Category: 2021
COVID-19: Armenian CDC reports lowest daily death toll in 4 months – 12/24/2021
COVID-19: Armenian CDC reports lowest daily death toll in 4 months
11:19, 24 December, 2021
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. 3 people died from COVID-19 in the last 24 hours, the lowest daily death toll in 4 months, the Armenian National Center for Disease Control and Prevention said Friday.
The total death toll reached 7939.
135 new cases were confirmed, bringing the cumulative total number of confirmed cases to 344,261.
407 patients recovered, raising the total recoveries to 329,983.
6236 tests were administered (total 2,522,916).
As of December 24 the number of active cases stood at 4843.
Nagorno Karabakh war has never been a religious war – Armenian President tells ArabNews
11:52, 24 December, 2021
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. President of Armenia Armen Sarkissian gave an exclusive interview to ArabNews.
Armenpress presents the part of the interview relating to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
-I have several questions about Azerbaijan, but one more question about the perceptions and the reality. Maybe people here are not talking much about it, but there is a perception in the Middle East, which, maybe, is spread by Turks or Azerbaijanis, that this is a religious war.
-It was never, never a religious war. Armenia has wonderful relations with a lot of states where Islam is a major religion. The Azeri side sometimes liked to use that in order to accumulate support from Islamic world. But Armenia, Armenian side never tried to use or get support from Christian states because this is a Christian war. Not at all, it was never.
-As it stands internationally Karabakh is considered Azerbaijan. So what can we do, probably the OIC, the Gulf region, everybody has an interest to bring peace. So what position do you expect from the GCC or the OIC to help end this conflict?
-Basically, I think, I would expect all of our friends, be that in the Gulf, in the Middle East or in Europe, to help to bring a logical end to this conflict.
-What would the logical end look like?
-As I said, 26 years ago Armenia was victorious and we failed somehow to use the position of being in a victory to converting that into peace. Of course, taking into account the rights of these people that live in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenians with their history of more than thousands of years. I think for the moment the war has just finished and there are so many emotions, wounds, unresolved issues, be that starting on the borders, demarcation and all of that stuff, and of course the future of Nagorno Karabakh and people there. There is an internationally agreed institution which is the OSCE Minsk Group and the Co-Chairs. There are still voices that I think we should go back and allow these negotiations to happen. There is a new reality where there is huge influence of the Russian Federation into the region because they were the once they brought the ceasefire, they are the ones who are offering to help both Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border demarcation and other issues related to that. Of course, there is the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh today. So, I would not say that the issue is resolved finally. Where we will get and how, what will be the final resolution, I think, time will show. But my advice will be, let’s try to help, that any solution that we will get the final solution, will be logical. A solution that will be acceptable by both sides. Any solution which is forced will not last forever.
Russian Foreign Ministry wishes “peace and patience” to Armenia and Azerbaijan
14:49, 24 December, 2021
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is one of the most complex, prolonged and bloody conflicts, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said at a press briefing.
She wished peace and patience to Armenia and Azerbaijan in settling the conflict.
“I wish patience to Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as to all those experts who are working, including from the Russian side, to those who are directly controlling the situation”, Zakharova said.
The Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman expressed hope that everything will be solved if all sides make maximum efforts.
She said that the Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan agreements of 2020 November 9 have been overall implemented in the passing year.
Informal meeting of CIS leaders to take place in St. Petersburg Dec 28
16:23, 24 December, 2021
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. The traditional informal meeting of the leaders of the CIS participating states will take place in St. Petersburg on December 28 at the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin press service reports.
The meeting will be attended by Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, first President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.
Moscow describes EU-mediated meeting of Pashinyan and Aliyev as “development of trilateral agreements” of Sochi
16:30, 24 December, 2021
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. The EU-mediated meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Brussels further develops the November 26 Sochi trilateral agreements, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said at a press conference.
She said that substantial discussions of these agreements continue in the trilateral task force co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan.
“The entire complex of issues relating to the unblocking of transport and economic connections in South Caucasus, including the restoration of both railway and road connection is being discussed within the framework of this mechanism,” Zakharova said.
She added that work is underway to create the commission for the delimitation and demarcation of the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with consultative support from Russia.
“Moscow welcomes international efforts aimed at the normalization of bilateral relations. But in this case it is very important to take into account regional realities, and consent of Yerevan and Baku,” Zakharova said.
