Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, May 17, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 96
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Kocharian banishes Orinats Yerkir party from government
*Yanukovych party moves to upgrade status of Russian language in Ukraine
*OSCE to review CFE treaty in late May
ARMENIAN SPEAKER OUSTED FROM RULING COALITION
Armenia’s President Robert Kocharian has banished one of the three
political parties represented in his government after it appeared to
threaten his reported plans to hand over power to a staunch loyalist in
2008. The Orinats Yerkir (Country of Law) party officially announced its
withdrawal from the ruling coalition on May 12. Its ambitious leader,
Artur Baghdasarian, also resigned as speaker of the Armenian parliament.
The move followed mass defections of lawmakers affiliated with Orinats
Yerkir, an exodus widely believed to have been engineered by the
presidential administration. Baghdasarian’s party boasted the
second-largest faction in the National Assembly as recently as last
month, controlling 20 of its 131 seats. It shrank by almost half in a
matter of one week.
The official reasons for the party’s ouster are its socioeconomic and
foreign policy differences with Kocharian and the two other coalition
partners. Both sides have been reluctant to elaborate on those
differences. The coalition has been beset by internal squabbles ever
since its formation in June 2003. Much of the bickering has been caused
by Orinats Yerkir’s periodic public criticism of the government, a
tactic that has been particularly galling for Prime Minister Andranik
Markarian and his Republican Party of Armenia (HHK). The latter has also
had an uneasy rapport with the third governing party, the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (HHD).
Kocharian has repeatedly intervened to salvage the three-party marriage
of convenience that has enabled him to deflect popular disaffection with
the government and somehow mitigate his lack of legitimacy. As recently
as February 6, the HHK, the HHD, and Orinats Yerkir vowed (apparently
under pressure from Kocharian) to continue to stick together “at least”
until next year’s parliamentary election. In a joint statement, they
also agreed to show “mutual respect for each other and each other’s
positions.”
However, the truce did not prove long lasting, with Orinats Yerkir
lashing out at the Armenian government (in which it was represented with
three ministers) on April 11 over its shady privatization policies (see
EDM, April 19). The attack drew an angry rebuttal from Markarian and his
loyalists. Baghdasarian further raised eyebrows in Yerevan with an April
19 interview with a leading German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, in which he contradicted the official line by calling for
Armenia’s eventual accession to NATO. More importantly, he also implied
that Kocharian’s hotly disputed reelection in 2003 was fraudulent.
The extraordinary confession (or a slip of the tongue) seems to have
been the final straw for Kocharian, who was reportedly behind the
devastating defections from the Orinats Yerkir faction in parliament
that began on May 5. The defectors, all of them wealthy businessmen
dependent on government connections, offered no clear explanation for
their actions. But newspaper reports citing coalition leaders said the
exodus was masterminded by Kocharian with the aim of forcing Orinats
Yerkir out of the government.
Hayots Ashkhar, a pro-Kocharian daily, indicated on May 15 that the
Armenian president has lost patience with Orinats Yerkir’s notorious
populism, widely attributed to its strong showing in the last
parliamentary polls. “It is more than weird to be part of the
government; have a number of government members, a myriad of
various-caliber officials, protected and reliable businesses; and play
the old tune,” the paper wrote. “This is a violation of the rules of the
game. One deserves to be severely punished for that.”
Interestingly, it was Kocharian who went to great lengths in June 2003
to get parliament to elect Baghdasarian as its speaker, fuelling
speculation that the then 34-year-old politician was being groomed to
become Armenia’s next president. However, it has since become evident
that Kocharian’s preferred successor is his most trusted and powerful
lieutenant, Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian. Some local commentators
suggest that the two men were incensed not so much by Baghdasarian’s
enduring populism as his far-reaching political ambitions that could
interfere with their anticipated handover of power in 2008. The outgoing
Armenian speaker has already attracted Western interest in his
personality with his pro-democracy statements and stated strong
commitment to Armenia’s “integration into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic
family.”
“Artur Baghdasarian has felt like Robert Kocharian’s successor and begun
his pre-election campaign of late,” the independent newspaper 168 Zham
wrote on May 11. “In the process, he was doing everything to distance
himself from the current authorities thanks to whom he had become the
number two official in the Republic of Armenia in 2003.”
Announcing his resignation on May 12, the Orinats Yerkir leader was
anxious not to blame Kocharian for the dramatic collapse of his
parliamentary faction, saying vaguely that the Orinats Yerkir defectors
faced pressure “from all sides.” His claims that Orinats Yerkir is
“becoming an opposition force” are therefore unlikely to be taken at
face value by leaders of Armenia’s main opposition parties. Some of them
have made it clear that Baghdasarian cannot join the opposition camp
unless he publicly “repents” his association with Kocharian.
Baghdasarian has owed his strong electoral performances to a canny
combination of opposition-style rhetoric with covert cooperation from
the ruling regime and wealthy businessmen hungry for political power.
