Category: 2020

Radio Farda
At the request of the Republic of Azerbaijan Russia handed over an
individual accused of receiving “terrorist” training in Iran, TASS and
Azerbaijani media reported July 28.
Russian Federation Prosecutor General’s Office announced that Mehdi
Shukurov, an Azerbaijani citizen sought by Baku was handed over for
criminal prosecution.
The accusation against Mr. Shukurov is that in 2016 he crossed the
border into Iran and joined an “illegal armed group” receiving
training in the use of firearms and explosives and other terror
techniques.
The group in question is not named and it is not clear whether the
Iranian government was involved in any way or Shukurov joined an
underground group.
After the alleged training the accused traveled to Russia and after
Azerbaijan determined he was in Russia asked for his extradition.
Russia arrested him earlier this year and finally extradited him to
Azerbaijan.
Two years ago, Azerbaijan claimed that a suspect in the assassination
of the mayor of Ganja had spent eight months in 2016 in Iran’s
religious city of Qom and then traveled to Syria for military
training. Yunis Safarov was arrested shortly after the mayor’s murder.
At the time it was reported that Safarov intended to establish an
organization called “Unity of Azerbaijan’s Muslims” and agitating for
the assassinations of government officials to prepare the ground for
an insurrection to set up an Islamic state.
 

War on the Rocks
By Berkay Mandıracı and Nigar Göksel
Once a month, since being detained sneaking back across Turkish border
from Syria two years ago, Hamza (all names used are pseudonyms) must
check in at his local police station as he awaits his court appeal to
a 6-year jail sentence. He hates having to do so and is thankful he
has little other contact with Turkish state officials he calls
“kafir,” or infidel.
“I still hold on to my previous convictions elhamdülillah…. My views
of the Turkish state have not changed,” Hamza said in comments that
echoed those of other returnees we spoke with for a new report
published by the International Crisis Group. Turkey is among many
countries grappling with how to deal with citizens who left for Syria
and Iraq. A small fraction of them, like Hamza, have been convicted on
charges of membership in a terrorist group. Many others were killed in
Syria and Iraq. The fate of the rest remains murky.
Enduring interest in living under a caliphate doesn’t in itself mean
Hamza or other returnees are poised to strap on a suicide vest, but it
may speak to the dangers of future recruitment or mobilization cycles.
“I would consider joining again if a new caliphate was established,”
Hamza said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
ISIL’s diminished influence and the Turkish state’s security measures
have helped prevent new attacks for over three years. But while the
threat should not be overplayed, it has not necessarily disappeared.
Were ISIL to gain ground again, or other jihadists fighting in Syria —
for example, the former al-Qaeda affiliate Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham — to
turn their sights on Turkey, some returnees could potentially
mobilize. Many of those behind bars will soon be released. More
militants may cross into Turkey from Idlib, Syria’s last rebel-held
bastion.
To disrupt ISIL’s recruitment efforts, Ankara relies on
resource-intensive surveillance and short-term detention. It has been
slower than some other nations to develop social programs to help
returnees go back to lives as civilians. Ankara should explore whether
and which soft measures can complement its hard security approach to
ensure returnees turn their backs on jihadist militancy and safely
reintegrate.
Given that Turkey since 2013 has been a transit route for weapons,
supplies, and people across the Turkish-Syrian border, it is critical
for national and regional security that Turkish returnees turn their
back on militancy. It is also a matter of some concern for Western
European governments, given Turkey’s role as a transit country, the
fact that some of their nationals that travelled to Iraq or Syria
likely pass through, and that it is plausible they interact with
Turkish militant networks.
Hamza’s Story
While most Turkish citizens who joined ISIL did so early on in the
conflict in 2014-2015, Hamza travelled to Idlib province in June 2017.
Then 20 years old, he had been introduced to pro-ISIL circles in
Turkey through a friend, sharing ISIL propaganda videos of life under
Sharia in Raqqa and other places. He said he did not have much to
lose. He had dropped out of university and said he didn’t have a
vocation that would enable him to make a living or develop a career.
