ZERO HOUR APPROACHES FOR YEREVAN: AZERBAIJANI BLITZKRIEG IS UNLIKELY
by Oleg Glashatov
Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 25, July 4 – 10, 2007, p. 3
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
July 6, 2007 Friday
War Over Karabakh
Azerbaijan prepares to fight for Nagorno-Karabakh. Will there be war?
Lieutenant General Seiran Oganjan, commander of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Defense Army and Defense Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, is the
new Chief of the General Staff of the Armenian regular army. His
appointment indicates that the government of Armenia is seriously
upset by Azerbaijan’s militant statements. Otherwise, it would hardly
be necessary to transfer a combat general from a familiar region of
potential hostilities to the capital of Armenia.
Oganjan will be required to focus the Armenian military’s "brain
center" on planning specific measures to repel a potential attack, and
improving combined troops management mechanisms for the Armenian Armed
Forces and the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army. Unfortunately, there
is still no reassurance for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on that issue.
The newly appointed chief of the General Staff clearly understands
what kind of losses may be incurred if forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Defense Army are withdrawn unilaterally from the "safety belt"
territories and the defense system established in those territories is
eliminated. Nevertheless, the view in Yerevan is that Armenia should
be prepared to take this step since Nagorno-Karabakh talks have been
under way for years but their outcome remains unpredictable.
The current front-line configuration is optimal for Yerevan. The
southern flank of the Artsakh front is covered by the Iranian border,
the northern by the inaccessible Mrava mountain range. To the east,
as far as the Araks, Armenian troops are manning a well-fortified
border with several lines of defense. Harsh as it may sound, the
border is fairly effective.
Azerbaijani military experts claim that almost 5,000 soldiers
of the national army died there in episodes of violation of the
Azerbaijani-Armenian cease-fire accord (signed in Bishkek on May 12,
1994) and of other causes (explosions of landmines, and so on). The
death-toll was particularly heavy between 1995 and 2000 (over 2,000
servicemen and officers). Over 200 soldiers and officers of the
Azerbaijani regular army died between 2000 and the present.
If the territories of six districts captured by Armenia in the
Nagorno-Karabakh war are returned to Azerbaijan, leaving only
he Lachi corridor, the common front-line between the two Armenian
states and Azerbaijan, including Nakhichevan, would increase by over
450 kilometers, to 1,100 kilometers. The length of the front-line
between Artsakh and Azerbaijan would increase from 150 kilometers to
360 kilometers. What would this imply? In order to provide reliable
cover for a substantially longer front-line, Armenia would have to
mobilize substantial resources – both human and financial resources.
There is a fairly high risk that the Nagorno-Karabakh territories may
be returned to Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction by force. Several possible
scenarios have been considered. The opinion of Azerbaijani military
expert Uzeir Jafarov reflects the mood of a large group of Azerbaijani
politicians. "If the order to liberate Nagorno-Karabakh by force of
arms is issued tomorrow, I don’t think it would be too difficult,"
Jafarov said. "Funding for our Armed Forces in 2007 is equivalent to
$1.1 billion, and we should consider how all this money can be spent
in a rational way."
Indeed, Azerbaijan’s militarization is proceeding at a rapid rate.
Azerbaijan has started intensive purchases of long-range rocket
and artillery systems. In recent years, it has purchased 12 Smerch
multiple rocket launcher systems from the Ukraine. With a range of up
to 70 kilometers, these systems can be fired from far in the rear to
strike across large areas. In 2002, Azerbaijan purchased 36 M-46 130-mm
artillery pieces from Bulgaria. The Ukraine supplied 72 MT-12 100-mm
anti-tank weapons, and Georgia supplied six SU-25 ground-strafers in
the same year.
On March 29, 2007, the Azerbaijani Air Force tested the MIG-29s
supplied by the Ukraine. Azerbaijani experts say that the United
States has modernized seven military airfields in Azerbaijan. Some
T-72 tanks have been purchased from Slovakia and the Ukraine. In 2005,
Belarus officially announced the sale of nineteen T-72s to Azerbaijan.
If the hostilities move into the mountain areas, this would mean an
enhanced role for mortars which are very effective in this terrain.
Azerbaijan is striving to build up superiority in these weapons as
well. It has bought Nona systems which may be used as howitzers and
mortars with a vertical alignment angle of up to 80 degrees.
According to the Stockholm International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Azerbaijan currently has 26 Nona systems.
Azerbaijan makes multiple rocket launchers and ordnances for them,
as well as mortars and some munitions. Certain difficulties are
encountered with the repair facilities for armored vehicles. What
facilities existed in Soviet Azerbaijan failed to last for long.
Azerbaijan has been compelled to enlist the services of the former
Russian 142nd Repair Plant of the former Caucasus Military District
in Tbilisi or send its armored vehicles for repairs in the Ukraine
since the Nagorno-Karabakh war. As a matter of fact, the situation
is some other sectors of the military industry is similar. Strictly
speaking, the republic cannot expect to develop the ability to produce
or repair sophisticated and complicated military hardware in the
foreseeable future.
For obvious reasons, official data on the military hardware balance
between opposing sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict area cannot
reflect the true picture. According to independent sources, however,
the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan have a total of 95,000 personnel: 85,000
in the Ground Forces, 8,000 in the Air Force and Antiaircraft Forces,
and 2,000 in the Navy. Azerbaijan also has a National Guard (2,500
men), Interior Ministry police troops (12,000), and Border Guards
(5,000). The Ground Forces have 292 tanks, 706 armored vehicles,
405 artillery pieces and mortars, 75 BM-21 multiple rocket launcher
systems, and 370 anti-tank rocket launchers. The Air Force has
61 combat aircraft and 46 auxiliary aircraft and helicopters. Its
main airbases are at Kyurdamir, Zeinalabdin (equipped with a NATO
air traffic monitoring system), Dallyar, Gyandzha, and Kala. The
Antiaircraft Forces include four air defense brigades, one air defense
regiment, and two separate radar battalions. They are equipped with
S-200, S-125, S-75 (35 launchers), Krug, and Osa air defense complexes.
The Azerbaijani Navy has a brigade of surface combatants (a division of
patrol ships, a division of landing ships, a division of minesweepers,
a division of the search and rescue services, a division of training
vessels), a territorial waters security brigade, a marines battalion,
an intelligence and special assignment center, and coast guard
units. The Navy has a total of 14 warships and patrol boats and 22
auxiliary vessels but not all of them are serviceable at present due to
various technical problems and a shortage of experienced specialists.
How do the Armenian Armed Forces compare? They have a total of
53,500 personnel (56,000, according to other estimates) including
nearly 45,000 men in the Ground Forces, approximately 3,900 in the
Antiaircraft Forces, and up to 700 in the Air Force. The Armenian
Ground Forces have eight operational-tactical rocket launchers,
198 T-72 tanks, 338 armored personnel carrier and infantry fighting
vehicles, 360 field artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket
launcher systems, around 160 100-mm guns for firing on ground targets,
55 air defense launcher systems (S-75s, S-125s, Krugs, Osas), and two
divisions of S-300 antiaircraft complexes. The Air Force has seven
aircraft (six SU-25s and a MIG-25), 12 combat helicopters (seven
MI-24s, three MI-24Ks, and two MI-24Rs), and 26 auxiliary aircraft
(two L-39s, 16 MI-2s, and eight MI-8MTs).
Like the Armenian Armed Forces, the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army is
well-trained and well-equipped. It has between 18,500 and 20,000
officers and soldiers with 220,000 to 30,000 reserve personnel for
mobilization. The Ground Forces have up to 16,000 men across eight
defense districts. According to various sources, the Ground Forces
have between 177 and 316 tanks, between 256 and 324 armored vehicles,
219 to 322 artillery pieces and mortars including up to 26 BM-21
multiple rocket launcher systems. The Air Force has up to 250 personnel
with two SU-25s, four MI-24s, and up to five other helicopters. The
Antiaircraft Forces are based on air defense weapons transferred from
Armenia. The air defense center in Stepanakert has one S-125 system,
four Krug launchers, eight OSA-AK systems, and four mobile ZSU-23-4
antiaircraft guns.
Defense experts say that even though the armed forces of Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh are smaller than the Azerbaijani Armed Forces,
they are more combat-capable. This is particularly applicable to
the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army which is relatively mobile and
compact and whose officers have combat experience. By mobilizing 100%
of Nagorno-Karabakh war veterans, it can operate as small autonomous
units in mountain terrain.
Speaking at John Hopkins University in Washington, US Council on
Foreign Relations analyst Wayne Merry noted that Azerbaijan cannot
win even though military options for resolving the conflict are
being discussed openly in Azerbaijan. He is of the opinion that
Nagorno-Karabakh is an impregnable fortress, further strengthened
by Armenian forces and that even the US Army would have difficulty
attacking this fortress. According to the analyst, this is also the
prevalent view in the Pentagon.
Azerbaijan in the meantime takes an entirely different view of the
situation. Zahir Oruj, a member of the Defense and Security Committee
of the republican parliament, says, "Armenia can only be superior
to us in the capacities it gains from bilateral military agreements
with Russia and participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization. For all other parameters and resources, Azerbaijan is
superior to Armenia, at least in military terms."
Hostilities could resume in several ways. In almost every scenario,
they would be started either by Azerbaijan or by dubious international
structures that specialize in the promotion of the West’s interests
in this region (such as the International Crisis Group). The most
immediately relevant scenario could involve the United States attacking
Iran, and Azerbaijan taking advantage of the chaos to make an attempt
at sorting out the Nagorno-Karabakh problem once and for all. However,
Azerbaijan could hardly expect substantial military support in these
circumstances from either the United States (it would be too busy
elsewhere) or Turkey (which might confine its participation in the
conflict to sending volunteers).
All of the above leads to the following conclusion: Azerbaijan is
unlikely to succeed with a blitzkrieg in the immediate future. The
time factor will be decisive in this situation as it is in most modern
conflicts. Moreover, if hostilities do break out, Russia’s political
obligations would come into effect: Armenia is an ally within the
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Consequently, Moscow is
likely to make every effort to see that this conflict is resolved by
diplomatic or other means.