Author: Vanyan Gary

‘IS THAT POSSIBLE THAT ERDOGAN WILL LAY A WREATH TO THE MONUMENT?’
AZG Armenian Daily #083, 07/05/2005
Armenian Genocide
This is the question that chairman of Turkish Press’ Council Oktay
Eqsi posed in his May 6 article of Hyurriet indicate point at the
Tsitsernakaberd Memorial of Genocide Victims. A “suspicious” question,
as the author dubbed it, opens the article, “Is that possible that
the Turkish prime minister will some day lay a wreath to the monument
of genocide victims in Yerevan?” and added, “I think yes. But before
that, there is a vital issue to triumph over.”
What’s that issue? Oktay Eqsi writes that he watched a program on
Turkish NTV recently during which Murad Belge said that people like
him (those who tell the truth) are threatened.
Belge’s words apparently bewildered Eqsi. He accepts that there are
fanatics in every society and compares Turkish fanatics with those
of Armenia and then concludes that Turkish society’s past is less
stained than Armenia’s but still asks, “How are we going to discuss
this issue? Those recognizing the fact of genocide will offer their
opinion but we will not be able to oppose it. Why? Out of fear that
something will happen to them. Unfortunately, this fear took roots in
all of us. Moreover, countries like Switzerland are taking measures
to jail those who deny the genocide. It also binds our hands”.
Eqsi wanders for a way out, “Well, so what are we to do? To accept
the unacceptable thesis that Turks eliminated Armenians without any
reason? I rebel against it because my approach opposes to those who
accept facts and those who reject the facts. I see the early 20th
century one full of tragic events. Not only Armenians underwent
hardship but Turks did too. But I am sure that Armenians saw more
of it. Deportation is indeed the symbol of that period that worries
Turks much. Even though today’s generation and government is not
responsible for what happened, we are ready to offer our condolences
(to Armenians) on condition that they sympathize with perished Turks
and Kurds. I wrote 5-6 years ago when these issue were not yet on the
agenda, ‘Let us build 2 monuments in Van, one in memory of Armenian
subjects killed in 1914-15, the other in memory of Turkish citizens
killed the same years’. People may lay flowers to whichever monument
they wish. Let us not forget the sorrow of that time and do not allow
that it is forgotten. But let us be just towards both sides”.
Coming back to his question whether it “Is possible that the Turkish
prime minister will some day lay a wreath to the monument of genocide
victims”, Eqsi says, “Yes, and wholeheartedly, let only the monuments
equally reflect responsibility and sorrow. For that to come true we
need Orhan Pamuks, Murad Begles to emerge in Armenia as well in order
to bring counterarguments”.
Turkish official denial of the Genocide remains in force. Though
speaking in his article from official Turkey’s positions, Oktay Eqsi
contradicts himself, thus, perhaps, uncovering the crack in Turkey’s
negation.
By Hakob Chakrian

ARMENIAN BREACH CEASE-FIRE IN ALL DIRECTIONS OF FRONTLINE
2005-05-06 11:23
Azerbaijan News Service
May 6 2005
Armenian military forces stirred up their efforts in all directions of
frontline. At 11:15 p.m., from their positions located in “sovkhoz”
called area of Agdam region, Armenian military forces fired at
positions of Azerbaijan army located in Ahmedagali and Chiragli
villages of the region. Armenian soldiers positioned at Bash Qervend
village shelled at positions of Azerbaijan army in Chiragli and
Miresehelli village. Orta Qishlag village of Azerbaijan also faced
periodic fire since 8:30 a.m. Azerbaijan army responded with adequate
fire. Casualties are not reported.

Georgia: Samtskhe-Javakheti Armenians Step Up Demands Amid Base Talks
By Jean-Christophe Peuch
Radio Free Europe, Czech Republic
May 5 2005
Russian soldiers in Georgia
Political groupings in Georgia’s predominantly Armenian region of
Samtskhe-Javakheti have in recent weeks staged a series of rallies to
protest against the possible withdrawal of Russian troops stationed
there. Although the timing suggests Moscow may have inspired the
demonstrations as it faces renewed pressure to vacate a military base
in the region, experts note that Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili’s failure to address social and economic concerns has
many residents worried.
Prague, 5 May 2005 (RFE/RL) — Visiting Tbilisi last week,
Armenia’s Parliament Speaker Artur Baghdasarian commented on
reports that tensions were once again brewing in Georgia’s southern
Samtskhe-Javakheti region.
“We believe all citizens of the unified Georgian state — be they
Armenians, Russians, or Georgians — must abide by the laws of this
country. But at the same time we must admit that in every society there
are various moods and we [must] accept this calmly,” Baghdasarian said.
Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Samtskhe-Javakheti has
been a thorn in Tbilisi’s side.
Successive invasions and population transfers have turned this center
of Georgian history and culture into a melting pot of nationalities.
Once Samtskhe-Javakheti’s dominant ethnic group, Georgians now
represent a minority there. Armenians, who account for more than
one-half of the population, largely outnumber them.
The region’s ethnic composition is not Tbilisi’s sole concern.
Considering this area a highly sensitive zone, Soviet authorities set
up one of their main military outposts in the Southern Caucasus there.
Located in Akhalkalaki, just 30 kilometers from Turkey, the base is
now the property of Russia — and a major bone of contention between
Moscow and Tbilisi.