“I was very excited,” he said, remembering how he felt just before he
and his friend crossed the border with the help of smugglers on both
sides.
By then, however, the group had suffered territorial defeats and Hamza
instead joined former al-Qaeda affiliate Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham. Barely
a year later, he was detained by Turkish authorities trying to make
his way back to Turkey. He told us he had grown disillusioned with
infighting among different jihadist groups there and feared for his
life: “A week after I arrived the area had turned into a witch’s
cauldron.”
Turkey formally designated Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham a terrorist group in
August 2018, but the group continues to control Idlib’s main border
crossing with Turkey and, inside Idlib, the group coexists with
Turkish forces on the ground.
After his arrest, Hamza was held for 4 months in Turkey’s southernmost
province of Hatay with other inmates suspected of affiliation with
groups with designated as terrorist in Turkey – including al-Qaeda,
Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham, and ISIL. Usually prison management tries to
separate inmates who hold clashing ideologies, to prevent contagion or
physical violence. However, prison overcrowding often does not permit
this containment. “When we first entered prison, there was a single
cell for al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, [ISIL], the Free Syrian Army, other
Turkmen groups. All of them were in the same cell,” Hamza said. “There
were five different groups who had declared each other infidels. They
were praying separately and were talking behind each other’s backs.”
He described the experience as “eye-opening”, because he saw the
futility of the fierce wrangling over these polemical accusations.
It was precisely this kind of infighting that had caused him to leave
the battlefields of Idlib. His time behind bars reinforced his
disillusionment. But others grow more hardline behind bars. Among the
20 inmates sharing his cell, Hamza said those who remained longer had
become more rigid in their outlook, more committed to both jihadist
ideology and enmity toward those they deemed infidels.
The Turkish religious authority (Diyanet) has 600 imams on duty at
prisons with whom inmates can interact should they so choose. However,
their efforts to “de-radicalize” ISIL-affiliates in prison have been
unsuccessful. The vast majority of these prisoners view the Diyanet as
an extension of the Turkish state and rejects any interaction with its
officials. While the Diyanet says they are best placed to change the
minds of people who reference the Quran to justify violence, they have
little success to point to in this regard.
Foreigners are some of the fiercest among them, according to both
Turkish returnees and officials. Some 600 foreigners charged with
ISIL-related crimes are currently jailed in Turkey. Like their Turkish
counterparts, many are soon to be released.
Turkish returnees have recourse to an “active remorse” clause that
allows for acquittal or reduced sentences if they give up useful
intelligence. Even if they don’t use the active remorse clause,
convicts sentenced for membership in a terrorist organization can be
released on probation after serving three quarters of their sentences.
Hamza, who was charged with membership to Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham, pled
not guilty and refused to cooperate, is among a smaller number of
individuals likely to serve at least three to four years.
Little is known about returnees who were not caught and interrogated
upon return. In some low-income urban neighborhoods almost everyone
knows a young cousin or neighbor who joined ISIL. Some were recruited
by older veterans of past wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. When
in 2014, parents went to the police to stop their sons and daughters
from being drawn into ISIL, they were told their children were adults
who had not committed a crime, so there was no role for law
enforcement.
In some cases, where sons and daughters returned to parents and homes
they had fled a couple of years earlier, families told us they had
improvised their own strategies to keep relatives from going back to
Syria –going so far as to lock in and keep watch over relatives.
Families said they had nowhere to apply for guidance about how to deal
with the challenge of keeping their children from going to Syria to
join ISIL. Some appealed to respected community elders or local imams
to convince their children. “[ISIL] had brainwashed them with wrong
interpretations of Islam,” the father of one returnee who joined at
the age of 16 told us.
Hamza, who was freed in July 2018 while awaiting an appeal hearing in
his case, has returned to his hometown.  Once a village, now it is a
conservative town swallowed by the urban sprawl of the industrial
province Bursa, in western Turkey. He has married and found a job, and
says he is looking forward to having children soon.
