Sargsian: NK Conflict Can’t be Settled Positively by Current Govm’t

KARABAKH CONFLICT NOT TO BE SETTLED TO ARMENIA’S ADVANTAGE UNDER
PRESENT ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT
YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. The Karabakh conflict will not be
settled to Armenia’s advantage under the present Armenian government,
says opposition MP, leader of Democratic Party of Armenia Aram
Sargsyan.
He says that PACE’s Jan 25 approval of David Atkinson’s report on
Karabakh was a serious defeat for the Armenian diplomacy and their
statements about some oil factor or even unprecedented diplomatic
success are just baby talk. “The brick has fallen off the roof and is
quickly coming down on our heads,” says Sargsyan noting that Ilham
Aliev whom the Armenian authorities have nicked “an incompetent
playboy” has managed to turn the situation to Azerbaijan’s advantage
in no longer than one year.
Instead of stubbornly playing the same tune a nation’s
self-determination right the Armenian authorities should have worked
hard with PACE delegations. The Armenian FM and president preferred
self-conceit and vanity so they should not be offended now at the US,
or Russia or Iran for not helping them or at Elizabeth Jones for her
statements. They better look at themselves in the mirror.

City violin event to get more play

indystar.com
City violin event to get more play
By Whitney Smith
[email protected]
January 29, 2005
A documentary chronicling the most recent International Violin Competition
of Indianapolis will be broadcast by dozens of public television stations
across the country this spring.
“Pure Gold — the 2002 International Violin Competition of Indianapolis” has
been picked up by 51 markets, including San Francisco, Denver and Atlanta.
It will be telecast starting in April.
The 56-minute documentary traces the 17-day contest from the opening
ceremonies through the finalists’ performances with the Indianapolis
Symphony Orchestra at Hilbert Circle Theatre. “Pure Gold” aired on WFYI
(Channel 20) in October and is expected to be repeated in the spring.
“We want to get our story about the competition out to the rest of the
country,” said Glen Kwok, the violin competition’s executive director, who
co-produced the documentary with former competition Director Thomas
Beczkiewicz. “The national broadcast will provide tremendous exposure, not
only for the competition, but Indianapolis in general.”
The quadrennial contest attracts violinists ages 16 to 29 from around the
globe. Josef Gingold, the late Indiana University School of Music professor,
helped start the contest.
The first Indianapolis competition took place in 1982. For the sixth edition
in September 2002, 43 competitors vied for about $200,000 in cash prizes and
career assistance.
Barnabas Kelemen, a 24-year-old Hungarian violinist, won the $30,000 top
prize, a gold medal, concert dates and the four-year use of Gingold’s
Stradivarius violin.
Sergey Khachatryan, 17, Armenia, won the silver medal and $15,000. Soovin
Kim, a 26-year-old American, won the bronze medal and $10,000. Kim narrates
“Pure Gold.”
Kwok said documentaries also were made about the 1986 and 1994 competitions.
A DVD recording of “Pure Gold” is available for $18 from the competition
office by calling (317) 637-4574.
Call Star reporter Whitney Smith at (317) 444-6226.

