The Jewish settler movement competes for a large part of the Armenian quarter

IG
India – Feb 9 2024
 

The Armenian Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem is facing its biggest crisis in recent times. A Jewish businessman linked to the radical settler movement is ready to develop a quarter of the neighborhood’s territory with plans to build a luxury hotel. If it goes ahead, it will significantly change part of Jerusalem’s Old City and accelerate the demographic shift toward the Jewish population of the city that has been happening for several years.

The Armenian Quarter actually makes up one-sixth of the Old City (the other quarters are Muslim, Christian and Jewish), and the Armenian presence in Jerusalem dates back to the 4th century. Together with the neighboring Christian quarter, it is the stronghold of the small Christian minority in the city. The threat of Jewish settlers taking over parts of the Quarter is widely understood as a change in the demographic status quo in favor of Israel’s interests.

In 2021, the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem, Nourhan Manougian, agreed with the developers on a 98-year lease for part of the Armenian Quarter. The agreement covers a significant area that today includes a parking lot, buildings belonging to the office of the Armenian church leader – known as the Patriarchate – and the homes of five Armenian families.

News of the deal sparked strong protests among Armenians in the neighborhood last year. Feelings ran so deep that in October the patriarch and other church leaders felt compelled to renege on the agreement. This led to violent clashes between settlers and local Armenians.

After a few weeks of calm, fighting broke out again in late December, when more than 30 men armed with stones and sticks allegedly attacked Armenians who had been guarding the area for several weeks.

The dispute has now gone to court. The question is whether the lease is valid or whether unilateral termination renders the contract null and void. The Patriarchate has engaged lawyers – local and from Armenia and the US – who will present their case that the contract was not properly concluded due to irregularities in the contract.

This is not a single incident. Since the Six-Day War of 1967, when all of Jerusalem came under Israeli control, there has been a concerted effort to change the demographics of traditionally Arab East Jerusalem.

In many places, the authorities are evicting Arab families who have lived there for decades on the grounds that they do not have the documents to own the house. Then a Jewish family immigrates.

This change in the demography of East Jerusalem occurs through emigration, demolition and construction restrictions. This is also happening in the famous and touristic Old City of Jerusalem.

Almost 20 years ago, there was a minor scandal when it emerged that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the owner of a large property, had entered into a long-term lease for two historic hotels with an organization of Jewish settlers.

Disputed territory: In most plans for a two-state solution, East Jerusalem would be the capital of a Palestinian state.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)CC BY-ND

Now we have a similar incident regarding the Armenian Patriarchate. Palestinians, who have long fought against illegal Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories, view the sale or long-term lease of real estate to Jewish settlers extremely negatively.

East Jerusalem is vital to the Palestinians. Proposed plans for a two-state solution call for the capital of a future Palestinian state. A decisive change in the demography there is therefore a priority goal of some in Israel – including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who does not want a two-state solution.



Read more: Explained: What is the solution to the two-state conflict between Israel and Palestine?


This conflict also highlights an old problem of the Jerusalem Christian churches – namely, the gulf between the leadership and the people. The old churches are hierarchical in nature and the leaders rule at the top. In Jerusalem, there is an additional problem in that church leaders are not always from the local population.

The largest Christian denomination in the Holy Land is the Greek Orthodox Church. Its members are mostly Arabs, while the patriarch and other leading prelates are Greeks.

Nourhan Manougian, the current and 97th Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem, was born in Syria to an Armenian family. The Armenian Patriarchate has been accused of corruption and illegitimate sale of assets in the past, long before the current crisis.

If the Armenians lose this battle and the settler movement is able to take control of such a key city, it will hurt a vulnerable small minority. The settler campaign to colonize East Jerusalem under Jewish control will achieve another victory.

https://irshadgul.com/the-jewish-settler-movement-competes-for-a-large-part-of-the-armenian-quarter-ig-news/


Britain lets Armenian president’s family own luxury properties using dark money


Feb 9 2024


The opulent streets of London, long associated with the rich and famous, have become the backdrop for yet another tale of hidden wealth and offshore companies. Recent investigations have unveiled a network of luxury properties owned by the family of Armen Sarkissian, the former president of Armenia, nestled behind the veils of opaque offshore firms.

In a report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), it was revealed that Sarkissian’s relatives, including his wife and sons, own multiple high-end properties in London’s affluent neighborhoods. The ownership, hidden behind offshore entities registered in the British Virgin Islands, has come to light following new transparency regulations enacted in the United Kingdom in 2022.

The properties, including a five-story mansion on Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, and several other prestigious residences, are purportedly owned by Sarkissian’s sister, Karine Sargsyan. These revelations raise questions about the origins of the wealth used to acquire such prime real estate and the implications of using offshore structures to obscure ownership.

Sarkissian, a successful businessman prior to his political career, claims that he entrusted his wealth to his sister in the 1990s, earned from ventures in software development and video games. However, discrepancies arise as the properties were not declared in Sarkissian’s asset declarations during his tenure in public office, as required by Armenian law.

Moreover, previous investigations have uncovered undisclosed assets and foreign citizenship held by Sarkissian, further complicating the narrative. Allegations of constitutional violations regarding foreign citizenship are under scrutiny by Armenian authorities.

The intricate web of offshore companies extends beyond real estate ownership, revealing connections to corporate assets and business ventures. Sarkissian’s family has been linked to companies involved in importing major international brands in Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, indicating a broader network of financial interests.

Additionally, the transfer of ownership within these corporate entities, particularly to Sarkissian’s son, raises concerns about the transparency and legality of such transactions. Questions linger about the true beneficiaries and motivations behind these intricate financial maneuvers.

The revelations underscore broader concerns about the role of the United Kingdom as a haven for illicit wealth and dark money. Despite recent legislative efforts to increase transparency, the ease of establishing opaque corporate structures and concealing beneficial ownership highlights ongoing challenges in combating financial secrecy and corruption.

As investigations continue into Sarkissian’s family wealth and offshore activities, calls for greater accountability and scrutiny of individuals holding public office resonate. The case serves as a poignant reminder of the intricate nexus between wealth, power, and opacity, and the imperative of robust regulatory frameworks to safeguard against abuse and exploitation.

From an Unconstitutional Rome Statute to Its Constitutionality: Why It Took Over 20 Years for Armenia to Join the ICC?

EJIL:TALK
Feb 8 2024
Written by Arnold Vardanyan

On November 14, 2023, the Republic of Armenia officially deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  While the Statute will come into force for Armenia on February 1, 2024, officially making it the 124th State Party to join, the process leading to Armenia’s ICC membership commenced significantly earlier on October 1, 1999, when Armenia, among the first countries globally, signed the Rome Statute.

This blog post aims to delve into the intricacies of the considerable time lapse between the initiation of Armenia’s journey toward ICC membership and the eventual ratification. It will primarily focus on the analysis of the decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia on August 13, 2004, finding the text of the Rome Statute unconstitutional, and the recent landmark decision of the Constitutional Court on March 24, 2023, revising the Court’s position regarding the constitutionality of the Statute, underscoring Armenia’s commitment to international criminal justice. What were the significant changes and implications that triggered this legal shift?

The First Attempt of Joining the ICC (1999-2004)

 After the Armenian Government signed the Rome Statute on October 1, 1999, following its ratification procedure outlined in the Armenian Constitution (1995 edition), the Constitutional Court reviewed its constitutionality on August 13, 2004, and found the Rome Statute unconstitutional.

