Category: 2022

The National Interest
[The United States assumed that Russia would be scared of the risks to
go into Syria. That is a mistake that should not be made when it comes
to Ukraine.]
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Feb. 12, 2022
enior U.S. national security officials, diplomats, and military
officers are all sounding similar warnings. “If Russia intervenes,
they face a difficult fight.” “Russian forces will have to cope with
an insurgency.” “As the bodies of dead soldiers return home, Vladimir
Putin will come under increasing public pressure.” “Russia will not be
able to achieve its objectives—and will become bogged down in a
quagmire.”
You might think this is referring to ongoing statements coming out of
President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris’ national
security team trying to warn the Kremlin over starting a military
adventure in Ukraine, but these comments echo pronouncements that were
being delivered in September 2015 by the Obama/Biden administration
prior to the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war. There are
some important lessons from how the Russian military and security
establishment has pursued that operation that are relevant if the
Kremlin decides to choose military force as its option for coercive
diplomacy against Ukraine. These lessons may lead to a different type
of fight than the United States is expecting and has been training and
equipping Ukrainian forces for.
First, the Russian intervention in Syria focused primarily on
destroying capabilities and fighting formations of the anti-Assad
opposition, rather than on occupying territory. The Kremlin made the
decision to become directly involved in the Syria conflict when, in
the late summer and early fall of 2015, opposition forces acquired
sufficient capabilities and momentum to push on Damascus and attempt
to dislodge Bashar al-Assad. By focusing on airpower, missile strikes,
and unmanned systems, the Russian task force concentrated on breaking
up and degrading opposition military formations.
The subsequent reoccupation of much of Syria’s territory by Assad’s
military was a byproduct of the massive pounding the opposition took,
rather than the initial purpose of the intervention, which was to
stave off Assad’s collapse.
Second, the Russians have maintained a relatively light footprint on
the ground in Syria. They chose not to focus on occupying territory or
taking on the responsibilities of governance. Indeed, in a number of
cases the Russians brokered a series of ceasefires that left local
leaders and notables in control of their immediate territory in return
for accepting overall government control. To the extent that the
Russian military has defined areas of control in Syria, they are
focused on a few pieces of critically strategic real estate.
Third, whenever ground forces were needed, the Russians turned to
private military companies or other irregular formations, limiting as
far as possible the exposure of uniformed members of the Russian armed
forces. As in the United States, Russian public opinion seems to draw
a very clear distinction between “soldiers” dying for the motherland
versus contractors who signed up and took the risks.
Finally, the Russians demonstrated, particularly in the launch of
Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea Flotilla, Russian
capabilities to deliver lethal strikes from assets based inside
Russian territory. The subtext of the use of the Caspian ships was to
subtly demonstrate that key Russian capabilities did not need to be
sent out and “exposed” but could be utilized without fear of reprisal
or counterattack.
So, in contrast to the predictions that Syria would be “Putin’s
Afghanistan,” where a large land-based Russian force would be ground
down by insurgent attacks and eventually Putin would risk popular
unrest at home as casualties mounted, the Russians focused on
delivering strikes to disrupt and degrade Assad’s opponents. Watching
the Russian campaign unfold, I was reminded of comments that Sergei
Ivanov, then Russia’s defense minister, delivered at a U.S.-Russia
dialogue in 2006—in perfect English with a command of American
military jargon—about how the Russian military was closely studying
and learning from the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Avoiding
large-scale land deployments seemed to be one of them.
I do not know whether the Russians will go into Ukraine, or whether
U.S. assessments are correct that the Russians will seek to occupy and
control large pieces of Ukrainian territory and send personnel and
systems into Ukraine to engage in close combat. The Syria campaign,
however, would suggest that if the Russian government decides to use
military force against Ukraine, it would focus on long-distance
strikes to destroy Ukrainian equipment, particularly its stockpiles of
drones, and try to break up organized military formations. The Syria
case also suggests that the Russians would try to avoid having people
cross the border, whenever possible, and direct fire from across the
line. (This might be part of the hair-splitting on sanctions to
suggest to the Germans and others that the promise that economic and
energy sanctions on Russia would come only if Russia “invaded”—that
is, sent large, organized formations across borders—and that this
would qualify as a more limited “incursion.”) It would also raise the
cost of any response, because the United States and other NATO
countries would be very skittish about any Western weaponry crossing
the border in return to strike at Russian artillery or airfields. And
the Kalibr strike in Syria from the Caspian Sea could easily be
replicated with no one willing to respond by returning fire into the
heart of Russia. Finally, with Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov
already talking about sending Chechen auxiliaries to Ukraine, the
pattern, as we have seen in Syria, Libya, Mali, and the Central
African Republic may hold here as well: any ground personnel needed to
take strategic sites or important nodes of communication would not be
formal Russian forces. Again, the Russian gamble may be that some of
the European states will hair-split and that private military
contractors would not constitute a formal Russian military
intervention.
Preparing Ukrainian special forces for partisan warfare, or assuming
that U.S.-supplied Javelins would be used against Russian tanks and
armored vehicles making the rapid dash to Kyiv, is not going to be
effective against the type of campaign Russia used in Syria. We have
been expecting a ground campaign to occupy territory, but the Russian
General Staff may be looking to destroy capabilities, demoralize the
Ukrainian military, and create conditions for political upheaval. And
if operations begin anytime soon, the types of military aid and
training that would be needed would come too late.
The United States assumed that Russia would be scared of the risks to
go into Syria. That is a mistake that should not be made when it comes
to Ukraine.
*
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research
Institute and a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. The views
expressed are his own.
 

Middle East Eye
[Michael Ben-Yair agrees with the Amnesty report and urges the
international community to recognise apartheid]
Feb. 11, 2022
Former Israeli attorney general Michael Ben-Yair said on Thursday that
his country is an "apartheid regime" and urged the international
community to recognise this reality and hold Israel accountable.
In an article published in the Irish newspaper The Journal, Ben-Yair
said he agreed with the Amnesty International report last week
classifying Israel as an apartheid state.
"It is with great sadness that I must also conclude that my country
has sunk to such political and moral depths that it is now an
apartheid regime," Ben-Yair said.
The 79-year-old, who served as Israel's attorney general between 1993
and 1996, said Israeli courts uphold "discriminatory laws" to expel
Palestinians from the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, which
contributes to the "ongoing domination over these territories."
"It is the Israeli ministerial cabinet for settlements that approves
every illegal settlement in the occupied territories. It was me, in my
role as the attorney general who approved the expropriation of private
Palestinian land in order to build infrastructure such as roads that
have entrenched settlement expansion," he said.
Millions of Palestinians between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea are being permanently deprived of their civil and
political rights, Ben-Yair added, saying that the "status quo on the
ground is a moral abomination."
Ben-Yair's remarks have appeared a week after Amnesty became the
latest organisation to label Israel an apartheid state, joining a
cadre of human rights groups that have used the term to describe
Israel's discriminatory treatment of Palestinians.
Apartheid is a legal term defined by international law that refers to
systematic oppression by one racial group over another.
As well as serving as attorney general, Ben-Yair was an acting Supreme
Court of Israel judge.
Amnesty report
In the 280-page-report, based upon research conducted from 2017 to
2021, Amnesty concluded that since 1948 Israel has pursued policies
that "benefit Jewish Israelis while restricting the rights of
Palestinians".
"Israel's system of institutionalised segregation and discrimination
against Palestinians, as a racial group, in all areas under its
control amounts to a system of apartheid, and a serious violation of
Israel's human rights obligations," Amnesty said.
"The segregation is conducted in a systematic and highly
institutionalised manner through laws, policies and practices, all of
which are intended to prevent Palestinians from claiming and enjoying
equal rights with Jewish Israelis."
This is the case both for Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up
20 percent of the country's population, and the five million
Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.
Prior to the report's release, Israel urged the rights group against
publishing the study and branded the conclusions "false, biased and
antisemitic".
Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid said Amnesty "is just another
radical organisation which echoes propaganda, without seriously
checking the facts", accusing it of repeating "the same lies shared by
terrorist organisations".
"Israel isn't perfect, but we are a democracy committed to
international law, open to criticism, with a free press and a strong
and independent judicial system," Lapid said in a statement.
The United States also rejected the apartheid label.
"We reject the view that Israel's actions constitute apartheid. The
department's own reports have never used such terminology," US State
Department spokesperson Ned Price told reporters last week.
"We think that it is important, as the world's only Jewish state, that
the Jewish people must not be denied their right to
self-determination, and we must ensure there isn't a double standard
being applied."
Agnes Callamard, Amnesty's secretary general, refuted the criticism of
the report as "propaganda and ideological" rather than evidence-based
in an interview with Middle East Eye.
"Have you done an assessment? Have you considered what is the meaning
of apartheid under international law? Have you even tried to check
whether the policies or practices of Israel meet that definition? No,"
Callamard said in response to the US position.
"We cannot be held hostage by the government of Israel on those
issues. We need to be very clear that our work is predicated on
international human rights standards. And those accusations will not
detract us."
 

Breaking Defense
[Israel relies on good relations with Russia to enable operations in
Syria. What happens if Russia invades Ukraine, though?]
By Arie Egozi
TEL AVIV: Like in the rest of the world, the Israeli defense
establishment is watching the Ukraine situation closely, and working
hard to figure out what a potential conflict between Moscow and Kyiv,
and Washington’s response, might mean for Israel’s interests.
More than many nations, Israel could find itself in an awkward spot.
On the one hand, the US is Israel’s biggest ally and longstanding
patron. At the same time, Jerusalem has to keep up good relations with
Moscow, in order to keep the ability to launch military strikes
against Iranian interests in Syria, where Russia largely controls the
airspace.
If the US were to call for wide sanctions against Russia, for example,
Jerusalem would have to weigh carefully any major steps forward; any
actions against Russia could result in Israeli operations being
blocked in Syria — potentially putting military personnel at risk if
they conduct operations Jerusalem views as vital for its own national
security.
In particular, a senior defense source said that Israel is currently
underway with a series of strikes against shipments of Iranian-made
rockets on their way to Lebanon, including one as recently as Tuesday
Washington time. This operation needs continued coordination between
Tel Aviv and Moscow to avoid harming Russian troops in Syria, which
would cross a red line for Moscow and endanger the ability to do
further operations.
Concerns about what could happen to Syrian operations should relations
with Russia shift were “brought up recently in some high-level defense
meetings, in which the top decision-makers were present,” the defense
source told Breaking Defense.
Giora Eiland, a retired major general and former head of the Israeli
National Security Council, said that if Washington asks Israel to
participate in sanctions against Russia Jerusalem will be in a very
“impossible” situation.
Even light sanctions could harm Israel’s standing with Russia, and
potentially, its technology industry. While Russia has not purchased
Israeli-made weapons since 2015, non-military technologies are
routinely sold to Russian firms.
Israel is also watching the Ukrainian situation as a potential
distraction for Washington, as Jerusalem makes its plans for how to
react to a new nuclear agreement with Iran. Officials this week
involved in the negotiations have signaled to the press that the
question of a new deal with Iran are coming to a head. While Israel
has made clear it is not in favor of any such deal, but has been
relatively quiet about it so as to not anger Washington.
In a new paper this week, Efraim Inbar, president of the Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security, noted that Iran is also watching
the Russia situation and seeing how distracted Washington is by it. It
is possible, Inbar wrote, that Iran will try to push for a harder deal
during the Vienna negotiations knowing the Biden team could
desperately use a geopolitical win.
While defense sources tell Breaking Defense that Israel is not
planning to directly attack any Iranian nuclear sites should a new
agreement be signed, there are plans underway for increased sabotage
efforts that would seek to damage nuclear sites and centrifuges in
Iran. Those operations would begin should an agreement be reached that
Israel judges allows Iran to successfully create a nuclear weapon.
As a second source put it, the current plans “will take the shadow war
to new heights.” And if that happens, intelligence and defense
planners here are operating under the assumption that Iranian proxies
will step up attacks against Israeli targets in retaliation.
Moredchai Kedar, one of Israel’s top experts on middle Eastern Issues,
told Breaking Defense that “Washington will try to restrain Israel
from continuing the shadow war against Iran. This is reason for a
major concern in Jerusalem, and may create friction between the US and
Israel.”
And Eiland, the former National Security Council official, said that
regional powers in the Middle East are looking to see how the US
ultimately supports Ukraine.
“They see what has happened in Afghanistan and how the Americans do
not react to attacks on their forces in Iraq,” Eiland said. “This
brings especially the Saudis to think that one option for them is to
improve their relations with Iran.”