Author: Torgomian Varazdat

The socio-economic crisis was one of the causes of the disintegration of centralized governments in Syria and Iraq in 2011 and the emergence of radical militants in rural areas. These militants were motivated by anger towards the urban elite, who for decades neglected rural areas. As civil wars and political instability hit Syria and Iraq, many young rural people were recruited by these groups, who were financed by regional countries or non-state actors. In 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was founded with the aim to establish an Islamic kingdom (caliphate) in the region. ISIS was a transnational militant Islamist terrorist group that by 2014 had occupied huge areas in Iraq and Syria and declared its “Islamic Caliphate.” Its militants were responsible for the Yezidi genocide that took place in August 2014 in Northern Iraq and the killing and deportation of thousands of Christians and Muslims. After the dissolution of ISIS in late 2019, the movement went underground, yet today it is taking advantage of the financial crisis in Syria and making a comeback.

The emergence of ISIS was one of the main reasons that Russia directly intervened in the Syrian conflict. As many ISIS recruits were from the North Caucasus, Russia was concerned about the return of radical militants to the Caucasus. Iran had similar concerns then about the expansion of ISIS to its borders and created pro-Iranian militias to fight these terrorist groups. Meanwhile Turkey, taking advantage of the battles between ISIS and Kurdish militants in Northern Syria, pushed its military expansion to contain and prevent the establishment of any Kurdish political entity near its southern border. What could happen to the region if ISIS re-emerges, and what will be its impact on developments in the South Caucasus? 

Socio-Economic Crisis in Syria

According to Syrian political economy expert Joseph Daher, the “currency devaluation and inflation in Syria have triggered a devastating cost of living crisis.” Faced with severe inflation, the Syrian Central Bank devalued the official exchange rate in July for the third time in 2023, from 6,532 Syrian lira to 8,542 Syrian lira to the USD. In the black market, it is traded for 13,000 Syrian lira. This depreciation caused panic in local markets, with rising prices forcing many shops to close to prevent further losses. 

This economic crisis has not just hit the government-controlled areas. A similar crisis is unfolding under the Kurdish and rebel-held zones. In the northeast, the Kurdish-controlled Autonomous Administration announced that by the end of July, it will pay the salaries of its employees according to the USD exchange rate. In the northwest, the “Syrian Salvation Government,” which is controlled by Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham (former Jubhat al Nusra/al Qaida), has permitted the use of USD in trade, as the Turkish lira, which was previously used as the main currency for trade, is facing a new collapse. 

Observers and local analysts argue that this may trigger a new wave of the emergence of terrorist movements, drawing in young people frustrated by the crisis. 

The first photos of Armenian Genocide Memorial Church in Der Zor blown up by ISIS emerged on Sept. 24, 2014.

Is ISIS Making a Comeback?

A few weeks ago, I met an old friend who is a Kurdish official from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK) based in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq. The official said that in recent months there have been very active ISIS activities in Iraq near the Syrian border. Civilians are forbidden from visiting certain zones in Iraq due to security concerns. On the other hand, pro-Iranian militias are refusing to merge with the army, creating parallel security institutions. The inability to merge all the remaining militias within the army is hindering the establishment of a strong and centralized security institution to contain the emergence of terrorist groups. Furthermore, underground militant groups affiliated with ISIS may reemerge, as they are profiting from illegal smuggling near the Iraqi-Syrian border.

Despite the fact that in March 2019, ISIS lost the last territory it held in Syria to the Kurdish fighters allied with the U.S., sleeper cells continue to carry out deadly attacks against both Kurdish fighters and government forces. These cells are active in the desert province of Deir ez Zor bordering Iraq. The province is divided into two zones: the northern zone is administered by the Kurds with the presence of U.S. troops, while the southern zone is governed by the Syrian government and the presence of Russian soldiers and Iranian-affiliated fighters. 

On August 11, ISIS militants ambushed a bus carrying Syrian soldiers in the above-mentioned desert province, killing at least 20 and wounding others. The group named Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as its new leader this month. Abu Hafs al Hashimi is a militant and the fifth and current caliph of ISIS. He was named as caliph on August 3, 2023, in an audio message by the spokesperson of ISIS, Abu Huthaifa al-Ansari. The announcement came four months after the killing of his predecessor Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi in northwestern Syria by fighters loyal to Turkey. Little is known about Abu Hafs al Hashimi, but Western media reports have mentioned that he played a key role in the Yezidi genocide and spent time in a U.S.-run prison, while Syrian media say that he is local from Deir ez Zor desert, where local Sunni tribes live. 

ISIS has also intensified its activities by freeing ISIS members from jail and forming contacts with ideologically similar movements such as the “Guardians of Religion,” who have their stronghold in the mountains of Idlib bordering Turkey. 

The Political and Regional/International Implications of ISIS’s Revival

The political situation in Syria is also feeding the re-emergence of ISIS. Politically, Syria is becoming a new battleground between Russia and the U.S. Moscow is concerned that the U.S. may open a new front in Syria against Russia to deviate the Kremlin’s military attention from Ukraine. On the other hand, according to political analyst Maria Maalouf, there is a growing political consensus in Washington that “Russia and Iran are aiming to kick the U.S. troops from Syria”. In June 2023, the Washington Post published a “leaked classified intelligence document” according to which “Iran and its allies are building and training forces to use more powerful armor-piercing roadside bombs intended specifically to target U.S. military vehicles and kill U.S. personnel” in Syria. 

At present, the strategic military balance in Syria between the U.S. and Russia favors Moscow. The number of American troops there is around 900, most of whom are contractors, while Russia has at least 6,000 soldiers, including Wagner fighters. Russia and Iran (through its militias such as Hezbollah) control vast areas of Syria, which they administer jointly with the Syrian government. Meanwhile, the U.S. operates in northeastern Syria under the Kurdish administration, and Turkey operates in northwestern Syria, mainly in Idlib.

Iranians and Russians have concerns about the presence of the U.S. troops not just for geopolitical but also for geo-economic reasons. During my visit to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, many Iranian experts raised concerns that one of the key obstacles to linking the Levant to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is the presence of U.S. troops and their control of key strategic roads connecting Iraq to Syria. For Iran, connecting Tehran to Baghdad and then to Damascus via future railways requires the removal of U.S. troops so that Iran and Russia can have highway access to the Eastern Mediterranean.

By connecting key players in a geopolitically and geo-economically strategic region, the Russian-backed INSTC and the Iranian-backed Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus railway have the potential to promote regional interconnectivity and defuse political tensions between regional states. The recent Iranian-Saudi and Syrian-Saudi rapprochement and negotiations show that the region is heading towards a “shy” collaborative mood, actively seeking economic development and openness instead of conflict. 

In the meantime, conflicts between the Kurds and the Turkish army could jeopardize stability. Recently, the Turkish army has escalated its military operations against Kurdish militias (mainly YPG in northeastern Syria and PKK in northern Iraq). According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, there have been more than 665 Turkish airstrikes and drone strikes in northern Iraq and Syria in the first half of 2023. Most of these targets were Kurdish officials and fighters. 

It is important for the U.S. to de-escalate tensions between the Kurds and the Turks and cut the road that connects the Syrian-Iraqi border where Iranian militias are in control. 

Impact on South Caucasus

The socio-economic situation and the political atmosphere in Syria and Iraq can create the grounds for the re-emergence of ISIS and radical groups to launch attacks against government positions. These groups can also be used by international and regional actors to push their agendas and contain their rivals. Turkey’s intensified attacks against the Kurds could give a green light to Russia and Iran to minimize U.S. influence in northeastern Syria. Amid this complex situation, another volatile region may be affected by instability in Syria – the South Caucasus. 

A new wave of terrorism and instability in Syria will have repercussions in the South Caucasus, where the possibility of a new round of clashes around Artsakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan increases amid Azerbaijan’s ongoing blockade of the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor and the humanitarian catastrophe in Artsakh. Baku may take advantage of the new developments in Syria and the shift of attention of the regional actors Russia, Turkey and Iran from the South Caucasus to launch a new escalation. 

Ararat Mirzoyan addresses U.N. Security Council (Armenia Foreign Ministry, August 16)

Armenia called on the United Nations to prevent genocide in blockaded Artsakh during an emergency meeting convened by the U.N. Security Council today.

“I do believe that this distinguished body, despite geopolitical differences, has the capacity to act as a genocide prevention body and not a genocide commemoration body when it might be too late,” Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said. 

The meeting was scheduled following an appeal from the government of Armenia to address the “deterioration of the humanitarian situation” in Artsakh. Azerbaijan’s blockade of Artsakh has been ongoing since December 12, 2022, when government-sponsored protesters posing as eco-activists closed the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor, the sole route connecting Artsakh with Armenia and the rest of the world. The blockade was tightened on April 23, 2023, when Azerbaijan set up an illegal military checkpoint along the corridor, placing all movement between Armenia and Artsakh under the control of Azerbaijani border guards. 

Artsakh leadership and international actors have warned that the humanitarian crisis in Artsakh is deteriorating significantly. Food, medicine and other basic supplies, which were already limited due to the blockade, have dwindled since Azerbaijani border guards barred deliveries of humanitarian aid in mid-June, which were previously supplied by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Russian peacekeeping mission. Azerbaijan has also blocked the ICRC from transporting patients requiring medical assistance to Armenia several times in the past two months.  

Several U.N. Security Council member countries called for the immediate resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries to Artsakh by the ICRC. 

“It is incumbent on the parties not to impede or politicize any principled humanitarian efforts,” said Edem Wosornu, the director of operations and advocacy of the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “Responding to humanitarian needs is not an act of legitimization of recognition. It does not take sides, and it does not yield to political influence,” Wosornu said, calling for humanitarian aid deliveries “through any available routes.”

The Azerbaijani government has proposed delivering humanitarian assistance to Artsakh via its territory through the Azerbaijani-controlled city Agdam. Artsakh’s leadership has rejected this offer, stating that there can be no alternative to reopening the Berdzor Corridor. 

Several member countries noted the possibility of delivering humanitarian aid via Agdam during today’s U.N. Security Council meeting. Dmitry Polyanskiy, deputy permanent representative of Russia to the U.N., said his country supports the use of alternative routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid, particularly the “opening of a parallel corridor through Agdam and Lachin for the movement of civilians and cargo.”

Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the United States ambassador to the U.N., acknowledged the “possibility of compromise on additional routes for humanitarian supplies.” “Neutral, impartial, humane and independent humanitarian access and assistance, including medical transfers, must not be hindered, full stop,” she said. 

Silvio Gonzato, deputy head of the European Union delegation to the U.N., said that the EU has “taken note of the expressed readiness of Azerbaijani authorities to supply goods via the city Agdam. However, this should not be seen as an alternative to the opening of the Lachin Corridor.” 

Yashar Aliyev, permanent representative of Azerbaijan to the U.N., accused Armenia of rejecting the offer to deliver goods through Agdam, which he called evidence of Armenia’s “political hypocrisy.” “If Armenia were genuinely concerned about ordinary residents of the region, it would have never objected to the usage of the Agdam-Khankendi [Stepanakert] road,” Aliyev said. 

He claimed that international actors, including Russian peacekeepers and the ICRC, had reached an agreement to open traffic along this road. However, the agreement did not materialize due to Armenia’s objections. 

Mirzoyan said that there is “no alternative” to the Lachin Corridor, which he called the “agreed link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”

Mirzoyan also quoted former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno Ocampo’s expert opinion from August 7 arguing that genocide is already underway in Artsakh. “There are no crematories, and there are no machete attacks. Starvation is the invisible Genocide weapon. Without immediate dramatic change, this group of Armenians will be destroyed in a few weeks,” Ocampo warned. 

Just one day prior to the U.N. Security Council meeting, the first case of death by starvation was recorded in Artsakh since the start of the region’s ongoing blockade by Azerbaijan.

Hemodialysis patients in Stepanakert (Artsakh Health Ministry)

40-year-old Karo Hovhannisyan died of “chronic malnutrition” and “protein and energy deficiency,” the Artsakh Human Rights Defender’s Office said on August 15. The office attributed his death to the “catastrophic consequences of the ongoing eight-month blockade of Artsakh by Azerbaijan.”

It added that the blockade primarily affected the “health situation of the most vulnerable groups in society – children, pregnant women, people with chronic diseases, people with disabilities and older persons.”

Health conditions have been deteriorating among Artsakh’s population. The Artsakh Health Ministry attributes worsening health indicators to the shortage of medicine and medical supplies, inadequate nutrition, stress, suspension of scheduled surgeries and restricted access to medical care in Armenia, all caused by the blockade. 

The Health Ministry has warned that medical supplies needed for hemodialysis will run out before the end of the month. The ministry appealed to the ICRC to conduct emergency evacuations of hemodialysis patients to specialized facilities in Armenia, warning that patients can die after a week of not receiving necessary treatment for kidney failure. Of the 41 patients receiving hemodialysis, 29 were evacuated to Armenia as of August 15. The remaining patients refused to be transferred, either because they have minor children at home or they are wheelchair-bound.

“I am bedridden. I have a caregiver at home. I want to live,” said 64-year-old Vera Hovsepyan, who has been receiving hemodialysis for the past five years. “I can’t go to Yerevan in this state and receive treatment, because I want to die in my wheelchair here in Artsakh and be buried in my own cemetery.”

“Patients who suffer from the terminal stage of acute and chronic kidney failure have been severely affected by the blockade as they can’t follow a special diet, adding additional dangers for their life and health,” said Kristine Avagimyan, head of the hemodialysis department at the Stepanakert hospital. 

Other health indicators have also worsened significantly since the start of the blockade, especially since June, when Azerbaijan prohibited the delivery of humanitarian aid to the region.

Deaths due to cardiovascular diseases more than doubled in July compared to the same month last year, according to official data. 

Deaths caused by malignant neoplasms, or cancerous tumors, have increased by more than 15-percent so far in 2023 compared to the same time period last year. Newly diagnosed cases of malignant neoplasms have increased by more than 24-percent. Health authorities attribute this data to the shortage of medication, changes in quality of life and severe limitations on adequate medical assistance. 

The incidence of strokes has increased by 26-percent, and heart attacks, by nearly 10-percent. 

Pregnant women have been especially vulnerable to the detrimental effects of the blockade on the healthcare system. Health officials have recorded cases of anemia among 90-percent of pregnant women under medical observation this year. This is a result of inadequate nutrition and a shortage of medication. 

There has also been an increase in the number of stillbirths. Most recently, a pregnant woman in the Haterk village of the Martakert region could not reach the hospital in time, due to the fuel shortage for ambulances, and lost her baby.

“The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Artsakh warns that in the event of the continued full siege of Artsakh by Azerbaijan, the mentioned and other indicators will further worsen, leading to the loss of many lives or a deterioration in their health,” the Artsakh Health Ministry said on August 8.

ICRC vehicles in Stepanakert (NKR InfoCenter)