History of Armenian Genocide to be taught in Massachusetts schools

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 15:34,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 14, ARMENPRESS. The history of the Armenian Genocide will be taught in middle and high schools in the U.S. state of Massachusetts after legislative amendments were passed.

A group of lawmakers had presented genocide education bill No. 692 for the Massachusetts Senate and House of Representatives approval in February 2021, and it was signed into law by the Governor on December 2, 2021.

The law will take effect from the beginning of the new academic year – July 1, 2022, the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute said in a press release.

The amendments to the compulsory education law seek “ to achieve and promote the teaching of human rights issues in all districts, with particular attention to the study of the inhumanity of genocide, including but not limited to the Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, the Famine-Genocide in Ukraine known as Holodomor, the Pontian Greek Genocide, the forcible transport of Africans to the Americas in the slave trade in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, the violence committed against indigenous people in the Americas, and more recent atrocities in Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sudan, there shall be established and set up on the books of the commonwealth a separate fund to be known as the Genocide Education Trust Fund for the purpose of educating middle and high school students on the history of genocide."

“The administration of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute welcomed the passage of the bill and sent a letter of gratitude to Senator Rodriguez. In the letter, we underscored genocide education as a preventive factor of the crime, its importance for Armenia and the Armenian nation, and expressed readiness to support the Massachusetts department of education and the state’s educational institutions with materials,” the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute said.

Kazakhstan: Putin hails CSTO potential for rapid reaction and effectiveness

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 13:04,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 10, ARMENPRESS. The CSTO showed its potential and ability to act swiftly in practice, the Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the CSTO summit on January 10.

“Our organization showed in practice its potential and ability to act swiftly, decisively and effectively. Each of the allies had their contribution in the composition of the CSTO military contingent for the implementation of the objectives,” Putin said.

Putin said that the CSTO military are training in common programs, have joint arsenals and communication.

“We developed the peacekeeping deployment skills during regular joint exercises,” Putin said.

Armenpress: Kazakhstan declares state of emergency throughout of the country

Kazakhstan declares state of emergency throughout of the country

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 21:30, 5 January, 2022

YEREVAN, 5 JANUARY, ARMENPRESS. A state of emergency has been declared throughout Kazakhstan, ARMENPRESS reports "Mir 24" TV channel informed, citing "Sputnik Kazakhstan".

According to TASS, eyewitnesses reported that protesters in Almaty seized the building of the local headquarters of the National Security Committee.

Earlier, the protesters set fire to Almaty's Branch of National TV Channel of Kazakhstan. They also stormed the former president's residence in the former capital, Almaty, as well as the Almaty administration building. Protests in Kazakhstan began on January 2 over the sharp rise in liquefied natural gas prices in the southwestern cities of Zhanaozen and Aktau. Two days later, riots broke out in Almaty, where police used light and sound grenades to disperse the crowd, as in other cities.




Turkish press: Armenia to lift embargo on Turkish goods from January

A border tower is seen in Getap, some 85 kilometers northwest of Yerevan, on the Armenian side of the Armenian-Turkish border, Nov. 1, 2009. (Reuters Photo)

The Armenian government said Thursday it has decided to lift the embargo on Turkish goods from Jan. 1. Armenia originally imposed the blockade after Ankara supported Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict last year.

"A decision was made not to extend the embargo on the import of Turkish goods into the country," the economy ministry said on Facebook.

Turkey and Armenia announced recently that steps toward normalization are being taken and that charter flights between the two countries would soon resume.

On Dec. 15, Turkey appointed Serdar Kılıç, a former ambassador to the U.S., as its special envoy to discuss steps for normalization with Armenia. Three days later, Armenia appointed its special representative for dialogue with Turkey, National Assembly Deputy Speaker Ruben Rubinyan.

Ankara also announced Moscow will host the first meeting between the two countries’ special envoys, however, no date is yet set.

The borders between the two countries have been closed for decades and diplomatic relations have been on hold.