The court’s decision was primarily based on two reasons. Firstly, the court determined that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the ICC contradicts the Constitution, designating the function of administering justice as an exceptional jurisdiction of domestic courts. Secondly, the court noted an inability to exercise constitutional functions such as granting pardons and amnesty to convicted individuals, particularly in relation to Article 105 of the Rome Statute.

While this decision prompted scholarly discourse within the Armenian and international legal community, the analysis of the Constitutional Court faced criticism for not comprehensively considering the ICC’s core principle of complementarity outlined in Article 1 of the Rome Statute. It overlooked that, as a court of “last resort,” the ICC intervenes when a national judicial system is unwilling or unable to perform its tasks, without having primacy over it. Regarding the second issue, the Court did not consider that the prosecution of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation, thus, it is not permissible to grant pardons or amnesty for such crimes (e.g., Abdülsamet Yaman v. Turkey, § 55).

Supposedly, the Armenian Constitutional Court’s decision was influenced by a nearly identical prevailing approach of other constitutional bodies, including the French Constitutional Council, Ukrainian Constitutional Court, Chilean Constitutional Court, Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council, sharing the perspective that the execution of the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction infringed on national sovereignty and the ratification of the Rome Statute requires constitutional amendments.

Following Constitutional and Political Changes (2004-2020)

As most of the aforementioned countries initiated constitutional amendments, primarily incorporating a specific reference to the possibility of accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction and ratifying the Rome Statute, Armenia also pursued constitutional amendments three times – in 2005, 2015 and 2020. However, none of them included such a reference.

In 2005, the constitutional amendments not only did not include any reference to the ICC, but also did not essentially modify regulations related to the domestic judicial system. There is no public source about the travaux préparatoires of the amendments; thus, officially, it is not known whether the inclusion of the ICC clause was even discussed by the drafting committee.

Meanwhile, prior to the 2015 constitutional amendments, the newly established drafting committee, headed by the president of the Constitutional Court, introduced a concept note in 2014, for the first time officially suggesting that: “Constitutional amendments should formulate the basis for ICC Rome Statute ratification, considering that some obligations resulting from the Statute were declared as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court’s August 13, 2004 decision.” Although this suggestion restated the public discourse on the necessity of joining the ICC after over ten years of the Rome Statute signature, and the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) provided a recommendation to ensure amendments’ cohesion with the Statute, the final text of the constitutional amendments introduced in 2015 refrained from including any reference to the ICC and essentially amending regulations related to the judicial system. This outcome was not foreseen, as it was presumed that Armenia had committed to joining the ICC. This unexpected development raised questions about the underlying considerations in the drafting of these amendments. However, considering that the drafting committee was formally attached to the President, who also led the governing political party, the deviation from the concept note of constitutional amendments was supposed to be a political decision rather than a legal one.

After the world-known Velvet Revolution in Armenia in 2018, a series of anti-government protests led to the overturn of the governing political power. Initially, the newly elected power did not discuss the necessity of constitutional amendments. However, in 2020, it proposed constitutional amendments solely aimed at terminating the functions of Constitutional Court judges who had been in office for over 12 years, resulting in the change of one-third of the Constitutional Court members.

Moreover, in the same year, the Prime Minister established a new drafting committee to prepare a concept note for possible constitutional amendments. The committee was reconstituted in 2022. However, as of now, the drafting committee has not presented any concepts of constitutional amendments and continues to operate.

The Second Decisive Attempt of Joining the ICC (2020-2024)

Following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, which involved Armenia and Azerbaijan and concluded with ongoing numerous violations of international law in the territory of Armenia, the Armenian Government has turned to international judicial mechanisms, submitting cases against Azerbaijan at the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Within this context, on December 29, 2022, the Government announced that, in response to the large-scale military aggression by the armed forces of Azerbaijan against the sovereign territory of Armenia, it is initiating the Rome Statute ratification process, with a retroactive recognition of the ICC jurisdiction commencing from 00:00 on May 10, 2021, covering the period of military escalation in Armenia started from that date.

At this time, on March 24, 2023, the Constitutional Court of Armenia, with three dissenting opinions, resolved that there was no longer any constitutional contradiction regarding the Rome Statute. In light of the Court’s previous decision, it reconsidered the constitutionality of the principle of complementarity and Article 105 of the Rome Statute.

 Regarding the issue of complementarity, the Court, referring to the purposes of the adoption of the Rome Statute and the values protected thereof, stated that the protection and preservation of those values are fully consistent with the affirmation of the civilizational commitment of the Armenian People to “universal values,” as prescribed by the Preamble of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that their protection could not only be considered as a constitutional imperative but also an obligation for any State governed by jus cogens norms. In this context, by analyzing the principle of complementarity, the Court highlighted that the failure of the criminal jurisdiction of the Republic of Armenia for any reason (unwillingness or inability) to ensure the protection of the peace and well-being of the world through the effective investigation and prosecution of those who commit the gravest international crimes cannot be assessed as an unconstitutional interference with the Armenia’s sovereign criminal jurisdiction.

Regarding Article 105 of the Rome Statute, the Court decided that the obligation of a State to enforce the sentence of a person sentenced to imprisonment by the ICC does not arise directly upon ratification of the Statute. Instead, it is an obligation voluntarily undertaken by a State Party through an international treaty. This treaty should be concluded in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Statute and is not subject to the current constitutional review.

Although this decision gave a “green light” for Armenia to join the ICC, it raises numerous reasonable questions. First, it questions whether the Constitutional Court was allowed to review its previous decision from the perspective of res judicata, especially considering that the exceptional jurisdiction of domestic courts have not been constitutionally amended since 2004. Additionally, it prompts an examination of the legitimacy of the domestic and international discourse surrounding the necessity of establishing a constitutional basis for accepting ICC jurisdiction. This is particularly pertinent given that the legal shift from the unconstitutional Rome Statute to its constitutionality was primarily based on the interpretation of “universal values” shared by the Rome Statute and the unamendable Preamble of the Constitution. After all, obligations arising from jus cogens norms and linked to the protection of “universal values” were inherent not only in the Armenian Constitution but also in the Constitutions of numerous other democratic states specifically amended to join the ICC.

 Conclusion

 Despite the issues raised regarding the legal shift from the unconstitutional Rome Statute to its constitutionality, Armenia’s decision to join the ICC is a critical step, demonstrating its commitment to international criminal justice, even in the face of Russia’s officially expressed “dissatisfaction” over the decision. This move underscores Armenia’s dedication to ensuring the accountability of perpetrators committing the gravest international crimes. As an ICC family member, the next crucial step should involve the active deployment of existing mechanisms to address the circumstances that triggered the initiation of such a contentious procedure for Rome Statute ratification.

Dr. Arnold Vardanyan is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law of Yerevan State University and a Research Fellow at the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia. He holds…

South Caucasus Turns Away From Russia Toward Middle East

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Feb 8 2024
Rapid geopolitical change is curtailing Russian power in the South Caucasus, boosting the influence of Middle Eastern countries and bookending the region’s “post-Soviet” history.
Emil
Avdaliani

The South Caucasus is undergoing a geopolitical transformation. The war in Ukraine and the effective resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan mean that the region is entering a new age. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have gradually become more confident on the world stage, with each trying to limit its dependence on Russia by diversifying its foreign policy.

Georgia has boosted relations with the European Union, China, and—to some extent—the United States, while Azerbaijan has sought closer ties with Turkey, Israel, Central Asia, and a number of European countries. Having gone through the traumatic loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has pushed for closer engagement with the EU, rapprochement with Turkey, and even military links with India and some European states.

