Category: 2020

Blogger Nas Daily shares video from Armenia, calls attention to ongoing hostilities

Emil Lazarian
Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 2 2020

Nuseir Yassin, an Israeli-Arab video blogger who created 1,000 daily 1-minute videos on Facebook under the page, Nas Daily, has called attention to the ongoing hostilities between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces and shared a video from Armenia for his 18 million followers on Facebook.

“Right now, there is a war that the world isn’t talking about. It’s between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And people are losing their lives. I am not a political analyst, but I did get a chance to see Armenia up close,” he wrote on Facebook․

“And I think, in these difficult times, everyone should get to see this country and its wonderful people. Let’s hope we see an end to this conflict soon,” he captioned the video.

The Country You Must See.

Right now, there is a war that the world isn’t talking about.It’s between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And people are losing their lives. I am not a political analyst, but I did get a chance to see Armenia up close.And I think, in these difficult times, everyone should get to see this country and its wonderful people. Let’s hope we see an end to this conflict soon.

Gepostet von Nas Daily am Donnerstag, 1. Oktober 2020

https://en.armradio.am/2020/10/02/blogger-nas-daily-shares-video-from-armenia-calls-attention-to-ongoing-hostilities/


https://en.armradio.am/2020/10/02/blogger-nas-daily-shares-video-from-armenia-calls-attention-to-ongoing-hostilities/

Video Allegedly Depicting Attack on Bridge Connecting Armenia to Karabakh Emerges Online

Albert Nalbandian
Sputnik
Oct 2 2020
© Photo : Twitter / @SputnikInt
World

10:07 GMT 02.10.2020(updated 12:35 GMT 02.10.2020) Get short URL
by Ilya Tsukanov

The long-running Armenian-Azeri conflict over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh exploded into full-scale war in the early 1990s before becoming a frozen conflict occasionally broken by new outbursts of violence. The latest clashes began Sunday, with each side blaming the other for the escalation.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s operational headquarters information centre has released footage of an alleged Azerbaijani attack on civilian infrastructure, including the shelling of a bridge connecting Armenia and the breakaway region.

The security cam footage shows vehicles travelling along a road to the bridge before what appears to be an artillery shell or missile strikes it, resulting in a massive fireball and a plume of smoke.

According to an Armenian media analysis of the projectile that struck the bridge, it may have been an Israeli-made Long Range Attack (LORA) theatre quasiballistic missile.

Local authorities say work is already underway to repair the damage.

The Azerbaijani side has not commented on the suspected attack.

Earlier Friday, the Armenian Defence Ministry accused the Azerbaijani military of launching an attack on Stepanakert, capital of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic.

There are two main routes connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh: the western Goris-Stepanakert route and the recently completed northern Vardenis-Martakert highway. Local authorities have made plans to build a third route.

© Wikipedia / Aivazovsky
Map of Nagorno-Karabakh

The long-running conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between the self-proclaimed Armenian-controlled Artsakh Republic and Azerbaijan exploded into open warfare on Sunday, with each side blaming the other for starting the fighting.

The fighting has left up to 3,600 people from both sides dead, including at least 31 civilians, and led to the destruction of an array of infrastructure, including civilian administration centres, schools, and homes. Each side has also claimed to have destroyed various types of military equipment, including tanks, aircraft, and drones. The Armenian side and France have accused Baku of deploying jihadist militiamen imported by Turkey from Syria.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict flared-up at the height of Soviet leader Mikahil Gorbachev’s “perestroika” reforms, which saw a rise in regional nationalist sentiments in the Caucasus and across the Soviet Union. These sentiments prompted leaders in the majority-Armenian populated Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic to attempt to secede and join the Armenian Soviet Republic. In late 1991, Azerbaijan’s parliament abolished the region’s autonomous status, prompting it to declare its complete independence. Azerbaijan lost control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several adjacent territories in full-scale fighting with Armenian forces between 1992 and 1994. The war led to the displacement of over 1 million Azerbaijanis and Armenians, both within the disputed region and other parts of the two countries, and to the deaths of over 42,000 soldiers, militiamen, and civilians from both sides.

Kseniya Kirillova explains the Kremlin’s strategy as conflict mounts between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Frangulian Shushan
ByLine Times
Oct 2 2020
Putin’s Gameplan in the Armenia-Azeri Conflict 

Fierce battles continue in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, after weeks of escalating tensions.

