Category: 2023

Momentum is building for Australian parliamentary recognition of the indigenous Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek genocides ahead of the annual commemorations of the three catastrophes.

Associate Professor Dr Melanie O’Brien, president of International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) participated in the Joint Justice Initiative (JJI) Advocacy Week held at the Commonwealth Parliament.

The commemorations of the three genocides serve as a reminder of the mass atrocities committed against indigenous Hellenic, Assyrian and Armenian communities by the Ottoman and Republican Turkish authorities in the early 20th Century.

Approximately 1.5 million Armenians, 300,000 Assyrians, and 350,000 to 500,000 Greeks (including Pontic Greeks) were killed during the genocides committed by the Ottoman Empire between 1914 and 1923.

Dr O’Brien, a global historical authority on genocide studies spoke to parliamentarians about the atrocities.

“We are delighted Dr O’Brien was our inaugural guest for the JJI Advocacy Week this year,” said Michael Kolokossian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of Australia (ANC-AU).

Dr O’Brien talked to parliamentarians about her book From Discrimination to Death: Genocide Process Through a Human Rights Lens.

Dr O’Brien has worked closely with Australian Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek organisations and was a keynote speaker at the 2018 National Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide, including the commemoration for the centenary of the holocaust of Smyrna in Sydney, in September 2022.

“Being part of this Joint Justice Initiative delegation is an important way that I can represent the International Association of Genocide Scholars.”

“Our members conduct scholarly work with the goal of preventing and punishing genocide and aim for our work to influence policy and lawmakers,” said Dr O’Brien.

“It is crucial that Australia recognise the genocide of the indigenous Armenian, Assyrian and Hellenic populations of the Ottoman Empire by the Ottoman and Republican governments.”

“It is important to acknowledge the reality of the crimes committed against the victims, survivors and their descendants – some of whom are Australian citizens – and to contribute to the prevention of future genocides.” O’Brien said.

Peter Stefanidis the president of the Federation of Pontian Associations of Australia said that a key factor in the success of JJI’s Advocacy Week was the involvement of youth leaders.

“Combining our resources on the key issue of genocide recognition continues to expand as the Hellenic, Armenian and Assyrian communities of Australia together develop the leadership skills of the next generation.”

The inaugural JJI Advocacy Week was held before Armenian Australians commemorate the 108th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and as Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Republic of Artsakh nears 100 days.

Formed in March 2020, the JJI is a joint advocacy effort aimed at achieving parliamentary recognition of the genocides of the Armenians, Assyrians and Hellenes from Australian Commonwealth, state and territory parliaments.

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia were renewed yesterday, as Yerevan announced the death of one of its soldiers in an exchange of fire with Baku’s forces, amid efforts to resolve the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

And while the Armenian Ministry of Defense confirmed the death of one of its soldiers in an exchange of fire in the city of Yersek in the Ararat canton, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense published, on Tuesday, a video recording accusing the Armenian forces of moving sectors in an area where Russian peacekeepers are deployed, near a border crossing linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Bagh is controlled by Azerbaijani forces.

Channels affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard reported information on alert in Iranian air bases located in the west of the country.

From Yerevan, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, called, after talks with Armenian officials, for “wisdom and dialogue” to avoid escalation in the region.

In turn, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, in contact with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, offered assistance to facilitate peace talks between the two countries, calling for reopening the Lachin corridor to commercial and private vehicles.

https://globeecho.com/news/middle-east/the-return-of-tension-between-azerbaijan-and-armenia/

“It is a truth universally acknowledged that Armenia is a post-Soviet democracy in the Caucasus oriented toward Western values.” This could have been the opening line in an article about Armenia in a better world, but it can hardly be said about Armenia in 2023. What concerns its Soviet past and geographic location is still relevant, but its commitment to democratic Western values and rule of law is highly questionable – writes James Wilson.

The Russian aggression in Ukraine has exposed the ugly truth about Armenia and its participation in the conflict on the side of the aggressor.

On November 23, Russia fired missiles at the maternity ward of the hospital in Volnyansk, Zaporizhia region (a newborn baby was killed), a residential house and a clinic in Kupyansk, Kharkiv region (two dead), residential buildings in Kyiv and Vyshgorod, Kyiv region (7 dead). More missiles targeted Poltava, Vinnitsa, Lviv regions, Odessa, Dnipro, and Mariupol. On the same day Prime Minister Pashinyan welcomed Putin in Yerevan, addressing him as "Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich" and shaking his hand.

This is not surprising: earlier in summer 2022 the Prime Minister claimed that “Russia is a strategic partner and ally of Armenia”.

"The positions of our countries on fundamental international issues are close or coincide," said the deputy speaker of Armenian Parliament Arshakyan on 11 July 11.
These are not isolated statements: "Russia is the closest partner and strategic ally of the Republic of Armenia," the prime minister repeated on 7 September. On 2 November, Parliament speaker Simonyan proudly stated, "I can confidently state that the current Armenian government is one of the most pro-Russian."