Instead of an arena for competition between Russia and the West, the South Caucasus has turned into a highly congested geopolitical space, with up to six major powers vying for influence. We are not, however, just witnessing the end of the post-Soviet period. We are witnessing the end of exclusive Russian influence in the South Caucasus, which has been the status quo for almost two hundred years.

The decline of Russian power has led to the reemergence of close links between the South Caucasus and the broader Middle East. Indeed, geography favors such a connection. Russia lies across the formidable Caucasus mountains, and Middle Eastern states have long regarded the South Caucasus as a natural continuation of their own territories.

The deepening ties are visible in growing trade, investment, energy infrastructure, and railways that link the South Caucasus to two large neighboring powers: Turkey and Iran.

Turkey is a key ally of Azerbaijan, and also enjoys close links with Georgia, while Armenia has Iran’s backing. In particular, Turkey has been pushing for the development of east-west connectivity that cuts through the traditional Russia-sponsored north-south infrastructure. The successful completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is one example; another is the push by Baku and Ankara to open a new route via Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik.

Iran, too, has scored significant victories. In October, it inked a deal with Baku on a new transit corridor linking Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan via Iranian territory. Tehran has also advanced work on the International North-South Transport Corridor, which runs from southern Iran to Russia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. Other initiatives involve the development of roads through Armenia, which could provide solid links between Iran and Georgia’s Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi.

Energy infrastructure in the South Caucasus, too, is increasingly tied to the Middle East. Azerbaijan has become one of Turkey’s major gas suppliers, covering about 16 percent of the country’s needs in 2022, while Iran and Armenia have agreed to extend their gas trade agreement through 2030.

The civil war in Syria showed how political and military developments in the Middle East impact the South Caucasus. For instance, residents of the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia volunteered to fight with radical Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq, sparking fears of terrorism spreading. Syria is also one of few countries that has recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020 allegedly saw Syrian soldiers fighting for Azerbaijan.

Even beyond security, Armenia and Georgia have built robust relations with other prominent Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia recently agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, which has also expanded its ties with other Gulf states. Similar trends are visible in Georgia’s relations with nations like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan.

Other actors like Israel are also playing an increasingly active role. Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan are especially noteworthy, with the two states enjoying close military ties. Azerbaijan used high-tech Israeli weaponry to devastating effect in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and, more recently, in September 2023, when it reclaimed full control over the disputed region. Azerbaijan is also a major supplier of oil to Israel, meeting as much as 40 percent of the country’s demand.

Azerbaijan’s links with the Middle East mean that flare-ups between Israel and Iran could have local consequences. Iran has expressed concern about Israel allegedly using Azerbaijan for espionage activities, and Azerbaijan was one of just a few Muslim countries not to condemn Israel’s military operation in Gaza, sparking anger in Tehran.

With an end to Russian dominance in the South Caucasus, it’s clear that the region is growing closer to the Middle East. Historically speaking, this is actually a return to normal practice, with Middle Eastern powers traditionally the most influential in the region. For Iran and Turkey, Russian hegemony was always an aberration.

The process could yield benefits for the West. After all, shifting tectonic plates create opportunities for multiple actors to project power. But the EU and United States are limited by geographical distance, and the absence of significant economic levers. Turkey and Iran are both nearby, and eager to accrue more influence in the South Caucasus.

By:
  • Emil Avdaliani

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Armenia’s Humanitarian Aid Landscape: A Tale of International Support and Decline

Feb 8 2024
Mazhar Abbas

In 2023, Armenia witnessed a significant influx of humanitarian aid, totaling $35.6 million. The United States led the charge as the largest donor, contributing over $8.1 million, followed closely by Italy and Switzerland, with $3.8 million and $2.8 million, respectively. This outpouring of support, however, came with a stark contrast; the volume of humanitarian aid decreased by 58.8% compared to the previous year.

Delving deeper into the data, Germany, China, and France emerged as notable contributors, offering $2.1 million, $1.8 million, and $1.3 million in aid, respectively. When analyzing the regional distribution, it became clear that European Union (EU) countries played a pivotal role, accounting for 46.8% of the total humanitarian assistance. The United States followed suit, providing 22.8% of the aid.

Intriguingly, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries contributed a mere 0.1%, raising questions about the regional dynamics at play. This disparity in contributions paints a complex picture of the global response to Armenia's humanitarian needs.

The 58.8% decrease in aid from 2022 to 2023 is a striking figure, prompting reflection on the shifting priorities and challenges within the international humanitarian landscape. As the world grapples with numerous crises, the allocation of resources becomes an increasingly delicate balancing act.

For Armenia, the implications of this decline are far-reaching. While the country received substantial support in 2023, the reduction in aid could potentially impact the ongoing efforts to address pressing humanitarian concerns.

As the world turns its attention to Armenia's humanitarian situation, the importance of international cooperation and understanding cannot be overstated. The intricate tapestry of aid, woven together by diverse countries and regions, serves as a testament to the power of global solidarity.

In the face of adversity, Armenia continues to navigate the complexities of humanitarian aid, forging a path forward with the support of the international community. As the world watches and responds, the story of Armenia's resilience unfolds, illuminating the enduring power of hope and unity in the face of challenge.

As we move further into 2024, the global audience remains captivated by the evolving narrative of Armenia's humanitarian journey. With each twist and turn, the world is reminded of the vital role that international aid plays in shaping the future of nations and the lives of those who call them home.

Why are EU and US unable to reconcile Yerevan and Baku? Analysis

Feb 8 2024
  • Arthur Khachatryan
  • Yerevan

The Western stance

The Karabakh conflict risks falling into oblivion, and this, at least, does not contradict the interests of the West in the South Caucasus region. Taking over the role of the main moderator of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Brussels aimed to construct the entire dialogue based primarily on the principle of the countries’ territorial integrity. This meant that official Yerevan had to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, which, indeed occurred.

However, current events are unfolding differently from the anticipated scenario. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has long been unwilling to resume negotiations on Western platforms. Meanwhile, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict remains unresolved. With Baku’s reluctance to engage in talks, there is a significant risk of renewed hostilities, despite warnings from Western partners about their unacceptable nature.


  • Signing of Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty is only theoretically possible
  • How Armenia solves the problems of the Karabakh people: are the government’s projects effective?
  • Stories and memories of Karabakh Armenians

October 5, 2023, could have marked a significant moment in the history of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. A five-party meeting was scheduled in Granada, Spain, facilitated by European Council President Charles Michel. Alongside the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron were slated to attend. While the Armenian Prime Minister arrived in Spain, Ilham Aliyev declined to participate, citing France’s perceived bias. He also proposed inviting the president of Turkey, a suggestion opposed by Paris and Berlin.

This refusal sparked a period of turmoil in the negotiation process between Yerevan and Baku. However, this was just one aspect of the issue. In Granada, the leaders of the two conflict-ridden nations in the South Caucasus were meant to sign a declaration acknowledging mutual territorial integrity. Yet, only Pashinyan’s signature appeared on the document.


  • “Pashinyan seeks peace, while Aliyev pursues war”: opinion from Yerevan
  • Ilham Aliyev: “People and cargo from Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan should pass without inspection”

The outcomes of the 44-day Karabakh war in 2020 appeared to bolster Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus region. Through Moscow’s mediation, a trilateral ceasefire declaration was inked, effectively designating Russia as the guarantor for its enforcement. Just days following the cessation of hostilities, the Russian peacekeeping force was deployed to the territory of the unrecognized republic.