Georgia has long suspected Russia of covertly stirring unrest among
local residents.
Following the change of leadership that took place in Tbilisi in late
2003, calls for the region’s autonomy somehow subsided. Political
groupings such as Virk, or Javakh — which were extremely vocal in the
final years of former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule —
hoped his successor would pay greater attention to Samtskhe-Javakheti’s
demands.
But despite President Mikheil Saakashvili’s repeated pledges to tackle
the region’s socioeconomic problems, the past 17 months have brought
little improvement — if any — to local residents.
Arnold Stepanian chairs a Tbilisi nongovernmental organization known
as Multinational Georgia. He tells RFE/RL that, for Georgia’s ethnic
minority groups, the regime change went largely unnoticed.
“It’s difficult to say that we’re dissatisfied with the national
integration policy conducted by the government because, unfortunately,
there is no such policy. We can’t even say there is a bad policy. To
be honest, there’s never been a national integration policy in
Georgia. There’ve been attempts to get the nongovernmental sector
involved in these issues. Some of these attempts have succeeded. But
the government has yet to elaborate a national integration policy,”
Stepanian said.
On 28 April, Multinational Georgia and other nongovernmental groups
sent Saakashvili an open letter, in which they criticize his national
policy.
This letter cautions against purported government plans to revise
Georgia’s administrative borders without taking into account the
delicate ethnic balance of its regions. It also demands that minority
groups enjoy better access to education in their native language,
and that non-ethnic Georgians be fairly represented in national
parliament and self-government bodies.
These calls follow reports of ethnic unrest in the predominantly ethnic
Armenian Tsalka district, an area of the Kvemo-Kartli region that
borders Samtskhe-Javakheti to the east. They also coincide with renewed
activity on the part of Samtskhe-Javakheti’s political organizations.
On 29 April, Saakashvili went to Ninotsminda, an ethnic Armenian city
located a few kilometers southeast of Akhalkalaki. The Georgian leader
promised residents he would personally see that a new Armenian school
is built by the beginning of the next school year.
“My wife was here a few weeks ago and she told me about the current
condition of the school. We’ve therefore decided that new foundations
should be built and that construction should be completed by 1
September so that all children get a new school. I promise I’ll come
for the inauguration with books, satchels, and many other gifts for
you,” Saakashvili said.
Saakashvili also called upon residents, most of whom depend on
agriculture for a living, to show patience until a new road linking
Ninotsminda to the rest of Georgia is built.
“You must understand that we subsidize everything here. We’re building
a road for you and we will help you with transportation until this
road is finished. Transportation is expensive [but] you will have
no problem reaching our [Tbilisi] markets. Not only will I give you
a school this year, but, most importantly, I will take you to our
markets,” Saakashvili said.
Stepanian fears that, as Saakashvili’s earlier pledges, these promises
may have no effect.
Last month, a newly created youth group known as United Javakh
organized a rally in Akhalkalaki that attracted several hundred
protestors.
This first demonstration, which was followed by others, was held to
protest against Georgia’s calls for the Russian military base to be
vacated as quickly as possible.
Whether the timing of these rallies — which took place in the
midst of uneasy Georgian-Russian talks — was purely coincidental,
or inspired by Moscow, remains unclear.
Stepanian says he has no answer to this question.
“It’s always difficult to talk about things you don’t know for sure
and in the present case I don’t know whether there is a link here.
But the timing, the fact that these rallies took place during the
[Russian-Georgian] negotiation process, is interesting,” Stepanian
said.
Russia’s Akhalkalaki base is mainly manned by local Armenian soldiers
and employs roughly one-sixth of the town’s 13,000 residents. In all,
more than half of the local population is said to depend, directly
or indirectly, on the base for its livelihood.
Although the base’s true economic value for the town remains to be
quantified, residents claim the departure of the Russian troops would
deprive them of their main source of income.
Georgian authorities say these concerns are unfounded. But they’re
sending contradictory signals on how they envisage the town’s economic
future.
A month ago, Saakashvili said on television that Georgian troops
will move into the base after the Russians leave. But, last week,
he appeared to have changed his mind.
“We’re not planning to set up a new military unit [there]. But we will
offer those who serve on this base to join the Georgian armed forces
in return for a higher pay. To those who turn down this proposal,
we will offer a separate social-rehabilitation program, business
[training]. These people must not feel they will lose out on the
deal. On the contrary, they must benefit from the fact that Georgia
is developing,” Saakashvili said.
Meanwhile, Georgia’s Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili on 2 May
warned that the government would soon take action against what those
who “are pursuing anti-Georgian activities in Samtskhe-Javakheti.”
But Stepanian says any further delay in addressing the demands of
Georgia’s minorities is fraught with risk, as recent Armenian-Georgian
clashes in Tsalka district show.

AGBU Press Office
55 East 59th Street
New York, NY 10022-1112
Phone 212.319.6383 x.118
Fax 212.319.6507
Email [email protected]
Website
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, May 4, 2005
AGBU PARIS SPONSORS SYMPOSIUM WITH JEAN-PIERRE MAHÉ
Paris, France – On March 23rd, 2005, AGBU Paris sponsored a
symposium with Jean-Pierre Mahé, renowned scholar on Armenia and
member of the French Academy, at the European Parliament Office in
Paris. Under the patronage of Marie-Anne Isler-Béguin, President of
the European Parliament (EU) delegation for the Southern Caucasus,
Mahé reviewed Armenian culture and history from the point of view of
their contribution to European culture and history.