Armenia and Turkey signed a landmark peace accord in 2009 to restore ties and open their shared border after decades, but the deal was never ratified and ties have remained tense.

Relations between Armenia and Turkey have historically been complicated. Turkey's position on the events of 1915 is that Armenians lost their lives in eastern Anatolia after some sided with the invading Russians and revolted against the Ottoman forces. The subsequent relocation of Armenians resulted in heavy casualties, as massacres carried out by militaries and militia groups from both sides increased the death toll.

Turkey objects to the presentation of the incidents as "genocide" but describes the 1915 events as a tragedy in which both sides suffered casualties.

Ankara has repeatedly proposed the creation of a joint commission consisting of historians from Turkey and Armenia and international experts to tackle the issue.

During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ankara supported Baku and accused Yerevan of occupying Azerbaijan’s territories.

Former mayor Hayk Marutyan, three other city councilors quit ruling My Step faction

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 11:22,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 28, ARMENPRESS. The former Mayor of Yerevan Hayk Marutyan and three other members of the My Step bloc of the City Council relinquished their mandates.

Mayor Hrachya Sargsyan announced at a City Council session on December 28 that Hayk Marutyan, Pavel Mazmanyan, Lilit Pipoyan and Ruben Hayrapetyan tendered their resignations as My Step councilors.

Another city councilor from My Step, Vahe Gevorgyan, also left the ruling faction but will continue serving as councilor.

RFE/RL Armenian Report – 12/20/2021

                                        Monday, December 20, 2021


Regulators Signal Rise In Electricity Prices
December 20, 2021

Armenia - A newly constructed electrical substation, October 24, 2019.


Utility regulators signaled on Monday plans to raise electricity prices in 
Armenia by an average of 10 percent.

The Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) warned that the Armenian energy 
sector will operate at an annual combined loss of 23.8 billion drams ($49 
million) if the existing prices are not revised upwards.

In a statement, the PSRC cited the need to repay $270 million in loans used for 
the recently completed modernization of the Metsamor nuclear plant. It also 
pointed to Armenia’s contractual obligation to enable Russia’s Gazprom energy 
giant to recoup investments made in a large thermal-power plant located in the 
central town of Hrazdan.

The statement revealed that the Armenian and Russian governments have reached an 
agreement that commits Yerevan to providing the Hrazdan plant with $31.8 million 
annually for the next ten years. It said in that in exchange for this subsidy 
Gazprom could keep the wholesale price of its natural gas for Armenia unchanged 
at $165 per thousand cubic meters, which is well below the current international 
levels.

The PSRC said the electricity tariffs should therefore rise by 4.7 drams (about 
1 U.S. cent) per kilowatt/hour on average. The daytime price paid by most 
Armenian households currently stands at almost 45 drams (9 cents) per 
kilowatt/hour.

The regulatory body said the tariff would remain unchanged for low-income 
families making up 11 percent of the population. They already pay significantly 
less for electricity than other individual consumers.

The latter could see their electricity bills rise by between 3 and 7 percent 
depending on the monthly amount of energy use, the PSRC statement said, adding 
that the steepest price rise should be set for businesses.

The PSRC also indicated that the higher tariffs will likely come into force on 
February 1. It said it will publicly discuss them with representatives of 
Armenia’s key power plants and electricity distribution network as well as 
consumer rights groups on Thursday.

The new energy tariffs and their knock-on effects could further push up the cost 
of living in the country. According to government data, consumer price inflation 
there rose to 9.6 percent in November, the highest rate in many years.



Pashinian Encouraged By Talks With Aliyev
December 20, 2021
        • Tatevik Lazarian

Armenia -- Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian speaks at a meeting with senior 
officials from the National Security Service, Yerevan, December 20, 2021.


Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian appeared satisfied on Monday with the results of 
his most recent talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev mediated by Russia 
and the European Union.