Founding Presidents of Soviet Successor States: A Comparative Study

TITLE: Founding Presidents of Soviet Successor States: A Comparative Study
SOURCE: Demokratizatsiya 12 no1 133-45 Wint 2004
DAVID C. BROOKER
As the Soviet Union completed its collapse in 1991, in founding
presidents of Soviet successor staes found themselves, sometimes
unexpectedly, leading independent countries. Except for Boris Yeltsin, and
perhaps Nursultan Nazarbayev, these leaders are not well known. Yet, the
fact that they were in positions of authority at a time of great change
meant that they had the potential to greatly influence the political and
economic development of their countries and leave a lasting imprint on their
respective countries. This makes studying their backgrounds, who they were
and where they came from, important.
The leaders covered in this study are: Askar Akaev(FN1) (Kyrgyzstan),
Zviad Gamsakhurdia(FN2) (Georgia), Anatolijs Gorbunovs(FN3) (Latvia), Islam
Karimov(FN4) (Uzbekistan), Leonid Kravchuk(FN5) (Ukraine), Vytautas
Landsbergis(FN6) (Lithuania), Ayaz Mutalibov(FN7) (Azerbaijan), Rakhmon
Nabiyev(FN8) (Tajikistan), Nursultan Nazarbayev(FN9) (Kazakhstan),
Saparmurad Niyazov(FN10) (Turkmenistan), Arnold Rüütel(FN11) (Estonia),
Stanislau Shushkevich(FN12) (Belarus), Mircea Snegur(FN13) (Moldova), Levon
Ter-Petrossian(FN14) (Armenia), and Boris Yeltsin(FN15) (Russia). These
individuals will be referred to collectively as the “founding presidents”
despite the fact that officially some held an office other than president.
Even those who were elected chairperson of a governing council, as was the
case in Belarus and the Baltic states, filled a role similar to that of a
president and were sometimes referred to as “de facto presidents.” This was
seen most clearly when Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich met to form the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Despite the fact that Shushkevich
technically was not the president of Belarus, reports were that the “three
presidents” met and effectively engineered the final end of the Soviet
Union.
Most of the founding presidents came to their positions through a
two-step process. First, they were elected to an executive office by their
country’s parliament. Second, they ran in and won a popular election. The
only ones who did not take this second step were Shushkevich and the three
Baltic leaders–Gorbunovs, Landsbergis, and Rüütel. Not only was the manner
in which most of the fifteen came into office similar, but so was the timing
(table 1). The first step, election by parliament, took place in 1990. There
wer eonly three exceptions to this. Gorbunovs was the veteran of the group,
first having been elected chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet in 1988.
The two latecomers were Nabiyev and Shushkevich. Both came into office in
September 1991 after their predecessors were kicked out for their behavior
during the coup attempt the previous month.
Most of the popular elections took place in 1991. Of the eleven popular
elections that were held, ten occurred in 1991–eight between September and
December 1991. Actually, Niyazov was the first to arrange a popular election
in October 1990, only a month after being elected by Turkmenistan’s
parliament. It was Gamsakhurdia and Yeltsin who were elected earlier in
1991. Many of these elections, particularly those after August 1991, were
scheduled very quickly and often lacked democratic qualities. Akaev,
Nazarbayev, Niyazov, and Snegur all ran unopposed, and most of the rest
faced only token opposition.
Research on political leadership in Soviet successor states generally
can be placed in one of three categories, based on its primary focus. The
first category focuses on elites–the widest swath of political leadership.
The second involves the presidency, where the main concern is the office
instead of the individual occupying the office. The third category of focus
is on the leaders themselves. This study derives something from each
category.
ELITES
Both Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephan White(FN16) and David Lane and
Cameron Ross(FN17) studied the Russian elite under President Yeltsin. Lane
and Ross did so as part of a larger project that traced the development of
the political elite from the late Soviet period, using the Brezhnev era as a
starting point, to the post-Soviet period in Russia. Both pairs of
researchers were interested in the extent that the Russian elite had its
roots in the old Soviet elite. Both studied political and governmental
leaders, regional administrators, and business leaders. Kryshtanovskaya and
White examined the background of 3,610 individuals, and Lane and Ross
studied approximately 800. In addition to studying similar individuals, the
two teams considered many of the same variables: age, gender, ethnicity,
educational background, and, most important, occupational background and
career path. Additionally, Lane and Ross used attitudinal surveys to study
the distribution of opinions within different sectors of the Russian elite.
Despite these similarities, they reached different conclusions.
Kryshtanovskaya and White argued that the Russian elite has its roots in the
Soviet elite, while Lane and Ross stated:
Our study refutes the view that the Soviet elite has been reconstituted
in a new form. We conclude that, though a significant minority of persons
holding middle positions in the former Soviet elite has been promoted to
particular segments of the new political elite, the previous Soviet ruling
elite has been largely destroyed.(FN18)
This disagreement stems not from how the two pairs saw the Russian
elite, but rather how they conceptualized the old Soviet elite. Lane and
Ross took issue with Kryshtanovskaya and White and others who define the
Soviet elite as having been the Soviet nomenklatura. Lane and Ross argued
that the nomenklatura was too large and too varied to be considered an
elite. Instead they likened it to a “political class.” Beyond this
disagreement, both teams isolated the important factors to focus on when
studying someone’s background.
PRESIDENCIES
Research on presidential offices has tended to focus on either the power
of the presidency or the nature of the political systems in which the
presidents operate. Work in this area has been more explicitly comparative
than work in either of the other two areas. Christian Lucky and James
McGregor separately compared the presidencies of a number of Eastern
European and former Soviet states in terms of the constitutional powers
given to the office. Lucky compared the presidencies of Albania, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine by examining the requirements of the office,
the manner of election, and whether the office contains twenty-seven
separate powers.(FN19) The list of countries studied by McGregor is very
similar, although Ukraine is absent, replaced by Croatia, Macedonia, and
Yugoslavia. Similar to Lucky, McGregor examined powers of appointment and
fifteen political powers. Additionally, McGregor ranked the presidencies in
terms of constitutional powers based on two scoring mechanisms.(FN20)
The broader question about post-Soviet institutional arrangements has
been largely a debate over the attributes of parliamentarianism,
presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism. Raymond Taras’s chapter in
Postcommunist Presidents is both a prime example of this type of work and
also a review of the debate, both in regards to the former Soviet Union and
a broader international context.(FN21) Even case studies that focus on a
single country are tied into this larger debate.(FN22)
Gerald M. Easter combined these first two categories. He argued that the
path a country followed with regards to constitutional arrangements was
influenced largely by the manner in which old regime elites weathered the
breakdown of the Soviet system.(FN23) Easter classified countries as having
a consolidated, dispersed, or reformed elite. In countries labeled
“consolidates” (the countries of central Asia and Azerbaijan), the old elite
suffered little fragmentation and maintained its dominance after
independence. Without exception, these countries ended up with presidential
systems. The cases of “dispersed old regime elites” (the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were
where the old elites crumbled. In the absence of any residual advantage due
to their former positions, old regime elites had to compete for political
power on equal footing with other political actors. In these cases, with the
exception of Lithuania and Poland, parliamentarianism was the norm. Finally,
there were countries with a reformed old elite. This was signified by cases
where the old elite split and part of it was able to maintain a share of
power by reforming itself. In most of these cases (Armenia, Belarus,
Croatia, Georgia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine), the result was a
presidential system. However, there were cases of parliamentary (Albania and
Bulgaria) and mixed (Moldova and Mongolia) systems.
One of the things that sets work in this category apart is the extent to
which it is directly comparative. Lucky, McGregor, and Easter all
systematically study and compare at least a dozen countries. Lucky and
McGregor do this in a descriptive fashion, whereas Easter does it to show
the relationship between elite cohesion and the form of government adopted.
As previously noted, the work on institutional arrangements, even when
focused on a single country, has a comparative focus to it.
LEADERS
Scholarly research focusing on individual leaders, the people occupying
the offices, generally has taken the form of book-length biographies and
autobiographies and edited volumes. Not surprising, most of the attention
here has been directed towards Yeltsin. In addition to numerous biographies,
written by both Russian and western authors,(FN24) his autobiography,
Against the Grain,(FN25) also has been published. It appears that the only
other autobiographies commonly available are Landsbergis’s Lithuania,
Independent Again(FN26) and Nazarbayev’s My Life, My Time, and the