Other Challenges for Turkey
Returnees are not the only challenge. A well-informed official in the
security bureaucracy told Crisis Group that those who didn’t join also
could be motivated should the opportunity arise: “Some wanted to go,
but couldn’t. Maybe someone from their family or the state stopped
them, maybe their mother got sick and they postponed, maybe they were
waiting for a wedding date…. They can be more dangerous than those who
went, got disappointed and came back.”
Turkish authorities believe they have the problem under control.
Following a spate of attacks that killed nearly 300 individuals on
Turkish soil in 2015 and 2016, security officials say they have an eye
on potentially dangerous returnees and monitor anyone who comes into
their orbit. They claim to have cultivated informants within ISIL,
including cross-border smuggling networks. They have benefitted not
only from information traded by returnees in exchange for reduced
sentences, but also from documents seized during raids in Turkey or at
the Syria-Turkey border as well as information obtained by security
units in areas in northern Syria under Turkish control. The
authorities are less concerned with the fate of an unknown number of
other returnees, who don’t appear to have come into contact with
individuals currently being monitored.
Unlike in most Western countries, Turkish officials have only recently
started contemplating social programs aimed at helping former
militants settle back into civilian life. The belief that many
returnees who joined ISIL were not ideologically committed, and they
had no difficulty folding back upon return may have contributed to the
Turkish social ministries’ lack of action. But more generally this is
simply a feature of the Turkish state. Security responses have
developed far more than social measures in dealing with people who
have taken the route of violent extremism.
The initiatives of the Diyanet have focused on broad
information-sharing activities and promotion of conservative family
values that they argue shield against extremism. But the Diyanet has
not devised programs tailored to the reintegration of returnees. Civil
society initiatives in this area are also largely absent.
Looking Ahead
Hamza’s story offers a glimpse of the challenge Turkey and other
nations face in developing policies toward returnees, especially given
the fluidity between allegiance to ISIL and to other jihadist groups.
While he appears to have returned to a normal life and have become
disillusioned with the existing transnational militant jihadist
factions, the fact that he mellowed can seem almost accidental. There
have been no social services involved with ensuring his mental health
or opportunities. If he had happened to bump into a jihadist outlet
that attracted him, he could have gone down a different track.
Overestimating the risk can be as counterproductive as underplaying
it. In any case, hard security measures will be needed to keep under
check those most committed. The track record of so-called
“rehabilitation” or “deradicalization” efforts is patchy in other
countries. Many of these efforts have come under criticism for
involving social workers, teachers and other civil servants in
surveillance or stigmatizing communities as potential terrorists. But
in some cases, soft measures may have the potential to help ensure
returnees, including those who have yet to cross the border from
Idlib, steer clear of militancy for the longer haul.
Ankara could explore initiatives in specific areas, such as prison
after-release programs and support for families who themselves
identify children at risk. Indeed, some may turn out to be more
effective than locking people up briefly in the hope that jail deters
them. While Hamza’s brief time behind bars appears to have deterred
him, he has not rejected violence entirely. His case is only one of
thousands in Turkey.
Besides the uncertainty as to the feasibility of  rehabilitation or
deradicalization, Turkey’s approach to returnees from battlefields in
Syria is complicated by the fluidity between the various armed groups
and by Ankara’s tactical relations with some of those groups based on
its own interests there. Choosing which returnees to leave to their
own devices and which to prosecute and/or rehabilitate will continue
to be complicated.
Nigar Göksel has been the Turkey Project director for Crisis Group
since April 2015. Based in Istanbul, she researches, produces reports
and conducts advocacy on regional and internal security issues in
Turkey, and between Turkey and its neighbors. She formerly worked as
editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly and as senior analyst for
the European Stability Initiative.
Berkay Mandıracı joined Crisis Group in June 2015 and currently works
as Turkey analyst based in Istanbul. He previously worked in the areas
of judicial and security sector reform for the Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and the German Foundation for
International Legal Cooperation (IRZ).