A few months into the Ukrainian conflict, the European Union visibly heightened its engagement in the Karabakh issue. While Moscow grappled with military matters, Brussels primed itself to assume the lead mediator role between Yerevan and Baku. And they succeeded in their endeavor.

In 2022-2023, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan primarily convened in Brussels and other European capitals for their meetings. Consequently, the war of 2020, which was supposed to strengthen Russia’s influence, initiated another process: the Kremlin’s retreat from the region.


  • Opinion: “Armenia can develop relations with NATO without exiting CSTO for now”
  • “I don’t expect an invasion, but strong pressure on Armenia” – Tom de Waal on Baku’s plans
  • Pashinyan proposes to establish arms control. Will Baku agree?

“Today the international community is telling us: lower your bar a little on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and you will ensure greater international consolidation around Armenia and Artsakh. Otherwise, says the international community, please don’t count on us – not because we don’t want to help you, but because we can’t help you”.

It’s evident now that Armenia has not just lowered its ambitions but completely relinquished its stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. However, it never gained consolidation around itself.

Why did the West prioritize the principle of territorial integrity over the right to self-determination in the context of the Karabakh conflict? Before the 2020 war, Azerbaijan had offered Karabakh significant autonomy within its borders. However, post-war, Baku changed its stance, refusing to discuss any status for the region. Concurrently, the West became highly invested in a definitive resolution to the Karabakh issue, with emerging realities suggesting that such a resolution would hinge on upholding the principle of territorial integrity.

The eventual resolution of the Karabakh conflict rendered the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the region obsolete, a goal pursued by Brussels and Washington from the outset. This outcome materialized as anticipated.

While the peacekeeping contingent remains in Karabakh, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the region seems imminent following the exodus of nearly the entire Armenian population. The peacekeeping mission’s mandate expires in 2025, and Azerbaijan appears unwilling to extend it. And there are all formal grounds for this.


  • “Russians ‘saved’ Artsakh, now they want to pass to Armenia”. Opinion from Yerevan
  • “Baku does not recognize Armenia’s territory”: opinion on the “West Azerbaijan” narrative

Once Azerbaijan secured verbal and written acknowledgment from Armenia, recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, Baku lost interest in Western platforms. Ilham Aliyev has boycotted several meetings and consistently declined invitations to attend events in Brussels or Washington. Instead, the Azerbaijani leader extends invitations to his Armenian counterpart to meet in Russia.

“Zangezur corridor” refers to a route that would link Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhichevan. The Azerbaijani authorities insist that the road should not be under Armenian control.

Baku is well aware that it stands to gain the most from negotiations on these matters if they occur in Moscow. Russia aligns with Azerbaijan on these issues, driven by its own strategic interests. Specifically, Russia seeks to assert control over the road passing through Armenian territory.

“Our Western counterparts prefer a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia to be signed exclusively on their soil. This is a fact. Also factual is Azerbaijan’s readiness to sign it on Russian territory, where the initial efforts to end the conflict and establish a comprehensive system of interaction to address all issues began. As for Yerevan’s readiness for this, I am uncertain, although signals in that regard have been sent to the Armenian capital for some time.”

This statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately portrays not only the Kremlin’s stance on the negotiations but also Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

On the contrary, Armenian authorities anticipate increasing involvement from the West and are making progress in this regard. Specifically, they have succeeded in boosting the number of civilian observers from the EU mission tasked with patrolling the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

The primary concern now revolves around whether Baku will initiate military action. Many in Armenia are convinced that it’s only a matter of time, and under favorable weather conditions, the border will become turbulent once again.


ARMENIA: Appeal court upholds conscientious objector’s jail term

Feb 8 2024

On 7 February, Yerevan's Criminal Court of Appeal rejected 20-year-old Baptist conscientious objector Davit Nazaretyan's appeal against a two-year jail term imposed in October 2023 for refusing military service. The judges ignored European Court of Human Rights judgments, including against Armenia. Nazaretyan's applications for alternative civilian service were repeatedly denied. He is considering a further appeal and will not be required to go to jail until any further appeal is heard. The last known jailed conscientious objector was freed in 2021.

On 7 February, a panel of three judges at Yerevan's Criminal Court of Appeal rejected Davit Nazaretyan's appeal against his two-year jail term imposed in October 2023 for refusing military service on grounds of conscience. He is considering a further appeal to the Cassation Court in Yerevan. The 20-year-old Baptist will not be required to go to jail until any further appeal is heard.

Davit Nazaretyan
Davit Nazaretyan

Nazaretyan is the only conscientious objector known to be currently facing jail under Criminal Code Article 461, Part 1 ("Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription").

Despite Baptist conscientious objector Nazaretyan's repeated requests from June 2022 onwards for alternative civilian service, officials of the Conscription Service and of the Alternative Service Commission refused his application. On 25 October 2023, Yerevan's Kentron District Court handed him a two-year jail term for "Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription" (see below).

"The Criminal Court of Appeal left last October's decision unchanged," Nazaretyan's pastor Mikhail Shubin told Forum 18 from Yerevan after the 7 February 2024 hearing. "He has one month to appeal. When he gets the decision in writing he will decide whether to appeal further" (see below)

Human rights defender Isabella Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation in Yerevan attended the appeal hearing. "This is very, very sad," she told Forum 18 from Yerevan after the decision was announced. She said Nazaretyan was "very sincere" in setting out his position in court. "Davit set out very clearly that he does not consider himself guilty of any crime, that he has been in the church since childhood and that he is ready to perform alternative service" (see below).

"I am a Christian and I read the Bible," Nazaretyan told Forum 18 from Yerevan on 7 November 2023. "Jesus Christ teaches us not to kill and he followed this also. We have to love one another, even our enemies, and not kill people." He added that Jesus Christ also instructed his followers not to swear oaths. "If I was given alternative civilian service now, I would do it" (see below).

"The judges seemed to be prejudiced against the religious community," Sarsgsyan said of the appeal hearing. "The court didn't take into consideration any of Davit's arguments about his right to alternative service, the decisions in similar cases of the European Court of Human Rights or anything else" (see below).

Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation noted that the prosecution did not attend the 7 February 2024 hearing. "The Court in its questioning of Davit stressed the expert opinion of the Theology Faculty of Yerevan State University, treating its opinion with some respect." The Theology Faculty, led by an Armenian Apostolic Church Bishop, claimed that: "The creed of the Baptist Church and the analysis of the presented case materials allow us to state that Nazaretyan's freedom of thought, conscience and religion would not be restricted by military service" (see below).

Nazaretyan's Baptist pastor strongly disputes this claim by another religious community about his and his Church's beliefs (see below).

Bishop Anushavan and a lecturer at the Theology Faculty repeatedly did not respond to Forum 18's requests in November 2023 and on 8 February 2024 for comment. So Forum 18 was unable to find out why they offer views on beliefs they do not understand, and why they also offer views on a legally binding human rights obligation – the freedom of thought, conscience and belief – which they also do not understand (see below).

Forum 18 asked the three Appeal Court judges – Marine Melkonyan, Armen Bektashyan and Anna Matevosyan – on the afternoon of 8 February why they had not taken their decision in Nazaretyan's case in the light of the jurisprudence (including in Armenian cases) of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to conscientious objection to military service, as part of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Forum 18 has not yet received any reply (see below).

Vahe Sarkisyan, head of Yerevan Garrison Military Prosecutor's Office, defended the decision to bring the criminal case against Nazaretyan. "We have to respond if documents are sent to us," he told Forum 18. "But it was the court which took the decision [to sentence him], not the Prosecutor's Office." He refused to answer any other questions by phone (see below).

Vardan Astsatryan of the government's Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs, who sits on the Alternative Service Commission, rejected suggestions that the Alternative Service Commission discriminated against conscientious objectors who are not Jehovah's Witnesses. "We gave alternative service to a Molokan about five years ago," he claimed to Forum 18 (see below).

Forum 18 asked the office of the Human Rights Defender Anahit Manasyan on 7 February about Nazaretyan's case and what it is doing (if anything) to support him and others who cannot perform military service on grounds of conscience. An official said an appropriate colleague would respond with a comment. Forum 18 has received no reply (see below).

The last known convicted conscientious objector, Maksim Telegin, a Molokan from Yerevan who had been refused alternative civilian service, was freed early from his one-year jail term in 2021 after three months. Jehovah's Witnesses told Forum 18 that their young men do not have problems opting for alternative civilian service (see below).

Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation noted that Astsatryan of the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs is the only Commission member with expertise in the area of freedom of religion or belief. "So the Commission seems to follow his recommendation in each case. My experience suggests that government officials – except those who deal with human rights professionally – are not well educated in human rights issues, and often lead by their own perceptions and biases when dealing with matters related to minority rights," Sargsyan noted (see below).

All men in Armenia are subject to conscription between the ages of 18 and 27. Deferments are available in strictly limited circumstances. Military service lasts for 24 months. Those subject to conscription can apply for service without weapons within the armed forces, which lasts 30 months, or for alternative civilian service, which lasts 36 months.

For many years, Armenia jailed those unable to perform military service on grounds of conscience, despite a commitment to the Council of Europe to introduce a civilian alternative to military service by January 2004. In May 2013, amendments to the 2003 Alternative Service Law and to the 2003 Law on Implementing the Criminal Code were passed, and a fully civilian alternative service was created. By November 2013, the authorities had freed all the then-jailed jailed conscientious objectors. All were Jehovah's Witnesses.

Jehovah's Witnesses told Forum 18 on 6 February 2024 that their young men do not have problems opting for alternative civilian service. Since 2013 hundreds of their young men have undertaken alternative civilian service.

The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee has stated in its General Comment 22 that conscientious objection to military service comes under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 18 ("Freedom of thought, conscience and religion"). General Comment 22 notes that if a religion or belief is official or followed by a majority of the population this "shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant .. nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers."

In relation to conscientious objection to military service, General Comment 22 also states among other things: "there shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination against conscientious objectors because they have failed to perform military service."

This has been reinforced by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recognising "the right of everyone to have conscientious objection to military service as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion". The OHCHR has also noted in its Conscientious Objection to Military Service guide that ICCPR Article 18 is "a non-derogable right .. even during times of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation".

In 2022 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated (WGAD-HRC50) that "the right to conscientious objection to military service is part of the absolutely protected right to hold a belief under article 18 (1) of the Covenant, which cannot be restricted by States". The Working Group also stated: "States should refrain from imprisoning individuals solely on the basis of their conscientious objection to military service, and should release those that have been so imprisoned."

Various judgments (including against Armenia) of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg have also defined states' obligations to respect and implement the right to conscientious objection to military service, as part of the right to freedom of religion or belief.

Isabella Sargsyan, 5 October 2023
OSCE/Piotr Dziubak [CC BY-ND 2.0 Deed]

Human rights defender Isabella Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation questions whether the Alternative Service Commission is competent to evaluate who should or should not be given alternative civilian service. "It is meant to be a public body, but in reality it is a fully government body, staffed mainly with deputy ministers not always knowledgeable or sensitive to human rights and minority issues," she told Forum 18 in November 2023.

Sargsyan noted that Vardan Astsatryan of the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs is the only Commission member with expertise in the area of freedom of religion or belief.

"So the Commission seems to follow his recommendation in each case. My experience suggests that government officials – except those who deal with human rights professionally – are not well educated in human rights issues, and often lead by their own perceptions and biases when dealing with matters related to minority rights," Sargsyan noted.

Davit Nazaretyan appeal hearing, Criminal Court of Appeal, Yerevan, 7 February 2024
Isabella Sargsyan

Davit Nazaretyan submitted his appeal against his two-year jail term imposed in October 2023 for refusing military service on grounds of conscience to Yerevan's Criminal Court of Appeal. On 7 February 2024, a panel of three judges – Marine Melkonyan, Armen Bektashyan and Anna Matevosyan – rejected Nazaretyan's appeal.

Nazaretyan will have one month from receiving the appeal court decision in writing to lodge a further appeal to the Cassation Court in Yerevan. He is considering a further appeal, and will not be required to go to jail until any further appeal is heard.

"The court left last November's decision unchanged," Nazaretyan's pastor Mikhail Shubin told Forum 18 from Yerevan after the hearing. "He has one month to appeal. When he gets the decision in writing he will decide whether to appeal further." The pastor added that about a dozen church members attended the appeal hearing in Nazaretyan's support.

Human rights defender Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation in Yerevan also attended the appeal hearing. "This is very, very sad," she told Forum 18 from Yerevan after the decision was announced. "Davit set out very clearly that he does not consider himself guilty of any crime, that he has been in the church since childhood and that he is ready to perform alternative service. He was very sincere."

Sargsyan said the whole hearing was over in about 40 minutes, including 10 minutes while the judges withdrew to consider their decision. "It was all very rapid. The Judges didn't get into the essence of the case. The judges seemed to be prejudiced against the religious community," she added. "The court didn't take into consideration any of Davit's arguments about his right to alternative service, the decisions in similar cases of the European Court of Human Rights or anything else."

Sargsyan noted that the prosecution did not attend the 7 February 2024 hearing. "The Court in its questioning of Davit stressed the expert opinion of the Theology Faculty of Yerevan State University, treating its opinion with some respect." The Theology Faculty, led by an Armenian Apostolic Church Bishop, claimed that: "The creed of the Baptist Church and the analysis of the presented case materials allow us to state that Nazaretyan's freedom of thought, conscience and religion would not be restricted by military service" (see below).

Nazaretyan's Baptist pastor strongly disputes this claim by another religious community about his and his Church's beliefs (see below).

Forum 18 asked the three Appeal Court judges – Melkonyan, Bektashyan and Matevosyan – on the afternoon of 8 February in writing why they had not taken their decision in Nazaretyan's case in the light of the jurisprudence (including in Armenian cases) of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to conscientious objection to military service, as part of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Forum 18 had received no reply by the end of the working day in Yerevan of 8 February.

Vahe Sarkisyan, head of Yerevan Garrison Military Prosecutor's Office, would not discuss with Forum 18 why no prosecutor had been sent to the appeal hearing.

Forum 18 asked the office of the Human Rights Defender Anahit Manasyan on 7 February about Nazaretyan's case and what it is doing (if anything) to support him and others who cannot perform military service on grounds of conscience. An official said an appropriate colleague would respond with a comment. Forum 18 had received no reply by the end of the working day in Yerevan of 8 February.

Davit Tigrani Nazaretyan (born 23 July 2003) is the only conscientious objector known to be currently facing jail under Criminal Code Article 461, Part 1 ("Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription").