The Lost Armenians of Gaziantep: New Lines
Why "Operation Baku" Failed
The promise of wealth brings Iran and Azerbaijan together after Armenia tensions
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Iran and Azerbaijan were quick to escalate their rhetoric when a heated war of words broke out between the two countries on the first anniversary of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Tehran accused Baku of offering its territory to Israel to spy on Iran and of deploying Syrian mercenaries in the 44-day war against Armenia. Baku accused Tehran of "briefly invading" parts of southern Azerbaijan during the war and allying with Armenia for organised drug trafficking to Europe.
As the rhetorical war continued between these two countries, which together share the highest percentage population of Shia people globally, their military show of power was also in full swing at the Iran-Azerbaijan border and the Caucasus.
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In mid-September, Azerbaijan launched a joint drill with Turkey and Pakistan. Two weeks later, the Iranian official army's ground forces deployed a large number of troops at the border with Azerbaijan and held a war game. Azerbaijan took its turn a few days later and participated in another joint drill with Iran's regional rival Turkey, this time in Georgia.
However, when the dust of the war games settled, a different image of the two neighbouring countries' relationships emerged in the media.
On 28 November, the Azeri and Iranian presidents met in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, and spoke of friendship and brotherhood, shaking hands and taking photos before the cameras.
Something had changed between the two countries.
Iran, which was previously closer to Armenia, has more recently leaned towards Azerbaijan, no longer stressing its reservations about Israel-Azerbaijan ties.
Moreover, President Ebrahim Raisi's conservative government had approached Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to sign a three-way gas-swap deal.
The deal was widely hailed by Farsi media as an outstanding economic achievement, a successful move to restore relations with Azerbaijan and a hard blow to the United States' maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which started in 2018 after then-president Donald Trump violated the 2015 nuclear agreement.
"At this point, all we can say about the gas-swap deal is that it's a not-smartly-crafted performance by a new government that needs to prove itself," an energy expert at the Tehran Stock Market told Middle East Eye, on condition of anonymity.
The only official detail about the swap contract was disclosed by Iran's oil minister, Javad Oji. He said that Iran would receive between 1.5 and two billion cubic metres of gas from Turkmenistan at the Sarakhs border crossing and deliver the same amount to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan at Iran's Astara border.
'Instead of having a well-founded foreign policy in the South Caucasus, we now run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'
– Iranian diplomat
"For how long will this contract be valid? No one knows. It is only said to be a long-term contract. But not any long-term contract is necessarily a good contract," the energy expert said
"And what is the quality of the gas we receive from Turkmenistan, compared to what we deliver to Azerbaijan?
"More importantly, what is the percentage of Iran's take from this amount of gas for delivering it to Azerbaijan?"
So far, Iran's official media have provided conflicting numbers for the percentage of the share that Iran would take from the transferred gas.
The state-run Young Journalist Club wrote that between 20 and 25 percent of the delivered gas would be allocated to Iran. Conversely, the ISNA news agency put the number as low as five percent.
"I won't be surprised if the actual number is even less than five percent. Firstly, because it was Iran that approached Turkmenistan for the deal, and secondly, due to the sanctions, we can only deal in the global market with prices much lower than actual prices," the expert stressed.
Iran has previously applied the same tactic by offering significant discounts to its oil customers to get around the US sanctions.
"I think this contract only has political importance for the establishment. This is the price that Iran must pay to keep Azerbaijan happy," the expert concluded.
However, other sources MEE spoke to believed that influencing neighbouring countries was not Tehran's only goal for signing the gas-swap contract with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
The contract was signed only a few days before the resumption of negotiations in Vienna for a potential revival of the 2015 nuclear agreement following a five-month pause.
It was the first time since Raisi's victory in the June presidential election that Iran's new hardliner delegation was sitting at the negotiations table with the signatories of the nuclear deal, which was originally signed under former reformist president Hassan Rouhani.
"The hardliners, who now lead the nuclear talks, did not want to arrive empty-handed at the negotiating table," an Iranian diplomat, who worked at Iran's foreign ministry between 2005 and 2013, told MEE.
The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media, said that, while the new negotiating team drafted the two proposals Iran presented in November during the talks, other offices at the foreign ministry attempted to improve Tehran's political relations with neighbouring countries and regional powers.
"I'm not saying that's been a successful strategy. But that's how Iran's new foreign policy will work for, at least, the next four years," he said.
The diplomat explained that Iran had lost the opportunity to maintain its influence in the Caucasus during Rouhani's administration, as Tehran was focused on negotiating with the US and improving ties with European powers.