 

                                        Tuesday, 
Armenian Lawmaker Fined Over Beach Party
        • Naira Nalbandian
Armenia -- Parliament deputy Hayk Sargsian is seen sitting behind the bar at a 
beach club, July 26, 2020.
Armenian authorities have fined a pro-government parliamentarian and shut down a 
lakeside resort where he partied at the weekend in breach or coronavirus safety 
rules set by the government.
The late-night party featuring live music took place at a beach club located on 
the northern shore of Lake Sevan. Photographs and videos posted on social media 
showed Hayk Sargsian, a 27-year-old lawmaker affiliated with Armenia’s ruling My 
Step bloc, and dozens of other young people wearing no face masks and not 
observing social distancing there.
This caused a media uproar in the country which has had one of the highest 
coronavirus infection rates in the world. The Armenian government has for months 
been trying to curb the spread of the disease by enforcing strict anti-epidemic 
rules. Sargsian himself urged Armenians earlier this summer to comply with the 
rules requiring them wear masks in all public spaces.
The lawmaker, who is no stranger to controversy, said on Monday that police have 
fined him and the other revelers. He also apologized to the government for 
causing “such a big and unnecessary rumpus.”
Sargsian claimed that he only briefly failed to put on a mask. However, the 
widely publicized images suggest that he was not masked throughout the beach 
party.
A pop singer who performed at the event said he was told that it was allowed by 
Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinian, who coordinates the government’s response 
to the coronavirus outbreak. A spokesman for Avinian insisted, however, that his 
office did not issue such permission.
The office shut down the Spitak Shorzha beach club for two weeks on Tuesday, 
saying that it violated a government ban on live performances and mass 
gatherings and failed to enforce other coronavirus safety rules.
The club manager, Vartan Simonian, denounced the measure as disproportionate, 
saying that he will appeal against it. He said that the controversial party was 
organized by another private firm.
Some media outlets claimed that Spitak Shorzha is owned by Sargsian. They seized 
upon a Facebook photo of the young lawmaker sitting behind the club bar and 
using what looked like a computer cash register.
Sargsian, whose twin brother Nairi is an aide to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, 
denies fully or partly owning the resort.
The chief of the Armenian police, Vahe Ghazarian, has also faced media 
accusations of breaking the government rules. The “Hraparak” daily reported that 
Ghazarian and dozens of other police officers dined late last week at a 
restaurant outside Yerevan.
“It was a protocol event, not a restaurant party,” a police spokesman insisted 
on Tuesday.
Ghazarian’s predecessor was sacked by Pashinian less than two months ago for 
failing to properly enforce the coronavirus-related state of emergency in the 
country.
Thousands of Armenians have since been fined by the police for not wearing face 
masks. The authorities have also temporarily shut down scores of restaurants, 
manufacturing firms and other businesses not following the anti-epidemic rules.
In early June, Pashinian also fired Armenia’s top army general, Artak Davtian, 
one day after the latter hosted his son’s wedding party attended by dozens of 
guests.
Pashinian Rejects Harsh Criticism From Kremlin Media Chief
        • Heghine Buniatian
Russia -- President Vladimir Putin and Russia Today (RT) editor-in-chief 
Margarita Simonyan attend an exhibition marking the 10th anniversary of RT, 
December 10, 2015.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has rejected allegations by one of the most 
influential figures in Russia’s state-run media that he has been undermining 
Russian-Armenian relations and supporting Western-funded groups hostile to 
Moscow.
Margarita Simonyan, the ethnic Armenian chief editor of the television network 
RT and several other Kremlin-funded media outlets, accused Pashinian last week 
of turning Armenia into a “bridgehead of anti-Russian forces in the Caucasus.”
In a social media post, Simonyan pointed to Yerevan’s failure to formally 
recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and controversial coup charges brought 
against former Armenian President Robert Kocharian. She charged that Pashinian 
“spat in the face of your Russian friends” by having “Russia’s perennial ally” 
jailed two years ago.
Simonyan also claimed that Pashinian has “inundated” Armenia with 
non-governmental organizations that are “training young people how to overthrow 
the government in Russia.”