The defense ministries of both countries report successful attacks on enemy equipment and troops. Although reports of losses from both sides may be exaggerated, it’s clear that full-scale warfare is being conducted in the region. 

In Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital Stepanakert and elsewhere, there has been gunfire for several days, while thousands of Armenian volunteers are gathering in Artsakh. Turkey continues to provide full support to Azerbaijan, with its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan calling Turks and Azerbaijanis “one people”.

Experts suggest that escalation of the conflict and the associated swelling of patriotism will benefit the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan. They have both seen their authority significantly weakened against the backdrop of the Coronavirus pandemic and associated economic problems.

Many analysts rightly point out that these military actions are disadvantageous for Moscow. Formally, Armenia is an ally of Russia and protected by it within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). If it can show that military activities are taking place not only in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in Armenia itself, then the country can demand the support of Russia’s military might.

However, Russian intervention would threaten relations with Turkey, which unconditionally supports Azerbaijan, and would mean opening a “third front” for Russia, which already is fighting in Ukraine and Syria. This is something the weakened Russian economy might not sustain.

Yet, not aiding Armenia would jeopardise the rationale for participating in the CSTO – weakening Russian influence globally. 

Moscow, then, faces a serious dilemma.

As the Director of the Armenian Centre for Political and International Studies, Agasi Yenokyan, stated in an interview recently, Russia has the leverage to force the de-escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but is in no hurry to do so. Instead, the Kremlin hopes that it can take advantage of the situation to put pressure on the Armenian leadership.

According to Yenokyan, the Kremlin could use Armenia’s military vulnerability to force Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to steer in a more pro-Russian direction, or else face a coup.

This theory is bolstered by the campaign mounted by the Russian mass media. “In Moscow drawing rooms they are saying that Armenia is either doomed to return to Russia or simply doomed,” according to the general editor of RT (Russia Today), Margarita Simonyan.

The Telegram channel ‘Nezygar,’ which is close to the Russian President’s administration, outlined 12 conditions for Russia to provide Pashinyan with military support. Among these are: recognition of the Crimea as part of Russia; the status of Russia as the official language; economic integration with the Eurasian Economic Union; and activation of the Armenian diaspora in the EU and the US to lobby for the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions.

It is quite possible that if Vladimir Putin’s blackmail is successful, the Kremlin will provide the assistance requested by Armenia, despite the considerable risks.

Indeed Russia employed a similar strategy in Belarus. By supporting the country’s illegitimate leader, Alexander Lukashenko, Russia guaranteed the resentment of most Belarusians and once again provoked the anger of the West. Lukashenko has also more than once proven to be a highly unreliable partner, simultaneously pledging loyalty to Russia while trying to “sell” himself to the West as a guarantor of “the defense of Belarus against the Russian threat”.

Despite this, Putin decided to support the “friendly dictator,” realising that a victory for anti-Lukashenko protestors would provide inspiration for dissidents in his own country. Moreover, although he has made overtures to the West, Lukashenko is now more dependent than ever on Moscow for his survival, guaranteeing his loyalty.

To judge from this logic, we can assume that Russia will interfere in the conflict on the side of Armenia only if it’s possible to extract complete subordination from the Armenian leadership.

It seems that Pashinyan took the first step in this direction by speaking on Russian TV by promising to build a qualitatively new relationship with Russia. The country’s sovereignty is at stake, with Putin ready to subsume Armenia into his neo-Soviet ecosystem.



Analysis: emboldened Azerbaijan takes fight to Armenia’s capital

Emil Lazarian
France 24
Oct 2 2020
Analysis: emboldened Azerbaijan takes fight to Armenia’s capital
Fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory showed no sign of relenting Friday, with reports Azerbaijani forces were attacking close to Armenia’s capital Yerevan. FRANCE 24’s chief foreign affairs editor Robert Parsons explains Azerbaijan feels emboldened by its military hardware and Turkey’s support.

Watch the video at

A hill here, a village there: Nagorno-Karabakh and the salami-slicing wars

Hovhannisian John
European Council on Foreign Relations
Oct 2 2020

Commentary

Nicu Popescu
2nd October, 2020

Azerbaijan and Armenia are shifting from two decades of ‘frozen conflict settlement’ to an era of ‘salami-slicing wars’ – small conflicts designed to extract diplomatic concessions or regain territory from the adversary slice by slice.