"Through the channels we had with the foreign ministry, we warned [former foreign minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif and Rouhani over Iran's political passivity in the Caucasus, but they were overwhelmed by the talks with the West," he said.
"And, as a result, instead of having a well-founded foreign policy in the South Caucasus, we now run with the hare and hunt with the hounds."
Nevertheless, the diplomat stressed that, since the early 1990s, the only matter that has remained intact in Iran's diplomacy in the Caucasus is its strong objection to the opening of the Zangezur transport corridor that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan.
The opening of the 21km corridor, which Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has persistently demanded following the 2020 war, would effectively cut off Iran's access to the Caucasus through Armenia.
Despite solid opposition by Iran and Armenia to the Zangezur passageway, experts believe that if Turkey and Russia decide to permit Azerbaijan to use the corridor, neither Iran nor Armenia has the power to go against it.
'Nowadays, we can't fool Azerbaijan by offering them a gas-swap deal. Indeed, they are using our weaknesses for their benefit, and the gas deal was clear evidence for that'
– Retired Iranian diplomat
A retired Iranian diplomat, who served in Iran's foreign ministry during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988-94), told MEE that Tehran is aware of its limited influence over the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict.
"Azerbaijan counts on Turkish and Israeli military and political support," the diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, said.
"On the other side, Armenia follows what Russia decides upon, so there is not much space left for Iran to play a role. If tomorrow Russia orders Armenia to withdraw its troops from the Zangezur corridor and hand it over to the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia will do that. As they did in Karabakh to end last year's war."
According to the veteran diplomat, even during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iran was not the most influential country in the region, and its efforts to broker a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia were unsuccessful. However, at that time Tehran could at least host the fighting neighbours for peace talks.
"Iran's power in the Caucasus has declined gradually, since our politicians and the commanders of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps were busy exerting influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen," he said.
PM Nikol Pashinyan says reactions to his interview “at least puzzling”
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said some of the responses to his December 24 interview are “at least puzzling” for several reasons. The Prime Minister took to Facebook to list the reasons:
- In that interview, I spoke about the content of the negotiations formed before I became Prime Minister in 2018, therefore, I could not have any influence on their formation.
- In response to a question, I denied Serzh Sargsyan’s assertion at the RPA Congress that the content of the negotiations left by them guaranteed that Nagorno Karabakh would be Armenian. I denied it because the right of Azerbaijanis living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to participate in the decision on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a resident of Nagorno-Karabakh was enshrined in that content of the negotiations. Therefore, if they are residents of Nagorno-Karabakh according to the content of the negotiations, then they had to live in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenian side never objected to this content before the 2018 revolution. And if we take into account that according to the content of the negotiations formed before I became Prime Minister, the referendum on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh could take place 100 years later, it is predictable what changes in the demographic picture of Artsakh would be under the mentioned conditions.
- As for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh before the potential referendum on status, I said in an interview that in 2016 the mediators had presented three negotiation packages (one before the April war, two after), where, unlike the 2011 Kazan document, the wording “Nagorno Karabakh gets an intermediate status” was missing. The third of these three packages, presented in August 2016, contains a provision stating that the decision on the legal and practical mechanisms for the organization of life in Nagorno-Karabakh will be made by the UN Security Council in consultation with the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. This is what I considered to be a catastrophe in the negotiation process, because it is obvious that the UN Security Council would make all the decisions following the logic of its own resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Nagorno-Karabakh was recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
- Taking into account these and several other important negotiation issues, I have insisted from the Parliament tribune that under the negotiation content and realities existing before I became Prime Minister in 2018, Artsakh had lost both theoretical and practical opportunities not to be part of Azerbaijan.
- Becoming Prime Minister, I did not accept this, but fought against it. And this is one of the reasons why the war started.
- People saying that I should not negotiate on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh have been criticizing me since 2018 for saying that I do not have a mandate to negotiate on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh.
- I understand that many respectable people are now protesting against the negotiation content that is the cause and consequence of the 2016 war. At that time they either did not know or did not have the right to complain. I also complain against that content and I did everything possible to neutralize that content. I am sorry I can not hide the truth.
The comments come in the wake of Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan’s statement, in which he said the full recognition of the right of the Armenians of Artsakh to self-determination is not subject to reservation and concession. Therefore, he said, only the authorities of the Artsakh Republic are authorized to speak on behalf of the people of Artsakh.