Future.(FN27) There also have been biographies on Akaev(FN28) and
Karimov(FN29) published, but they are not widely available. The
autobiographies are, almost by definition, noncomparative and the
biographies all have a single subject.
The two most prominent edited volums are Post Communist
Presidents,(FN30) edited by Ray Taras, and Patterns in Post-Soviet
Leadership,(FN31) edited by Timothy Colton and Robert Tucker. Both have
introductory chapters followed by profiles of individual leaders. Post
Soviet Presidents profiles Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Nazarbayev as well as Lech
Walesa of Poland, Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, and Arpad Goncz of
Hungary. The examples of Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Landsbergis, Nazarbayev, and
Karimov are covered in Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership. It should be
noted that some of the chapters in the Colton and Tucker volume focus on the
broader ruling elite, in either Russia or the countries of “Transcaucasia,”
and would fit in the first category of this classification scheme. The
chapters that profile a particular leader were written mostly by country
specialists. In fact, Martha Brill Olcott wrote the chapter on Nazarbayev in
both volumes. This reliance on country specialists, while having many
advantages, has kept comparison to a minimum.
As previously noted, this article draws on aspects of the work in all
three of the categories just discussed. It shares a focus on the individual
with the third category. A comparative focus has been adopted from the work
on presidential offices. The backgrounds of the fifteen leaders were studied
together, using variables derived from the work on elites. In other words,
the subject matter of the third category was studied using variables from
the second and the method of the first.
The choice of variables for this project was influenced by both
Kryshtanovskaya and White, and Lane and Ross. The variables used to compare
the founding presidents are age, social origins, educational background,
membership in the Communist Party, and career path. Some of the variables
used in the elite studies were not used here, due to a lack of variability
among the individuals studied. All are male and belong to the titular
nationality of their country, therefore gender and ethnicity were not
considered in any depth. For many of these variables, a norm was established
as a majority of the founding presidents were quite similar. Combining these
variables makes it possible to describe the typical founding president and
to indicate the extent to which each leader resembles this typical image.
AGE
When their countries became independent, the founding presidents ranged
in age from forty-six (Ter-Petrossian) to sixty-three (Rüütel).(FN32)
Through the work of Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips, it is possible to
compare the founding presidents, in terms of age, to other categories of
leaders. In their study of revolutionary leaders, Rejai and Phillips found
that more than 60 percent of the revolutionary leaders they studied came to
power before the age of forty-four.(FN33) By comparison only 36 percent were
between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four. Unlike revolutions seen in
other places, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring a new
generation of leaders to power. The fact that all fifteen founding
presidents fell within the forty-five to sixty-four age range shows that, in
terms of age, the founding presidents of the Soviet successor states were
similar to the presidents of the United States. In a study of American
presidents that paralleled their work on revolutionaries, Rejai, Phillips,
and Mason found that almost 90 percent were within the forty-five- to
sixty-four-year-old age range when they entered office.(FN34) The relatively
advanced age of the founding presidents, compared to revolutionary leaders,
reflects the fact that most of them had achieved some level of prominence
during the Gorbachev era.
SOCIAL ORIGINS
The founding presidents can be seen largely as Soviet success stories.
Most came from rather humble beginnings, usually born in villages of their
home republic. The exceptions to this were Gamsakhurdia, Karimov,
Landsbergis. Mutalibov, Shushkevich, and Ter-Petrossian. Ter-Petrossian
actually was born in Syria, but his family moved to Armenia soon after this
birth. Landsbergis was born in Kaunas, which was the Lithuanian capital
during the interwar years. Gamsakhurdia, Mutalibov, and Shushkevich were all
born in republican capitals–Tbiliski, Baku, and Minsk respectively.
Samarkand, where Karimov was born, was not the capital of Uzbekistan, but it
was still one of the major cities of central Asia and had a great deal of
history.
In terms of social origins, most came from a peasant background,
reflecting their rural births. The exceptions to this norm are similar to
those noted above. Gamsakhurdia, Shushkevich, and Ter-Petrossian were all
born into the intelligentsia. Membership in this class can be both positive
and negative. The fact that Gamsakhurdia’s father was a renowned Georgian
author probably offered a measure of protection as Gamsakhurdia began to
engage in dissident activities. On the other hand, Shushkevich’s father was
a poet who was sent away to a prison camp where he died. It was necessary
for Shushkevich to denounce his father to be allowed to attend
college.(FN35) In his official biography, Karimov’s father is described as
an office worker.(FN36) It is worth noting that Karimov’s parents both died
when he was very young, and he grew up in an orphanage, as did Niyazov.
Finally, both of Mutalibov’s parents and Landisbergis’s mother were medical
doctors. Landsbergis’s father was an architect.
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Because of their humble beginnings, it was their access to higher
education that made the founding presidents into Soviet success stories. Due
to the progress made during the Soviet era, these men had opportunities that
their fathers did not. Not only did all have college degrees, but most had
advanced degrees. Seven (Akaev, Gamsakhurdia, Landsbergis, Nazarbayev,
Rüütel, Shushkevich, and Ter-Petrossian) have doctorates. It should be noted
that in the cases of Gamsakhurdia, Nazarbayev, and Rüütel they did not
obtain their degrees until the 1990s, when they were already politically
prominent.
Reflecting the Soviet norm, and perhaps their humble beginnings, most
obtained degrees in practical areas of study–agriculture, engineering, and
science. The exceptions to this were Gamsakhurdia (literature), Landsbergis
(music), and Ter-Petrossian (history). Even Shushkevich, the son of a poet,
studied physics, and Mutalibov, whose parents were both doctors, went to the
Azizbekov Institute for Petroleum and Chemistry in Azerbaijan.
In some ways Kravchuk falls between these two categories. His degree was
in political economics. This was by no means impractical, particularly in
the Soviet Union with its emphasis on ideology. At the same time, this was
different than a degree in engineering or agriculture. This put Kravchuk on
a slightly different career path. He still worked in the governing
structures, but almost exclusively for the party, and he oversaw ideology
instead of construction or agriculture.
For many, higher education brought the chance to live outside their home
areas. Of the fifteen founding fathers, seven studied outside of their home
republic–two in Moscow (Gorbunovs and Kravchuk) and three in Leningrad
(Akaev, Niyazov, and Ter-Petrossian). Of the two who did not study in
Russia, Nazarbayev studied in Ukraine. This meant he still went to the
Slavic area of the Soviet Union for his education. The only one who studied
away from home in a non-Slavic area was Nabiyev, who studied agriculture in
Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. Leaving their home area to study was
most common in central Asia where four of the five did so. The only one who
did not was Karimov, who also studied in Tashkent. This points to Tashkent
as a possible alternative to going to the Slavic area to receive an
education.
This is one of the few areas where Gamsakhurdia, Landsbergis, and
Ter-Petrossian did not share a similar background. While Ter-Petrossian
studied at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Leningrad, neither
Gamsakhurdia nor Landsbergis spent a significant portion of their academic
or professional lives outside of their home republic.
PARTY MEMBERSHIP
Of the fifteen founding presidents, twelve were long-standing party
members. Of these, only Akaev joined the party relatively late in life. It
was not until 1981, when he was in his early 40s, that he joined the party.
The three who never joined the party were Gamsakhurdia, Landsbergis, and
Ter-Petrossian. Of the factors that set these three apart, this might be the
most telling. Not being a member of the party reflects a conscious decision
to reject the Soviet system. Of those who were party members, most
maintained their membership until after the failed coup attempt. Only
Gorbunovs, Snegur, and Yeltsin renounced their party membership before
August 1991. Yeltsin did so most dramatically, announcing his resignation in
front of the party leadership at the twenty-eighth Party Congress on July
12, 1990.(FN37) The rest lung onto their membership until giving it up was a
necessity. In some cases, the party was a given a new name while its
leadership and organization remained intact.
CAREER PATH
There were two career paths taken to reach the presidency. The first,
and less utilized, was academia. Akaev, Landsbergis, Shushkevich,
Gamsakhurdia, and Ter-Petrossian followed this path. The first three were
professors, and the final two worked as researchers. Altough all five spent
their prepresidential careers in academia, there is a distinction to be made
within this group. Gamsakhurdia, Landsbergis, and Ter-Petrossian were
oppositional figures; Gamsakhurdia and Ter-Petrossian could even be called
dissidents, as both spent time in prison on charges stemming from political
activities. The success of these three came at the expense of the Communist
