Category: 2022

July 4 2022

Turkey wants to become a world superpower. But, it cannot complete such an endeavor on its own; Turkey needs its neighbors on both sides of the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries. Hence why Turkey has the Turkic Council, which is really becoming the Turkic union. Just as the European Union has free trade and security cooperation, the Turkic Council is developing a system of integration involving trade and military alliances. Just as the EU is a major world power (with the biggest free trade zone) led by Germany, the Turkic Council is transforming into a major security bloc and trade zone, led by Turkey. Integration of the Turkic world would mean a powerful international force, a security bloc led by Turkey that the world would have to respect. Such a bloc would be a huge rival against Russia, and would act as a bulwark against Russia in both the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. You already can see Turkey forming this bloc with Azerbaijan. Turkey used Azerbaijan as a proxy to defeat Armenia and, together with their Azeri ally, took the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Now that this region belongs to Azerbaijan (and by extension Turkey), Turkey now has a direct route through Azerbaijan’s region of Nakhichevan, Armenia (through a corridor that Turkey and Azerbaijan want to create), mainland Azerbaijan, into the Caspian Sea. This is significant given the fact that the Turkic Council want to make the Caspian Sea into a major trade route for its bloc. A confederacy of Turkic nations, led by Turkey, would be a major superpower, really an empire. The recent instability in Central Asia, with riots in Uzbekistan, (and also with the riots that happened in Kazakhstan in January of 2022) is indicative that Central Asia is a ticking time bomb, and such instability could be used by Turkey to push for more security cooperation between itself and the Central Asian countries.   

Riots erupted in Uzbekistan’s autonomous region of Karakalpakstan. The rioting was sparked as a response to proposed constitutional reforms which would have taken away Karakalpakstan’s right to secede. Violence was so bad that the government decided not to pursue the reforms. Under the current constitution, Karakalpakstan is a sovereign republic within Uzbekistan and has the right to secede through referendum. The government has cancelled the reforms that would have taken away this right due to the severity of the violence. Eighteen people were killed and 243 were injured, according to the Uzbek government. 516 people were arrested but have since been released. The president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, said that there were “civilians and law enforcement officers” among the dead. The government reported that protestors stormed through the streets of the Karakalpakstan’s capital city of Nukus, threw stones, started fires, attacked police and tried to take over government buildings. The police, parliament and cabinet made a joint statement in which they said that “provocateurs” had attempted “to seize state institutions … split the society and destabilise the socio-political situation in Uzbekistan”. This is the second case in 2022 of instability in Central Asia. In January of 2022 there were massive riots in Kazakstan that saw at least 227 people dead, with nearly 10,000 arrested. When this happened, soldiers from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — which consists of Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan – were deployed to the country at the request of Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

When poorer countries are in conditions of chaos, more powerful countries arrive to bring about order, and ultimately to establish their rule.

Turkey wants to expand its hegemony into Central Asia, and one of the reasons for this is the Caspian Sea. According to a US government cable from 2008, Turkey is “striving for energy supply security and believes warmer relations with Central Asian leaders can create the conditions for Turkey to realize its Caspian energy objectives.” The same document reads that “ Turkey has offered to play a leading role in developing a trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline (TCP).” A US diplomatic cable from 2009 explains that Turkey “sees itself as a guide and leader for the other ‘developing’ Turkic countries.”

Turkey has several interests in Central Asia: there is of course the cultural aspect in all of this. It was from the lands of Central Asia where the Oghuz Turks  — violent marauders — came, storming into Anatolia (present-day Turkey) in the Medieval period, and spreading Islam. Thus, Turkey sees Central Asia as a continual part of cultural territory. And then there is the importance of resources. Kazakstan is a major source of oil, and Turkey wants in on it. As the 2009 US diplomatic cable reads: 

“Turkey is positioning itself to become a major

energy transit country, it is paying close attention to

Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel resources (REF A).  Kazakhstan

possesses large oil and gas reserves and analysts predict

that it will likely become one of the top 10 oil producing

nations in the near future.”

