KOSOVO: REVENGE OF CNN AND POLITICS OF EMOTION
By Michael Radu
ISN
April 8 2008
Switzerland
What started a decade ago as a policy of emotions based on CNN’s
lachrymose images has boomeranged into a smoldering fire in
Southeastern Europe, Michael Radu writes for FPRI.
To paraphrase Talleyrand, the invention and recognition of a "state"
called Kosovo by the United States and Brussels in February was worse
than gross ignorance, it was a mistake.
Every Western political delusion since the end of the Cold War
was at the root of the disaster, and, to make matters worse, those
delusions have been shared by otherwise unlikely partners: the Clinton
administration and George Bush, the usually anti-American Europeans,
the "human rights" establishment and "progressive" media here and
in Europe.
A brief analysis makes it clear that there is and should not be a
state named "Kosovo."
The initial motivation for NATO’s (read America’s) 1999 intervention
in Kosovo, stopping "genocide," was based on false premises and images,
largely created by CNN and similar media outlets, and vocally supported
by the "human rights" chorus led by Amnesty International and the like.
There was no genocide in any serious definition. There was a massive,
disproportionate Serbian military response to the sporadic and often
indiscriminate attacks against authorities and civilians by a ragtag
combination of Leninists, Maoists, thugs, drug runners and misguided
members of the Albanian diaspora, going under the grand name of Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA).
It took a combination of overexcited CNN sympathizers of the Albanian
secessionist cause, a mass exodus of scared Albanians, and a skilled
Albanian lobby in Washington to convince a human rights-obsessed
Clinton administration that a new Auschwitz was in the making.
Most Europeans at the time, even more influenced by their human rights
lobbies and put off by the Serbs’ old-fashioned use of religious and
historic arguments for their claim on Kosovo, supported the military
intervention – mostly by holding our coat.
Kosovo, a bit larger than Delaware but, with 2.4 million people (in
2001), three times the population, has proclaimed its statehood, the
newest and so far the latest "country" created on the ruins of the
former Yugoslavia. Other than the stubborn support of the majority
Albanians, it has none of the basic necessary qualifications of
statehood – functioning institutions, human or natural resources,
ethnic and historic arguments.
Nonetheless, Washington and most European countries are prepared
to take the bet that somehow Kosovo will be something else – say,
a Luxembourg or Monaco. Is this serious? And if not, as common sense
and experience suggest, why the pressure to take the bet, indeed why
the decade-long encouragement of such development?
To begin with, as far as Washington is concerned, the blame is clearly
bipartisan, with Democrats like Richard Holbrooke being and remaining
staunchly and indiscriminately pro-Albanian for more than a decade,
and the Bush administration mysteriously following the same misguided
path. True enough, some Republican veterans of foreign affairs,
such as former secretary of state and former ambassador to Belgrade
Lawrence Eagleburger, do know better and have made their opposition
clear, but they remain a minority.
It is very hard, if not impossible, to have much sympathy for the
Serbs, now claiming the role of victims in Kosovo after years of
overreacting to excessive Albanian demands there; it is even harder
to do so now, after an opportunistic Russia decided to support
Belgrade’s position and to suddenly become a stalwart defender of
"national integrity."
That, after more than a decade of supporting illegal, indeed
Mafioso-type secessionist regions of Transnistria in Moldova, South
Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
It is clear that Russia supports Serbia’s hopeless claim to Kosovo
out of sheer hypocrisy – and a more general policy of showing the West
that Moscow is to be taken seriously again, after its internationally
weak presence since the end of the Soviet Union.
Simply put, Moscow is right on Kosovo for all the wrong and dishonest
reasons – but correct nonetheless. As they say, even a broken clock
is right twice a day.
Washington is politically, ideologically and strategically mistaken
on Kosovo for all the "right" reasons. The Albanian lobby in the
US managed to convince enough members of Congress of their "right"
cause ever since the late 1990s, to earn uncritical sympathy for
Albanian "victimhood" at Serb hands, to convince them of their alleged
"right," historically unheard of, to independence; so that Washington
is now the main engine behind the international bandwagon to recognize
Kosovo’s statehood.
The Europeans – Spain, Slovakia, Romania all knowledgeable of or
threatened by separatism and reluctant subscribers to a "common"
policy of recognition for Kosovo’s independence aside – are ready to
be bullied by larger Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
The Serbs’ lack of an organized (or large) diaspora in the West and
their steady preference for unsavory politicians, like Milosevic,
did not help their cause either.
Now that things seem to be decided – in the West as much as in
the capital of Pristina, and in a Moscow determined to oppose
independence, including at the United Nations – what next? The answers
are disturbingly negative.
Even today, after the sad examples of artificially created and failed
postcolonial countries (mostly in Africa), it remains unfashionable
to admit that there are unviable states.
