Author: Yeghisabet Arthur

Asia Times
Moscow's plan to end Azerbaijan-Armenia war in Nagorno-Karabakh puts
Russia firmly in the strategic region's driver's seat
By Richard Giragosian 
YEREVAN – After 40 days and 40 nights of often intense fighting, the
latest war for Nagorno-Karabakh halted with an abrupt midnight posting
early on November 10 on Facebook.
Couched in a confession of an “unspeakably painful” acceptance,
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced his acceptance of a
new agreement that effectively ceded territory to Azerbaijan.
The agreement to halt the war, which salvaged the remnants of
Armenian-held Karabakh and saved the Armenian population from
advancing Azerbaijani forces, raises only more questions about the
status and security of the enclave.
The Russian-crafted plan, signed by Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev,
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan, is multi-faceted.
According to the agreement’s terms, a roughly 2,000-strong Russian
peacekeeping force was immediately deployed to Karabakh, establishing
a perimeter to protect and defend the vital Lachin Corridor, a
lifeline connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Armenia is to
withdraw its forces from districts of Azerbaijan beyond the borders of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In a staged withdrawal, this initial disengagement is to be followed
with a return of the two districts of Kelbajar and Aghdam by November
20, with a further Armenian pullback from the Lachin district by
December 1. By that time, Russian peacekeepers are to ensure the
Armenian use and control of a five-kilometer-wide corridor through
Lachin.
In a seeming attempt at parity, a similar but much more vague
“corridor” is also stipulated to connect Azerbaijan to its exclave
Nakhichevan, which borders Armenia, Iran and Turkey.
The agreement’s last point is one of the most potentially significant
outcomes, as the nature of such an Azerbaijani connection through
Armenian territory remains unclear and undefined, raising potentially
dangerous questions over sovereignty, legal standing and policing.
[Map. Image: Facebook/TRTWorld]
An additional concern stems from what is not stipulated or stressed in
the agreement. For example, there is no clarity for the “status” of
the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, with a disregard for earlier
negotiations. And there is an obvious need for direct negotiations and
further agreements on several other implications and issues.
Such diplomacy to come should also include and incorporate all parties
to the conflict, including the democratically elected representatives
from Nagorno-Karabakh. Otherwise, any further exclusion of Karabakh
would only undermine the durability and sustaining power of this
agreement.
Agreement under duress
Although all sides seem to have accepted the Russia-crafted agreement
under differing degrees of duress or discomfort, for the
democratically-elected leaders of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh there
was little choice and no alternative.
The Azerbaijani capture of the strategic city of Shushi, the
second-largest in Karabakh, was a pivotal tipping point. As the
Karabakh Armenians lost the city, the magnitude of the disaster became
clear.
Retreating to the Karabakh capital Stepanakert, leaders in both
Karabakh and Armenia came to the painful realization that in order to
save the remaining civilians and salvage what remained of Karabakh,
there was little alternative but to accept the terms of the agreement
imposed and demanded by Moscow.
Most armed conflicts and nearly every war eventually follow their own
tempo, falling into a cycle of sustained force and suspended fighting.
And like a wildfire, such clashes dictate their own intensity and
determine their own pace before eventually burning out.
The ongoing war for Nagorno-Karabakh is no different and now seems
poised to reach a final exhaustive end.
[Photo: A man stands among the debris of a destroyed house hit by a
rocket strike during the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in a residential area of
Ganja, Azerbaijan, October 21, 2020. Photo: AFP/Tofik Banayev]
Since the launch of a massive military offensive by Azerbaijan on
September 27, the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted
into a sudden and kinetic war. With daily combat driven by a sweeping
advance of attacking Azerbaijani forces, Armenian defenders were
largely overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the onslaught.
Empowered with direct Turkish military assistance and operational
support, the Azerbaijani offensive quickly expanded into an all-out
war that quickly achieved substantial gains in territory. Militarily,
this war was significantly different than the intermittent clashes of
the past three decades, with an offensive that was decisive in several
ways.
First, Turkey’s military support and direct engagement empowered and
emboldened Azerbaijani forces, helping to seize a vast swath of
territory to the south and a lesser area to the north and east of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the same time, Karabakh Armenian forces suffered staggering losses
of equipment, mainly as a result of precise targeting by Turkish and
Israeli military drones, or UAVs, that overwhelmed their outdated air
defense network.
Beyond the unexpected pressure from Turkish engagement, a second
equally significant factor that made this war so decisive was Russia’s
response.
Russia reasserts dominance
After a rather embarrassing public failure by Russia to conclude a
basic and temporary cessation of hostilities that fell short of a full
ceasefire, the sudden announcement of a Russia-backed “peace deal” for
Nagorno-Karabakh represents a real win for Moscow for several reasons.
First, the terms of this new agreement grant Russia the most important
of Moscow’s objectives: a dominant military presence on the ground.
The prior lack of any direct military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh was
one of the most distinctive aspects of the Karabakh conflict, standing
in stark contrast to every other such conflict within the former
Soviet Union.
That absence was a long-standing irritant for Moscow, reflecting the
limits of Russia’s capacity for effective power projection and
influence. But with this elusive goal now met, Russian peacekeepers
are now central to the credibility and sustainability of the new peace
deal, thereby granting Moscow an even more decisive role in the
region.
A second dividend for Russia stems from its enhanced leverage over the
Armenian government. Despite an uncharacteristically passive response
to Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” in 2018, Moscow seems to have bided
its time and now has seized an opportunity to maximize pressure on
Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government.
[Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister
Nikol Pashinyan arrive at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic
Council in St Petersburg, Russia in a file photo. Image: Sergey
Guneev/Sputnik via AFP]
Enhanced Russian leverage will not only keep Armenia well within
Moscow’s orbit but will also greatly limit Armenia’s options and
orientation in seeking closer relations with the West.
In this context, Moscow may push for more Armenian compliance, whereby
Yerevan is in danger of mortgaging its independence and ceding
sovereignty to Russia.
And third, the Nagorno-Karabakh agreement was very much an individual
Russian initiative, meaning it was not pursued through the framework
or cover of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is co-chaired by the United
States, France and Russia.
This suggests that the Minsk Group’s format and structure is imperiled
by these latest Russia-led developments. Although the military phase
of the Karabakh conflict has ended, the diplomatic contest is only
just beginning.