Party, and even at the expense of the Soviet Union.
Although Shushkevich and Akaev were critical of the Soviet regime,
particularly over Chernobyl in the case of Shushkevich, they can be seen as
compromise candidates. Neither would have been the first choice of the
Communist Party, but both were acceptable choices. Their victory was not a
defeat for the party as a whole. It is worth noting that Akaev was active in
the Kirghiz Communist Party. He served on a party committee overseeing
science and education and also served as first vice president and then
president of the republic’s Academy of Science. While this was not a
position within the party, it was an appointment that would have needed
party approval. First and foremost, Akaev was an academic, but he also had a
political background.
The more common path to the presidency was through the official channels
of government and the party. Although the party and the government were
supposed to be separate institutions, in an operational sense it is
virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. Most of the founding
presidents, while they were working their way up through the ranks, bounced
back and forth between the two institutions. For example, Snegur worked in
the Moldavian Ministry of Agriculture, a government job, and then served as
the Secretary of Agriculture for the Moldavian Communist Party. Of those
that rose through the party and government path, Karimov is unique in
spending much of his career, up until 1986, working exclusively for the
government. Since government jobs were less prestigious than party jobs, the
fact that he never held a party post until 1986 can be taken as a sign that
his career was not progressing very rapidly.(FN38)
On the other hand, Gorbunovs, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin spent the bulk of
their careers working for the party. Kravchuk is further unique in that his
specialty was ideology. A background in construction or agriculture was much
more common.
Those that worked their way up through the party hierarchy were, by and
large, “Gorbachev’s men.” This meant that their careers accelerated under
Gorbachev’s leadership. In 1986, Karimov was the party leader in the Kaska
Darya oblast’ and Mutalibov was working on the auditing committee. By 1990,
both were serving as first secretary in their republics. Yeltsin was
promoted from a position of leadership in Sverdlosk to a position of
leadership in Moscow. Gorbachev promoted the careers of the founding
presidents in two ways. First, he cleared a path for them by removing
entrenched figures from power. Once these positions were open, Gorbachev
undoubtedly had a hand in selecting the new occupants. The fact that they
rose under Gorbachev meant they were acceptable to him. The glaring
exception to this was Nabiyev, who became the leader of the Tajik Party in
1982, and then was forced out by Gorbachev in 1985. Nabiyev was able to
stage a comeback after Gorbachev’s man, Kakhar Makhkamov, was forced from
office for supporting the coup.
CONCLUSION
Each of these variables provide useful information on the founding
presidents, but they are even more useful when considered together. From
these variables a portrait of the “typical” first president of a Soviet
successor state emerges. He was from a humble social background, raised
either in a village or an orphanage. He received a college education,
specializing in a technical field such as physics, engineering,
construction, or agriculture. He joined the Communist Party, and spent most
of his prepresidential career working for either the party or the
government. He was a person of prominence who rose to a position of
influence under Gorbachev. He was in a position to benefit from the Soviet
Union’s collapse.
Each of these statements describes at least ten of the fifteen first
presidents. Of the fifteen, eight fit this profile in every way (table 2).
An additional three deviate from this profile only on a single
variable–Akaev because of his academic career path, Mutalibov because of
his parents being doctors, and Kravchuk because of his academic focus on
political economics. (As noted earlier, someone could argue that a focus on
political economics is just as practical as majoring in engineering or
agriculture.)
At the same time, these variables draw attention to three individuals
who deviated from the established norm in every way. Gamsakhurdia,
Landsbergis, and Ter-Petrossian all were from more privileged backgrounds,
majored in purely academic subjects, never joined the Communist Party, and
worked in academia. Post-Soviet first presidents essentially came in two
varieties. There was the dominant group and its antithesis. Only one person,
Shushkevich, can be said to fall between the two groups. He had the
technical education and party membership of the dominant group, but shared
the more privileged beginnings and academic backgrounds with the
“antithetical first presidents.”
The most prominent first presidents (Yeltsin and Kravchuk) and longest
lasting (Akaev, Karimov, Nazarbayev, and Niyazov) are from the dominant
group. This has helped create the popular perception that all of the initial
post-Soviet leaders were party careerists who turned against the party once
it was safe to do so in their own interest. They did not leave the party
until it was in the final stage of its collapse and then appropriated many
of its resources. One of the most useful things about studying the first
presidents collectively in this manner is that it calls attention to the
fact that not all of the people who came to power with the disintegration of
the Soviet Union were of the Yeltsin-Nazarbayev mold. There was a second
type of first president. The unlikely journey to power that they each took
is part of the story of the Soviet Union’s end that should not be
overlooked.
ADDED MATERIAL
David C. Brooker is a visiting assistant professor in the politics and
government department at the University of Hartford in West Hartford,
Connecticut.
TABLE 1. Date of Elections.
Presidents Election by Parliament Popular Election
Akaev October 1990 October 1991
Gamsakhurdia October 1990 May 1991
Gorbunovs October 1990 —
Karimov May 1990 December 1991
Kravchuk July 1990 December 1991
Landsbergis March 1990 —
Mutalibov May 1990 September 1991
Nabiyev September 1991 November 1991
Nazarbayev April 1990 December 1991
Niyazov January 1990 October 1990
Rüütel March 1990 —
Shushkevich September 1991 —
Snegur September 1990 December 1991
Ter-Petrossian August 1990 October 1991
Yeltsin May 1990 June 1991
TABLE 2. Comparision of Founding Presidents of Soviet Successor States.
Membership
in the
Humble social Technical Communist
Party/Government
Presidents origins education Party career path
Akaev X X X
Gamsakhurdia
Gorbunovs X X X X
Karimov X X X X
Kravchuk X X X
Landsbergis
Mutalibov X X X
Nabiyev X X X X
Nazarbayev X X X X
Niyazo X X X X
Rüütel X X X X
Shushkevich X X
Snegur X X X X
Ter-Petrossian
Yeltsin X X X X
FOOTNOTES
1. Biographical information on Askar Akaev was obtained from the following
sources: Naryn Aiyp, “Kyrgyzstan: Askar Akaev’s Diminishing Democracy,”
Transitions (October 1998), “Askar Akaev–The
President of the Kyrgyz Republic,” Web page of the embassy of the Kyrgyz
Republic to the United States and Canada,
; Asal Azamova, “Askar Akaev,” Moscow
News Weekly, no. 46 (1992): 10; Bess Brown, “Liberalization Reaches
Kirghzia: Profile of the New President,” Report on the USSR (November 30,
1990): 17-20; T. Koychaev and V. Glosky, Askar Akaev–Uchenie, Politik
(Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Ilim, 1996), 12-13; and Mukhamed-Murad Salamatov,
“Scientist President,” Moscow News Weekly, no. 19 (1991): 11.
2. Biographical information on Zviad Gamsakhurdia was obtained from the
following sources: Natalia Bogatova, “A Provincial President,” New Times,
no. 4 (1992): 16-17; “His Excellency, First President of the Republic of
Georgia, Dr. Zviad K. Gamsakhurdia (31.03.1939-31.12.1993),” President Zviad
K. Gamsakhurdia Memorial Page,
; Galina
Kovalskaya, “The End of a ‘Legendary’ Leader,” New Times International, no.
2 (1994): 10-11; Irina Lagunina, “Will Georgia Stay in the Union,” New
Times, no. 46 (1990): 10; Obituary of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, The Daily
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Indestructible Bungler,” New Statesman & Society (January 24, 1992): 16-17;
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Eltie Transformation in Transcaucasia,” in Patterns in
Post-Soviet Leadership, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995), 154-158; and Who’s Who in Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, RUSSICA Information Inc., 1994.
3. Biographical information on Anatolijs Gorbunovs was obtained from the
following sources: “Biography of Anatolijs Gorbunovs,” Web page of the
Saeima (Latvian Parliament),
; “Latvia,” in
Europa World Year Book 1998 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1998),
2052; and Who’s Who in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
4. Biographical information on Islam Karimov was obtained from the following
sources: “Biography of the President,” Web page of the government of
Uzbekistan, ; Donald S. Carlisle, “Islam
Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future?” in Patterns in Post-Soviet
Leadership, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995), 196-98; Felix Corley, “Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov’s Everlasting
First Term,” Transitions (October 1998),
195.212.213.208/transitions/oct98/islamkar.htm/; Mukhammed-Babur Malikov,
“Uzbekistan: A View from the opposition,” Problems of Post-Communism 42, no.
2 (March/April 1995): 19-24; and Who’s Who in Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States.
5. Biographical information on Leonid Kravchuk was obtained from the
following sources: Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to
Independence (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 172-73; Andrew J. Motyl,
“The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk,” in Patterns in Post-Soviet