Aliyev and Pashinian held a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin in Sochi on November 26 before meeting twice in Brussels last week. The 
Brussels talks were organized by European Council President Charles Michel and 
French President Emmanuel Macron.

“I want to point out that after the meetings in Sochi and Brussels I see an 
opportunity for us to move step by step along the path of opening an era of 
peaceful development for our country and the region,” said Pashinian.

“At least the government of Armenia will do everything in its power to achieve 
progress in this direction,” he told senior officials of the country’s National 
Security Service (NSS).

Pashinian did not go into details of the talks. He said the NSS will have to 
cope with more serious challenges “in this new environment” but did not 
elaborate.

The first Aliyev-Pashinian meeting in Brussels lasted for than four hours. 
Michel said afterwards that the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders pledged to 
de-escalate tensions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and restore rail links 
between the two South Caucasus. But he admitted that they failed to patch up 
their differences on the status of a highway that would connect Azerbaijan to 
its Nakhichevan exclave via Armenia’s southeastern Syunik province.

Speaking just a few hours before the December 14 meeting, Aliyev said people and 
cargo passing through that “Zangezur corridor” must be exempt from Armenian 
border controls. Pashinian swiftly rejected the demand, saying that it runs 
counter to Armenian-Azerbaijani understandings reached with Russian mediation.

Aliyev described the talks as “productive” before meeting with Pashinian again 
on December 15.



Yerevan Mayor Rounds On Ruling Party
December 20, 2021
        • Harry Tamrazian

Armenia - Mayor Hayk Marutian inspects new buses purchased for Yerevan's public 
transport system, February 5, 2021.


A spokesman for Yerevan’s embattled Mayor Hayk Marutian has hit out at Armenia’s 
ruling Civil Contract party, saying that it wants to oust him because of his 
popularity.

The party headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian officially announced on 
Friday its decision to replace Marutian by one of his deputies. It controls at 
least 54 seats in Yerevan’s 65-member municipal council empowered to appoint and 
dismiss mayors.

The council is scheduled to vote on Wednesday on a motion of no confidence 
proposed by its pro-government majority.

In a statement issued after a meeting with Pashinian held on Friday, the 
majority leaders said that Marutian quit Civil Contract in December 2020 and is 
not running the Armenian capital “with sufficient efficiency.”

Marutian’s spokesman, Hakob Karapetian, dismissed on Sunday the official 
rationale for the bid to impeach him.

“Thanks to his three-year work Mayor Hayk Marutian has a quite high approval 
ratings, and I think that one must look for reasons for this whole process 
behind this fact,” he told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.

Karapetian also accused council members loyal to Pashinian of sabotaging his 
efforts to improve public transport. He said that they attempted last February 
to block the purchase of hundreds of news buses for the city.

Some council members affiliated with the My Step bloc have openly disagreed with 
the move to remove Marutian. Two of them, Grigor Yeritsian and Gayane Vartanian, 
have resigned from the city council in protest.

Yeritsian said on Monday that the mayor’s relationship with Armenia’s political 
leadership was “in tatters” even before the September 2020 outbreak of the war 
in Nagorno-Karabakh. He said that following Armenia’s defeat in the war Marutian 
did not publicize his decision to leave the ruling party at the request of 
Pashinian’s entourage.

Marutian, 45, is a former TV comedian who actively participated in the “velvet 
revolution” that brought Pashinian to power in May 2018. He was handpicked by 
Pashinian to lead My Step’s list of candidates in the last municipal elections 
held in September 2018 and won by the pro-government bloc.



More Armenian POWs Freed
December 20, 2021

Armenia - Toivo Klaar, the EU's special envoy to the South Caucasus, accompanies 
Armenian soldiers flown from Baku to Yerevan,December19, 2021


Azerbaijan freed and repatriated at the weekend ten more Armenian soldiers 
captured during deadly fighting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border that broke 
out last month.