Turkey wanting to expand into Central Asia is also a counter against Russia and Armenia. A 2007 US diplomatic cable (found on Wikileaks) explains:

“Historical and cultural ties, expanding commercial interests, strategic competition with Russia and Iran, and  disenchantment with Euro-Atlantic relations are the traditional drivers of Turkey’s interest in the east. Increasingly, however, military officials justify intensified  security ties by citing threats to energy security from perceived Russian conniving with Armenia and Iran to “breach” U.S.-supported east-west routes for Caspian energy.”

Turkey just had a proxy war with Armenia through its main Turkic ally, Azerbaijan, in which the latter defeated the Armenians and took the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Now that Nagorno-Karabakh is under Azeri control, Turkey seeks to have a corridor built that would go from the Azeri region of Nakhichevan (which borders with Turkey), through Armenia, into Azerbaijan (specifically where Nagorno-Karabakh is) and into the Caspian Sea, from where Turkey would have access into Central Asia. Thus, from Azerbaijan Turkey has direct access into the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

This is part of the dream of establishing a Turkic union — or really a Turkic NATO — led by Turkey, of course. The umbrella organization for this is the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking Countries, and it is meant to be a power bloc of countries all sharing the Turkic heritage. Michael Wilson of Stratfor wrote in 2010: 

“The Council of Cooperation of Turkic-speaking countries will be the basis for a new regional Turkic union, designed to strengthen the unity of the peoples living in similar linguistic and cultural environment, and to strengthen political and trade relations.”

Turkey’s desire to deepen itself within Central Asia is seen in its trade and security agreements with Uzbekistan. But there is a rival that Turkey is dealing with — Russia. As Gorkem Dirik explains: “Nevertheless, Uzbekistan is not a hassle-free country and yet again, Russia stands as Turkey’s main rival on its path to penetrate Uzbekistan culturally and economically and to provide it with military assistance when necessary.”

While Turkey does have diplomatic ties with Russia, the two countries are still at odds, being historically enemies and rivals over Asia, especially the Middle East and Central Asia. In fact, Turkey regarded the collapse of the Soviet Union as its opportunity to expand its influence into Central Asia. Another security bloc that Turkey has formed as a way to establish its own Turkic coalition is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), founded in 2009 and consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan and Hungary have observer status. This group of Turkic states are becoming more and more into an equivalent to the European Union, but for Turkic countries. What we are seeing is the rise of a Turkic Union, and just as Germany leads the European Union, Turkey is leading its own union.

In 2019, Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev (who is also the honorary president of the Turkic Council) proposed coming up with a “Turkic World Vision 2040” for the Turkic Council at the Baku Summit. Nazarbayev proposed strengthening ties in “foreign policy”, indicating how this union wants to become a major international force. In the Baku Summit of 2019, it was said by General Secretary of the Turkic Council, Bagdat Amreyev, that the Turkic Council was entering a new phase of integration between Turkic countries: “The last decade was a period of development. We achieved this development thanks to the decisions we made for the political will and unity of the Turkic world. Now we have stepped into a new phase, the phase of great integration.” Just as there is integration between EU countries, the Turkic Council wants integration between its member countries. This, of course, would involve free trade. The Daily Sabah reported in 2021 that the 2040 vision for the Turkic Council entailed “signing free trade agreements, opening borders in transportation and strong cooperation between member countries.”

The Turkic Union wants to form a collective shipping company and establish the trans-Caspian trade route into a transport corridor. General Secretary Amreyev explained:

“We are bringing up the issue of creating the most favorable conditions in the field of shipping and customs in order to transform the Trans-Caspian route into an effective transport corridor in trade between East and West. It is imperative to reduce logistics costs while increasing the efficiency of shipping and customs operations along this corridor. For this, we are planning to establish a joint Caspian shipping company.” 

Turkey and Russia are rivaling over the Caspian Sea, and Turkey wants a Turkic Union to act as a counter to Russia and also to be a major international power. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, declared: “We will strengthen our international power as we consolidate our unity without forgetting our roots”. So, Turkey wants to become a world superpower as the head of a union of Turkic countries with which it is partaking in a policy of integration involving trade and security cooperation. Since we know that Turkey wants the Turkic Union to become a world power, then we know that Turkey needs to penetrate Central Asia. Since Central Asia is in a moment of instability — be it riots in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, or Afghanistan dealing with the aftermath of the US’s withdrawal — then it is evident that Central Asia is a ticking time bomb. An explosion, caused by a chaotic political, could be used to Turkey’s advantage to entrench itself deeper in the region. 