Nevertheless, if there is a case study of such an unpromising future
"state," Kosovo is the one. Perhaps, with Kosovo being in Europe, the
usual obstacle to a serious assessment of political dysfunctionality
and economic backwardness elsewhere – the Pavlovian accusation of
"racism" – may finally be purged from serious public debate. That
would be good news.
Ethnically, after the massive expulsion of most non-Albanians following
the 1999 NATO intervention (which, ironically, was conducted to
prevent "ethnic cleansing" of Albanians by Serbs), the population
is now 95 percent or more ethnic Albanian. Worse still, the large
Macedonian ethnic Albanian areas and the smaller Albanian majority
regions of Montenegro and Serbia’s Presevo, Bujanovac and Medveda are
all already infiltrated by irredentists from or supported by Kosovo
Albanians. It does not require much imagination to see a collapsing
Kosovo "state’ seek a diversion in demanding "human rights" for ethnic
kin – i.e. encouraging secessionism in those areas.
Ethnic homogeneity may be helpful, but only when complete, and
that is not the case, not with Serbian enclaves around Pristina,
the second-largest town, Prizren and, especially in the northern
border region of Mitrovica – on the Serbian border and functioning
as a de facto province of Serbia, complete with common currency,
communication and economic ties. All of this, notwithstanding NATO’s
dubious promise of protection for the Serbs outside Mitrovica,
amounts to certain trouble, and it came on 17 March.
By itself, Kosovo, always the poorest area, despite massive subsidies
from the rest of the former Yugoslavia, is an economic basket case.
Its few and now mostly closed mines remain the only possible source
of income, other than European and American economic aid. The Trepka
mining complex of lignite, lead, zinc and nickel happens to be of
dubious economic value now and, on top of that, is located in the
Serbian majority area of Northern Kosovo.
In theory, of course, the extraordinary Serbian 14th-century
monasteries of Peæ, Decani and Gracani, with their valuable interior
and exterior late-Byzantine frescoes, could be major tourist
attractions – for Serbs and the Orthodox, all unlikely visitors to
an Albanian Muslim-majority site – not to mention their possible
destruction by local Albanians.
The rest of the would-be state’s revenues come from the diaspora’s
remittances and, even more, from the only flourishing "industry" –
organized crime. That is mostly centered on international prostitution
rings, narcotics (heroin) and smuggling of arms, cigarettes and other
items, bring the Kosovars into competition, often deadly, with their
Albanian kin and explain the latter’s reluctance to accept Kosovo as a
normal part of their country. All these realities should also be seen
on the background of Europe’s largest population growth rate by far!
Kosovo Albanians have consistently demonstrated their allegiance
to the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), even though that
organization never amounted to anything but a glorified armed mafia,
inept and ineffective against the Serbian military prior to 1999, but
very good at public relations (at home, in Europe and in Washington)
and nationalist propaganda.
The latest elections, in November 2007, in fact brought the KLA and
its leader Hashim Thaci to power in Pristina. Thaci was a founder
of the 1993 People’s Movement of Kosovo (LPK), a Switzerland-based
"political party" seeking a greater Albania. A very probably
dysfunctional Kosovo state would naturally seek a greater cause – by
supporting irredentist causes in neighboring countries, or unification
with the mother country, Albania. We have seen that movie before –
dysfunctional Somalia still seeking annexation of regions of Ethiopia
or, worse still, Chechnya during its de facto independence in 1996-99
seeking an Islamist Northern Caucasus and thus provoking another war.
In a nutshell, this is the likely future of Kosovo – a resentful,
poor and well armed area with a population 90 percent Muslim. And
that is the trouble, as we have seen, in part, in neighboring Bosnia
and Chechnya – poverty, an international criminal established link,
a sense of victimhood (real or imagined) and transnational connections
inevitably attract, like moths to a lamp, international jihadis. Of
course, we are told, Albanians are pro-American, a rare case in
today’s Europe.
But that could change. Indeed, Albanians were pro-Ottoman when it fit
their interests, pro-Nazis during World War II without being Nazis,
Maoists during the Tito years of old Yugoslavia and so on. Now they
are pro-American because the GIs and Secretary Condoleezza Rice seem
to offer them more than anybody else – but all that could, indeed
will, change once circumstances change. Albanians are no different
from anyone else, especially in the Balkans.
Finally, there is the cost. Many Americans complain about the cost
of the Iraq war, but few even mention the cost of the US presence in
and aid to Kosovo, an area of no strategic interest, running in the
hundreds of millions of dollars since 1999.
As for the Europeans, they paid much more and promise more still.
NATO, i.e. Europe with some US military presence, pretends to offer
protection for the isolated Serb enclaves, for the vocal Albanians
against a possible Serb threat, and promises to prevent a likely
secession by the Mitrovica Serbs – none with much credibility.
But how about the other side – Serbia, most of its neighbors, and
Russia? As mentioned, Moscow is only accidentally, rather than morally
or legally, on the realistic side of the Kosovo issue. That is not,
as many in the West believe, because of some Orthodox solidarity
(Socialist, anti-Catholic Spain and mostly Catholic Slovakia are also
opposed to independence for Kosovo), but for practical reasons.
For the same reason Moscow sells weapons to anti-American Hugo Chavez,
protects Iran’s mullahs against western economic threats, keeps in
power Europe’s only open dictator in Belarus, etc. – because it shows
muscle. If that has to be done at the UN, so much publicity.
Second, because a Moscow-dependent and thus weak Serbia is a useful
bridgehead in Europe – just as the Transnistria enclave between Moldova
and Ukraine keeps both countries on their toes; Third, because legal
ambiguity serves Russia’s interests. If Kosovo’s situation remains
unclear, manipulation opportunities are rife – just as they are in
Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, all areas
Moscow controls and/or manipulated for years in order to dominate
neighboring former Soviet colonies.
All of this suggests that Kosovo independence is a mistake, that
support for it (indeed its creation) by the Europeans and the US is
a greater mistake, and that it should not have been done.
But what is the alternative, considering the present reality?
Clearly, the Marti Ahtisaari plan of a "supervised sovereignty"
is neither horse nor donkey, nor acceptable to anyone. More honest
and wiser would be direct support for the unification of Kosovo to
Albania – minus the Serb enclave of Mitrovica, and permanent autonomy
for historic Serb/Orthodox enclaves around historic monuments.
That would give responsibility for Kosovo to an admittedly reluctant
Albania – a country interested in becoming a NATO and European
member – rather than create a black hole in the central Balkans;
it would also create a precedent, to be sure, but a less damaging
one. Instead of mini-mafia states, responsibility would be transferred
to established ones.
True enough, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan would be happy with the
loss of a South Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh, but history and reality
should force them to live with it.
On the other hand, Transnistria is "legally" part of an artificial
Stalinist creation – "Moldova," a depressed area of sad, confused
people of Romanian ethnicity, with only one major export – people,
mostly with Romanian passports. Transnistria never was a legitimate
part of the Romanian ethnic or historic area, and Moldova’s claims
to it are as self-damaging as they are artificial.
As for Abkhazia, it is a Georgian territory occupied by Russia,
period, where the issue is foreign occupation, rather than
self-determination. Prior to the Russian-supported forced separation
and associated ethnic cleansing of Georgians, the local Abkhaz were
only 17 percent of the population.
So much for the precedents an independent Kosovo would create, and
so much for the worries in Madrid, Bratislava or Bucharest if the
issue is treated as a general problem rather than as it is now –
a balm for the allegedly victimized Albanians.
In addition, and certainly in the long term, one has to consider the
"feelings" of relevant peoples (message to Foggy Bottom!) in the
Balkans rather than of the Washington lobbyists.
The Serbs are, perhaps unique among Europeans, born with a chip on
their collective shoulder (just as Albanians are born with a victimhood
obsession), but for those who believe centuries of historical
experience are worth nothing, it should be recalled that Albanians
are unpopular with all their neighbors (Greeks, Macedonians, Serbs,
Montenegrins) and some further away – Romanians and Bulgarians. It
may not be politically correct but the general opinion of all those
is that Albanians are (even more) nationalist and violent – and that
in a historically violent and nationalist area.
Seen in this context, the recent violence in Mitrovica should be
no surprise. Whether manipulated from Serbia (as is likely) and/or
rooted in local sentiments, the fact remains that unless major force
is repeatedly applied by the foreign troops – i.e. the Europeans,
since the UN, especially without Russian and Chinese support, is
unlikely to even remain there for long – the area will secede.
Whether the Europeans have the will or even the means to use such force
is doubtful, especially as that would only offer more opportunities
for Russian involvement. At best, an ambiguous situation will develop,
with Pristina complaining, Brussels pretending that nothing serious
is happening and Serbia treating the area as its own.
Another possible scenario, equally hopeless, is that the Serbian area
of Bosnia will use the Kosovo precedent and organize a referendum to
join Serbia – especially if, as is probable, the coming parliamentary
elections of 11 May in the latter country bring nationalists to power
in Belgrade.
Then, once again, despite Washington’s claims that Kosovo is a
unique case, the options will again be heavy use of force or de facto
secession, making Bosnia even less viable than is now.
Ultimately, it appears that the Serbs have learned from the Albanian
methods: provoke reprisals, claim victimhood and raise the cost of
any solution unacceptable to them. What started a decade ago as a
policy of emotions based on CNN’s lachrymose images has boomeranged
into a smoldering fire in Southeastern Europe.
Michael Radu, PhD, is Co-Chair of FPRI’s Center on Terrorism,
Counterterrorism, and Homeland Security. He recently completed a book
manuscript on Islamism in Europe.
Reprinted with permission from Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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