Leadership, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1995), 108-11; Svetlana Ryaboshapka, “The Referendum: Before
and After,” New Times, no. 49 (1991): 5-6; Serge Schmemann,
“Leader-Come-Lately,” New York Times, December 3, 1991, A7; Elizabeth
Shogren, “Even Russians Concede Kravchuk is ‘Crafty Fox,'” Los Angeles
Times, March 31, 1992, 6; Staff of the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, “Report on Ukraine’s Referendum on Independence and
Presidential Election: December 1, 1991,” in Presidential Elections and
Independence Referendums in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union and
Successor States–A Compendium of Reports, 1991-1992, (Washington, DC:
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992), 104, 105, 110; and
Who’s Who in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
6. Biographical information on Vytautas Landsbergis was obtained from the
following sources: “Biography of Vytautas Landsbergis,” Web page of the
Multimedia Center for the Humanities (Lithuania),
; Esther B.
Fein, “Lithuanian to the Core,” New York Times, March 26, 1990, 8; Stephen
Kinzer, “Militant Lithuanian Now Gives Pause,” New York Times, August 31,
1991, 5; Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuania, Independent Again: The
Autobiography of Vytautas Landsbegis (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 2000): “Lithuania,” in Europa World Year Book 1998 (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1998), 2135; Esther Schrader and Masha Hamilton,
“Music Professor is Secession’s Unlikely Leader,” Los Angeles Times, March
23, 1990, 1; V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: The Rebel
Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 140, 155, 209; and Who’s Who in
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
7. Biographical information on Ayaz Mutalibov was obtained from the
following sources: Bill Keller, “Provincial Communist is Born (Again) Free,”
New York Times, September 4, 1991, A16; Galina Kovalskaya, “Now That
Mutalibov Has Gone,” New Times, no. 11 (1992): 8; Liana Minasyan, “Ayaz
Mutalibov: ‘I Would Not Like to be Considered Either a Political Emigre or a
Refugee,'” New Times (June 1996): 48; “Staying On,”, The Economist 321, no.
7735 (November 30, 1991): 50; Suny, 150-152; Staff of the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, “The Presidential Election in
Azerbaijan: June 7, 1992,” in Presidential Elections and Independence
Referendums in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union and Successors States–A
Compendium of Reports, 1991-1992 (Washington, DC: Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 1992), 171; and Who’s Who in Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
8. Biographical information on Rakhman Nabiyev was obtained from the
following sources: Bess Brown, “Tajikistan: The Fall of Nabiev,” RFE/RL
Research Reports 1, no. 38, (September 25, 1992): 12-18; Obituary of Rakhman
Nabiyev, The Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1993, 19; Martha Brill Olcott,
“Ceremony and Substance: The Illusion of Unity in Central Asia” in Central
Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign
Relations, 1994), 29; “Rakhman N. Nabiyev Dies at 62; Led Tajikistan Under
Communism,” New York Times, April 12, 1993, D11; “The Nays Have It,” Time,
September 21, 1992, 17; and Who’s Who in Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States.
9. Biographical information on Nursultan Nazarbayev was obtained from the
following sources: Bess Brown, “Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan: A
Profile,” Report on the USSR (May 31, 1991): 10; “Dossier of Nursultan
Abishevich Nazarbayev,” Web page of the Kazakhstani Government,
;a
rt=dosie/; Vladimir Morozov, “Nursultan Means Enlightened Ruler,” New Times
International, no. 4 (1993): 14; Martha Brill Olcott, “Nursultan Nazarbaev
and the Balancing Act of State Building in Kazakhstan” in Patterns in
Post-Soviet Leadership, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995), 169-75; and Who’s Who in Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
10. Biographical information on Saparmurad Niyazov was obtained from the
following sources: Aleksandr Bushev, “A Kind of Prosperity,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 50, no. 1, (January/February 1994): 44-47; Murad Esenov,
“Turkmenistan: Saparmurat Niyazov’s Invincible Rule,” Transitions (October
1998), Yael Kahana,
“Mahtumkuli, Avicenna and Saparmurad Niyazov,” New Times International, no.
51 (1993): 11; Avdy Kuliev, “The Dictator With the Personal Touch,”
Transitions (November 1997), ;
“The President of Turkmenistan,” Turkmenistan on the Internet,
html/; and Who’s Who in Russia and
the Commonwealth of Independent States.
11. Biographical information on ARnold Rüütel was obtained from the
following sources: “Estonia,” in Europa World Year Book 1999 (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1999), 1318-19; “Presidential Ballot: The Five
Candidates,” Estonia Today, Estonian Foreign Ministry,
; and “Ruutel Falls Short of
Estonia Target,” Financial Times (London), September 21, 1992, 6.
12. Biographical information on Stanislau Shushkevich was obtained from the
following sources: “Belarus Parliament Ousts Its Reformist Chairman,” New
York Times, January 27, 1994, A6. James Bennet, “Byelorussian Leader Seeking
Stability in Economic Union,” New York Times, December 10, 1991, A19;
“Biography of Stanislau Shushkevich,” RFE/RL Research Reports, (February 14,
1992): 7; Kathleen Mihalisko, “Stanislau Shushkevich and the ‘Republic of
Belarus,'” Report on the USSR (October 11, 1991): 28; and Who’s Who in
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
13. Biographical information on Mircea Snegur was obtained from the
following sources: Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, “Report on the Moldovan Presidential Election: December 8, 1991” in
Presidential Elections and Independence Referendums in the Baltic States,
the Soviet Union and Successor States–A Compendium of Reports, 1991-1992
(Washington, DC: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992),
123; Who’s Who in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States; and
Vladimir Yemelyanenko, “Mircea Snegur,” Moscow News Weekly, no. 21 (1992):
14.
14. Biographical information on Levon Ter-Petrossian was obtained from the
following sources: “Levon Ter-Petrossian,” Web page of ARMINCO Global
Communications, ; Gevork
Nazaryan, “Levon Ter-Petrossian: The First President of Armenia,” Web page
of the Armenian Enlightenment Chronicle,
; Staff of
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Report on the
Presidential Election in Armenia: October 16, 1991” in Presidential
Elections and Independence Referendums in the Baltic States, the Soviet
Union and Successor States–A Compendium of Reports, 1991-1992 (Washington,
DC: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992), 78; Staff of
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Report on Armenia’s
Presidential Election: March 16 and 30, 1998,”
; and Suny, 145-46.
15. Biographical information on boris Yeltsin was obtained from the
following sources: Timothy J. Colton, “Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s All-Thumbs
Democrat” in Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership, ed. Timothy J. Colton and
Robert C. Tucker (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 50-54; Stephen White,
“Russia: Presidential Leadership Under Yeltsin,” in Postcommunist
Presidents, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
47-55; and Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain (New York: Summit Books, 1990).
16. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to
Russian Elite,” Europe-Asia Studies 48 (1996): 711-33.
17. David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
18. Ibid., 149.
19. Christain Lucky, “Table of Presidential Powers in Eastern Europe,” East
European Constitutional Review (Fall 1993/Winter 1994): 81-94.
20. James McGregor, “The Presidency in East Central Europe,” RFE/RL Research
Report 3, no. 2 (January 14, 1994): 23-31.
21. Raymond Taras, “Separating Powers: Keeping Presidents in Check,” in
Postcommunist Presidents, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge: ambridge University
Press, 1997), 38-66.
22. Eugene Huskey, “Democracy and Institutional Design in Russia,”
Demokratizatsiya (Fall 1996): 453-73; and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Presidentalism
in Ukraine: A Mid-Term Review of the Second Presidency,” Democratization
(Fall 1997): 152-77.
23. Gerald M. Easter, “Preference for Presdentialism: Postcommunist Regime
Change in Russia and the NIS,” World Politics (January 1997): 184-211.
24. John Morrison, Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat (New York:
Dutton, 1991); and Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Boris Yeltsin: A
Political Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1992).
25. Yeltsin.
26. Landsbergis.
27. Nursultan Nazarbayev, Nursultan Nazarbayev: My Life, My Time and the
Future (Northampton: Pilkington, 1998).
28. Koychaev and Glosky.
29. Leonid Levitin and Donald Carlisle, Islam Karimov, Prezident novogo
Uzbekistana (Tashkent: Izd-vo Uzbekiston, 1999).
30. Raymond Taras, Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
31. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker, Patterns in Post-Soviet
Leadership (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).
32. Sources differ on the year Nabiyev was born. Some list his date of birth
as October 5, 1930, others have it as October 5, 1931.
33. Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips, Loyalists and Revolutionaries: Political
Leaders Compared (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1988), 23.
34. Mostafa Rejai, Kay Phillips, and Warren Mason, Demythologizing an Elite:
American Presidents in Empirical, Comparative and Historical Perspective
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 34-35.
35. Mihalisko, 28.
36. “Biography of the President.”
37. See Solovyov and Klepikova, 206-207 for a description of the event.
38. Carlisle, 196.

www.house.gov/csce/1998ArmenianElectionsreport.html/

OSCE Mission to Check Facts of Settlement in Azeri Districts

OSCE MISSION IN ARMENIA TO CHECK FACTS OF SETTLEMENT IN AZERI DISTRICTS
Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
29 Jan 05
(Presenter in studio speaking over video of the OSCE mission) The OSCE
factfinding mission has arrived in Yerevan to check whether there are
settlements on the (occupied Azerbaijani) territories. The experts
will visit the seven districts outside Nagornyy Karabakh. The mission
appointed by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen includes experts from
Finland, Italy, Switzerland and Germany. The mission is led by an
OSCE expert from Germany, Emily Margarethe Haber. The representatives
will not be accompanied by anyone from the Azerbaijani side.
After the mission completes its work, the experts will prepare a
technical report in 8-10 days and submit it to the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairmen. It is expected that the co-chairmen will issue a
statement on the facts they discover. The Azerbaijani side says that
they presented the members of the mission, while in Baku, with video
and audio tapes of settlements in these territories. Russian
co-chairman Yuriy Merzlyakov said in his brief interview in Yerevan
that they (Azerbaijanis) say there are settlements in these
territories.
It is necessary to find out who they are, where they have come from
and why they have settled there.
(Yuriy Merzlyakov speaking in Russian with Armenian voice-over) Our
route has been determined. We will be in Stepanakert tomorrow morning
and visit the districts around Nagornyy Karabakh every day in one
week. It means that we will visit one district every day. As for the
monitoring in the north of Karabakh, this is a separate issue and
should be carried out separately.

Armenia’s President to Meet with Venice Mayor Today

ARMENIA’S PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH VENICE MAYOR TODAY
VENICE, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. Armenia’s President Robert Kocharyan who
is paying a three-day official visit to Italy is to meet with Venice
Mayor Paolo Costa today.
Kocharyan is also to meet with the local Armenian community and to
visit the Mkhitarian Fraternity on St Lazarus island.
To remind, Kocharyan is visiting Italy on his Italian counterpart
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi’s invitation. The key objective of the visit is
to enlarge political and economic cooperation between Armenia and
Italy.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Parliament Speaker Treasure of Youth Wing of Orinats Yerkir Party

SPEAKER OF ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT TREASURE OF YOUTH WING OF ORINATS
YERKIR PARTY: OY MEMBERS
YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. The youth wing of Orinats Yerkir party
must be proud of the fact that it has such a treasure as Armenian
Parliament Speaker, Arthur Baghdasaryan, Head of the parliamentary
faction of the party Samvel Balasanyan addressed the participants of
the Congress of OY Youth Wing, Saturday.
In his words, the youth wing can rely on Arthur Baghdasaryan in all
the issues of party construction. In his turn, Arthur Baghdasaryan
stated that the youth wing must play an active role in overcoming the
possible challenges to be made to Armenia. he said.

ANKARA: PM urges world leaders to stop “globalization of terrorism”

Turkey’s premier urges world leaders to stop “globalization of terrorism”
TRT 1 television, Ankara
28 Jan 05
Announcer Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has held a news
conference at the World Economic Forum congress centre in
Davos. Within the framework of this year’s theme in the summit,
Erdogan said, the politicians should offer alternatives.
Erdogan In my opinion, the first of these is to be able to prevent the
globalization of terrorism. We should discuss what we can do to
globalize peace. We must take the step of the joint struggle platform
together, including the most developed countries, the developing
countries and even the underdeveloped countries. All terrorists are
bad. Turkey is one of the countries that was hurt most by
terrorism. From the onset we declared, and are still declaring, that
we are ready to engage in all types of solidarity in this regard.”
Announcer In reply to a question on the Armenian genocide allegations
raised in various countries, Erdogan said that his government
advocates a concept of politics that leaves historical events to
historians.
Erdogan We are a government that has started flights from Yerevan to
Istanbul by opening the air corridor. My government has very proper
relations with the Armenian citizens in my country. There are 30,000
Armenian citizens in my country, and they have no such problem. At
present, we are engaged in efforts to build the world of tomorrow.”
Announcer Answering a question on the Israeli-Palestinian question,
Erdogan said:
Erdogan According to our saying, friends tell the painful truth. We
are saying: Let these bombs stop spewing death. We want a
Palestine-Israel where there are two separate states. We are saying:
peace, peace, peace.

Azerbaijan for Dialogue with Karabakh Only After ROA Troops Leave

AZERBAIJAN READY FOR DIALOGUE WITH KARABAKH ARMENIANS ONLY AFTER
ARMENIAN TROOPS LEAVE OCCUPIED AZERI TERRITORIES
YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. “Azerbaijan is ready for a dialogue with
the Karabakh Armenians but only after the Armenian troops are
withdrawn from the occupied Azeri territories,” says Azeri Deputy FM
Araz Azimov.
Zerkalo reports him as saying that the PACE resolution on Karabakh
“has given an unbiased picture of the occupation of and the ethnic
cleansing over Azeri territories.” Azimov says that now Armenia and
Azerbaijan are negotiating for stopping their military conflict and
eliminating its consequences. In due time Azerbaijan will start
negotiating with Karabakh’s Armenian community too but at the same
time with the local Azeri community who will return to Karabakh by
that time. This will be talks with own citizens and the public should
understand this, says Azimov.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azerbijan PPFA Leader Calls Karabakh Authorities Wild Separatists

PPFA LEADER CALLS KARABAKH AUTHORITIES WILD SEPARATISTS
YEREVAN, JANUARY 29. ARMINFO. “Wild separatist has nothing to do with
the rights of ethnic minorities,” the leader of the Party of People’s
Front of Azerbaijan Ali Kerimli said at the conference “Azerbaijan and
Europe: Enlarging Cooperation” in Stockholm Jan 26.
He said that when asked “how the Armenian community of Karabakh can
live within Azerbaijan if human rights are not respected in that
country.” Kermili also said that “Armenia’s occupation of Azeri
territories and its consequences” is one of the key obstacles to the
deepening of Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU.

The Critical but Perilous Caucasus

TITLE: The Critical but Perilous Caucasus
SOURCE: Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.) 48 no1 105-16 Wint 2004
Kenneth Yalowitz and Svante E. Cornell
The war on terrorism has brought Afghanistan and the Central Asian
states into the spotlight of world politics, but the nearby region of the
Caucasus between the Black and Caspian Seas, made up of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia, is less well known. It is by no means less important to U.S.
foreign policy. In the military operations in Afghanistan after 9/11, the
three Caucasian states offered their support to the United States. All U.S.
and coalition aircraft transiting from America and Western Europe to Central
Asia flew in the South Caucasian states’ airspace. These two states offered
blanket overflight and basing rights, and their cooperation has been vital
in the war on terror. But the importance of the Caucasus does not stop at
this: the oil resources of the Caspian Sea, especially Azerbaijan and
Kazakstan, are one potential alternative to Middle Eastern oil, and Caspian
natural gas reserves are a possible future source of energy for Western
Europe and Turkey. The Caucasus is again the “Silk Road” linking Central
Asia and Europe. Its location, between Russia, Iran, and Turkey and near
Iraq and the Middle East, gives it great strategic value.
But the South Caucasus is also a troubled region. In the 1990s it was a
hotbed of ethnic conflicts, none of which have been resolved; just over the
Caucasus mountains to the north, Chechnya’s war for independence from Russia
rages on. The entire region has become a center for the illegal drug trade,
transnational crime, and trafficking in women and illegal migrants. Concerns
are also rising regarding the availability in the region of fissile
materials and other components useful for making “dirty bombs.” All of this
has led to “Caucasus fatigue” in the West–the sense that too much economic
assistance and political support has been tendered with too little to show
for it.
However, the strategic relevance of the Caucasus is growing, since
terrorists could gain serious footholds there unless current political and
economic trends are reversed. This is a situation ripe for cooperation among
the United States, the EU, and Russia to resolve the ethnic conflicts,
promote needed reforms, and protect the sovereignty of the three independent
states.
DEADLOCKED CONFLICTS
In addition to the war in Chechnya that destabilizes the entire region,
three other ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus–Georgia’s conflicts with its
South Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities and Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan
over the latter’s Nagorno-Karabakh region–remain deadlocked. The
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is by far the most threatening, since it
involves two independent states and could potentially have larger
humanitarian and regional ramifications.
Close to 1 million Azeris became refugees in 1992-94 as Armenia occupied
Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. The 1994
cease-fire has held, but a decade of negotiations has failed to lead to a
solution, and the refugees remain in refugee camps. The negotiations have
exhausted both Azeris and Armenians, and many in Baku are pressing for a
military solution to restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. As Ilham
Aliyev, who was since elected president of Azerbaijan, noted in an October
2002 speech in Washington, “Azerbaijan’s patience is running out.”(FN1)
While neither conflict has been resolved, the tensions over South
Ossetia have abated somewhat, whereas Abkhazia is still a major issue in
Georgian politics and a much more unstable situation. Tbilisi lost control
there after a 1992-93 war in which Russia supported Abkhazia. The
consequences of the conflict have been severe in human, material, and
political terms. The 250,000 refugees from the Abkhazia conflict form an
important pressure group. As in Azerbaijan, a cease-fire has been in place
for close to a decade, but negotiations have failed to bring the parties
closer to a solution. There have been returns to warfare in both 1998 and
2001, and low-intensity conflict is a constant in the border areas between
Georgia proper and areas controlled by the self-styled Abkhaz government.
The loss of territory was a major humiliation for the people of both
Azerbaijan and Georgia. At present, neither country has the military
capability to take back the lost lands, yet tensions are increasing in both,
and calls for a military solution are becoming ever more common. A political
solution to either conflict, as discussed below, would require a
substantially higher level of involvement on the part of the international
community. Substantial compromises from both sides will be necessary,
preceded by efforts to prepare public opinion on the respective sides of the
conflict.
The War in Chechnya. Just north of the Caucasus mountains, an estimated
100,000 Chechens–one tenth of the population–have been killed in the
ongoing war in Chechnya, and 300,000 to 400,000 have been forced to flee
their homes. The conflict had already spilled over to the independent
Caucasian states in 1999, when some 7,000 Chechen refugees and several
hundred fighters sought refuge in the Pankisi Gorge in northern Georgia.
This led to Russian threats of intervention against Georgia and Azerbaijan,
where some Chechen networks had also established a presence.
The war has also shifted in character. If the first war, in 1994-96, was
primarily an ethnic-based struggle for independence, many Chechen fighters
now are motivated primarily by their Islamic faith. (Russia itself has
cloaked the war in religious and civilizational terms ever since Chechnya
declared independence in 1991.) While Chechnya’s leadership is nationalist
and secular, this religious trend has helped regionalize the conflict and
bring in radical-minded fighters from other parts of the Islamic world, who
challenge the less radical Chechen groups.
Russia is clearly unable to either win the war or resolve the Chechen
problem politically. President Putin staged his 2000 presidential campaign
on restoring law and order there. He has repeatedly asserted that the war is
over: in his state of the union address in May 2003, referring to the war,
he pointedly noted, “All that has finished.” Yet this is far from the case.
Chechen fighters have acquired weapons that have enabled them to shoot down
a dozen Russian helicopters since fall 2002, challenging Russia’s command of
the skies. Russia has also been unable to prevent high-profile Chechen
terrorist acts, such as the bombing of the Russian central administrative
building in Chechnya in December 2002 and the hostage-taking in a Moscow
theater in October 2002, in which 120 hostages died when Russian special
services stormed the building.
These incidents staged by young Chechens (primarily women) illustrate
the ways the collapse of the social fabric in Chechnya is radicalizing the
country’s youth. Growing up with no hope for the future, many young Chechens
are drawn toward radical Islam. The state of war has drawn various radical
Islamic groups to Chechnya, where they propagate extremist ideologies and
jihad. The Middle Eastern funding sources of the radicals provides them with
better weapons than other fighters. That capital, coupled with their high
levels of motivation, enable them to perform daring raids on Russian forces.
This aura of resistance, along with constant Russian abuse of civilians,
pushes young Chechens to extremism.
A political solution to the Chechen conflict would require Moscow to
negotiate with the separatist authorities. Yet so far, Moscow has instead
pursued a policy of appointing the Chechen leadership, with which it then
negotiates. If Moscow called for the October 5 presidential elections in
Chechnya only to sideline the separatists and cement a loyal regime there,
the situation is unlikely to improve.
Weak States. The struggling economies, debilitating ethnic conflict, and
large refugee flows in the region’s three nations have severely hindered the
governments’ ability to create viable state bureaucracies, control and
police their territories, reform their economies, and establish the rule of
law and democracy. Progress has clearly been made in the last ten years: all
three countries have pluralist political systems with functioning opposition
parties, a relatively free print media, and economies that have been
liberalized to varying degrees. This progress has been recognized through
their admission to membership in the Council of Europe (in 1999 for Georgia
and in 2001 for Armenia and Azerbaijan). But on a political level, the
governments have not managed to build stable, let alone democratic, state
institutions.
In Georgia, the fragmented political system has produced no clear
successor to President Eduard Shevardnadze, who returned to Georgia to lead
the ruling State Council in early 1992 and was elected president in 1995 in
flawed elections. [Editor’s note: As this issue was going to press on Nov.
23 it was announced that President Shevardnadze had resigned.] Georgia is
ill prepared to organize free and fair elections and handle the succession.
Relationships among the multitude of parties and candidates are puzzling and
fluctuating. Even leaving aside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the government
barely controls large tracts of the country, such as the Armenian-populated
Javakheti region, the southwestern region of Adjara, or Svaneti and
Mingrelia in the west. Georgia’s very statehood is at risk. Should its
current downward trend continue, it risks either losing its independence
from Russia or simply state failure.
In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the situation is slightly better. While
corruption is widespread in both countries, neither has a government as weak
as Georgia’s, and they do exercise writ over their territories.
Azerbaijan faced its own succession crisis in the run-up to the October
15 presidential election this fall, with President Heydar Aliyev’s health in
decline. Aliyev, one of the Soviet Union’s most powerful men during the
Brezhnev and Andropov eras, had returned to power in 1993 after a brief
interlude of rule by the nationalist Popular Front in 1992-93. Aliyev
effectively safeguarded some stability, which permitted Western companies to
operate with reasonable security in the country’s booming oil industry. But
this came at the cost of the country’s initially positive democratic
development. In August 2003, 80-year-old Aliyev appointed his son, Ilham,
prime minister, putting him in line for the October 15 presidential
election. Ilham is an experienced politician who has held important
positions in the state oil company, headed the national Olympic committee,
and heads the Azerbaijani delegation to the Council of Europe. Aliyev Sr.
withdrew from the race two weeks before the election. With opposition
leaders failing to unite of offer an alternative strategy for the country,
Ilham won by a large majority in an election marred by intimidation and
allegations of fraud and followed by extensive rioting and reported police
brutality.
Armenia’s transfer of power came in the form of a palace coup in 1998
that ousted President Levon Ter-Petrossian. But President Robert Kocharyan,
who moved to Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh only in the late 1990s, has
become alienated from the people. The murder of both the prime minister and
the speaker of parliament during a parliamentary session in October 1999
shocked the country. Some Kocharyan aides were accused of conspiracy and
even taken into custody, and five key witnesses have been murdered or died
in mysterious circumstances. The case is ongoing, but few Armenians think it
will ever be resolved. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh left Armenia with no
economic links to either Azerbaijan or Turkey, which is Azerbaijan’s key
supporter and with which it shares strong cultural, linguistic, and economic
links. Armenia’s economy contracted in the early 1990s to less than 35
percent of its 1989 levels, forcing an estimated half of the country’s
population of 3 million to migrate to Russia, the United States, and Europe
in search of work. Yerevan is working constructively with the IMF, but
unless peace and economic stability are achieved soon, its statehood will be
further weakened due to simple demographic factors and it will become ever
more dependent on Russia for its economic survival and security.
Transnational Crime. One often-overlooked challenge to Caucasian
security is the region’s transnational crime. Situated along the Balkan and
“northern” smuggling routes, the region is an important international center
for narcotics and arms trafficking. Criminal organizations in the Caucasian
states as well as in the north Caucasus within Russia–especially Dagestan
and Chechnya–are active in these areas, in addition to their cigarette,
fuel, and alcohol smuggling. The fact that approximately 30 percent of
Georgia and 20 percent of Azerbaijan are outside effective government
control creates propitious conditions for transnational crime, which has
flourished in the Caucasus. With its proximity to Russia, Turkey, and the
Arab world, the Caucasus is a natural channel for arms smuggling. A flood of
weapons has poured into the region from Russia, Turkey, Iran, Greece and
Western states since 1989-90, when separatist and civil conflicts began.
Criminal organizations involved in the large-scale trafficking of arms and
drugs tend to be highly organized entities with influential leaders and
connections to key state institutions, and in some cases direct links to the
upper levels of government.(FN2) Abkhazia, on the Black Sea coast, is a
particular hub of the drug trade, as it offers easy access to Eastern and
Central Europe and, due to its unrecognized status, does not participate in
any international cooperation efforts that would provide oversight and
assistance. The Caucasus is located between Russia, the main source of
potential illegal WMD materials, and the Middle East, the main destination
of such materials. Unsafeguarded radiological material has been found in or
trafficked through Georgia, including in 2002 the then-largest seizure in
the world of enriched uranium.(FN3) Moreover, Abkhazia was a storage point
for enriched uranium and other radioactive materials during the Soviet
period, and it has been alleged that such materials may have been sold to
Iraq or terrorist groups.(FN4)
ECONOMIC RECESSION
The regional economic recession that began with ethnic conflicts in the
late 1980s was exacerbated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Poverty
and unemployment are rampant, and government officials’ salaries are
ridiculously low (a deputy minister makes $200 a month), creating a black
market economy and feeding corruption. The region’s health and education
systems, which functioned reasonably well in Soviet times, are decaying
rapidly. Income gaps are widening as a small wealthy class emerges, whose
income derives from both legitimate business and also from corruption and
crime. Meanwhile, the great majority of the population is left in poverty.
The major investments in the region have been in the oil and gas sector, and
then primarily in Azerbaijan; Armenia has been kept going to a large degree
by remittances from the Armenian diaspora in the West and in Russia, and
Georgia mainly by Western (especially American) aid. Oil and gas investments
have helped the macroeconomic stability of Azerbaijan, but this sector is
capital, not labor, intensive. The cease-fire lines of the deadlocked
conflicts keep investors wary and prevent legal trade across these lines,
which only encourages smuggling, especially in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.(FN5)
RUSSIA AND OTHER REGIONAL PLAYERS
The international environment surrounding the Caucasus has made the
region a focal point for post-Cold War geopolitical rivalry. For much of
their history before Russia’s final conquest of the region in the early
nineteenth century, the Caucasian countries formed a zone of competition and
conflict among the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, all of which, in
their modern forms retain important interests in the region today. Turkey is
primarily interested in trade, commerce, Caspian oil and gas, preventing
Nagorno-Karabakh from flaring into a regional war, and ensuring the
sovereignty and independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, as a barrier to
possible future Russian expansionism in the Caucasus. Iran’s focus is
primarily on breaking out of its U.S.-imposed isolation. Not wanting to see
the region become an American bastion, Iran has maintained close ties to
Russia, which shares this concern, to help it promote its own influence
there. Iran, which has a substantial ethnic Azeri population in its north,
sided with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, while Turkey has been Azerbaijan’s
strongest supporter. All three powers keep a close watch on the activities
of the others and are keenly interested in the outcome of debates over the
direction of pipelines carrying Caspian energy; market, military, and
security arrangements in the area; and any resolution of the
ethnic-territorial conflicts.
For Russia, the Caucasus carries an especially significant geostrategic
and historical weight. Expanding into the region was the first step in
Russia’s efforts to expand its territory and its influence with Iran and
Turkey beginning in the eighteenth century. The region was later seen as a
gateway to the Middle East. Georgia in particular was essential to Russia’s
conquest of the North Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century, since it
formed the link between the North Caucasian peoples and the Islamic world,
especially Turkey. Control over Georgia allowed Moscow to isolate the North
Caucasus from the Islamic world–and Moscow still sees Georgia as crucial to
maintaining control of that restive region. The Caucasus is Russia’s soft
underbelly, through which unwelcome influences, ranging from radical Islamic
groups to Turkey or the United States, could make inroads into Russia. As
such, while Russia has accepted the placement of U.S. forces in Georgia in
the struggle against terrorism, for the most part Moscow still views the
Caucasus from the zero-sum game perspective and wishes to minimize U.S.
influence. President Putin has increasingly used economic levers to maintain
influence in the Caucasus. Russia’s traditional approach was
divide-and-conquer, exploiting ethnicterritorial conflicts and weak
governments. It still has military bases in Armenia and seeks to keep the
two bases it has left in Georgia until 2013, but Georgia is unwilling for
these to remain for more than three years.(FN6)
The key issue for Russia in the Caucasus (and perhaps in general) is the
war in Chechnya, which has made its already uneasy relations with Azerbaijan
even worse and almost brought it to war with bordering Georgia. The acrimony
began in late 1999, when the Georgians refused Russian requests to use their
bases in Georgia to attack into Chechnya. Russia countered with a harsh
propaganda campaign against Georgia, alleging that Pankisi Gorge (home to
the Kists, Georgians descended from Chechen refugees from earlier wars in
the North Caucasus, and some 7,000 Chechen refugees from the current war)
had become a major rear base of support and training for Chechen rebels.
Russia continually sought but was refused permission to conduct either their
own operations there or joint operations.
After 9/11, Moscow charged that terrorist elements had taken over the
Chechen struggle and that the Pankisi Gorge was the last holdout of the
Chechen fighters, making it the last barrier to a successful conclusion of
the war. The United States later concluded that there were likely some Al
Qaeda elements in Pankisi along with Chechen fighters, and in February 2002
agreed on a two-year program through which U.S. Special Forces would train
and equip the Georgian military in antiterrorism activities. President Putin
voiced no objections, but strong forces in the Russian military were and are
adamantly opposed to the American military presence in the Caucasus.(FN7)
When the United States announced its intentions to bring about regime change
in Iraq, the Russians argued that the Pankisi threat was just as serious a
threat to regional and international security.(FN8) On September 11, 2002,
President Putin said preemptive action in Pankisi would be required if
Georgia could not deal with the situation. When Russia renewed bombings of
Georgian territory, the United States urged it to respect Georgia’s borders
and work cooperatively with Georgia in dealing with the problem.(FN9) In
late summer 2002, Tbilisi finally sent security forces into the Gorge to
restore order, with some degree of success. Since then, the Gorge has
receded as an irritant in Georgian-Russian relations, but the concern
remains that a spread of the Chechen war into Georgia could set off a
conflict involving all of the Caucasus.
Russia is clearly a key player in the South Caucasus and has
considerable ability to block or undermine agreements it does not like and
destabilize governments if it chooses. A Russian policy supporting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Caucasus states and
recognizing the legitimate interests of all regional powers as well as the
United States and EU would be a significant step forward in assuring peace
and stability in this volatile region. Russia can be either part of the
problem or part of the solution in the future.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EU
The United States and the EU are relatively new actors on the scene,
trying both to deal with the social and political complexities of these new
countries and agree on their place in the Eurasian geopolitical framework.
To date, the aim has mainly been to assure that the South Caucasus does not
become the sphere of influence of a hostile power and to open it to trade
and investment. Accordingly, both have provided significant amounts of
economic, technical, and humanitarian assistance to the Caucasian countries
and sought to promote democratization processes, especially via the Council
of Europe.
EU aid programs have focused on the Caucasus’ role as a link between
Central Asia and Europe. The EU has funded transportation infrastructure
improvements such as roads, bridges, and ports to improve the “new Silk
Road.” Individual European countries have also focused on economic and
commercial links, but some have special political ties. For example, Berlin
has a special relationship with Tbilisi dating back to when President
Shevardnadze was the Soviet foreign minister during the peaceful
reunification of Germany, and France with Armenia due to the large Armenian
population in France. The EU, however, is constrained in its policy in the
Caucasus by its members’ frequent inability to reach consensus, which often
results in the EU’s taking no position at all on issues. The EU also tends
to give priority to its relations with Russia, particularly in trade and
energy matters, and to avoid confrontation in an area of Russia’s strong
interest.
The United States’ initial disposition to the new countries was to defer
to Russia and avoid entering into security arrangements with the new states.
In the mid-1990s, as American firms’ interest in Caspian energy supplies and
U.S. concerns about Russia’s intentions in the Caucasus grew, Washington
began to play a more active role. Following its policy of containing Iran,
it sought from the very independence of the CIS in 1991 to prevent Iran from
making inroads for radical Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus. By 1998,
the United States was endorsing a multiple pipeline strategy to carry
Caspian energy to markets, focusing on the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, which would bypass Russia and Iran. Security arrangements were
initiated, mainly with Georgia, to build up the states’ border guard
capability and promote military modernization and downsizing. Georgia’s
military, like others in the region, was modeled on the manpower-heavy
Soviet model and therefore ill-suited to the military realities of small
nations like the Caucasian states.
Most recently, the United States has come to see the South Caucasus as
part of a larger strategic effort to create a zone of stability stretching
from the Balkans to Central Asia and buttressing NATO’s expansion into
Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. aid levels to Armenia and Georgia have been
among the highest per capita in the world, thanks in part to the efforts of
the influential Armenian lobby in Washington. The Bush administration
supports constructing east-west pipelines to carry Caspian oil and gas to
Turkey;(FN10) and since 9/11 has entered into potentially significant
security cooperation programs with all three Caucasus countries aimed at
antiterrorism and building up border guard capabilities. The latter was made
possible by the waiving of legislation prohibiting the provision of other
than humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan and the enactment of legislation
enabling increased security cooperation with Armenia. The key element of aid
to the Caucasus is the two-year antiterrorism train-and-equip program in
Georgia. It is not yet known what the longer term U.S. military presence in
the region will be.
With its global view and international responsibilities, especially in
Iraq, the United States’ interest and focus could easily be diverted from
the Caucasus to other regional hotspots. U.S. efforts on conflict resolution
in the Caucasus have historically been episodic and lacked continuing
high-level attention, and Western attention is questionable now given other
priorities.
U.S.-EU COOPERATION
The United States and the EU share virtually identical goals and
objectives in the Caucasus. With the many other issues threatening to weaken
U.S.-European ties, cooperation between the two in the Caucasus could
demonstrate the considerable scope for positive engagement as well. This
cooperation could be built around four elements: more fully involving the
Caucasus countries in the war on terror, given their location and
Azerbaijan’s being a moderate, secular Islamic country; encouraging the
development and export of Azerbaijani oil and gas to improve world energy
supplies; resolving deadlocked conflicts; and helping improve governance and
development of the rule of law.
The United States and EU should be holding regular high-level meetings,
in addition to the current discussions at the deputy assistant secretary
level. They should agree to use the opportunities presented by America’s new
dialogue with Russia and the war on terror to firm up a common interest and
approach to promote peace and stability in the Caucasus and respect for the
independence and territorial integrity of each of the three southern states.
This must include a significantly enhanced effort to look afresh at the
unresolved conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The two could also
agree to joint measures to help fight the corruption that saps popular
confidence in governments and deters new investment in the Caucasus. Work
needs to be done to ensure that revenues from new east-west pipelines are
used in Georgia and Azerbaijan for the public good and not the corrupt few.
And priority should be given to building legitimate state institutions and
ensuring free and fair elections.
The EU and United States could jointly study what economic assistance to
the Caucasus has worked and what constrains other efforts. Is more
assistance justified, and if so, how much and where? This would avoid
duplication of effort and the development of competing approaches for the
same project, which often becomes an excuse for the aid recipient to do
nothing.
Security cooperation in the Caucasus is problematic. Georgia and
Azerbaijan aspire to NATO membership, but this is not on the immediate
horizon given the current status of their militaries, as well as their
incomplete democratic institutions. Membership for these countries is
unlikely in the next five years, although this does not exclude bilateral
security arrangements short of membership. Armenia, on the other hand, has a
close military and security relationship with Russia. Russian efforts to
expand military cooperation within the CIS have foundered, in part due to
opposition from Georgia and Azerbaijan, which fear CIS cooperation as a
Russian tool to regain control over the former Soviet Union. Proposals by
Turkey and others for regional stability pacts can go nowhere as long as
Armenia and Azerbaijan are deadlocked over Nagorno-Karabakh. Nonetheless,
the United States and EU should also pursue a dialogue on security
cooperation in the Caucasus, although a continued deadlock on
Nagorno-Karabakh would make such steps harder. These could include building
up border guard forces, as is already being done in Georgia and currently in
Azerbaijan; assisting in antiterrorist training for the new pipelines;
encouraging greater participation in NATO Partnership for Peace activities;
and helping the militaries in all three countries with downsizing and
modernization.
Russia’s involvement, or at least its tacit approval, will be crucial.
This will not be easily won, given its historical proprietary views of the
Caucasus, but there is no more propitious time than now to try to achieve
it, in light of the common goals of fighting terrorism and providing
stability. Russia’s actions and attitudes in the South Caucasus will provide
a good measure of the depth of its commitment to closer integration with the
West. This dialogue with Russia could also become a vehicle for helping it
reach a political settlement of the Chechen war. By the same token, a
U.S.-EU dialogue with Turkey on the Caucasus aimed at enlisting Ankara in
the same set of initiatives would underscore that the region must be open to
all with legitimate interests and peaceful intentions. This could also have
the collateral effect of improving the Turkey-EU relationship.
The year 2004 will be a turning point for this region. If the region is
to be stabilized after the successions of 2003, the United States needs to
take the lead in an effort to resolve the conflicts of the region, beginning
with the most important one, which has the gravest potential regional
implications: the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In the past, direct
American involvement has brought the conflict close to a solution on two
occasions. This effort should be coordinated with the EU and also with the
Russian Federation to the extent possible. The South Caucasus constitutes a
region where American and European interests converge and where some success
is likely to come from a joint initiative.
ADDED MATERIAL
Kenneth Yalowitz served as U.S. ambassador to Georgia from 1998-2001 and
to Belarus from 1994-97. He is presently the Director of the Dickey Center
for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, and also teaches the
Caucasus at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. Svante
E. Cornell ([email protected]) is deputy director of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, editor of the
Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, and Research Director of the Silk Road
Studies Program at Uppsala University.
FOOTNOTES