To put matters into perspective: since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Pashinyan has visited Russia five times, met with Putin six times and talked to him on the phone 18 (eighteen) times.

Pashinyan was not the only high-ranking Armenian official to bow to the Kremlin. The Armenian defense minister, the secretary of the Security Council, and the chief of the General Staff all paid their visits to Moscow, most of them more than once. The Russian aggression against Ukraine has clearly intensified the military partnership between the two countries: joint military exercises were held in September, and an agreement on military cooperation in 2023 was signed in December. In February of this year, the Armenian parliamentary committee on defense and security issues ratified an agreement on cooperation between the intelligence services of the two countries in the field of information security^[i]. The latter looks almost insulting against the backdrop of Ukraine's joint efforts with Western partners to counter threats from Russia in this area.

The war in Ukraine triggered unprecedented growth in trade turnover between Armenia and Russia: in 2022 Armenian exports to Russia totalled $2.4bn, which is 185.7% more than in 2021. Russian imports to Armenia totaled $2.6bn — an increase of 44.5%. On 2 February this year Pashinyan stated with satisfaction: "There is a great and steady growth in our trade and economic relations.” He emphasised "the special personal role of Vladimir Putin… in these dynamics."

Nevertheless, the growth of exports from Armenia to Russia is not only due to simply replacing imports from countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia. According to Western officials, government agencies and research centres, Armenia serves as one of the main Russian hubs for the purchase of goods in the EU and East Asia, bypassing sanctions. The parallel import of microchips, smartphones and cars through Armenia is especially booming. "New supply chains through Armenia … were established within days of the sanctions, and it took several months to expand them," a February 2023 report from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development noted. On 2 March, a joint document by the DOJ, Commerce Department, and U.S. Treasury identified Armenia among " third-party intermediaries or transshipment points to evade Russian- and Belarusian-related sanctions and export controls."

Armenia actively assists the Russian Federation in circumventing sanctions not only in the import of civilian goods. In September, the U.S. Treasury Department published detailed information about the participation of an Armenian company in the purchase of foreign equipment for the Russian military industry. In October Bloomberg published evidence of supplies of European equipment components through Armenia for use in Russian military equipment. Armenia is not just a logistical hub, but a centre of military and technical supplies that supports Putin's regime in its war against Ukraine.

Armenia has become a convenient transshipment point for weapons from Iran. It seems that Ukrainians should “thank” the Armenians for the fact that the Russian army has drones that damage their civilian and energy infrastructure, as well as kill and wound civilians. On 28 November, the Polish magazine New Eastern Europe noted: "Iran supports Russia's war against Ukraine with the support of Armenia, which helps Moscow circumvent sanctions by supplying Iranian drones and missiles through Armenian airspace and airports. Iran Air Cargo, a subsidiary of Iran Air, flew from Yerevan Zvartnots Airport to Moscow on September 4 and 5, following two previous flights on August 21 and 29. Iran Air Cargo, Safiran Airport Services and their parent company Iran Air are under U.S. sanctions for transferring Iranian drones to Russia with Armenian assistance. Il-76MD Russian Air Force aircraft were also used to transport Iranian drones through Yerevan. Russia used these Iranian drones and missiles for terrorist attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. The U.S. warned Armenia about its close relations with Iran and Russia, including during the CIA chief's visit to Armenia in the summer of 2022. He warned to stay away from the close military alliance between Iran and Russia, but Armenia has ignored the warning".

This data publicised by a major media outlet affiliated with the Polish government and the European Commission shows that Armenia also serves as a military and logistical base for the war of Russian-Iranian alliance against Ukraine.

The bitter irony of the situation lies in the fact that Armenia is taking unprecedented measures of diplomatic pressure in the international arena in order to achieve recognition of the Armenian genocide. A nation that claims to be a victim of one of the loudest crimes of the 20th century, that demands to hold countries and nations accountable a century later, that demands sanctions against its neighbours, is knowingly and actively participating in the most blatant crime against a once brotherly people. In fact, right now Armenia is up to its neck in what has been repeatedly called the genocide of the Ukrainian people.

 Fahad Shabbir (@FahadShabbir)  Published March 23, 2023 | 05:40 PM

On March 1, the Azerbaijani authorities held a meeting with the representatives of the Armenian community of Karabakh at the headquarters of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Khojaly district in Azerbaijan. Russian Major General Andrey Volkov, commander of the peacekeeping unit, mediated the session (Trend.az, March 1). Earlier, Baku had appointed Ramin Mammadov, an Azerbaijani member of parliament, as the point person for contacts with the Armenian community in Karabakh (Apa.az, March 1). Alongside Mammadov, the Azerbaijani delegation included representatives of the monitoring group formed to inspect the illicit exploitation of natural resources in Karabakh, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, the Ministry of the Economy and AzerGold. These agencies all have portfolios that cover at least some of the major concerns of the Azerbaijani protestors who have been demonstrating along the Lachin road since December 2022 (see EDM, December 19, 2022; January 19).

The Armenian community’s delegation was headed by Samvel Shahramanyan, secretary of the so-called “security council” of the de facto separatist regime in Karabakh (News.am, March 3). According to Azerbaijani media reports, the sides discussed the reintegration of Armenian residents in the region into the constitutional structure of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Trend.az, March 1). However, this was denied by the Armenian representatives who claimed that the discussion’s agenda was actually based on the following issues: uninterrupted gas and electricity supplies from Armenia to the Karabakh region, a “one-time visual tour” by an Azerbaijani specialized group of the Gizilbulag and Damirli mines and the complete opening of the Lachin road (News.am, March 3).

Earlier contacts were also held between the Azerbaijani authorities and the Armenian community in the Karabakh region, with the mediation of the Russian peacekeepers. Yet, these contacts stalled after the dispatch of Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian oligarch of Armenian origin, to Karabakh. Baku considered Vardanyan to be Moscow’s agent in disrupting the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process as well as Karabakh’s reintegration into Azerbaijan. As a result, Azerbaijani officials refused to hold any talks with him (see EDM, February 13).

Contacts between the two sides restarted almost immediately after Vardanyan’s dismissal from his position in the de facto separatist Karabakh government. On February 24, one day after his dismissal, representatives of the Armenian community and the Azerbaijani authorities held a meeting, once again with mediation from the Russian side (1lurer.am, February 25). According to the Armenian media, discussions at this time also centered on electricity and gas supplies as well as the opening of the Lachin road (1lurer.am, February 25).

A couple of weeks after the March 1 meeting, the Office of the Azerbaijani President made a public call inviting representatives of the Armenian community to Baku to hold the next round of talks on “reintegration” and “issues related to the implementation of infrastructure projects in Karabakh” (Azernews, March 13). This can be viewed as Baku’s attempt to sideline Russia’s peacekeeping contingent and make a further move toward the peaceful reintegration of the Armenian community in Karabakh.

However, to the likely detriment of the peace process, the representatives of the separatist regime declined the invitation. In response, the Armenian community instead insisted that future negotiations should be held with the mediation of the Russian peacekeeping mission at the same venue as on March 1 (Artsakhpress.am, March 13). Other representative demanded that Baku treat the so-called “Artsakh republic” as an equal partner, seemingly disregarding realities on the ground as well as the internationally supported peace effort (News.am, March 13).

Apart from these, a series of other regional developments have further strained tensions and caused many observers to warn against a possible escalation (see EDM, February 9; Twitter.com/shafiyev_farid, March 14). The first major sign of possible wider escalation happened on March 5 when Azerbaijani armed units detected the transfer of military supplies to the Karabakh region from Armenia using the unpaved Khankendi–Khalfali–Tursusu road (alternative to the Lachin road) (Mod.gov.az, March 5). As a result, small-scale fighting erupted between the parties when the Azerbaijani side attempted to stop and inspect the suspected vehicles. In total, five military servicemen on both sides were killed in the incident.

In the days that followed, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry released video footage indicating the alleged movement of units from the Armenian Armed Forces along the unpaved road, accompanied by the Russian peacekeeping contingent (Mod.gov.az, March 7, 11). In its statement, the Defense Ministry reminded the Russian peacekeepers about their responsibilities under the trilateral [Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia] statement of November 10, 2020, and reiterated calls for checkpoints along the Lachin road to better control movement between Armenia and the Karabakh region (see EDM, March 7).

Furthermore, the present situation with negotiations between Baku and Yerevan has not helped the reintegration process of the Karabakh region with Azerbaijan. Baku rejects the involvement of any third party in talks between Baku and the Armenian community of Karabakh as well as the creation of an international mechanism toward this end. These pronouncements have taken a central role in Baku’s position—along with ongoing demands for the establishment of checkpoints in the Lachin Corridor (Report.az, March 12).

In contrast, Armenia’s leadership rejects these proposed checkpoints and vows not to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan that does not include provisions regarding the security of the Armenian community in Karabakh. Interestingly, they have not demanded the right of “self-determination” for the Armenians in Karabakh, unlike previous governments (Azatutyun.am, March 10; Azatutyun.am, March 14). Ultimately, this stalemate in negotiations has created a dangerous situation that could end with a military flare-up between the two sides, as has been the case in the past.

In this context, the support of international mediators is crucial in providing a breakthrough. Overall, the European Union has supported Azerbaijan’s concerns about the illegal trafficking of weapons and goods along the Lachin Corridor. EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar stated in an interview with Azerbaijani media that “the idea that there should be transparency about what is being transported on the Lachin road is absolutely legitimate,” adding that this road should not be used for any “military or illicit purposes” (Apa.az, March 8).

The EU official, however, did not clarify how such transparency can be provided. Nevertheless, unlike Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Klaar did not exclude the establishment of checkpoints for this purpose (see EDM, March 7). Indeed, the installation of checkpoints would constitute a great leap toward the reintegration of the Karabakh region with Azerbaijan, significantly reduce Russian influence over the region and make a key contribution to the efforts for establishing lasting peace between Baku and Yerevan.