The soldiers were flown to Yerevan by a plane chartered by the European Union. 
Toivo Klaar, the EU’s special representative to the South Caucasus, was also on 
board.

The EU said their release was the result of an agreement reached by Armenian 
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at their 
December 14 meeting in Brussels hosted by European Council President Charles 
Michel.

“An important humanitarian gesture follows the efforts by EU to work with both 
countries to build on mutual trust,” it added in a statement.

Michel said after the Brussels talks that Aliyev and Pashinian pledged to 
de-escalate tensions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and restore rail links 
between the two South Caucasus states. Aliyev described the talks as 
“productive.”

A total of three dozen Armenian soldiers were taken prisoner during the November 
16 fighting on the border which left at least 13 troops from both sides dead. 
Azerbaijan freed ten POWs on December 4.

A few days later, Armenian courts allowed the Investigative Committee to arrest 
four of them on charges of violating “rules for performing military service.” 
They will face between three and seven years in prison if convicted.

Armenian opposition figures and human rights lawyers criticized the arrests, 
saying that Baku could exploit them to further delay the release of dozens of 
other Armenian servicemen remaining in Azerbaijani captivity. Pashinian’s 
political allies dismissed these warnings.


Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2021 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

 

The promise of wealth brings Iran and Azerbaijan together after Armenia tensions

Dec 26 2021

The promise of wealth brings Iran and Azerbaijan together after Armenia tensions

Iran's shifting policy in South Caucasus can be summed up as both running with the hare and hunting with the hounds

By 

MEE correspondent

 in 

Tehran
Published date:  09:33 UTC 

Iran and Azerbaijan were quick to escalate their rhetoric when a heated war of words broke out between the two countries on the first anniversary of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Tehran accused Baku of offering its territory to Israel to spy on Iran and of deploying Syrian mercenaries in the 44-day war against Armenia. Baku accused Tehran of "briefly invading" parts of southern Azerbaijan during the war and allying with Armenia for organised drug trafficking to Europe.

As the rhetorical war continued between these two countries, which together share the highest percentage population of Shia people globally, their military show of power was also in full swing at the Iran-Azerbaijan border and the Caucasus.

Iran-Azerbaijan tensions are all about Israel and geopolitics

Read More »

In mid-September, Azerbaijan launched a joint drill with Turkey and Pakistan. Two weeks later, the Iranian official army's ground forces deployed a large number of troops at the border with Azerbaijan and held a war game. Azerbaijan took its turn a few days later and participated in another joint drill with Iran's regional rival Turkey, this time in Georgia.

However, when the dust of the war games settled, a different image of the two neighbouring countries' relationships emerged in the media.

On 28 November, the Azeri and Iranian presidents met in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, and spoke of friendship and brotherhood, shaking hands and taking photos before the cameras.

Something had changed between the two countries.

Iran, which was previously closer to Armenia, has more recently leaned towards Azerbaijan, no longer stressing its reservations about Israel-Azerbaijan ties.

Moreover, President Ebrahim Raisi's conservative government had approached Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to sign a three-way gas-swap deal.

The deal was widely hailed by Farsi media as an outstanding economic achievement, a successful move to restore relations with Azerbaijan and a hard blow to the United States' maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which started in 2018 after then-president Donald Trump violated the 2015 nuclear agreement.

"At this point, all we can say about the gas-swap deal is that it's a not-smartly-crafted performance by a new government that needs to prove itself," an energy expert at the Tehran Stock Market told Middle East Eye, on condition of anonymity.

The only official detail about the swap contract was disclosed by Iran's oil minister, Javad Oji. He said that Iran would receive between 1.5 and two billion cubic metres of gas from Turkmenistan at the Sarakhs border crossing and deliver the same amount to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan at Iran's Astara border.

'Instead of having a well-founded foreign policy in the South Caucasus, we now run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'

– Iranian diplomat

"For how long will this contract be valid? No one knows. It is only said to be a long-term contract. But not any long-term contract is necessarily a good contract," the energy expert said 

"And what is the quality of the gas we receive from Turkmenistan, compared to what we deliver to Azerbaijan?