AGBU Paris is dedicated to preserving and promoting the Armenian
heritage and culture through humanitarian, educational, and cultural
programs in France and Armenia. To view the complete conference
transcript, please visit For more information on AGBU
Paris, please e-mail [email protected] or call (33) (1) 45-20-03-18.
For more information on AGBU and its worldwide chapters, please
visit
–Boundary_(ID_ewU7ZtAiZZlS8WMpiVplgg)–

ARKA News Agency
May 2 2005
Armenian President signs amendments to Law on Holidays and Memorial
Dates
Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II receives a group of Iranian
alpinists who have effected ascents of Ararat and Sipan mountains
*********************************************************************
ARMENIAN PRESIDENT SIGNS AMENDMENTS TO LAW ON HOLIDAYS AND MEMORIAL
DATES
YEREVAN, May 2. /ARKA/. RA President Robert Kocharyan has signed the
law on amendments to the Law on Holidays and Memorial Dates adopted
by the RA Parliament on April 11, 2005. The RA presidential press
service reports that according to the amendments February 21 is
declared Native Language Day.
According to the authors of the bill, it indicates the role of the
Armenian language in protecting the Armenians, the necessity of
preserving the Armenian language in the Diaspora. The adoption of the
bill was also necessitated by the 1600th anniversary of creation of
the Armenian alphabet. P.T. -0–
*********************************************************************
CATHOLICOS OF ALL ARMENIANS GAREGIN II RECEIVES A GROUP OF IRANIAN
ALPINISTS WHO HAVE EFFECTED ASCENTS OF ARARAT AND SIPAN MOUNTAINS
YEREVAN, May 2. /ARKA/. Catholicos of all Armenians Garegin II has
received a group of Iranian alpinists who effected ascents of Ararat
and Sipan mountains in connection with 90th anniversary of Armenian
Genocide. As the Press Chancellery of Echmiadzin Holy See told ARKA
News Agency. Garegin II welcomed the guests and expressed confidence
that their action will contribute to the cause of Armenian Genocide
recognition and denunciation. “Ararat is the cherished sanctuary for
all Armenians. Our people see the symbol of their eternity in
Ararat”, added Garegin II.
In his turn, the Iranian alpinists presented a stone brought from
Ararat to the Catholicos. L.V.-0-
*********************************************************************
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

72481/
03.05.2005
“Türkei braucht eine glaubwürdige EU-Perspektive”
Claudia Roth drängt auf weitere Reformen
Moderation: Christine Heuer
Die Vorsitzende von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Claudia Roth, hat an die
Türkei appelliert, in den Reformbemühungen nicht nachzulassen. Es
sei wichtig, dass die Dynamik nicht gebremst werde, sagte Roth. Dazu
brauche das Land aber Perspektiven. Wichtig sei deshalb, am 3. Oktober
wie geplant Beitrittsverhandlungen aufzunehmen.
Christine Heuer: Elf Jahre lang hatte kein deutscher Regierungschef
die Türkei besucht. Gerhard Schröder hat das geändert. Schließlich
versteht sich der deutsche Bundeskanzler als wichtiger Mittler für
einen Beitritt des Landes zur Europäischen Union. Heute reist er
bereits zum zweiten Mal binnen 15 Monaten in die Türkei.
Am Telefon jetzt eine Koalitionspartnerin Gerhard Schröders und eine
mindestens ebenso entschlossene Befürworterin des Türkei-Beitritts,
wie es der Bundeskanzler ist: die Bundesvorsitzende der Grünen. Guten
Morgen Claudia Roth!
Claudia Roth: Schönen guten Morgen Frau Heuer!
Heuer: Ihr Koalitionskollege Gernot Erler sagt heute, er sei
ernüchtert über die mangelnde Umsetzung von Reformen in der
Türkei. Sind Sie auch ernüchtert?
Roth: Ja. Man hätte sich einiges schneller wünschen können und es
ist wichtig, dass der Kanzler ganz sicher auch jetzt in der Türkei
darauf drängen wird, dass die Reformdynamik in der Türkei nicht
gebremst wird. Damit diese Reformdynamik aber unterstützt wird,
braucht es eben nach wie vor eine glaubwürdige EU-Perspektive
und das ist das wichtige Signal, das von diesem Besuch sicher auch
ausgehen wird, dass rot-grün zu dieser EU-Perspektive steht, zu
einer glaubwürdigen Perspektive, dass aber die Voraussetzung ist,
dass in der Tat in Ankara die Reformen weiter fortgesetzt werden,
die Dynamik nicht unterbrochen wird.
Heuer: Sollte man, Frau Roth, offensiver damit drohen, dass der
Verhandlungsprozess auch scheitern kann und scheitern muss, wenn die
Türkei sich nicht mehr beeilt?
