023.
Before that point, the relationship rested primarily on political, cultural, and humanitarian ties. Between 2020 and 2023, France assumed a leading diplomatic role for support to Armenia in multilateral forums. In the United Nations Security Council, it consistently raised issues related to Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as humanitarian access, the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. France also played an important role within European frameworks in advancing support for Armenia, including his initiation of the quadrilateral EU-France-Armenia-Azerbaijan meeting on the margins of the EPC meeting in Prague, which led to the deployment of EUMA.
A qualitative break occurred after the collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, when France became the first EU and NATO member state to provide armaments to Armenia, formally still a CSTO member. This step constituted important support for Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and defence. The French defence support to Armenia has combined deliveries of military equipment-including Bastion armored vehicles, Thales GM radars, and CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems-with institution-building through training, military education, and advisory support. It extends beyond immediate capability support to the longer-term modernization of Armenia’s defence sector, building deterrence by increasing the cost of potential military offensives against Armenia and reducing Armenia’s security dependence on Russia.
The strategic partnership declaration signed on 5 May 2026 translated these developments into a structured and forward-looking framework. It institutionalizes regular high-level political and security dialogue, consolidates defence cooperation through defence technologies, innovation, and cyber defence. Beyond defence, the partnership extends into other high-technology sectors-including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and semiconductors. It also encompasses connectivity and infrastructure projects, most notably components of the strategic North-South regional transport corridor with a potential to connect Europe to India through Armenia and Georgia, and an essential tunnel in Armenia’s Syunik region. At the political level, Macron framed Armenia as moving “towards Europe” and emphasized that Armenia can rely on France, signaling both political alignment and strategic intent.
A qualitative break occurred after the collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, when France became the first EU and NATO member state to provide armaments to Armenia.
Symbolic dimensions of the visit also reinforced this partnership. Macron’s three-day stay was marked not only by formal meetings but also by visible public engagement-walks in Yerevan and Armenia’s second city Gyumri, participation in cultural events, direct interaction with citizens, and unprecedented performance of Charles Aznavour’s songs while Armenian PM played drums during the official dinner. This reception reflected the depth of France’s soft power alongside its growing security role in Armenia and underscored that the partnership rests not only on strategic interests, but also on a strong societal and cultural foundation.
Public perceptions of the France-Armenia partnership vary in Armenia between inflated expectations and critical narratives. Radical pro-European voices portray France as a potential security guarantor, while pro-Russian and Euro-sceptic circles blame France for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and dismiss its role as illusory. The government and pro-European experts maintain a pragmatic view, seeing France as a key partner in strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty and deterrence.
The formalization of the strategic partnership consolidates an already established trajectory. France thus stands out among European actors as Armenia’s key bilateral partner and a principal driver of its integration with Europe.
Europe’s Balancing Act: From Yerevan to Baku
The visits to Baku by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, following the Yerevan meetings, underscore Europe’s attempt to balance between its diverging priorities and interests.
In Baku, Meloni focused on consolidating Italy’s Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan, centered on energy cooperation through the Southern Gas Corridor-particularly the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)-as well as trade and defence-industrial cooperation. While France’s engagement with Armenia is both strategic and value-based, Italy’s engagement with Azerbaijan is primarily shaped by energy security and trade transactional interests. These approaches do not necessarily contradict one another, but reflect distinct natures of partnerships.
Kallas addressed EU-Azerbaijan relations with a focus on energy, reaffirming Azerbaijan’s role as a key gas supplier to Europe, including expanded deliveries to Germany and Austria. Discussions also covered regional communications toward Central Asia, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), and establishment of economic and trade ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although the EU’s role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan process has been constrained by Azerbaijan’s efforts to sideline it as a mediator, the EU continues to encourage the finalization of the peace process and connectivity in the South Caucasus. Besides, Azerbaijan is expected to host a future EPC meeting in 2028.
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