Category: 2022

Armenian-Russian cooperation agreement

Armenia and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance twenty-five years ago today, August 29. The Foreign Ministries exchanged statements underscoring the importance of allied relations on the anniversary of the signing.

A telephone call between the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Russia also took place. Pashinyan and Putin are reported to have congratulated each other, the leaders “expressing confidence that the mutually beneficial relations between Armenia and Russia will continue to develop and be strengthened effectively.”

However, Armenian analysts say that not everything is as smooth as it could be or should have been. According to political scientist Suren Surenyants, the cooperation agreement is a comprehensive document that fixes the relationship between the two states. Meanwhile, “in real life there are discrepancies that do not correspond to the spirit of the document.”

According to economist Armen Ktoyan, dependence on Russia, which is under sanctions, significantly limits the possibilities of development in Armenia.

Diplomatic statements by Yerevan and Moscow on the 25th anniversary of the cooperation agreement, and analytical opinion about the document and Armenian-Russian relations in general.

• Note from Russian Embassy to Armenian Foreign Ministry: Armenians react and analyst comment

• Peacekeepers or border guards? Russian checkpoints on the roads of Armenia

• Putin-Erdogan negotiations: agreements on the region and risks for Armenia. Opinion

The Armenian Foreign Ministry described the mutual assistance agreement as a “key document” that “determines the principles and priorities of interstate relations” between the two countries.

“Regular trust-based contacts between the leadership of Armenia and Russia are of decisive importance for building up bilateral potential, allowing not only resolution of pressing issues, but coordination on key regional and international problems,” the Armenian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Moscow stressed that the agreement was an important milestone in the bilateral partnership to become a real alliance.

“We are ready to continue to help Yerevan as an ally in strengthening its defense capability and border security, and in regulating relations with its neighbors,” the congratulatory message from Russia reads.

Political scientist Suren Surenyants believes that the agreement signed in 1997 is indeed the basis of Armenian-Russian relations, but that there’s more than meets the eye.

He says that at the time the document was signed, Armenian-Russian relations were more natural, and Armenia’s role in the region was stronger.

“Armenia was gradually losing its dependency, especially after the war. This could not but affect the nature and direction of Armenian-Russian relations. While at the time Armenia was Russia’s only ally in the region, Russia has now documented relations with Azerbaijan as well,” Surenyants said in an interview with JAMnews.

In his opinion, despite Armenia’s dissatisfaction with the level of allied relations, it has no other choice:

“Is there another geopolitical center or state that is ready to be a more responsible ally? I think not, at the moment. Not that Armenia could even choose another option and find itself in more favorable conditions.”

Surenyants has doubts and reservations not about the agreement itself, but about its fulfillment:

“The problem is that in real life, especially today, there are certain differences and even some elements of crisis in Armenian-Russian relations, which contradict the spirit of the document. I would like the current level of these relations to be adapted to the spirit and logic of the document.”

Surenyants considers it natural that relations between Armenia and Russia were initially asymmetrical. He says that is also the relationship of the United States with its many allies.

He emphasizes that Yerevan and Moscow are on the same economic, political plane and in a single security environment. Therefore, the task of Armenia is to maintain allied relations at the highest possible level in diplomatic relations.

“Allied relations should be protected from all risks that may arise as a result of relations between Russia and other regional players.”

Economist Armen Ktoyan says the Russian Federation is Armenia’s main trading partner, and this can be seen as both an advantage and a disadvantage.

“The advantage is that we thus have a large market in which we can sell our products and services. It is easier and more convenient for our manufacturers. On the other hand, when you get used to ease, you face significant difficulties in entering more complex markets,” Ktoyan told JAMnews.

In Ktoyan’s opinion, after joining the Eurasian Economic Union, which operates under the auspices of Russia, Armenia’s dependence on the Russian Federation has increased even more and continues to grow.

The economist believes that dependence on a single main partner which is under sanctions significantly limits Armenia’s opportunities for development and diversification.