Roth: Ich weiß nicht, ob jetzt eine Drohung angebracht wäre. Was
völlig falsch ist ist das, was Herr Stoiber am Wochenende schon
wieder getan hat, dass er nämlich verkündet hat, dass die
Türkei nie Mitglied in der Europäischen Union werden wird, und
vorauseilend, sollte es in Frankreich nicht zu einer Mehrheit für
die EU-Verfassung kommen, wird in der Union gesagt, ja dafür ist die
Türkei verantwortlich zu machen beziehungsweise die Perspektive der
Türkei für die Europäische Union.
Nein, ich denke wir sollten sagen, unsere Position sollte sein, wir
halten an dem 3. Oktober als Beginn der Verhandlungen fest, die sich ja
über viele Jahre hinziehen werden, aber die Voraussetzungen müssen
erfüllt sein. Da ist eben tatsächlich einiges zu tun. Es bremst! Es
gibt wirklich ein Bremsen in der Reform des Justizwesens. Das
Strafgesetz muss umgesetzt werden. In der Pressefreiheit gibt es nach
wie vor Defizite. Die neu vorgelegten Vorschläge sind aus meiner
Sicht nicht ausreichend genug. Ankara hat seit langem zugesagt und
versprochen, die Rechte der christlichen Minderheiten, der religiösen
Minderheiten zu stärken. Und leider merkt man gerade in diesen Tagen
und Wochen, dass die Kurden-Frage doch sehr fragil ist. Also ich
glaube, eine massive Unterstützung und auch sozusagen ein Bestehen
auf der Reformdynamik, das ist das jetzt, was uns weiter bringt.
Heuer: Sie setzen auf eine Strategie des Zuckerbrots. Frau Roth, wo
bleibt die Peitsche? Wenn wir zu einem konkreten Punkt kommen, der
Armenien-Debatte, wo bleibt zum Beispiel die Forderung von rot-grün,
dass die türkische Regierung das Massaker an den Armeniern vor 90
Jahren als Völkermord anerkennen muss?
Roth: Nein, es geht ja nicht um Zuckerbrot und Peitsche, sondern
es geht darum, dass die Türkei genauso behandelt werden soll wie
alle anderen Beitrittskandidaten. Das heißt es gibt Kriterien;
die müssen erfüllt sein als Voraussetzung für einen EU-Beitritt,
der sich erst in vielen, vielen Jahren dann konkret stellen wird. Aber
dass man nicht jetzt schon sagt, ihr habt eh keine Chance, das was die
Union macht ist völlig unverantwortlich, weil sie alle Bemühungen,
alle Kräfte, die in der Türkei massiv für die Veränderung, für
die Menschenrechte, für die Demokratie kämpfen, frustriert und
diesen Prozess sozusagen konterkariert.
Armenien ist eine wichtige Frage und ich denke es kommt darauf
an zu vermitteln, dass es im eigenen türkischen Interesse ist,
sich mit der eigenen Geschichte zu befassen, mit den Verbrechen,
die im osmanischen Reich passiert sind, mit den Verbrechen gegen
die Menschlichkeit am armenischen Volk. Ich glaube wir als Deutsche
können das sehr glaubwürdig sagen. Zum einen haben wir eine
historische Verantwortung aus dem Holocaust und wissen, wie wichtig
Gedenken ist, aber aktives Gedenken. Zum zweiten – und ich denke das
wird helfen auch in der Türkei, das Tabu der Beschäftigung mit der
Armenien-Frage zu überwinden – es gibt auch eine deutsche Beteiligung
an diesen Verbrechen. Die militärische, die politische Führung des
deutschen Reiches war 1915 informiert über das, was dort passiert,
und hat nicht interveniert. Ich glaube wenn wir das selber zum Teil
unserer Geschichte machen, wird eine Debatte in der Türkei möglich,
eröffnet werden und es ist richtig zu unterstützen, dass eine
Historikerkommission eingerichtet werden soll. Die muss aber
wirklich unabhängig sein. Da darf das Ergebnis nicht von Vornherein
feststehen.
Heuer: Frau Roth, aber es liegen 90 Jahre zwischen den Ereignissen und
der Debatte, die wir heute haben. Das ist eine lange Zeit. Frage an
Sie: waren die Verbrechen an den Armeniern ein Völkermord, nennen Sie
das so und finden Sie, die türkische Regierung muss es auch so nennen?
Roth: Ich glaube nicht, dass es viel Sinn macht, jetzt über Begriffe
zu streiten. Ich denke wenn man die Kriterien von heute anwendet,
vom Völkerrecht, dann handelt es sich um einen Völkermord. Ich
möchte jetzt aber nicht über Begriffe streiten; ich möchte mit dazu
beitragen, dass in der Türkei ein Tabu sich öffnet, weil das eine
Gesellschaft nur stärkt, wenn über die eigene Geschichte diskutiert
wird, wenn man sich mit der eigenen Geschichte auseinandersetzt. Ich
glaube unsere Rolle muss sein, jetzt nicht mit dem erhobenen
Zeigefinger zu verlangen, dass in der Türkei ein Genozid anerkannt
wird, sondern unsere Rolle muss und kann sein, dazu beizutragen, dass
es zu einer Versöhnung zwischen Türken und Armeniern kommt und dass
die Rechte der Armenier in der Türkei gleichberechtigt gewahrt sind.