"More importantly, what is the percentage of Iran's take from this amount of gas for delivering it to Azerbaijan?"

So far, Iran's official media have provided conflicting numbers for the percentage of the share that Iran would take from the transferred gas.

The state-run Young Journalist Club wrote that between 20 and 25 percent of the delivered gas would be allocated to Iran. Conversely, the ISNA news agency put the number as low as five percent.

"I won't be surprised if the actual number is even less than five percent. Firstly, because it was Iran that approached Turkmenistan for the deal, and secondly, due to the sanctions, we can only deal in the global market with prices much lower than actual prices," the expert stressed. 

Iran has previously applied the same tactic by offering significant discounts to its oil customers to get around the US sanctions.

"I think this contract only has political importance for the establishment. This is the price that Iran must pay to keep Azerbaijan happy," the expert concluded.

However, other sources MEE spoke to believed that influencing neighbouring countries was not Tehran's only goal for signing the gas-swap contract with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. 

The contract was signed only a few days before the resumption of negotiations in Vienna for a potential revival of the 2015 nuclear agreement following a five-month pause.

It was the first time since Raisi's victory in the June presidential election that Iran's new hardliner delegation was sitting at the negotiations table with the signatories of the nuclear deal, which was originally signed under former reformist president Hassan Rouhani.

"The hardliners, who now lead the nuclear talks, did not want to arrive empty-handed at the negotiating table," an Iranian diplomat, who worked at Iran's foreign ministry between 2005 and 2013, told MEE. 

The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media, said that, while the new negotiating team drafted the two proposals Iran presented in November during the talks, other offices at the foreign ministry attempted to improve Tehran's political relations with neighbouring countries and regional powers.

"I'm not saying that's been a successful strategy. But that's how Iran's new foreign policy will work for, at least, the next four years," he said.

The diplomat explained that Iran had lost the opportunity to maintain its influence in the Caucasus during Rouhani's administration, as Tehran was focused on negotiating with the US and improving ties with European powers.

"Through the channels we had with the foreign ministry, we warned [former foreign minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif and Rouhani over Iran's political passivity in the Caucasus, but they were overwhelmed by the talks with the West," he said. 

"And, as a result, instead of having a well-founded foreign policy in the South Caucasus, we now run with the hare and hunt with the hounds."

Nevertheless, the diplomat stressed that, since the early 1990s, the only matter that has remained intact in Iran's diplomacy in the Caucasus is its strong objection to the opening of the Zangezur transport corridor that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan.

The opening of the 21km corridor, which Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has persistently demanded following the 2020 war, would effectively cut off Iran's access to the Caucasus through Armenia. 

Despite solid opposition by Iran and Armenia to the Zangezur passageway, experts believe that if Turkey and Russia decide to permit Azerbaijan to use the corridor, neither Iran nor Armenia has the power to go against it.

'Nowadays, we can't fool Azerbaijan by offering them a gas-swap deal. Indeed, they are using our weaknesses for their benefit, and the gas deal was clear evidence for that'

– Retired Iranian diplomat

A retired Iranian diplomat, who served in Iran's foreign ministry during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988-94), told MEE that Tehran is aware of its limited influence over the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict.

"Azerbaijan counts on Turkish and Israeli military and political support," the diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, said.

"On the other side, Armenia follows what Russia decides upon, so there is not much space left for Iran to play a role. If tomorrow Russia orders Armenia to withdraw its troops from the Zangezur corridor and hand it over to the Russian peacekeepers, Armenia will do that. As they did in Karabakh to end last year's war." 

According to the veteran diplomat, even during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iran was not the most influential country in the region, and its efforts to broker a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia were unsuccessful. However, at that time Tehran could at least host the fighting neighbours for peace talks. 