According to Ktoyan, Armenia will feel this negative impact more strongly over time, although this process is currently benefiting it:

“Russians are coming to Armenia, they are moving their business here, Armenia has managed to generate double-digit growth in economic activity so far, but all this is short-term.”

Ktoyan regards it as a disadvantage that Russia alone invests in certain sectors of the Armenian economy, and holds that Western companies simply do not have the opportunity to penetrate these areas:

“Increasing the share of Western companies may be more profitable for us. They have an established business culture and more advanced technology.”

Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations

Quickened Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations by the end of August have caused alarm in Armenia, citizens fearing another concessions to Azerbaijan. A meeting of the national commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the issue of demarcation and delimitation of borders is scheduled in Moscow for August 30, and on August 31, a meeting of the heads of state in Brussels.

Opinions of Armenian analysts about what can be expected from Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations.

• “There are elements of crisis in Armenian-Russian relations”: opinion
• “Independence is like health – it needs to be taken care of every day” – Pashinyan
• Note from Russian Embassy to Armenian Foreign Ministry: Armenians react and analyst comment

Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations in Moscow and Brussels were preceded by a portentous series of events. In early August another escalation took place in Karabakh. Thanks to military pressure, Azerbaijan managed to ensure that the corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was changed. In a related development, two more towns and the city of Lachin, through which the former corridor passed, came under the control of Azerbaijan.

At the same time, relations between Azerbaijan and the United States deteriorated. Baku reacted critically to the appointment of a new American co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. Baku is against the resumption of the Minsk process to resolve the Karabakh conflict, as it considers it to have been resolved militarily.

The refusal of the US and French ambassadors to visit the city of Shushi (Shusha in Azerbaijan) caused a scandal in Baku, being seen as disrespect for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

In Brussels, the creation of a working group to prepare the text of a peace agreement with Armenia will be agreed upon, Hikmet Hajiyev, adviser to the President of Azerbaijan, said prior to the Pashinyan–Aliyev meeting.

Armenian experts believe that fundamental contradictions between the parties on key issues will prevent this.

“It is unlikely that the August meetings of heads of state in Brussels and heads of border demarcation commissions in Moscow will lead to a significant breakthrough. There are too many radically opposed approaches in the positions of the parties. It is hard to imagine that a couple of meetings will not only smooth them over, but also lead to a peace agreement. Moreover, in addition to the positions of the parties themselves, there are also conflicts of interests between major intermediary actors. This is not only Brussels and Moscow, but also Washington and Moscow.

“The latest US statements on the appointment of an American co-chair indicate that Washington has its own proposals and the main message is directed towards Baku. This suggests that substantive work on a peace agreement is not to be expected in the near future.”

“There are many contradictions between the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, above all the unblocking of transport routes, in which there are Azerbaijani “corridor” ambitions. There are complex discussions here, as evinced by the reaction of Iran.

“There are also contradictions in the issue of demarcation and delimitation of borders. The most acute is the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. In particular, the issues of the status of Artsakh, management of the situation, defense, the army itself. The contradictions of the parties here are fundamental.

“At the same time there are contradictions between major players fighting for influence in the region. Moscow is trying to maintain its influence, the US is trying to limit and weaken Moscow’s influence. In the actions of the United States there is a certain pressure on Iran in order to dictate its terms on the nuclear deal. Turkey is trying to play both sides, navigating the contradictions between Washington and Moscow.”

“The key and painful issues for Armenia underlie the strategic struggle of major players. For example in the Karabakh issue, if it were beneficial for Russia to resolve the status of Artsakh today, the United States would do the opposite. America itself would suggest leaving the issue of status for later and addressing only humanitarian issues.

“The Russians see postponing the status problem as an opportunity to maintain their influence. Russia wants to leave these things behind, as it is busy with Ukraine and prefers to pay less attention to the Caucasus.

“The United States suggests to Baku only those solutions which will rid the region of the Russians, since with their solution it will be easier to withdraw Russian troops. Naturally, for this, America must make Baku a more attractive offer than the Russians.

“On the same issue of the “corridor” through Meghri. We know more or less what the Russians are proposing – according to point 9 of the tripartite statement on Karabakh, Armenia provides the road and the Russians control the transport of Azerbaijani and Turkish goods. Obviously, Russia does not want to give this corridor to Azerbaijan and Turkey.

“What the US proposes in this matter is unclear. It is reported that the West is offering assistance that will facilitate the unblocking of roads and provide technical support. What that means is hard to say. But apparently the approaches are again different, since Iran speaks of “the unacceptability of closing the Armenian-Iranian border.”

“Whether the West is offering an abrogation of the 9th paragraph of the statement, that is from Russian control in exchange for some kind of international mechanism, is unknown.

“Under such conditions it is difficult to imagine any work on a peace agreement. But if the meetings in Brussels and Moscow help maintain stability in the region and prevent the situation from escalating, then we can already talk about a positive result.”

“I am far from thinking that Baku is so naive that they decided to go on an adventure, allowing themselves a daring tone in a conversation with the United States. At the same time, I am far from thinking that Baku was unduly frightened by the announcement of a new American co-chair and the restoration of the OSCE Minsk Group. Russians will not work in this format, the MG cannot be restored.

“It’s most likely a trade. There are subtexts in the American responses; the US wants to lure Baku to its side. Washington says – accept our proposals, in three years we will withdraw Russian troops from the region.

“Washington now does not particularly need to revive the MG, especially since they understand that this is not entirely realistic. All statements are made for bargaining, and Baku, knowing this very well, allows itself free statements.”

“Obviously, Russia is not at all interested in a resolution in Karabakh. In this its approach coincides with Azerbaijan, but partly. Baku generally refuses to recognize the existence of the Karabakh issue, stating that the problem has been resolved, it is the territory of Azerbaijan; and the population may accept that or leave.

“Russia’s position is as follows: it admits that there is a problem, but it is not going to discuss it now and plans to postpone it until better times. The Russian Federation is trying to keep its place in the region, leaving a lever of influence on both Baku and Yerevan. Therefore, Russia is in no way interested in changing the favorable status quo for it with the presence of its troops here.”

“Europeans and Americans understand this and therefore believe that the problem needs to be solved radically and the sooner the better. In this regard, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, through his press secretary, says that “we need to go back to the root of the problem and solve it.”

“The Americans say the same thing, saying that the problem has not been solved, and it needs to be thoroughly, globally and comprehensively addressed. The change of the American co-chairman to a fairly high-ranking and influential diplomat speaks to this.

“This is a sign of US interest in this issue and it plans to put pressure on Azerbaijan in order to bring it to the negotiating table regarding Karabakh in a new round of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. The regular refusal of the American and French ambassadors to attend an event organized by the Azerbaijani authorities in Shushi is also significant.

“The West declares that a political solution to the Karabakh issue is needed, referring to the status of NK. Everything depends on the approaches and readiness of Azerbaijan for peaceful coexistence with the Armenians in Artsakh. But today such total xenophobia, Armenophobia, racism and the desire for ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population are widespread in Azerbaijan, that I don’t think the Europeans will consider it possible to leave Nagorno-Karabakh entirely to Azerbaijan.”

“The West suggests Azerbaijan take the path of democracy: in this case, the problem of Artsakh is automatically attached to democratic processes and becomes a lever of pressure in the hands of the West on Baku. Otherwise, Azerbaijan loses NK.

“With a democratization of Azerbaijan, Baku will not be able to carry out ethnic cleansing of Armenians, because it will automatically agree to the presence of international forces, as well as to the status of Artsakh, providing a full guarantee of the security of Armenians. In principle, this was stipulated in the 1997 package agreement.

“If Azerbaijan does not follow a democratic path, I am sure that the international community and the West will force it into the Kosovo scenario, the legal and political packages for which are already being prepared by the European Parliament, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice in The Hague.”

https://jam-news.net/armenian-azerbaijani-talks-in-moscow-and-brussels-more-contradictions-than-connections/