Nagorno-Karabakh is on fire. Again. One of the increasingly forgotten post-Soviet wars is reminding everyone of its existence. In the last six years, the frequency of – and the death toll resulting from – clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region has increased exponentially. Some of these clashes – like those in 2016 or the ones taking place now – have turned into mini wars that last several days and result in casualties numbering in the lower hundreds. One of the most worrying aspects of the mini wars is that they signal a slow but irresistible slide towards a new era of hostile relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The countries are shifting from two decades of ‘frozen conflict settlement’ to an era of ‘salami-slicing wars’ – small conflicts designed to extract diplomatic concessions or regain territory from the adversary slice by slice, as if cutting a salami, rather than in one large frontal attack.

Along with the conflicts in Abkhazia, Transnistria, and South Ossetia, the confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh has formed part of a chain of misnamed ‘frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space for almost three decades. Since the signing of a fragile ceasefire agreement in 1994, Armenia has been in de facto control not only of the Nagorno-Karabakh area itself (a part of Azerbaijan with a predominantly Armenian population) but also seven other Azerbaijani districts – which Armenia has turned into a heavily militarised buffer zone protecting Nagorno-Karabakh. For most of that period, negotiations on both the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan have all but stalled.

Exasperated that the negotiations have been completely stalled for years, Azerbaijan has increasingly turned to military operations to make its voice heard. Throughout most of the 2000s, buoyed by rising oil revenues, Azerbaijan engaged in heavy rearmament. Its strategy has been to change the balance of power and shatter the ‘frozen’ status quo. Azerbaijan has openly said that it reserves the right to regain its territories through military means if the negotiations fail. And the talks have been failing for more than two decades.

However, Azerbaijan’s strategy is not to launch a major war whose outcome would be uncertain. Another military defeat would doom the Azerbaijani ruling family. Rather, Azerbaijan seems bent on launching a series of salami-slicing wars. Thus, more frequent and more intense flare-ups in the conflict seem inevitable.

One aim of these wars is to recapture at least some territory – a hill here, a village there. This would be something to show to the Azerbaijani public. The second aim is to increase pressure on Armenia – even if operations to recapture territory fail – by making the situation uncomfortable for Armenian leaders and thereby extracting concessions at the negotiating table.

While the most influential powers in the region do not want war between the two countries, they are unlikely to form a common front.

In practice, there is not much the international community can do about this, other than shifting from offers of fair mediation to a much more aggressive effort to force a compromise between Armenia and Azerbaijan – one that involves diplomatic and even economic pressure on both sides. But the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan are so entrenched that the international community has little practical leverage over them. And, while the most influential powers in the region do not want war between the two countries, they are unlikely to form a common front that puts equally intense pressure on Armenia to compromise in negotiations and on Azerbaijan to be less hawkish.

Such flare-ups make all other powers look either somewhat irrelevant or too aggressive. The European Union seems hapless once again – facing another conflict in its neighbourhood in which few care to hear what the Europeans have to say. The United States might be somewhat more influential, but not by much.

The situation is even more uncomfortable for Russia. On paper, Russia has a military alliance with Armenia. Russia maintains an important military base in Armenia, and Armenia is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Russian-led defence alliance. However, CSTO guarantees are only supposed to apply to Armenia’s internationally recognised borders, which do not encompass either Nagorno-Karabakh or the other occupied districts of Azerbaijan. It is still unclear what happens to the Russian-Armenian collective defence arrangement in the inevitable scenario of a war that starts around – or because of – Nagorno-Karabakh, but involves military action along the internationally recognised borders of Armenia, the integrity of which is guaranteed by the CSTO. In any case, Russia is eager to avoid choosing sides. The country may be allied with Armenia, but it also has a rather constructive relationship with Azerbaijan that it does not want to lose.