"Iran's power in the Caucasus has declined gradually, since our politicians and the commanders of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps were busy exerting influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen," he said.

"Nowadays, we can't fool Azerbaijan by offering them a gas-swap deal. Indeed, they are using our weaknesses for their benefit, and the gas deal was clear evidence for that."
 

Constantine Orbelian: I believe difficulties are a thing of the past

Panorama, Armenia
Dec 25 2021

Famous Armenian conductor and pianist Constantine Orbelian has extended New Year greetings.

"Dear friends, at the end of every year we sum up our activities of the past 12 months, the failures and achievements. I hope that in spite of all the difficulties, we still managed to find the most effective solutions to certain issues,” he said in a message on Saturday.

“I am convinced that difficulties are a thing of the past. Most of all I wish Peace to my homeland, unflagging patience to our compatriots and all the prerequisites for work and creation. In loving memory of the heroes who sacrificed their lives for the homeland, I bow down before their mothers.

“Each of us must contribute to the development and strengthening of our homeland through our hard work. Each of us has dreams related to Armenia and the world, which we will definitely realize together. May 2022 be a fruitful year and may the breath of art be everywhere. Happy New Year and Merry Christmas!” reads the message.

Opposition factions turn down PM Pashinyan’s offer for “closed meeting”

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 11:00,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 23, ARMENPRESS. The opposition Hayastan and Pativ Unem factions of the Armenian parliament say they have rejected Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s offer to hold a closed meeting with him.

In a statement, the two opposition blocs said that Speaker Alen Simonyan relayed PM Pashinyan’s offer.

“[We] notified that [we] will participate in the meeting only in open, equal conditions accountable before the people – which was rejected – therefore, we reiterate our stance that closed meetings are inexpedient,” the opposition factions said in a joint statement.

Phoney peace fails to break Armenia-Azerbaijan deadlock

Dec 15 2021
Phoney peace fails to break Armenia-Azerbaijan deadlock

Since a ceasefire brought the 2020 Karabakh war to an end, peace initiatives have won only rhetorical support while the reasons driving conflict multiply.

EXPERT COMMENT

15 DECEMBER 2021

The 2020 Karabakh war was widely framed as breaking the preceding status quo of 26 years, but assessments of its transformative potential overlook the fact the war resulted in outcomes satisfying only a minority of stakeholders – Turkey and, to a considerable but ambiguous extent, Azerbaijan. Two false narratives have circulated widely which obscure this absence of consensus – that the war ‘ended’ the Karabakh conflict, and that Russia ‘won’ the war.

Two significant post-war dynamics contradict the notion that the Karabakh conflict is now resolved. The first is the widening of the spaces and issues in conflict. Azerbaijan’s restoration of sovereignty over territories it lost in 1990s surfaced the long-submerged issue of border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani forces are now deployed across the border to occupy 40-100 square kilometres of Armenia’s territory.

Since no formal border has ever been demarcated, Azerbaijan maintains a ‘plausible deniability’ narrative about these deployments. Their purpose appears to be to compel Armenia to agree to Azerbaijani terms for a wider settlement, which include Armenia’s fulfilment of Article 9 – the final and most transformative clause of the 2020 ceasefire statement.

Russia’s intervention to bring the war to a close, and whether that was driven by grand strategy or tactical improvisation, will be keenly debated for years to come

Article 9 commits both parties to opening borders and transport links, and additionally commits Armenia to guaranteeing safe transit connecting mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave in Nakhichevan. Publicly, Azerbaijan frames this clause as a geopolitical prize allowing Azerbaijani citizens, vehicles, and goods transit using the corridor without customs checks. But this assertion of what is effectively a sovereign right of use leaves the discussion of corridors mired in a competitive understanding of sovereignty.

The second dynamic is the narrowing of active mediation efforts to focus only on issues appearing since the ceasefire. The OSCE’s Minsk Group – mandated to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement – has struggled to reassert itself after being sidelined during the 2020 war.

Rather, the Minsk Group has become by default both the guardian of the most contested and difficult issue of all – the political identity of the Armenian population in Nagorny Karabakh – and the vehicle for this issue’s indefinite deferral to an uncertain future.

It is instead Russia’s trilateral formats of summits and a working group on infrastructure convened by the vice-prime ministers that now take the diplomatic centre stage but, despite feverish speculation, these did not result in the anticipated agreements to coincide with the end of the war’s first anniversary.

Russia’s diplomatic calendar is haphazardly subject to renewed frontline violence and competitive summitry, asserting a performative diplomacy and Russia’s dominance over other outside actors rather than a substantive diplomacy generating new agreements.

Turkey’s role is crucial because the combination of Russian and Turkish foreign policies have created a system of distinct but interconnected pressure points in the theatres where both powers are involved

Russia’s intervention to bring the war to a close, and whether that was driven by grand strategy or tactical improvisation, will be keenly debated for years to come but one popular view is Russia won the war by planting ‘boots on the ground’, excluding Euro-Atlantic actors, and securing new sources of leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

An alternative – and less ideological – view is that Turkey’s successful execution with Azerbaijan of a military operation bringing an external actor into the formerly Soviet space presented a shocking challenge to Russia’s assumed monopoly on security provision in former Soviet domains, as well as an ongoing quagmire which will continue to illustrate the limits of Russian power.

Moreover, Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh are present by mutual consent of Armenia and Azerbaijan and so, combined with the absence of a territorial proximity of their area of deployment with Russia, this introduces substantial conditionality to their presence. It is a two-way street when it comes to leverage, particularly in the relationship with Azerbaijan which is decidedly more ambivalent about Russia’s presence.

Russia’s capacity to actually keep the peace is also under constant interrogation and it has on at least two occasions taken the unusual – for this context – step of naming the party violating the ceasefire. But this had little impact in deterring either further violations or the large-scale Azerbaijani offensive witnessed on 16 November. Russia’s presence may deter the outbreak of sustained war, but it is insufficient to deter major offensives, skirmishes, or even civilian executions.

The compromised ceasefire relates to the fact that Azerbaijan can now ‘lean into’ Turkish patronage to resist Russian control. Turkey’s role is crucial because the combination of Russian and Turkish foreign policies have created a system of distinct but interconnected pressure points in the theatres where both powers are involved. Russia’s Karabakh policy – and enforcement capacity – is no longer independent of this wider system.

So, Russia must bear responsibility for a situation which satisfies no-one except possibly Turkey. It is responsible for both mediation and the containment of violence in a context where coercive bargaining has been normalized – and a wider regional context where Russia makes extensive use of coercive bargaining tactics. This is highly concerning when considering the parties’ continuing dissatisfaction with the new status quo.

The exposure of Azerbaijani society to the devastated wastelands of territory occupied by Armenian forces in 1992-3 was always going to elicit shock and trauma. And these reactions are then sustained by dozens of landmine casualties, including a reported 29 civilians, since the end of the war, but also a steady investment in enemy imagery, such as a horrific ‘trophy park’ in Baku which featured racialized waxwork caricatures of Armenian soldiers in various poses of distress – thankfully removed after Armenia and Azerbaijan both filed cases with the International Court of Justice relating to claims of racial discrimination.

Despite a decisive victory in 2020, Armenians are still presented to Azerbaijani society as a monolithic mythologized enemy to be dominated, instead of distinct real-world communities needing differentiated Azerbaijani approaches and policies. Mobilization around other ideas or values is meanwhile violently suppressed.

In late 2021 Azerbaijani forces shot dead three Karabakh Armenian civilians, reinforcing Karabakh Armenian fears that Azerbaijan has no other plan but their demographic attrition through intimidation. Azerbaijan also continues to hold an uncertain number of Armenian prisoners whose maltreatment has been attested to by human rights organizations.