McCain’s Gaffes Reflect Bush’s Iran-Qaeda Myth
Published on Saturday, March 22, 2008 by Inter Press Service
by Gareth Porter
WASHINGTON – Sen. John McCain’s confusion in recent allegations of
Iranian training of al Qaeda fighters in Iraq is the result of a
drumbeat of official propaganda about close Iran-al Qaeda ties that the
George W. Bush administration and neoconservatives have promoted ever
since early 2002.
McCain, the Republican nominee for the presidency, was confusing the
Bush administration’s charges of Iranian training of Shi’a militiamen
associated with the Mahdi Army with the administration’s propaganda
theme of Iranian tacit or explicit support for al Qaeda operatives in
Iran – charges which have amplified by right-wing media.
During a press conference in Jordan Tuesday, McCain brought up the
charge that Iran with training al Qaeda operatives
and sending them to Iraq, then corrected himself after Sen. Joseph
Lieberman, a Democrat from Connecticut, whispered in his ear. It was
the fourth time in a little over three weeks, however, that McCain had
made the same charge.
McCain’s confusion has been widely characterised as demonstrating his
inability to distinguish Sunni al Qaeda from Shiite Mahdi Army. But
more fundamentally, McCain’s gaffes were a reflection of how thoroughly
he had internalised a favourite theme of the Bush administration and
neoconservatives – that Iran has tolerated and even covertly assisted
al Qaeda agents operating inside Iran.
Those administration charges have continued despite the repeated
release of information by Iran and other countries about its arrest,
detention and repatriation of al Qaeda suspects.
That charge has been given credence by mainstream news media for years.
The theme of an Iran-al Qaeda link first appeared in the wake of the
defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Although most al Qaeda
cadres escaped to Pakistan, a much smaller number crossed the border
into Iran. Despite the fact that U.S. officials later said Iran had
been responsive to U.S. communications about intercepting al Qaeda
cadres at the border, then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld stated
on more than one occasion in 2002 that Iran was `harbouring’ al Qaeda
officials.
That was same term Bush had used in his Sep. 20, 2001 speech as
criterion for considering a nation to be a `hostile regime’ in regard
to terrorism.
The Bush propaganda line was taken so seriously by the news media that
the Washington Post reported Aug. 28, 2002 that `Arab intelligence
sources’ were saying that two high-ranking al Qaeda officials were
being `sheltered in Iran along with dozens of other al Qaeda fighters
in hotels and guesthouses in the border cities of Mashad and Zabol.’
The Post said the report `supported the Bush administration’s
long-standing assertion that Iran – or at least hardliners in the
conservative clerical line of authority that controls the army and
intelligence services – is harbouring al Qaeda fighters.’
In spring 2003, Iran declared that it was holding senior members of al
Qaeda but refused to divulge their identities and proposed to exchange
information on its al Qaeda detainees in return for the U.S. providing
Iran with information on the anti-Iran terrorist group Mujihidden e
Khalk (MEK) which had surrendered to U.S. troops in Iraq. But
hardliners in the Bush administration rejected such a deal, on the
grounds that MEK should be protected from Iran.
After the May 12, 2003 terrorist bombing in Saudi Arabia, which killed
eight U.S. citizens and 26 Saudis, Rumsfeld declared, `We know there
are senior al Qaeda in Iran¦presumably not an ungoverned area.’ Then
CBS news reported, `U.S. officials say they have evidence the bombings
in Saudi Arabia and other attacks still in the works were planned and
directed by senior al Qaeda operatives who have found safe haven in
Iran.’
That was an obvious ploy to insinuate that Iran was deliberately
allowing al Qaeda operatives to plan terrorist attacks from Iranian
territory. The New York Times reported May 26, 2003, however, that the
Rumsfeld statement was disputed by another unnamed administration
official who observed that the intercepted messages did not necessarily
refer to the Saudi bombing at all.
Former U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence on the matter say
there was never any clear evidence that any al Qaeda detainees were
being allowed to operate freely. Paul Pillar, the intelligence officer
on Iran at the time, said in an interview in 2006, `It was very fuzzy
whether they were free to do things or not.’
Lawrence Wilkerson, later chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin
Powell, recalled in an interview, `The Iran experts agreed that, even
if al Qaeda had come in and out of Iran, it didn’t mean the Iranian
government was complicit.’
Iran did hand over 225 suspected al Qaeda operatives to their country
of origin in 2003, and provided their names to the United Nations.
Saudi Arabia confirmed that Iran had repatriated suspected al Qaeda of
Saudi nationality.
Nevertheless, Bush administration officials carried out a determined
campaign of press leaks in 2003 and 2004 suggesting covert Iranian
support for al Qaeda terrorism.
A typical example of such press leaks is a CNN story on Oct. 27, 2003
quoting `U.S. intelligence officials’ as saying that the `Quds Force’
of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps `may be sheltering some al
Qaeda leaders, including its military commander, Saif al-Adel and Saad
bin Laden, son of the al Qaeda leader.’
On Mar. 24, 2003, the New York Times reported from Tel Aviv that senior
al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had `turned up in Iran’ under the
protection of Iranian security forces, according to senior Israeli and
U.S. officials.
But in the Arab-language London daily Asharq Alawsat, usually known for
its anti-Iran coverage, published an article by Mahammed Al Shafey in
2005 which quoted an internet posting by al-Adel in which he recalled
that approximately 80 percent of the group of al Qaeda operatives led
by al-Zarqawi which had fled to Iran had been arrested and the rest had
fled to Iraq.
According to Al-Adel, `The steps taken by Iran against us shook [us]
and caused the failure of 75 percent of our plan.’
The high point of the Iran-al Qaeda theme was the spate of stories in
the week before the publication of the 9/11 Commission report in July
2004, reporting that the Iranian government had facilitated the transit
of eight Sep. 11 hijackers through Iran.
But CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin said the CIA had `no evidence’
of any official Iranian approval of the transit.
In July 2005, Iran’s intelligence minister Ali Younessi said Iran had
apprehended more than 1,000 members of al Qaeda since late 2001.
Younessi said that some al Qaeda agents had taken refuge in Iranian
cities but had been arrested `because they intended to use Iranian
territory to launch terrorist strikes on other countries’.
He also referred to the arrests and trial of a number of Ansar al Islam
operatives who he said were `still in prison’.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst.
The paperback edition of his latest book, `Perils of Dominance:
Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam’, was published in
2006.