The Armenian village of Sotk located on the border with the Azerbaijan-held Kalbajar district..Alexander Ryumin / TASS

July 19 2022

Jennifer Rankin in Brussels

Human rights groups have criticised an EU deal to ramp up gas supplies from Azerbaijan, as Europe scrambles to secure non-Russian sources of energy.

The European commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, on Monday hailed Azerbaijan as a “crucial” and “reliable” energy supplier, as she announced an agreement with Baku to expand the southern gas corridor, the 3,500km pipeline bringing Caspian Sea gas to Europe.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU officials have been touring the world’s fossil fuel producers in search of alternative suppliers, amid growing fears the Kremlin will completely shut down gas flows to Europe.

Standing alongside Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, Von der Leyen said the EU was diversifying away from Russia and turning “towards more reliable, trustworthy partners”, adding she was glad to count Azerbaijan among them. “You are indeed a crucial energy partner for us and you have always been reliable.”

Aliyev, who has presided over rampant corruption and the repression of activists and independent media during his 19 years in power, described the memorandum of understanding on energy signed with the EU as “a roadmap for the future”.

Under the agreement, gas supplies to the EU from Azerbaijan are forecast to reach 20bn cubic metres a year in 2027, up from 8bn currently. Supplies are set to increase to 12bn by 2023.

The plan to more than double existing capacity in five years will “require significant investments to the expansion of the southern gas corridor pipeline network” the memorandum states. It adds that both sides will try to develop infrastructure, “to the extent possible”, ready to be converted for renewable gases.

Von der Leyen said she had discussed with Aliyev his country’s “tremendous potential” for renewable energy, such as offshore wind and so-called green hydrogen. She also urged Azerbaijan to join 119 countries in signing the global methane pledge, a pact to cut the potent greenhouse gas by almost a third in the next decade.

The energy agreement is expected to pave the way for deeper cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan, on trade, aviation and the development of Baku port.

Human Rights Watch said the EU should not have signed the memorandum, nor enter a mooted new bilateral agreement, without insisting on political reforms: the release of scores of political prisoners and changes to laws that heavily restrict non-governmental organisations and the media.

Azerbaijan uses oil and gas “to silence the EU on fundamental rights issues”, said Philippe Dam, acting EU director at Human Rights Watch. “The reality is that Azerbaijan authorities have been famous for cracking down on civil society activists investigating corruption, especially when it comes to oil and gas.”

According to Human Rights Watch, nearly 40 opposition leaders, journalists and civil society leaders were released from jail in March, but dozens of others remain wrongfully imprisoned. The NGO has also reported multiple cases of torture and abuse in custody. “The EU should not say a country is reliable when it is restricting the activities of civil society groups and crushing political dissent,” Dam said.

Other campaigners accused the EU of undermining its climate goals, while enriching autocrats. “It is extraordinary that the EU seems intent on not learning from its current predicament, and is pushing to build more pipelines which would lock us into gas in the long term,” said Barnaby Pace, a senior gas campaigner at Global Witness. “A rapid boost for renewable energy and home insulation should be the obvious answer to the crises Europe is staring at – and certainly not repeating the mistakes that have taken us to this point.”

Eve Geddie, director of Amnesty International’s Brussels office, said: “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine serves as a reminder that repressive and unaccountable regimes are rarely reliable partners and that privileging short-term objectives at the expense of human rights is a recipe for disaster.”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/19/human-rights-groups-criticise-eus-azerbaijan-gas-deal 

Meg Pier | Published: July 2, 2019

Armenian lavash is celebrated by singer Anush Stepanyan in this traditional folk song that pays homage to the traditional thin bread that is an essential part of Armenian cuisine! Enjoy Anush’s beautiful and heartfelt ode to this delicacy that is part of daily life in Armenia. Making lavash is considered a ceremony, as there are many customs and beliefs associated with it; this folk song, “Hats Ktkhem Garia,” also praises the year’s successful harvest.

Armenian lavash, baked in a conical clay oven called a tonir, was inscribed as an item of Intangible Cultural Heritage by UNESCO in 2014. Beyond being a staple of everyday Armenian cuisine, lavash has some symbolic significance; the bread plays a ritual role in weddings, where it is placed on the shoulders of newlyweds to bring fertility and prosperity.

Anush, 30 years old, is from Armenia’s capital of Yerevan and is the solo singer of “JNAR” Armenian Traditional Music Ensemble; when asked how long she has been singing, she says “Since I was born!” Her talent certainly is a natural gift!

 

Residents of the South Caucasus region feel subject to political maneuvering beyond their control.

At first glance, life in Stepanakert is quiet: cafes are open, children play in parks, clothes flap in the wind on Monday, the region’s traditional laundry day. The calm seems to have returned to Nagorny Karabakh’s de facto capital since the 2020 war scarred the region, killing thousands and displacing tens of thousands in 44 days of fighting.

The peace however is a façade: behind it, over 100,000 people life in fear.

“Human beings can get used to everything,” said Gennady Petrosyan, a taxi driver from Stepanakert. “And we are getting used to this uncertainty and anxiety.

“We are getting used to the fact that Azerbaijanis are in Shushi, which was simply unimaginable before the war,” he continued, referring to the strategic mountain town, called Susha in Azerbaijani, that Baku has controlled since November 2020.

“We have actually turned off our minds and live like zombies. Otherwise you can go crazy,” he concluded.

The war ended with a Moscow-brokered ceasefire on November 10, 2020, leaving the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan altered, with the former defeated and the latter regaining control over territories it had lost in the early 1990s. Russia deployed peacekeepers who acted as security guarantors.

But uncertainty still lingers over the mountain region. The mainly Armenian-populated territory, which is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, now faces a new challenge in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine is thousands of miles away, but locals fear that if Moscow fails, their future will be at risk.

Karabakh is one of three un-recognised statelets in the South Caucasus, alongside Georgia’s breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that is living under Russian military patronage. This is particularly obvious in the Lachin corridor, where Russian peacekeepers guard ten checkpoints on the five kilometre section of the road connecting Armenia with Karabakh, checking documents and inspecting cars.

"Peace doesn't seem realistic to me.”

Significant reconstruction is underway, with new neighbourhoods being built around Stepanakert where the authorities intend to resettle refugees from Shushi and Hadrut, now under Azerbaijani control. The new infrastructure comes equipped with mandatory bomb shelters, which were so badly needed in 2020.

The de-facto authorities promise to provide 3,700 families with houses by the end of 2023, but this is unlikely to be enough.

“As a result of the war, about 9,000 families need new homes, these are either displaced persons or the relatives of the deceased,” Aram Sargsyan, the de-facto minister of urban development told IWPR, adding that Armenia allocated hundreds of millions of dollars for housing construction in Karabakh annually.

POST-WAR REALITY

The Armenian authorities have shifted their tune since the 2020 war. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his team, who repeatedly stated before the conflict that Karabakh was unquestionably part of Armenia, have dramatically changed their rhetoric in the post-war reality.

Instead of publicly declaring that Karabakh will not become part of Azerbaijan, as the opposition demands, they emphasise the importance of protecting the rights of the its population.

Petrosyan, like many others in Karabakh, has his doubts over Yerevan’s new approach.

“After all, it was only yesterday when we fought against them [Azerbaijanis]. I can’t imagine how it is possible to live peacefully with them after these war wounds. It doesn't seem realistic to me,” he said.

Meanwhile he lives in uncertainty, like many others.

Before the 2020 war, Petrosyan installed drip irrigation systems for intensive fruit cultivation, a sector which blossomed in Karabakh’s rich soil and mild climate.

“My [irrigation] business was developing fast; the number of intensive gardens grew at high speed. I was planning to buy a house, but then, the war broke out and everything went downhill. Now I drive a taxi, and those gardens are left on lands that came under the control of Azerbaijan,” he recalled, adding that no one was willing to make even small investments in Karabakh.

Several Stepanakert residents told IWPR that people were waiting for government assistance, avoiding long-term investments amid the unpredictability.

“Before building something, an ordinary citizen thinks 1,000 times whether it is worth doing it or not, whether it will be possible to complete it or not,” said Gegham Stepanyan, Karabakh’s human rights ombudsman. “Meanwhile, the residents of Artsakh [the Armenian name for Karabakh] are desperately clinging to their land.”

LIFE IN LIMBO

Armen Arzumanyan, like many residents of Karabakh, is grateful to Russia. Severely wounded in the war, in February he and his family moved to a new house in one of the new settlements near the peacekeepers’ base, close to the airport.

“I have everything, I have nothing to complain about,” he said. “Only my wounds hurt at night. I am going to have another operation soon.”

He and his fellow soldiers were injured when their car ran over a land mine on November 7, 2020, two days before the end of the war. He was in a coma for 27 days, followed by seven months of treatment in clinics in Armenia.

“We cannot keep on fighting Azerbaijan."

The father-of-three said that he has been given a second chance at life. He receives a monthly allowance of 250,000 drams (600 US dollars) from the government and military insurance fund. He and his wife grow vegetables on their land.

“Russian peacekeepers are here, they are providing our security. This is good, of course,” he continued, “but these are the troops of another state. We must ensure our own safety in the first place and only after that rely on someone else’s help.”

Grigory Poghosyan, a resident of the town of Askeran, agreed.

“Russia is in a state of war, which can weaken it and then, of course, Azerbaijan will take advantage and seize Karabakh. Baku is already making such attempts,” he said, referring to events in the borderline village of Parukh which Azerbaijani forces captured in March 2022, contrary to the November ceasefire.

Yerevan and Stepanakert explained the actions of the Azerbaijani armed forces as Baku's desire to take advantage of the situation in Ukraine, which has led to the weakening of Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. The Russian ministry of defence has repeatedly reproached Azerbaijan for violating agreements on Karabakh, a charge that Baku has denied.

“If at one moment, God forbid, Russia becomes so weak that it has no time for Karabakh, what then?” Poghosyan asked.

“If Russia weakens, this will only make one country in the region stronger – Turkey, which fully supports Azerbaijan in its desire to seize Karabakh,” argued David Babayan, the region’s de-facto foreign minister. “In the current circumstances, if Russia weakens, there will be neither Artsakh nor Armenia.”

For Armenian analyst and writer Tatul Hakobyan, there is no alternative to negotiations.

“We need a constant and direct dialogue with Baku and Ankara. We must understand our capacities and establish direct contacts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which will not be easy in the current circumstances, but we have no other option,” he told IWPR.

“We cannot keep on fighting Azerbaijan, a country of ten million, and Turkey, a country of 80 million which strongly supports Azerbaijan. Neither can we relocate our country to another place on earth. So, we need dialogue and the will to achieve peace, which will have its price.”

Karabakh’s human rights ombudsman Stepanyan said that even the possibility of being within Azerbaijan was unacceptable.

 “In the current circumstances the population of Artsakh would rather live in uncertainty than be a part of Azerbaijan,” he concluded.

https://iwpr.net/global-voices/nagorny-karabakhs-fearful-calm

July 19 2022

TEHRAN- The value of Iran’s export to Armenia increased 21 percent in the first quarter of the current Iranian calendar year (March 21-June 21), from the first quarter of the previous year, the spokesman of Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) announced.

Ruhollah Latifi said that Iran exported commodities worth $74 million to Armenia in the three-month period.

Iran and Armenia signed a memorandum of understanding at the end of the two countries’ 17th meeting of Joint Economic Committee in Yerevan in mid-May.

The MOU, which covers cooperation in areas of transit, transportation, facilitation of exchange of goods, energy, development of environmental cooperation in Aras area and removal of pollution from border rivers, as well as medical tourism, was signed by Iranian Energy Minister Ali-Akbar Mehrabian and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, who are the chairmen of the two countries’ Joint Economic Committee.

In that meeting, which was attended by a large number of deputy ministers, senior officials, ambassadors, and members of parliament of the two countries, the main issues that play a key role in the development of relations between the two countries were discussed.

According to the officials, the purpose of holding the 17th meeting of Iran-Armenia Joint Economic Committee was the real and tangible development of relations between the two countries.

In late April, Iranian Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Ehsan Khandouzi headed a delegation on a visit to Armenia to hold talks with the country’s senior officials with the aim of expanding economic ties between the two nations.

During the visit, Khandouzi met with Armenia’s Deputy Prime Minister Mher Herbert Grigoryan, the country’s Economy Minister Vahan Kerobyan, and Minister of Finance Tigran Khachatryan.

MA/MA

July 19 2022

July 19 2022