Heuer: Der Historiker Heinrich August Winkler, Frau Roth, wirft
rot-grün eine “Politik der vollendeten Tatsachen” vor, nämlich
erst wird entschieden und dann wird geredet, zum Beispiel über den
Türkei-Beitritt. Er sagt, dies passe zum Absolutismus, nicht aber
zur Demokratie, und er befürchtet, dies schaffe Europa-Skepsis bei
den Bürgern. Können Sie das in Kauf nehmen?
Roth: Nein, das kann ich überhaupt nicht in Kauf nehmen. Es ist
völlig falsch. Es geht darum, sich immer wieder zu fragen was kann
Europa, was kann auch deutsche Politik dazu beitragen, dass es in der
Türkei zu einer Demokratisierungsdynamik kommt, dass in der Türkei
die Menschenrechte, die Minderheitenrechte, der Rechtsstaat geachtet
wird. Es ist in unserem privilegierten Interesse, dass die Türkei
eine demokratische, rechtstaatliche Türkei ist. Das ist in unserem
deutschen Interesse und im europäischen Interesse. Dazu trägt eine
glaubwürdige EU-Perspektive bei. Am 3. Oktober in diesem Jahr wird die
Türkei nicht Mitglied der Europäischen Union – das weiß Herr Winkler
auch ganz genau -, sondern am 3. Oktober soll ein Verhandlungsprozess
beginnen, der sich über viele Jahre hinweg zieht, genauso wie mit
anderen Kandidaten. Wir haben als Bundesrepublik Deutschland und als
Europäische Union ein Interesse aus sicherheitspolitischen Gründen,
ein Signal zu setzen in den nahen und mittleren
Osten, dass Islam und Demokratie miteinander vereinbar sind, dass
eine demokratische Türkei ein Signal ist in die ganze Welt und dass
Europa die Kraft hat, eine demokratische Türkei zu integrieren,
weil nicht die Religion das entscheidende Identitätsmerkmal ist,
sondern Glaubensfreiheit und Religionsfreiheit.
Heuer: Nun haben Sie das zweite Mal gesagt, Frau Roth, man müsse mit
der Türkei genauso umgehen wie mit anderen Beitrittskandidaten. Viele
Bürger und auch viele Politiker sehen die Türkei nicht als einen so
ganz normalen Kandidaten für einen EU-Beitritt. Ist die Demokratie
in der EU stark genug, dass sie das Undemokratische an der Türkei
schon ertragen kann?
Roth: Moment! Es geht ja nicht darum, eine undemokratische Türkei
zu ertragen, sondern es geht darum, auch mit einem Beitrittsprozess
zur Demokratisierung beizutragen.
Heuer: Aber noch ist dieser Prozess ja nicht abgeschlossen?
Roth: Natürlich ist er nicht abgeschlossen, aber dazu dient ja auch
ein Verhandlungsprozess, der sich über viele Monate hinwegziehen
wird. Sie sehen ja auch, dass wir aktuell eine Diskussion haben
und dass sich auch in Rumänien noch einiges verändern muss und
dass sich auch Rumänien anstrengen muss, weil die Kriterien sind
einzuhalten. Aber wenn ich mir anschaue, wie die Glaubwürdigkeit
der EU-Perspektive, die _99 mit rot-grün sozusagen begonnen hat,
in der Türkei gewirkt hat, dann muss man sagen die Türkei ist
nicht mehr die Türkei von vor wenigen Jahren. Die Todesstrafe ist
abgeschafft worden. Es gibt ein wirklich gutes Anti-Folter-Gesetz. Das
heißt nicht, dass es nicht immer noch vereinzelt zu Folterfällen
kommt, aber das genau muss man überwinden. Die Kurden-Frage wurde
enttabuisiert. Es gibt immer noch große Probleme, aber der EU-Prozess
trägt mit dazu bei und wir sind glaube ich besonders privilegiert,
denn in unserem Land leben Millionen Menschen, deren Wurzeln in
der Türkei
sind. Eine Türkei-Perspektive trägt auch bei uns zur Integration
bei.
Heuer: Die Bundesvorsitzende von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Claudia
Roth. Besten Dank für das Gespräch, Frau Roth.
Roth: Ich danke Ihnen! Auf Wiederhören!
–Boundary_(ID_MV6+jHPTI+OA+yWiQmC1LA)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

A1plus
| 13:35:42 | 30-04-2005 | Politics |
A-BOMB FOR AUTHORITIES
With the strict position of the people and one item fixed in the
Constitution we could avoid the implementation of card system, prevent the
cutting of green plantations and building up of these territories with
cafes, avoid unnecessary rise in prices and so on.
The people should have the right to initiate referenda. A few weeks ago a
civic union named «People- master of the county» and headed by vice chairman
of the National Democratic Union Alexander Butayev was formed. «As the
existence of an atomic bomb allows the country to keep the enemy at
distance, the existence of an item of the Constitution will play a
restrictive role. If the authorities are aware of this «threat» they will
have to work more effectively», Alexander Butayev says.
The initiators of the Civic Union hope the people will have the possibility
to hold referenda with the essential number of signatures. However, under
the present condition the referenda initiated by the people can become
weekly. Nevertheless, Butayev adheres to a different opinion. He is
convinced that it will not be easy to collect the fixed number of
signatures. The demands should be realistic first of all.
The exercise of the right depends on the activities of the government.