Pashinian rejected the accusations in an interview with RBC, a private Russian 
TV channel, aired on Tuesday.
The prime minister argued, in particular, that most Armenian NGOs funded by 
Western governments or private donors were set up when he Armenia was governed 
by Kocharian or his successor Serzh Sarkisian. “If [Kocharian and Sarkisian] 
were so pro-Russian why did they not shut down those organizations?” he asked.
Armenia - Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian is interviewed by Russian RBC TV, 
Yerevan, July 25, 2020.
Turning to the high-profile case against Kocharian, Pashinian said: “They should 
realize in Russia that Russia’s [main] ally in Armenia is not Pashinian, 
Petrosian, Poghosian, Kocharian or Sarkisian. Russia’s ally and partner is the 
Armenian people. This is a very importance nuance.”
Russia and Armenia, Pashinian went on, have long maintained close political, 
economic and military ties because of their “common strategic interests,” rather 
than certain individuals. He said that contrary to some gloomy Russian forecasts 
he has not changed his country’s geopolitical orientation since coming to power 
in the “Velvet Revolution” of April-May 2018.
Kocharian, who ruled the South Caucasus state from 1998-2008, was first arrested 
in July 2018 on coup charges strongly denied by him. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry denounced the criminal case as politically motivated at the time.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly signaled support for Kocharian 
since then. During an October 2019 visit to Yerevan, Putin made a point of 
meeting with the ex-president’s wife Bella.
Armenia -- Former President Robert Kocharian speaks during his trial, Yerevan, 
.
Armenia’s Court of Appeals released Kocharian from custody on bail late last 
month. Prosecutors appealed against the ruling.
Speaking to the Russian broadcaster, Pashinian also praised Russia’s “absolutely 
constructive” role in international efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. In that context, he implicitly urged Moscow to counter what he 
described as Turkey’s efforts to fan Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions and 
eventually “take control of the Caucasus.”
“If that becomes a reality, I think it is first and foremost clear to the 
Russians what geopolitical consequences that would have,” he said.
“Russia cannot stay away from these events [in the conflict zone] because at 
stake are vital interests of not only Armenia but also the Russian Federation,” 
added the Armenian leader.
Armenian Military To ‘Closely’ Watch Turkish-Azeri Drills
        • Sargis Harutyunyan
        • Aza Babayan
Armenia - An Armenian soldier stands guard on the border with Azerbaijan's 
Nakhichevan exclave, 14 May 2016.
The Armenian military said on Tuesday that it will closely watch joint 
Turkish-Azerbaijani war games that will start on Wednesday two weeks after 
deadly fighting on Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.
“Armenia’s Defense Ministry and Armed Forces will be very attentively monitoring 
the course of and trends in joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises 
scheduled for July 29 to August 10,” the ministry spokeswoman, Shushan 
Stepanian, told RFE/RL’s Armenian service.
Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan told the Russian ambassador in Yerevan, Sergei 
Kopyrkin, later in the day that Armenian army units as well as a 
Russian-Armenian military contingent are “continuing to constantly monitor and 
analyze” Turkish-Azerbaijani military activities “with all reconnaissance means” 
at their disposal. They remain “prepared for any development of the situation,” 
Tonoyan said, according to his press office.
The exercises will reportedly involve heavy artillery, warplanes and helicopter 
gunships and take place in various parts of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani and 
Turkish militaries have not specified the number of participating troops.
The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry said on Monday that ground forces of the two 
states will simulate joint operations in Baku and Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan 
exclave from August 1-5. It said separate drills involving the Turkish and 
Azerbaijani air forces will be held in these and three other locations from July 
29 through August 10.
The Armenian Foreign Ministry expressed concern over the drills. A ministry 
spokeswoman said they are part of Baku’s “provocative actions” aimed at 
obstructing international mediators’ efforts to de-escalate the situation at the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani border and kick-start talks on resolving the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
At least 12 Azerbaijani servicemen, including a general, and five Armenian 
soldiers were killed during several days of heavy fighting that broke out at a 
western section of the volatile frontier on July 12.
Azerbaijan -- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, center, poses for photos 
with Azeri and Turkish army commanders during a summit of Turkic states in Baku, 
October 15, 2019.
Turkey has blamed Armenia for the flare-up and vowed to boost its military and 
diplomatic support for Azerbaijan. Yerevan has responded by accusing Ankara of 
trying to destabilize the region.
Hours after the announcement of the Turkish-Azerbaijani exercises, Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan telephoned his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin 
to discuss the Armenian-Azerbaijani border clashes. According to the Kremlin, 
Putin “stressed the importance of preventing any steps that could cause an 
escalation in tensions” in the Karabakh conflict zone.
Arkady Dubnov, an independent Russian political analyst, said on Tuesday that 
Russia continues to regard the region as its geopolitical backyard and would 
therefore not tolerate Turkish military intervention in the long-running 
conflict.
“Erdogan certainly realizes that this would be simply unacceptable to Moscow,” 
Dubnov told RFE/RL’s Armenian service.
Dubnov suggested that Erdogan assured Putin on Monday that the upcoming 
exercises are not a prelude to Turkish military presence in Azerbaijan and will 
not degenerate into a Turkish-Azerbaijani offensive against Armenia. The war 
games are first and foremost a publicity stunt designed to cement Erdogan’s 
self-image as “the supreme Islamic leader of the world,” speculated the pundit.
Russia is allied to Armenia and has thousands of troops stationed in the South 
Caucasus state. The current and former Armenian governments have regarded the 
Russian military presence as a vital safeguard against possible Turkish 
aggression.
Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations and open its border with 
Armenia at the start of the 1991-1994 war in Karabakh. Erdogan and his 
predecessors have made the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations 
conditional on a Karabakh settlement sought by Baku. Yerevan has always rejected 
this precondition.
Putin, Erdogan Discuss Armenian-Azeri Tensions
RUSSIA -- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan 
leave after their joint news conference following the talks in Moscow, March 5, 
2020
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned against attempts to further heighten 
tensions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone when he spoke with his Turkish 
counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan by telephone on Monday.
The two men discussed the recent deadly clashes on the border between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan during the phone conversation which the Kremlin said took place 
“at the initiative of the Turkish side.”
“Vladimir Putin stressed the importance of preventing any steps that could cause 
an escalation in tensions,” the Kremlin reported in a statement.
“Both presidents spoke in favor of resolving the conflict through peaceful 
means, through talks.They expressed their readiness to coordinate efforts to 
stabilize the region,” it said.
Erdogan’s office also said the two leaders talked about the “Armenia-Azerbaijan 
tension” but gave no details.
Turkey has blamed Armenia for the hostilities on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border 
which broke out on April 12 and continued for several days, leaving at least 17 
soldiers from both sides dead. It has pledged to continue to strongly support 
Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict, including with military assistance.
Meeting with senior Azerbaijani military officials on July 16, Turkish Defense 
Minister Hulusi Akar vowed that Armenia will be “brought to account” and “will 
be drowned under this plot.” Erdogan’s National Security Council said afterwards 
that Ankara “will support any decision by Azerbaijan.”
Armenia has condemned these unusually strongly-worded statements that raised the 
possibility of Turkish intervention in the Karabakh conflict. It has branded 
Turkey a “security threat to Armenia and the region.”
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged Ankara to exercise restraint in its 
reaction to the Armenian-Azerbaijani skirmishes in a July 23 phone call with his 
Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu.
Russia is allied to Armenia and has thousands of troops stationed in the South 
Caucasus state. By contrast, Turkey has close ties with Azerbaijan cemented by 
ethnic and cultural affinities between the two Turkic nations.
Erdogan phoned Putin hours after it was announced that the Azerbaijani and 
Turkish armies will begin on Wednesday joint military exercises in various parts 
of Azerbaijan. A short video released by the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry showed 
a convoy of Turkish military trucks carrying soldiers and heavy weapons entering 
Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan region in advance of the drills.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
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