The last known convicted conscientious objector, Maksim Mikhaili Telegin (born 15 November 1998), a Molokan from Yerevan who had been refused alternative civilian service in 2016, was jailed for one year by Judge Tatevik Grigoryan at Yerevan City Court on 23 March 2021, according to court records. He was freed early from his jail term after about three months.

Molokans are followers of a Christian church which emerged in the Russian Empire in the late 18th century, and which is often compared to Protestant churches. Molokans conscientiously object to military service in any country they live in.

Telegin had applied for alternative civilian service on 23 August 2016, explaining that he is a Molokan and that his faith does not allow him to take up weapons. The Alternative Service Commission rejected his application, claiming that he "did not justify that his duty to undergo compulsory military service is in serious and weighty conflict with his conscience or deep and true religious belief or other beliefs", according to the 2021 court verdict. The Commission claimed he sought alternative civilian service "for reasons of personal interest or convenience".

Vardan Astsatryan, head of the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs, was one of the five Commission members who unanimously rejected Telegin's application for alternative civilian service.

On 14 June 2018, the Administrative Court rejected Telegin's challenge to the Alternative Service Commission rejection.

Military prosecutors had already launched a criminal case against Telegin under Article 327, Part 1 of the then Criminal Code. (A new Criminal Code came into force on 1 July 2022.) On 12 July 2019, Yerevan Garrison Military Prosecutor's Office finally sent the case to court. In 2020 the judge in the case was removed and Judge Grigoryan took over the case.

Telegin set out in court his objection to serving in the military. "Defendant Maksim Telegin testified during the trial that his religion forbids taking up arms and swearing an oath, so he cannot go to military service," the 2021 verdict – seen by Forum 18 – notes. "He himself is guided by the Gospel, where it says that it is forbidden to carry weapons or to take an oath. He stated that since he is a faithful Christian, he cannot violate the message in the Gospel."

Astsatryan of the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs would not discuss Telegin's case. But he insisted that decisions to accept or reject applications for alternative civilian service are taken by the Alternative Service Commission which listens to the cases presented to it.

Astsatryan rejected suggestions that the Commission discriminated against conscientious objectors who are not Jehovah's Witnesses. "We gave alternative service to a Molokan about five years ago," he told Forum 18 on 8 February 2024. He was unable to give the young man's name or say exactly when he was given alternative civilian service.

Vahe Sarkisyan, head of Yerevan Garrison Military Prosecutor's Office, refused to discuss with Forum 18 on 8 February 2024 why his office had brought the criminal case against Telegin.

Davit Nazaretyan (centre) with parents, Gagik Mirzoyan (left), Mikhail Shubin (right), Kentron District Court, Yerevan, 25 October 2023
Davit Nazaretyan

Davit Nazaretyan lives in the capital Yerevan and is a member of a Council of Churches Baptist congregation in Arinj, a town next to Yerevan. The congregation – which chooses not to seek state registration – is led by Pastor Mikhail Shubin.

Despite his repeated requests for alternative civilian service, officials of the Conscription Service and of the Alternative Service Commission refused Nazaretyan's application. On 25 October, Judge Gagik Pogosyan of Yerevan's Kentron District Court handed the 20-year-old a two-year jail term for "Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription".

"Davit asked for alternative civilian service," Baptist Pastor Shubin – who attended the trial and the appeal hearing with other Baptists - told Forum 18. "If the law allows this, why didn't they give it to him? If an individual's conscientious views do not allow him to carry weapons or swear the oath, why didn't they give him alternative service?"

Judge Pogosyan's assistant refused to put Forum 18 through to the Judge to find out why he jailed an individual who could not serve in the military on grounds of conscience and who is ready to perform alternative civilian service. "Everything is written in the verdict," the assistant – who did not give his name – told Forum 18.

"I am a Christian and I read the Bible," Nazaretyan told Forum 18. "Jesus Christ teaches us not to kill and he followed this also. We have to love one another, even our enemies, and not kill people." He added that Jesus Christ also instructed his followers not to swear oaths. "If I was given alternative civilian service now, I would do it."

Forum 18 was unable to ask Serop Armenakyan of Yerevan's No. 2 Regional Division of the Conscription Service why he had refused to accept Nazaretyan's application for alternative civilian service in July 2022. The duty officer told Forum 18 that Armenakyan was out of the office. He insisted that "all here work according to the law". He added that decisions on whether to grant alternative civilian service are taken not by the local office of the Conscription Service but by the Alternative Service Commission.

In early 2023, while the criminal investigation was already underway, officials summoned Nazaretyan to the Alternative Service Commission. This is a state body made up of deputy ministers from a range of ministries, as well as Vardan Astsatryan of the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs. On 23 January, it accepted all the Jehovah's Witnesses' applications for alternative civilian service, but rejected Nazaretyan's.

Arkady Cherchinyan, head of the Territorial Management and Infrastructure Ministry's Administrative Control Department, who officials said was in charge of alternative service issues at the Ministry, told Forum 18 that he had not participated in the 23 January meetings with applicants for alternative civilian service and refused to discuss anything.

Asked why the Commission rejected Nazaretyan's application, Astsatryan of the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs said he does not remember the name. "If he has these views he should have presented them," he told Forum 18 in November 2023.

On 8 February 2024, Astsatryan claimed to Forum 18 that the Commission rejected Nazaretyan's application as it had not been convinced by his case. "Why couldn't he present his views convincingly?"

Forum 18 told Astsatryan that in November 2023, Nazaretyan had clearly and logically explained his conscientious reasons why he could not serve in the military and his readiness to perform alternative civilian service. Yet Astsatryan claimed again that Nazaretyan had not been able to explain this to the Commission

Investigator Arsen Topchyan handed documents on Nazaretyan's case to the Theology Faculty of Yerevan State University and asked it to review his religious views. The Theology Faculty is led by Bishop Anushavan Jamkochyan of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

On 17 April 2023 the Faculty claimed that the case materials on Nazaretyan's religious affiliation were allegedly "contradictory". Despite admitting that Nazaretyan regularly attends a Baptist Church with his family, the Theological Faculty claimed: "We conclude from all this that Nazaretyan's religious worldview is either not clearly formed, or he himself does not clearly know what religious affiliation he has. We also do not rule out that his statements are opportunistic."

The Theology Faculty also claimed: "The creed of the Baptist Church and the analysis of the presented case materials allow us to state that Nazaretyan's freedom of thought, conscience and religion would not be restricted by military service."

However, Pastor Shubin says that he and his Church think that decisions on whether or not church members should serve in the military are "a personal decision for each church member based on their conscience", he told Forum 18 in November 2023. "We support Davit in his decision."

Bishop Anushavan and a lecturer at the Theology Faculty repeatedly did not respond to Forum 18's requests in November 2023 and on 8 February 2024 for comment. So Forum 18 was unable to find out why they offer views on beliefs they do not understand, and why they also offer views on a legally binding human rights obligation – the freedom of thought, conscience and belief – which they also do not understand.

Investigator Topchyan confirmed to Forum 18 that he had been the investigator in Nazaretyan's case. But he refused to explain why he handed case materials to and asked for an assessment of Nazaretyan's religious beliefs from the Theology Faculty, which is led by a member of another religious community. It also remains unclear why he sought views on the implementation of Armenia's legally binding human rights obligations from a group which does not understand Armenia's obligations.

As Investigator Topchyan refused to discuss the case in October 2023 and on 8 November 2024 did not answer his phone, Forum 18 was also not able to ask him why he thought Armenia's international human rights obligation to respect the rights of conscientious objectors to military service should not apply in Nazaretyan's case.

Anna Barsegyan of Yerevan Garrison Military Prosecutor's Office, who led the case, including in court, did not in November 2023 answer Forum 18's questions about why she brought the criminal case against Nazaretyan when he cannot serve in the armed forces because of his conscientious beliefs. (END)

https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2891

Rego Park woman sentenced for visa fraud scheme using fake cultural program to smuggle Armenians into U.S.

Feb 8 2024
Rego Park woman was sentenced in Brooklyn federal court last week to just over two years imprisonment for running a visa fraud, identity theft and immigrant smuggling conspiracy that brought Armenian citizens in the the United States for profit.

Stella Boyadjian, 53, pleaded guilty in March 2019 to running a transnational network of co-conspirators in an elaborate scheme to bring Armenians into the country posing as folk dance performers to qualify for P-3 “Culturally Unique Artist” visas.

The P-3 nonimmigrant visa classification allows foreign nationals to temporarily travel to the U.S. to perform, teach or coach as artists or entertainers, under a program that is culturally unique.

Boyadjian, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Armenia, ran a Rego Park-based nonprofit organization called Big Apple Music Awards (BAMA) Foundation which she used to charge citizens of Armenia between $3,000 and $15,000 for the P-3 visas, a category often sought by legitimate Armenian performers.

Boyadjian and her associates in Armenia acquired fraudulent performer certificates and organized staged photo sessions where Armenian citizens wore traditional folk costumes. After being trained by Boyadjian and her conspirators on how to answer questions from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) visa adjudicators, the individuals then presented these certificates and photos to U.S. Consular officers during their visa interviews.

Once the Armenians entered the U.S., some would pay Boyadjian and her associates additional money to be included in another fraudulent petition asking for P-3 visa extensions. Some of the fake folk performers overstayed their visas and remained unlawfully in the United States.

The State Department’s Diplomatic Security Services (DSS) Criminal Fraud Investigations and Overseas Criminal Investigations Divisions investigated the case and DSS announced that Boyadjian was sentenced to 25 months in federal prison by U.S. Chief District Judge Margo K. Brodie.

https://qns.com/2024/02/rego-park-woman-sentenced-visa-fraud-scheme-fake-cultural-program-smuggle-armenians-into-u-s/

How a 1,600-year-old alphabet shaped Armenian identity

 B   B   C 
UK – Feb 8 2024
The Armenian alphabet is not just a writing system: it's also a numerical system used for mathematical calculations and recording calendar dates, as well as a national point of pride.
I

It was a late autumn morning when we set off from Yerevan, Armenia's capital city. After driving for about half an hour through the Armenian highlands, the driver stopped the car and Sofya Hakobyan, my guide, signalled for me to come out of the vehicle.

On my left, the snow-capped, four-peaked massif of Mount Aragats loomed in the distance, its contours indistinct in the hazy sun. Grassy uplands rolled out from the edges of the highway right up to the base of Armenia's highest mountain. The landscape looked bleak – a sandy-brown stretch of wind-pummelled uplands dotted with withering bushes – but a number of human-sized stone sculptures set on the gentle slopes lent a mysterious touch to the desolate expanse.

"We're at Alphabet Park. This was constructed in 2005 to mark the 1,600th anniversary of our Armenian alphabet," Hakobyan said.

The statues, carved out of faded pink, pastel yellow and light black stonewere etched with flowers and symbols. Some of them were in clusters, others were in solitary stances, and Hakobyan led me to a U-shaped statue with a dainty flourish on the bottom right. "This is our Armenian 'A' in uppercase," she said with a sweeping movement of her hand. "What you see around us are the other letters of our alphabet, which was invented by that man – Mesrop Mashtots – [a little more than] 1,600 years ago.

I followed her gaze to a stately sculpture of a bearded old man. Draped in a flowing robe, the rose-tinted, larger-than-life statue wore the _expression_ of an ascetic: tranquil, and slightly jaded. I remembered the man. Two days ago, I had seen his statue at the entrance of Matenadaran.

Perched on a hill at the northern edge of Mashtots Avenue in Yerevan, the imposing basalt structure of Matenadaran has a fortress-like appearance, but it is actually a scriptorium (a library of ancient manuscripts) that doubles as a research institute. I had tiptoed through the hushed solemnity of the halls that showcased permanent exhibits arranged in thematic divisions, including translated literature, philosophy, theology, trivium and quadrivium with mathematical sciences and humanities, poetry, law, history and the arts.


Emma Horopyan, Matenadaran's head of PR, told me that the manuscript library is one of the world's largest repositories of valuable archival documents and early printed books. A diverse array of medieval manuscripts in languages including Greek, Arabic, Persian, Syriac, Latin, Ethiopian, Georgian and Hebrew have been carefully preserved here.

"This is hallowed ground for us," said Grigor Stepanian.

I'd run into Stepanian while marvelling at a hand-drawn map of the ancient Armenian kingdom in Matenadaran's grand Central Hall, and now the affable architect from Yerevan was walking me around the rectangular facade of the five-storey structure, adorned with statues of medieval philosophers, poets and scholars who have collectively shaped Armenia's literary and cultural legacy. 

"But he remains the most important of them all," Stepanian said.

The immaculately carved stone statue of Mashtots stood at the entrance, his hands raised in the timeless posture of a master elucidating a point to his disciple – a smaller stone statue – listening attentively at his feet.

I was curious to know why Mashtots' invention of the Armenian alphabet is among the most important events in Armenian history. "Mashtots designed the alphabet so that it could be used to translate the Bible into Armenian," Stepanian explained, as we sipped on thick and strong Armenian coffee at a nearby cafe.

In 301 CE, Armenia became the first nation in the world to embrace Christianity as its official religion. But almost for a century after that, the methods of converting its citizens, who had a long nature-worshipping past, were often vicious, Stepanian saidMashtots was working as a translator in the Armenian royal chancellery in the final years of the 4th Century CE. He had witnessed the coercive and often violent ways to force the people of this Caucasian nation to adopt the state-sponsored faith that was markedly different from their polytheistic belief system.

"What Mashtots did was fairly ingenious," Stepanian said. The linguist understood that his countrymen's aversion to Christianity stemmed from unfamiliarity: the Greek and Syriac translations of the Christian liturgy and theology, including the New Testament, were very foreign to the Armenians, who had been introduced to the Bible and the liturgy orally during religious services held by targmanicks (a term that meant translator and commentator).

Mashtots created his new alphabet in a phonetic style so it was easy for the Armenians to adapt to the written form of a language they were already speaking, Stepanian explained. "The letters were designed in very distinctive shapes, with an independent character, very dissimilar to the lettering of other written languages of the time," he added.

Their language thus gave a new identity to the Armenians.

Over the next 1,500 years, the alphabet would remain a national point of pride at the core of Armenian cultural identity, an emblem of solidarity for the war-torn land that was almost continually ruled and colonised by foreign forces – the Romans, the Byzantines, the Persians and the Ottoman Turks. This almost-continuous and unrelenting saga of oppression and subjugation would finally end in 1991, when the 69-year-old Soviet regime collapsed and Armenia became an independent republic.

"We would have been a lost race without our alphabet," Stepanian said.