However members of the Civic Union consider that the periodicity can be
fixed in a separate law. Alexander Butayev does not mind the Government’s
veto in case the issue initiated for a referendum is pointless.
It is known that the Civic Union is supported by chairman of the National
Democratic Union Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the National
Self-Determination Union Paruyr Hayrikyan, representative of the Forum of
Intellectuals Ashot Manucharyan. The Justice bloc is also likely to join the
initiative.
Lena Badeyan

The Hindu
April 29, 2005
GOVERNOR’S INITIATIVE SAVED ELEPHANT CALF
Special Correspondent
Although it was the intervention of the Prime Minister, Manmohan
Singh, which in the ultimate saved the young she-elephant Veda of the
Bannerghatta National Park near here from being trans-located to the
cold and unfamiliar climes of Armenia, the Governor, T.N. Chaturvedi,
too had a role in it.
Reacting to a report from New Delhi in The Hindu of Thursday about
the decision against gifting the elephant to Armenia, the Raj Bhavan
here noted that Compassion Unlimited Plus Action had represented to
the Governor opposing the Centre’s decision to transfer the elephant
to the Yerevan Zoo in Armenia as the “elephant calf cannot withstand
the extreme cold climate of Armenia and it may prove fatal for it”.
Mr. Chaturvedi wrote to the Prime Minister about the decision. Ten
days later, the Prime Minister replied saying: “I have received your
letter of April 11, 2005. My Government has examined the issue and it
has been decided not to send Veda to Armenia”.

AzerTag, Azerbaijan
April 28 2005
AZERBAIJANIS HOLD RALLY OF PROTEST IN SWITZERLAND
[April 28, 2005, 14:23:03]
The Sweden-Azerbaijan Turks Association on 24 April has hold in Bern
a rally of protest against `genocide’ claims of the Armenians, State
Committee on Works with Azerbaijanis Living Abroad said.
In the 4-hour action, were raised slogans exposing intention of the
Armenians without any historical ground.
Participants of the rally – Azerbaijani country-fellows have adopted
an address to prove groundless claims of the notorious `genocide’.
The document was sent to state bodies, Parliament and public
organizations of Switzerland.
Many Swiss media organs have covered the action.

Global Politician, NY
April 29 2005
Genocide Factor in Armenia’s Foreign Policy
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. – 4/30/2005
Among the issues on the Armenian foreign policy agenda, perhaps the
problem of the recognition of the fact of the Genocide and its
condemnation is in many respects the most significant one. It also
has a serious domestic political and all-national meaning (in terms
of functioning of the whole Diaspora-Homeland system), as well as an
important foreign political resonance.
The Genocide Factor as an Item on the Agenda of Armenian Foreign
Policy
The Genocide issue is the only vector of Armenia’s foreign policy,
which reaches far beyond the regional context and enters modern
global politics. The fact that in the past several decades this issue
has been widely debated in political and public circles of many
countries, including world powers, as well as sudden interest towards
that issue by the European Union, go to show our point.
In the past decade, global political processes have been aiming
noticeably at strengthening their moral component, as manifested by
the growing attention to issues, falling under the category of
protection of human rights. In this context, Armenia’s policy of
promoting the universal recognition of the Genocide and its
condemnation as a crime of sweeping and massive violation of the
fundamental right to live of the whole nation, takes the central
stage of significance.
Another distinctive feature of the Genocide issue is that the
intensity level of its foreign political manifestation can basically
be only set by Armenia’s authorities. Here again a fact confirming
our idiom is quite evident: perhaps the only adjustment the new
Armenian leadership made to the foreign policy agenda upon coming to
power in 1998 was the official acknowledgment of the Genocide factor
as a priority issue.
An important characteristic of the recognition issue as a foreign
policy factor is the striking contradiction between its core content
and its perception by Turkey. In effect, this issue is one of the
foreign policy problems that are charged with a high degree of moral
humanity. Armenia, as a state established by the nation victimized by
genocide right after its unacknowledged and unpunished occurrence,
now includes on its foreign policy agenda the question this gravest
crime under the international law be affirmed and condemned by the
genocide perpetrator’s successor-state, as well as and by the
international community.
Turkey, however, is trying, firstly, to downgrade the problem to a
level of bilateral relations, and secondly, to falsify the very
essence of that policy by portraying it as conspiracy built on
hatred, confrontation, even hostility. At the same time, Turkey has
actively been taking steps, increasingly reminiscent of a full-scale
diplomatic offensive, aimed at inflicting her point of view on the
international community.
The above-mentioned features of the Genocide factor point to the
uniqueness of its nature, thus justifying the vitality of its
multilevel study.
The Genocide Factor in Foreign Policy of Armenia: a Diachronistic
Analysis
After passing through several stages, the issue of recognition and
condemnation of the Genocide, as a key all-Armenian issue, initially
concerning mainly the Diaspora and subsequently being embraced (of
course, within the limits set by the authorities) by Soviet Armenia
as well; and a public and political discourse of the past four
decades, has been crystallized into a factor of the foreign policy of
the Republic of Armenia. Let us discuss them all in brief.
In the period, immediately preceding the declaration of independence,
two approaches were outlined. The Armenian National Movement (ANM),
that headed the national democratic liberation movement in Armenia,
had in their platform the point calling for struggle for the
recognition and condemnation of the Genocide. However, at the same
time, it made an attempt at revising postulates traditional of
Armenian public and political school of thought, by introducing the
idea of the genocide issue not standing in the way of normalizing the
Armenian-Turkish relations. The majority of the remaining political
forces centered around Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party (the
Dashnaktsutyun) advocated the “traditional” approach, which hinged
the establishment of normal relations with Turkey upon her
affirmation of the Genocide. Both camps considered that issue in the
context of the bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations.
After coming to power in 1990, the ANM had to compromise and agreed
to incorporate that issue into the Declaration of Independence
(1990), thus booking a spot for it on the Armenian foreign policy
agenda. Afterwards, however, the Party tried to ignore the issue by
giving it a status secondary to the issue of normalizing relations
with Turkey. This policy was then voiced through the concept of
Armenia’s readiness to establish normal relations with Turkey without
any preconditions.
In its turn Turkey, which recognized the Republic of Armenia’s
independence as early as December 1991, had refused to establish
diplomatic relations with her until a number of preconditions has
been met. In so doing, in its attitude towards the young state Turkey
has chosen a rare operational code for modern international
relations, where severance of existing diplomatic relations or
refusal to recognize a newly-established state are more common
practices for similar situations. [1] The choice of that operational
code can be attributed to Turkey’s desire to achieve a strategic
upper-hand in her relations with Armenia, compelling the latter,
which had aspired to normalize her relations with the neighbor, to
accept non-conventional relations with Turkey. [2]
The lack of a diplomatic representation and the resulting narrowing
of reliable channels of information on the political life of the
Turkish state had further weakened the positions of young Armenian
diplomacy.
In general, Turkey’s policy towards Armenia from the very beginning
can be described as a policy of coercion. That policy is being
articulated with particular clarity in Turkey’s tendency to impose
her own issues on discussion agendas for various non-conventional
contacts.
The shaping of that agenda began as early as in 1991 and already by
the mid 1990s it has been fully formulated, whereby Turkey tried to
compel Armenia to:
– Relinquish its policy of pressing for the affirmation of the
Genocide;
– Officially recognize the inviolability of the Armenian-Turkish
borders border, as established by the 1921 Kars Treaty;
– Make unilateral concessions to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh
settlement.
The Armenian side was interested in developing trade and economic
relations with Turkey as well as using its communications. Later on,
after Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in 1993, a new item
had been added to the agenda: the conditions of opening of the
border. From 1991-1997, Turkey exerted a firm diplomatic pressure on
Armenia, trying to get concessions across the entire range of the
above-mentioned issues. Twice, in 1992 and 1993, Turkey even
threatened to use military force, moving troops closer to the
Armenian border.
In these conditions, Armenia chose defensive tactics, and attempted
to distance itself from the Genocide recognition policy by conceding
the leadership on that issue to the Diaspora.
After coming to power in 1998, the new leadership of the country
amended the foreign policy agenda by placing the abovementioned
problem on top of the state’s most important issues. Meanwhile, the
formula designed by the past leadership, according to which the
Genocide recognition issue should not impede the establishment of
normal relations between Armenia and Turkey, remained intact. So here
we have a unique fusion of the traditional approach with that of the
ANM.
Initially, after the indicated above amendments had been made, the
issue was largely viewed by Armenia within the framework of
Armenian-Turkish relations, and in the context of strengthening ties
with the Diaspora. Later on, though, set off primarily by the
increased efforts to have the issue placed on the agendas of the US
Congress and the French Parliament in 2000, a tendency to view it in
a larger context of the expansion of Armenian’s relations with the
West has emerged.
The Genocide in Armenian Foreign Policy: A Synchronistic Analysis
How does the Genocide factor really come across in the diplomatic
activity of Armenia? We suggest several analysis levels.
1. Bilateral relations
In Armenian-Turkish relations, the problem of the recognition of the
Genocide and the whole set of associated issues have not yet been
seriously discussed by the two sides. This stems from the policy of a
total denial of the very fact of the Genocide, traditionally employed
by Turkish authorities until recently, when Turkey has put forward an
idea of discussing the issue by historians from both countries, being
fully aware that this proposal, which transforms a political problem
into a historical debate, would be unacceptable for Armenia. As
expected, Armenia immediately rejected that suggestion, in her turn
advising the Turkish leadership to expand their familiarity with the
available scientific and historical materials.
In the situation where no direct contacts with Turkey on this issue
exist, in addition to the obvious objective set forth by Armenian
leadership the affirmation of the Genocide and its condemnation by
Turkey – Genocide factor in the Armenian foreign policy, acquires
additional functions of a containment instrument for Turkey’s policy
of coercion against Armenia.
Actually, we have the following picture of diplomatic interactions
between the sides. Turkey, which seeks concessions from Armenia on a
number of issues, using the latter’s unfavorable geographic location
to its advantage, is exerting pressure on her, and as it was noted
above, puts forward preconditions for establishing diplomatic
relations, opening land border, and developing normal trade and
economic contacts with Armenia.
In contrast to the Turkish approach, Armenia proposes two fundamental
principles underlying the concept of her relations with Turkey: the
establishment of normal relations without preconditions, and Turkey’s
readiness to discuss all disputable issues, including those set
forward by Turkey as preconditions.