In recent years, Russia might have built a reputation for sticking with and defending its allies politically and militarily – be they in Syria, Venezuela, or Libya. But, for Armenia, this image of Russia as a trustworthy ally is a mirage. Russia has been doing everything it can to avoid taking sides in Nagorno-Karabakh, supplying weapons not just to Armenia but also to Azerbaijan – much to the outrage of Armenian leaders. As the mini wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan become more frequent and intense, Russia’s balancing act will be increasingly untenable. Somewhat paradoxically (if unsurprisingly), France has been more outspoken than Russia in criticising Turkey and Azerbaijan for the escalation – even though Russia is a military ally of Armenia and, in theory, would be expected to speak up more firmly in favour of its Armenian ally .

Turkey is very vocal in its support of Azerbaijan. There have been allegations that Turkey has provided active military support to the Azerbaijani armed forces. There has also been speculation about Kurdish fighters helping Armenia, and Turkish-backed fighters from Syria and Libya being sent to help the Azerbaijani army. Turkey has been increasingly eager to flex its muscle in the Syrian war, the Libyan conflict, and territorial disputes in the eastern Mediterranean, but it is unclear how many fronts the country really wants to fight on – militarily or diplomatically.

There is little prospect that the cycle of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh will end. The current stalemate is not damaging enough to force either Armenia or Azerbaijan to seek a compromise. Foreign powers will not or cannot truly force the parties to significantly change their approaches to the conflict. And the current flare-up around Nagorno-Karabakh will certainly not be the last. It is almost inevitable that there will be other limited wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the years to come. The outcome of those wars will either be a shift in the balance of power whereby Armenia becomes more willing to compromise at the negotiating table or, alternatively, Azerbaijan’s failure to extract concessions or capture territory. And then the countries’ militaries will let the diplomats get back into the driving seat in what is called the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh peace process’. But that will not happen without at least a few more salami-slicing wars in the next few years.


Canada needs to pick a side as Nagorno-Karabakh tensions rise, Armenian PM says

Alex Jidarian
Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 2 2020

Armenia and Azerbaijan are on the brink of all-out war over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. But it’s Turkey that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sees as his country’s real enemy in the conflict.

In an exclusive interview with The Globe and Mail, Mr. Pashinyan said his country is on a “civilizational front line” – and that countries such as Canada that are allied to Turkey, via NATO, need to decide which side they are on.

Mr. Pashinyan said Turkey had encouraged what looks to be a full-scale attempt by Azerbaijan to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh. He said Turkey had sent Syrian mercenaries to aid the Azerbaijani side – an statement supported by Russia and France – and that the Turkish air force had also attacked Armenian positions.

“Turkey’s military personnel and the Turkish armed forces are directly engaged in the hostilities,” Mr. Pashinyan said by telephone from the Armenian capital of Yerevan. “Turkey’s NATO allies must explain why these F-16 jets are shelling towns and villages in Nagorno-Karabakh and killing civilian populations.”

Mr. Pashinyan also called for Western countries to reconsider weapons sales to Turkey.

He said Turkey’s role in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be viewed in the context of Turkey’s involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya – where Ankara has backed factions in those countries’ lengthy civil wars – as well as Turkey’s “aggressive” stand toward Greece and Cyprus over maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea.

“Terrorists imported from the Middle East are fighting on the side of Azerbaijan, under Turkey’s sponsorship. How could anyone propose now to leave the population of Nagorno-Karabakh unprotected, facing terrorists and extremists?” the Prime Minister said. “A ceasefire can be established only if Turkey is removed from the South Caucasus.”

Mr. Pashinyan cast Mr. Erdogan as a leader with dreams of restoring the Ottoman Empire. “A hundred years have passed and Turkey has returned to the South Caucasus, in order to continue the Armenian genocide here.”

https://en.armradio.am/2020/10/02/canada-needs-to-pick-a-side-as-nagorno-karabakh-tensions-rise-armenian-pm-says/

Nagorno-Karabakh defence ministry reports 54 more military casualties – Ifax

Ophelia Vardapetian
Reuters
Oct 2 2020

By Reuters Staff

MOSCOW (Reuters) – The defence ministry of the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh reported 54 more military casualties on Friday, bringing the death toll to 158, Russia’s Interfax news agency said in a report.

Fighting broke out on Sunday between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenian forces in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh — which is part of Azerbaijan but run by its mostly ethnic Armenian inhabitants — and has reached its most serious level since a war in the 1990s.

https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-c-idUKKBN26N0UA






A Nagorno-Karabakh Scenario in the Balkans?