Their defections and his subsequent ouster from the government mean that
Orinats Yerkir will have to operate in a more hostile environment and
with far fewer financial resources.
(Aravot, May 13; Hayots Ashkhar, May 12; 168 Zham, May 11; RFE/RL
Armenia Report, February 6)
–Emil Danielyan
REGIONS OF UKRAINE COMES BACK, TAKES UP LANGUAGE ISSUE
Though defeated in the Orange Revolution, regional elites scored a
strong performance in Ukraine’s March 26 general election, strengthening
the position of their main party — the Party of Regions (PRU) of former
presidential contender Viktor Yanukovych. President Viktor Yushchenko’s
Our Ukraine bloc emerged very weak in the east and south of Ukraine,
where PRU people dominate the local councils. Yushchenko is grudgingly
accepting the status quo and starting to withdraw his appointees from
those regions. The opposition, in the meantime, is displaying its
strength in its strongholds, challenging Yushchenko on a highly
sensitive issue — language. Several regional councils have decided to
officially equate Russian to Ukrainian, and Yushchenko seems to be
helpless to stop them.
Yushchenko-appointed governors in the eastern-most regions, including
Henady Moskal of Luhansk and Vadym Chuprun of Donetsk, resigned in
April. Yushchenko dismissed Kirovohrad governor Eduard Zeynalov of Our
Ukraine and Odessa governor Vasyl Tsushko of the Socialist Party on May
3, and on May 12 he dismissed another Socialist governor, Stepan Bulba,
in Poltava region. More dismissals apparently loom.
So far the government has found a replacement only for Chuprun —
Volodymyr Lohvynenko. Unlike Chuprun, essentially an outsider who had
spent many years abroad as a diplomat before coming home in 2005,
Lohvynenko is firmly entrenched in Donetsk. He was deputy governor in
2002-2005, and prior to that that he had managed Energo — one of the
major local business conglomerates controlling companies in the metals
and mining sector and several banks. The PRU has no objections to
Lohvynenko, who “is a person with extensive life experience,” according
to one of the PRU’s leaders, Volodymyr Rybak. The business daily Delo,
which published the comment by Rybak, led its article on Lohvynenko with
a telling headline: “The end of Orange experiments in Donbas.”
Following the March elections, Yanukovych’s people became the dominant
force in the Crimean parliament. The “For Yanukovych” bloc —
essentially the local PRU branch — secured 44 of the legislature’s 100
seats. Allied locally with the radical anti-West Progressive Socialists
and several smaller pro-Russian groups, the PRU secured the election of
its own Anatoly Hrytsenko as local parliament speaker to replace the
politically neutral Borys Deych. Hrytsenko was elected on May 12 with 71
votes. He is hardly a political novice — Hrytsenko occupied the same
position in 1997-98.
In the regions where it dominates, the PRU began to challenge Yushchenko
almost immediately after the election on a matter of principle for him
— language. Giving Russian an official status equal to Ukrainian was
one of the PRU’s main election promises. Russian de facto dominates in
Kyiv and other major cities except Lviv, and public opinion polls over
the past several years have shown that most Ukrainians are in favor of
raising the status of Russian. De jure, however, Russian is just another
minority language, on par with Hungarian or Greek. It will be hard to
raise the language issue at the national level, as the PRU has no
dedicated allies on this issue in the national parliament in Kyiv. In
the east and south, however, the PRU quickly got down to business.
Even before the election, on March 6, northeastern Kharkiv’s regional
council voted, 53-22, to give Russian “regional language” status. This
should mean that official correspondence and bookkeeping may be
conducted in Russian. Yushchenko’s secretariat reacted on the same day,
saying the decision was outside the legal field, as the constitution
does not provide for such a status. The PRU-dominated regional councils
in Luhansk and Sevastopol, however, followed Kharkiv’s suit on April
25-26. Yushchenko on April 28 asked the Justice Ministry and the
Prosecutor-General’s Office to look into the legal side of the three
councils’ decisions.
The councils argued that they were inspired by the European Charter for
Regional and Minority Languages, adopted by Ukraine. But Justice
Minister Serhy Holovaty argues that the charter referred to languages on
the verge of extinction — a threat Russian definitely is not facing.
Yushchenko has laid the blame for the language dispute on parliament,
which has failed to swear in Constitutional Court judges. Language is a
constitutional matter, so a decision on the Russian language status by
the Constitutional Court should have — in theory — settled the
dispute. But the court cannot resume it work, as it does not have a
quorum. The outgoing parliament blocked the appointment of new judges to
replace those whose tenure expired.
The language dispute has revealed how difficult it will be for
Yushchenko to steer the country after the election in the absence of an
Orange coalition, and with an opposition that dominates half of the
country. The language discussion has been a convenient occasion for the
PRU to demonstrate its strengths and probe Yushchenko’s weaknesses.
(UT1, March 6; Korrespondent.net, April 14; Interfax-Ukraine, April 21,
May 3, 12; Channel 5, April 28, May 10; Delo, May 12; Delovaya stolitsa,
May 15)
–Oleg Varfolomeyev
MOSCOW PRESSING FOR CFE TREATY RATIFICATION DESPITE ITS OWN
NON-COMPLIANCE
Amid a deep secrecy that belies its democratic professions, the OSCE is
preparing to hold a Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna at the end of this month.
Some West European chancelleries are seeking ways to give in to Moscow’s
main goal at this conference: ratification of the 1999 treaty at the
expense of a few small countries in Europe’s East. Thus far, Moscow has
only managed to persuade Belarus, Ukraine (during Leonid Kuchma’s
presidency), and Kazakhstan to ratify that treaty.
Originally signed in 1990, the CFE Treaty underwent adaptation at the
1999 OSCE Istanbul summit, in one package with the Final Act that
includes what came to be known as Russia’s “Istanbul Commitments”;
namely, to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. While the
original 1990 treaty remains in force, the 1999-adapted treaty never
entered into force because Russia has not fulfilled those commitments.
Moreover, Armenian forces deploy Russian-supplied heavy weaponry
exceeding CFE treaty limits in areas seized from Azerbaijan, out of
bounds to international inspection.
Meanwhile, Russia seeks to extend the CFE Treaty’s area of applicability
so as to include the three Baltic states, which were not parties to the
1990 treaty (they were still occupied by Moscow at that time). Since the
Baltic states joined NATO, Russia seeks to bring them under the purview
of the 1999-adapted CFE treaty and start negotiations with them about
limiting allied forces that might hypothetically be deployed to the
Baltic states’ territories, for example in crisis contingencies.
Legally, however, the Baltic states cannot join an unratified treaty.
Thus, Russia is now pressing for the treaty’s speedy ratification by all
state-parties, so as to make possible the Baltic states’ accession to
the ratified treaty, while still keeping Russian troops on Georgia’s and
Moldova’s territories in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.
Moscow calculates that Western consent to ratification of the 1999
treaty in such circumstances would legitimize, prolong, and even
legalize the stationing of Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova as
“peacekeepers.”
To pave the way for such an outcome, Moscow has agreed with Georgia to
close Russian bases and military installations situated deep inside the
country by 2008 (nine years after its pledge to do so); but it insists
on maintaining its “peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
while heavily arming its proxy forces there. Russia had liquidated most
of its treaty-limited weaponry in Transnistria already in 2001; but
retains a part of it to this day, has transferred another part as well
as personnel to Transnistria-flagged forces, and openly repudiates the
obligation to withdraw Russia’s own troops, styled as “peacekeepers.”
The United States as well as NATO collectively take the position that
ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty is inseparably linked to
fulfillment of Russia’s commitments to withdraw its forces from Georgia
and Moldova; and that the Baltic states would accede to the treaty, once
it enters into force.
Russia has drafted its version of a decision for the CFE Treaty Review
conference and wants negotiations on its basis in the OSCE’s Joint
Consultative Group (JCG), the Vienna forum of the 30 state-parties to
the treaty. Moscow’s draft claims, “Most commitments and arrangements
mentioned in the [1999] Final Act are either already fulfilled or are in
the process of fulfillment, [while] the implementation of the remaining
ones has no direct relevance to the CFE Treaty and depends on the
progress of conflict settlement on the territories of some State
Parties.” It proposes that all state parties should deem the 1999 treaty
as valid from October 2006, start the national ratification procedures,
bring the treaty into force in 2007, and “discuss the possibility of
accession of new participants.”
The translation: Although Russia has far from completely honored its
force-withdrawal commitments, the state-parties (mostly NATO and
European Union member countries) should agree that is has. Thus, they
should: proceed with the Moscow-desired ratification of the treaty;
de-link ratification from the fulfillment of Russia’s withdrawal
commitments, using the conflicts for an excuse; lean on Georgia,
Moldova, and Azerbaijan to accept the situation and ratify the treaty;
and start the procedure of the Baltic states’ accession to the
force-limiting treaty.
Some German, French, Belgian, and other diplomats are now exploring a
solution that could allow Russia to claim that it has fulfilled its
troop-withdrawal commitments. Such a solution would:
1) exempt Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops from the obligation to
withdraw, recognizing their hitherto unrecognized role as “peacekeepers”
and allowing them to stay on;
2) silently tolerate the arsenals of CFE treaty-limited weaponry that
Russia has transferred to proxy forces in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia, as well as the deployments inside Azerbaijan; and
3) elicit consent from Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Baku with such a solution.
It would seem that the secrecy surrounding the JCG debates in Vienna and
the ironing out of common positions at the EU in Brussels is a
propitious atmosphere for a compromise with Moscow at the expense of
small countries. Lack of transparency in Vienna also tends to facilitate
undercutting or diluting the U.S. and collective NATO position on these
issues through initiatives from a few important European capitals.
(JCG documents, May 2006)
–Vladimir Socor
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
Copyright (c) 1983-2006 The Jamestown Foundation.