A conflict between the operational codes of the two approaches to
bilateral relations is apparent. In this situation, the Genocide
factor becomes especially important for Armenia, as the only sphere
allowing for more independent and flexible policy towards Turkey and
counterbalance to the Turkish policy of coercion against Armenia. The
previous Armenian leadership had demonstrated this approach, which,
however, was overall unsuccessful, because it was based on a
“defensive” operational code.
The incumbent authorities have apparently built on the negative
experience of their predecessors, which is why on this issue they
have chosen an “offensive” operation code. Thus Armenia’s options for
resisting and confronting the Turkish coercion policy have increased,
make it possible to neutralize their negative diplomatic
consequences. Armenia’s strong rebuttal to the Turkish proposal to
downgrade the issue of the Genocide recognition from the political
domain to academia discussions was only be possible because of the
“offensive” operational code, which just proves our point.
2. “Big policy”
In 1987, the European Parliament passed the resolution on the
“Political Solution to the Armenian Issue,” in which the tragic
events of 1915-1917 on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which
targeted the Armenian population, are qualified as genocide. The same
Resolution calls upon the European Council to exert pressure on the
Turkish Government in order for it to recognize the Genocide. The
process of placing of the genocide issue on the agenda of the “big
European policy” has clearly begun. Since the 1990s, a similar
process has been noticeable in the United States.
Therefore, the leadership of the newly independent Republic of
Armenia has from the very beginning had an opportunity to extend the
Genocide factor beyond the frameworks of the bilateral
Armenian-Turkish relations and apply it to Armenia’s relationship
with the West, thus trying to acquire an instrument against the
coercion policy exercised by Turkey towards Armenia. However, since
the then Armenian leadership had chosen the “defensive” operational
code in relations with Turkey, they preferred not to do it.
Armenia’s joining the campaign for the international recognition of
the genocide in 2000 has given it a new momentum by having it
integrated in global processes. Having thus adopted the “active”
operational code, our state has at the same time strengthened its
position vis-à-vis Turkey.
In 2004, the above process was given new dimensions when the public
opinion of the EU countries, as voiced by influential intellectuals,
began actively demanding from Turkey, which seeks membership in the
EU, to condemn the dark pages of its history, while leaders of the EU
countries started raising this issue in bilateral negotiations with
the Turks.
On the whole, one can say that the internationalization of the
Genocide factor is being accomplished on two levels. In the realm of
Realpolitik, it is being used by influential political circles in
Europe and the United States for their own gain – as an additional
vehicle to put pressure on Turkey. At the same time, it has already
been adopted by global discourse on the problems of genocide and
other crimes against humanity.
Armenia’s interaction with European countries and the U.S. on the
level of Realpolitik strengthens its overall position in the world
and, particularly, its relations with Turkey. The active
participation in the above discourse enhances Armenia’s authority in
the world.
3. Geostrategic aspect
The Genocide factor has also been influencing the choice of a
Geostrategic direction in which Armenia will develop. It is Russia
that has been traditionally perceived by Armenians as one of the most
consistent allies on this issue. Russia’s recent inclination to
establish closer relations with Turkey, as well as general weakening
of its positions in the world, seem to dash all hopes that Russia
would assist in this matter which had remained some of the Armenian
political elite.
In fact, Armenia today can realistically expect support in having the
genocide recognized and condemned only from the European Union and
the United States, and count on them to keep pressuring Turkey on
that issue. This situation is an additional Geostrategic factor
contributing to the movement of Armenia toward the West.
Perspectives
Operational code, adopted by the incumbent Armenian authorities in
regard of Turkey, assumes that there will be no unilateral
concessions on such a key and wide-scale pan-Armenian issue, as the
Genocide affirmation. Following its introduction into the agenda of
the Armenian policy on Turkey, the room for maneuvering for the
Armenian side seems to have shrunk quite considerably.
On the other hand, the establishment of an appropriate interaction
modus with the Western politics and global political processes makes
Armenia’s position in its bilateral relations with Turkey more
sustainable. For that reason it appears that the path towards further
integration with the West can uncover additional resources required
to successfully counter the coercion policy of Turkey. The official
recognition and condemnation of the fact of the genocide by Turkey
would be the ultimate justification of this operational code.
After the affirmation has been achieved, this question could be moved
from the political realm to the domain of international law thus
preparing ground for raising legal issues of retributions for the
crime of genocide against the Armenian people, perpetrated by the
Ottoman Empire, the successor of which is the present Turkish
Republic.
SOURCES
1. The term was first introduced into international relations studies
by Alexander George, who used it to characterize the ways of action
by policy makers. See A. George. The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected
Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,
International Studies Quarterly – International Studies Quarterly,
1969, 13:2 (June), p. 1900-222. Used here to characterize a paradigm
of a foreign policy of a state, the genesis of which may be reduced
to one definite action.
2. That is, the multi-layer bilateral relations in the conditions of
absence of diplomatic relations. This scantily explored aspect of
international relations is highlighted in the innovative work: G. R.
Berridge, Talking to Enemy: How States without ‘Diplomatic Relations’
Communicate. New York, 1994.

Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International
Relations at Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the
Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at Institute of
Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. In the past,
he served as a Counselor of the Armenian Embassy in Germany and was
the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Analysis for the
Office of the President of Armenia.

;cid=4
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress