Author: Torgomian Varazdat

Georgia, too, followed a similar path. Former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia led protests and demonstrations which, against the backdrop of the Soviet Union’s collapse, culminated in the restoration of Georgian independence. Gamsakhurdia did not last long, however. Opposition grew to his dictatorial tendencies. He sought to repress South Ossetian nationalism which he accused the Kremlin of encouraging. Ultimately, a Russian-backed coup unseated Gamsakhurdia after less than a year in office, and he died under mysterious circumstances in exile less than two years later. Former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze became president. He understood the need to balance relations between Russia and the United States, although he encouraged NATO’s eastward expansion and sought to orient Georgia more in the Western camp. Ultimately, in 2003, after parliamentary elections which international observers deemed fraudulent, protestors in the so-called “Rose Revolution” forced Shevardnadze’s resignation. Mikheil Saakashvili, a leader of the revolution, dominated subsequent polls winning 96 percent in an election with more than 82 percent turnout. Saakashvili interpreted his landslide as a mandate to more firmly tie Georgia to the West. Putin despised Saakashvili and, in 2008, intervened directly in support of both Abkazian and South Ossetian secession efforts. The Russian occupation kneecapped Saakashvili’s ambitions and his popularity plummeted. In 2013, after losing a parliamentary election, Saakashvili fled Georgia and subsequently moved to Ukraine where he renounced his Georgian citizenship in order to avoid extradition on corruption and abuse-of-power charges. In the post-Saakashvili-era, Georgia returned to a more balanced foreign policy deferential to Kremlin sensitivities and red lines. 

Armenia, perhaps culturally the closest country in the Caucasus to Russia, has followed the same pattern. Former journalist turned politician Nikol Pashinyan shot to power against the backdrop in 2018 of mass protests against attempts by Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia’s long-time prime minister, to extend his term. Pashinyan sought greater foreign policy neutrality. While he did nothing either to challenge Russia’s influence in Armenia or the presence of the Russian base in Gyumri, both his willingness to cultivate the West and his rise in a people power revolution were deeply offensive to Putin for whom such uprisings are a nightmare scenario. 

Armenians may be disappointed that Russia did little to protect them against the Azerbaijani and Turkish onslaught in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh War but, in hindsight, protecting Armenia—and especially the self-declared Artsakh Republic in Nagorno-Karabakh—was secondary to reinforcing a lesson the Kremlin had previously applied to Azerbaijan and Georgia: Democratic revolutions may bring short-term political freedom, but they also lead to territorial loss and an erosion of sovereignty.

In contrast, Putin has shown that dictatorships and counter-revolutionary regimes succeed where their democratic predecessors fail. Elchibey in Azerbaijan, Saakashvili in Georgia, and now Pashinyan in Armenia all assumed office amidst popular acclaim. All presided over significant territorial loss—Elchibey to Armenia, Saakashvili to Russian-backed forced, and Pashinyan to Azerbaijan. Both Elchibey and Saakashvili ended their political careers in exile and disgrace and, if opposition parties in Armenia have their way, Pashinyan may not be far behind.