Hakobyan agreed. "Our country has been encroached upon, fragmented and plundered, over and over again," she told me as she steered me through the maze of letters laid out amid the wilderness like a giant, haphazard jigsaw puzzle. "But one of the reasons we could hold on was perhaps because we always knew that we have a beautiful language, encased by a beautiful set of letters."

As we walked through Alphabet Park, the mid-morning sun shone bright on the delicate curves of the letters, hand-carved from volcanic tuff rock. Together, Hakobyan told me, the richness and flexibility of this beautiful set of letters has helped sustain an uninterrupted literary tradition since the inception of its written form.

I knew that the aesthetically eloquent shapes of Armenian letters, with their long usage in folk art and calligraphy, have made it onto Unesco's Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage. But I had no idea that the dainty, artistic designs are also imbued with secret codes and cryptographs, and endowed with hidden properties.

"To start with, the alphabet formed the structure of a complex, but sophisticated numerical system," Hakobyan said, explaining how the Mashtotian letters were also used for mathematical calculations.

As well as being part of the alphabet, all the original 36 letters also have an assigned numerical value based on their order in the alphabet. When arranged in four columns and nine rows, the letters in each column respectively represent digits in singles, tens, hundreds and thousands. They can even be used to determine dates according to the Armenian calendar, Hakobyan said.

We ended up back near the statue of Mesrop Mashtots. Raised on a small mound, the wise old man was looking at his feet, his kind, contemplative gaze remarkably life-like.

It was time to resume our journey. A strong wind blew in over the sun-lit valley and we slowly retraced our steps towards our car parked on the side of the highway. Before getting in, I looked back, thinking about the incredible legacy of this ancient alphabet. Thick puffs of clouds were clambering up the snowy slopes of Mount Aragats. An Armenian family had just arrived at the park. Two young girls, dressed in lemon-yellow jackets, flitted playfully amid the giant letters – a linguistic and cultural legacy they have inherited from a sagacious polymath, whose statue stood just a few metres away from them in the wind-swept landscape.

Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenian heritage aim to erase an entire culture

EconoTimes
Feb 8 2024

On 25 December 2023, the Azerbaijan parliament (the Milli Majlis) passed a declaration claiming that, in what is currently Armenia, there was previously an Azerbaijani community that was displaced by conflict. Though based on scant evidence and flimsy rhetoric, this document also states the right of Azerbaijanis to return to these lands.

Further aggression by Azerbaijan against Armenia can therefore not be ruled out, despite steps towards a possible truce in recent months. Several countries, including France and Iran, have already warned Azerbaijan against an occupying the southern Armenian province of Syunik to gain access to its Nakhchivan exclave via the Zangezur corridor, which runs along the Iran-Armenia border.

In addition to Azerbaijan’s strategic aims, there is a history of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the region. This has entailed massive cultural, as well as human, losses.

A city divided

Iran is the only Muslim-majority country in the region where the Armenian diaspora still coexists relatively peacefully. There, Armenian historical heritage is respected and visited by people of all faiths, and is even promoted to tourists.

In the Northern Iranian city of Jolfa, Armenian culture is treated with pride. The churches and monasteries are cared for, and visited by thousands of travellers a year, most of them Iranians (including those of Armenian heritage). Its architectural jewel is the Saint Stepanous monastery, built in the 9th century and renovated several times. Thanks to the efforts of the Iranian state, it has been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

The Saint Stepanous Monastery, an Armenian monastery near the Iranian city of Jolfa. Alireza Javaheri/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

However, this is only half the story, as today the city is divided into two halves by the Iran-Azerbaijan border, which runs through it. Until the 19th century the two halves formed a single urban unit, but after Persia’s defeat in the war with Russia between 1826 and 1828, the northern side of the city passed into Russian hands. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it was then integrated into Azerbaijan.

On the Azerbaijani side there are no traces of Armenian culture, following a systematic campaign to remove them in recent decades. This tragic loss is epitomised by Jolfa’s medieval cemetery, where over 3,000 Khachkars (Armenian stone crosses) have been destroyed, an event that British newspaper The Guardian has dubbed “the worst cultural genocide of the 21st century”.

Photograph of Khachkars in the Armenian cemetery of Jolfa. Today there is no trace left of the cemetery. Wikimedia Commons

Erasing Nagorno Karabakh

After Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023, and the subsequent exit of both international journalists and NGOs – meaning the progressive withdrawal of media attention and humanitarian aid – it is not difficult to imagine that here too, efforts are already underway to wipe any traces of Armenian heritage off the map.

Importantly, Azerbaijan does not allow visits to verify that protections on Armenian cultural heritage sites are being respected. They can therefore only be monitored by satellite, and from such a distance it is all but impossible to document the events on the ground.

In Nagorno Karabakh there are around 500 historical sites, home to approximately 6,000 Armenian monuments that are now under the control of Azerbaijani armed forces. However, their destruction is not just the work of the military. The swift colonisation programme put in place by President Ilham Aliyev includes urban reorganisation and reoccupation of urban and rural areas.

This too has a historical precedent. During the first Nagorno Karabakh war in the 1990s, Azerbaijani authorities decided to eliminate all Armenian presence in the country, be it human or cultural, in what was known as the Baku pogrom.

This caused an exodus among Azerbaijan’s Armenian community, which had previously made up a substantial part of the population of cities like Baku. In the Nakhchivan exclave alone, a total of 5,849 stone crosses, 22,000 tombs and 89 medieval churches were destroyed, according to figures from the academic Nélida Elena Boulgourdjian.

The Cathedral of the Holy Cross, at Lake Van, Turkey. F. Camacho Padilla

The destruction is reminiscent of the fate of the Armenian architectural heritage across Turkey during the 20th century, where very little was done to preserve, recover or restore it. The few exceptions were the Cathedral of the Holy Cross at Lake Van, and the historic city of Ani, capital of the kingdom of Bagratid Armenia. The latter of these was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2016.

The international community’s muted response

In recent decades, the Armenian diaspora – along with a considerable number of other institutions and organisations including the European Parliament – have spoken out against the crimes committed against Armenia’s cultural heritage.

Until only recently, this had been met with silence from most of the international community, and even UNESCO’s response was lacklustre, as pointed out by the University of Cornell. Caucasus Heritage Watch, which forms part of Cornell, has been closely following Azerbaijan’s destructive trail, regularly publishing monitoring reports that include photos and detailed information of the crimes being committed against Armenian heritage sites. In doing so, it is calling for international mobilisation and condemnation of Baku’s actions, though with little impact to date.

The severity and the turmoil of other global conflicts – some of them relatively close to the Caucasus, such as the war in Ukraine and the Israeli invasion of Gaza – leave little room for reporting on this situation. This leaves the Armenian people, once again, to fend for themselves.

Armenian heritage is, in fact, currently under threat in Israel: over the last three years, an Israeli company has tried to buy up 25% of Jerusalem’s 1500 year old Armenian quarter to build luxury homes. Local Armenian resistance has stalled the project by occupying work sites, but not without violent repercussions. With the world’s eyes on the ongoing atrocities being committed in Palestine this is receiving little attention, despite clear parallels with events in Gaza.

The systematic destruction of cultural heritage – in addition to being a crime against the history of humanity itself – highlights the cruelty and lack of ethics of those responsible. As with the Buddhas of Bāmiyān in Afghanistan, which were dynamited in March 2001 by the Taliban, there is no way to bring back the legacy of an entire people once it has been destroyed.

https://www.econotimes.com/Azerbaijans-attacks-on-Armenian-heritage-aim-to-erase-an-entire-culture-1671075#google_vignette