Karapet Navasardian
RUSI.org
Oct 2 2020
Harun Karčić
Commentary, 2 October 2020
Europe

As the fighting rages in the South Caucasus, the citizens of another frozen conflict watch with unease.

Nagorno-Karabakh is back in the news. The largely forgotten Soviet-era ‘frozen conflict’ is anything but frozen these days. No one really knows who fired the first shot, nor is this important anymore. The fact of the matter is that fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan spiraled out of control literally overnight.

Just across the Black Sea and the Balkan Mountains, Bosnians are preparing to mark the 25th anniversary of the US-brokered Dayton Accords. The times are uneasy and some wonder whether their own ‘frozen conflict’ might flare up like the one in Nagorno-Karabakh. After all, the two conflicts are very similar.

Bosnia and Serbia on one side, and Armenia and Azerbaijan on the other, were all member states within larger communist supranational states (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, respectively). Historical antagonism existed between Serbs and Bosniak Muslims (Bosnia’s majority population) and between Armenians and Azeris. Both Orthodox Christian populations perceived their Muslim neighbours as the physical remnants of an oppressive Ottoman Empire. This antagonism was kept under the lid during communist rule, only to explode in the late 1980s when both communist regimes were in freefall. In both cases, the Orthodox Christian population living in a Muslim-majority country wanted to secede and territorially adjoin their neighbouring Orthodox Christian brethren. Ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh wanted to break away from Azerbaijan and join neighbouring Armenia, while ethnic Serbs from Bosnia wanted to secede and join neighboring Serbia.  

In both cases, a referendum on independence was held which was boycotted by the opposing side: ethnic Azeris boycotted the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum in 1991, while Bosnian Serbs boycotted Bosnia’s referendum in 1992. Bloody wars soon erupted. During them, Armenia preferred to keep Nagorno-Karabakh as a nominally independent republic – the Republic of Artsakh. Serbia also preferred to keep the Republic of Srpska nominally independent during the war, instead of incorporating it outright into its territory. This was done to avoid allegations of aggression and maintain a stronger negotiating position. Today, Nagorno-Karabakh is a self-declared republic and supported by neighbouring Armenia, just like the Republic of Srpska is – though part of Bosnia – highly autonomous and financially and politically backed by Serbia.

The same foreign actors have been involved in both examples. While Turkey backs Azerbaijan due to its old ‘one nation, two states’ policy and its century-old grudge against Armenia, Russia maintains tight links with Armenia, including two military bases stationing 5,000 troops. In the case of the Balkans, Turkey backs Bosniak Muslims and a unified Bosnia, while Russia backs Serbia and Bosnian Serb secessionists. Russia has sent military advisors to both Serbia and the Republic of Srpska, and sells military hardware to both.

Today, Bosnia is more vulnerable to malign foreign influence than ever before. Namely, after the US diplomatically ended the Bosnian War, 60,000 NATO soldiers were sent to Bosnia and tasked with keeping the peace. The peacekeeping mission was eventually outsourced to the EU which has been reducing its military footprint to just a few hundred. The EU’s force today, known as EUFOR, is a watered-down version of what NATO’s peacekeeping force was and does not seem to instill much confidence in the general public. On the other side, the EU’s diplomatic approach towards Bosnia and the region wrongly assumed that offering Balkan countries a distant prospect of joining the Union would neutralise nationalism and inter-ethnic animosities. Its overemphasis on the normative harmonisation of Balkan legal frameworks with that of the EU was not very enticing to the region’s political leaders. A vacuum was formed after the American retreat from the Balkans and the EU’s diplomatic inertia. In turn, Russia and China interpreted this as an opportunity to make inroads with their bureaucracy-free, top-down approach and personal relations with local strongmen.

Despite simmering social frustration, rising authoritarianism and superpowers vying for influence, the EU does not seem to be changing course. The international community’s high representative in Bosnia, Austrian-born Valentin Inzko – despite having the ‘Bonn Powers’ to sack uncooperative and obstructive politicians – has at most only expressed his ‘concern’ over deteriorating security developments in the country. As such, he is subject to much mockery among Bosnians.

At present, Bosnia’s political and security situation is so precarious that the country is not even able to handle a relatively small presence of migrants and refugees. The Republic of Srpska, run by Serb nationalists and emboldened by neighbouring Belgrade and Moscow, acts like a state of its own and refuses to align its policies with the capital, Sarajevo. Take the migrant crisis for example: Milorad Dodik, the hardline Serb member of the presidency, refuses to join the other two members and deploy Bosnia’s armed forces along the country’s eastern border to help stem the illegal crossings of migrants from Serbia. Then, on a local level, the Republic of Srpska – which is ruled by Dodik’s party – refuses to house any migrants on its territory and instead pushes them across the invisible border to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Both Bosnian and Western analysts point the finger at Russia. Administratively, Bosnia is divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosniak Muslims are a majority, and the Republic of Srpska, where Orthodox Christians dominate. The country’s convoluted ethnic makeup and government composition gives significant autonomy to both political entities, governing 51% and 49% of the country respectively. This means that secessionist Serbs who run the Republic of Srpska not only have large autonomy, but a militarised police force and political leverage to block state institutions – since a consensus within the tripartite presidency is needed for any foreign policy moves or state-level decisions.

Such a structure is ideally suited for foreign meddling, particularly when a foreign actor favours one specific side and wants to bring the entire country to a halt. Russian President Vladimir Putin has been openly backing Dodik, who in turn does not shy from making it known that his ultimate goal is for the Republic of Srpska to join neighbouring Serbia.

Russia’s influence in Bosnia is further strengthened through the work of non-governmental organisations and friendship associations, Serbian and Russian Orthodox churches, motorbike gangs such as the ‘Night Wolves’ and various murky businessmen linked to the Kremlin. In a way, Putin sees Dodik as a guarantee that Bosnia will not join NATO or the EU. By supporting a war-mongering secessionist, Moscow knows it can extract concessions from the West regarding Ukraine, Georgia and even Belarus. It is also a tit-for-tat move aimed to take revenge on the EU and NATO for their perceived ‘intrusion’ into Russia’s neighborhood. It is very telling that over the past five years, Russia has supported a highly divisive referendum in the Republic of Srpska on its national day (deemed illegal by Bosnia’s constitutional court). It is also blamed for a failed coup d’état in Montenegro just before its NATO accession, and it has sought to derail the name-change agreement between North Macedonia and Greece (which, again, paved the way for North Macedonia to join NATO).

Pre-existing frozen conflicts have become an important instrument of Russia’s increasingly revisionist foreign policy. Meddling in Bosnia strengthens Russia’s hand in Europe should it want to create chaos in the EU’s soft underbelly. Judging from examples of similar frozen conflicts, such as Transnistria, Ossetia, Abkhazia and Donbass, Russia’s approach seems to be tactically adapted to the conflict nature of each particular country, having the sole aim of keeping the affected states in a perpetual state of controlled instability.

Balkan analysts have been warning that Moscow’s malign influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina could only aggravate the situation after the recent elections in Montenegro, where pro-Serbian and pro-Russian political parties gained the most seats to the detriment of pro-Western forces.

Bosnia’s early post-war optimism and a robust NATO military presence created an opening that breathed life into the fragile peace among warring factions inside Bosnia and across the region. The Dayton Accords have not atrophied as some claim; rather, the country’s power-sharing arrangements seem to have proved easy to abuse. Additionally, Bosnia has become victim to a declining ‘Pax Americana’ and a deepening crisis of the European security order.

The West needs to aggressively respond to this new Russian posture. A fast-tracked membership to NATO’s security umbrella and greater Western involvement, both of a political and military nature, would spell stability for Bosnia and the entire region.

Harun Karčić is a journalist and political analyst based in Sarajevo covering foreign influences in the Balkans.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

BANNER IMAGE: Courtesy of legio09






Karabakh Tests ‘Competitive Cooperation’ of Putin, Erdogan

Emil Lazarian
Moscow Times
Oct 2 2020

The marriage of convenience between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan has confounded sceptics by withstanding Russian and Turkish rivalries in Syria and Libya.

Now, with the deadliest fighting in decades returning to Azerbaijan’s Armenian separatist region of Nagorno Karabakh, the bond between the two strong-willed leaders is being tested in Russia’s own backyard, analysts said.

Putin, who views the volatile Caucasus as part of Russia’s “near abroad”, wants Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia to bury their historic rivalries and make peace.

Not so Erdogan, who is urging Azerbaijan to press on with its campaign until Armenian separatists withdraw “from every span of Azerbaijani territory”.

“Turkey and Russia are engaged in a relationship which can be best characterised as competitive cooperation,” said Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, Ankara office director of the US German Marshall Fund.

“The South Caucasus is among the regions where this competition is most intense.”

The Kremlin supplies arms to both Yerevan and Baku, although Armenia — while poorer and smaller than its resource-rich eastern neighbor — is also part of a Moscow defense alliance and hosts a Russian base.

Turkey, meanwhile, views Azerbaijan as a brotherly nation whose interests it will defend on the global stage.

While their differences in the Caucasus are not yet as stark as they have been on the battlefields of Syria and Libya, where Moscow and Ankara back opposing sides, analysts said the situation was fraught with risks.

Erdogan appears to know Putin’s limits, stopping short of backing Baku militarily and keeping mum about reports that Turkey was sending Libyan or Syrian mercenaries to the Caucasus.

And weighing its own interests, the Kremlin has shown only tepid support for Armenia, whose current prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has previously irritated Moscow.

“Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan is not new, but Russia’s reluctance to back Armenia is. So I don’t think Erdogan is attracting Putin’s anger, yet,” Unluhisarcikli said. 

But if Russia feels threatened “to the extent that it is worth dismantling the relationship it has been developing with Turkey, it can retaliate in Libya and more likely in Syria,” Unluhisarcikli said.

Turkey’s Ottoman empire never got along comfortably with the Russian tsarist one, and Moscow’s more recent relationship with Ankara has exhibited signs of mutual mistrust.

And while historic, Turkey’s hostilities with Armenia are now defined by one of the darkest episodes of Ottoman empire’s demise, with the two countries still unable to reconcile the 1915 Armenian genocide.

Erdogan’s unlikely courtship of Putin began after he survived a failed Turkish coup in 2016, when Russia was feeling isolated internationally in the wake of its annexation of Crimea.

Erdogan and Putin began cooperating more closely in Syria, where Russia backs the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and Turkey supported the insurgency trying to topple him.

Yet it was always an uneasy alliance.

More than 30 Turkish soldiers have died this year alone in northwestern Syria.

The strains have been compounded in Libya, where Turkey supports a UN-recognised government in the west, and Russia helps the eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar with fighters from the Kremlin-linked Wagner group.

“Turkey-Russia relations were already very complicated because of Syria and Libya. The Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict will further complicate this relation,” said Ankara-based analyst Ali Bakeer.

While Putin might be wary of Erdogan’s push into the Caucasus, Bakeer said Turkey views Syria as part of its own “backyard” in which Russia is meddling.

“The latest disagreement (in northwest Syria) shows that Moscow is not willing to make things easy for Ankara,” he said.

Alexei Khlebnikov, a Middle East analyst with the Russian International Affairs Council, agreed that Turkey’s diplomatic posturing in Nagorno Karabakh could affect its relations with Russia in other hotspots, particularly Syria.

“Not in a major way, but there will be some influence,” Khlebnikov said.

“We know that in the past years Russia and Turkey have gone through more than a few crisis situations that couldn’t cardinally drive a wedge between the two countries,” Khlebnikov said.

“Russia and Turkey will try to find a common language, but there are no guarantees.”

Emre Kaya, of Istanbul’s Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, said Russia was most likely to retaliate if Ankara went beyond supplying Baku with intelligence and logistical support — or if Azerbaijan made swift military gains.

“Then we could definitely expect a Russian-backed attack on Turkish troops stationed in Syria or Libya,” Kaya said.


Australia urges to show restraint over NK conflict

Hovik Karapetian

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 13:44, 1 October, 2020

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 1, ARMENPRESS. Australia is concerned by the renewed fighting in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone, Foreign Minister Marise Payne said in a statement.

“We urge parties to the conflict and all other sides to show restraint and support the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to help negotiate a peaceful resolution”, the statement says.

Azerbaijan launched a massive attack against the Republic of Artsakh on September 27. According to the latest data, the Azerbaijani side lost nearly 1280 soldiers with 2700 wounded in its offensive launched against Artsakh. Azerbaijan has lost 90 UAVs, 10 helicopters, 181 armored equipment, 1 aircraft, 2 Smerch launchers and 3 TOS-1A heavy artillery systems.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan