WikiLeaks: Ilham Aliyev Asks Why CNN Called Him a Dictator
WASHINGTON DC. September 10, 2011: The new WikiLeaks report discloses
the diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in Baku to the US State
Department dated August 6, 2008. The cable is classified as `secret’
and reflects the results of the meetings held between the senior level
US State Department Delegation and the Azerbaijani president Ilham
Aliyev. The US diplomats held preparatory talks with the Azerbaijani
president on the eve of the US vice-president Dick Cheney’s visit to
Azerbaijan in early September of 2008. The parties discussed broad
range of issues, but the most controversial part of the discussion was
on the US focus on democratization issues in Azerbaijan. `Aliyev also
paraphrased Secretary Rice’s recent comments in Prague about “oil rich
dictatorships with 18th century systems enjoying only temporary
success,” which he said were made in response to a question about
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. “These kinds of statements are not helpful;
we do not understand why they are happening. They are not in line with
our relations and they do not reflect Azerbaijan’s realities.” Major
events in Georgia or Armenia draw little US criticism, while minor
events in Azerbaijan draw major USG reactions, Aliyev said. Such
statements also create a negative image of Azerbaijan. `CNN called me
a dictator, but not Sargisian or Kocharian, and they killed people.”
Below is the full text of the diplomatic cable:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000739
EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED, EUR DAS BRYZA, EEB SPECIAL ENVOY BOYDEN GRAY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ENRG, AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV WELCOMES HIGHEST-LEVEL USG VISITS, COMPLAINS
OF ENERGY IMPASSE AND CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4(b,d)
1. (C) Summary: In an August 4 meeting with the Ambassador and
visiting OVP Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Joe Wood,
President Aliyev welcomed the proposed visit of the Vice President,
expressing general satisfaction with the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship.
Identifying Nagorno-Karabakh as “issue number one” Aliyev asked that
the United States push Armenia for a solution in accord with the
“norms and standards of international law.” He outlined at length his
deep concern that Nabucco and the southern gas corridor are at risk of
failure, and with “time running out,” urged rapid development and
implementation of a concrete plan to bring them to fruition. He
re-emphasized the need for Turkmenistan to be a key partner on energy
and sought USG assistance to win Turkey’s cooperation in this project
of “common strategic interest.” He underscored again that Azerbaijan
“does not agree with and cannot accept” recent public
characterizations of Azerbaijan’s democratic development lagging that
of others in the region. Aliyev said the OSCE can bring “as many
observers as it wants” to monitor the October Presidential elections.
End summary.
VP Visit
2. (C) In an August 4 meeting with the Ambassador and visiting OVP
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Joseph Wood, President
Aliyev welcomed a visit of the Vice President to Baku as a “very
important signal,” saying it will be “instrumental” from the point of
view of practical bilateral cooperation. Noting that “cooperation
continues successfully on important joint projects in the region” and
that he is “in general very satisfied with our level of relations,”
Aliyev said he looks forward to broad discussions touching on all
aspects of the relationship.
Nagorno-Karabakh is Issue Number One
3. (C) Aliyev underscored that Nagorno-Karabakh is “the number one
issue” for Azerbaijan today. Unfortunately, there has been “no
breakthrough, no final solution8 in the five years in which he has
been actively engaged on the issue, although there has been “progress
in the process.” It is clear, Aliyev said, that “there will be no
independence for NK. The Armenian leader agreed, and now they
understand the status quo won’t become permanent.” Hence, in Aliyev’s
view, there is no further justification for Armenia to prevent
Azerbaijanis from returning or to delay any further a settlement.
Azerbaijan “counts on the USG’s efforts to persuade Armenia to behave
according to the norms and standards of international law. This is our
major request and our expectation from you.”
Energy
4. (C) Aliyev said that energy and security in the Caspian are
interrelated. Absent security, there can be no movement of energy. The
Caspian is playing a larger role than ever in global energy production
and Europe should pay more attention to matters in the region. The
future political configuration of the region is being determined
today, with “rivalry, aggressiveness and energy diplomacy”
intensifying, Aliyev said. “We do not have much time,” Aliyev added,
noting that he had openly asked European partners to be more decisive
on strategic energy projects.
5. (C) Azerbaijan, Aliyev asserted, is doing all it can do to
facilitate provision of gas to Europe and in fact is presently “the
most active party for future energy diversification.” The other
interested parties need to get in step, display more unity, and “play
as a team,” Aliyev said. Azerbaijan appears to be the one country most
interested in promoting Nabucco. Others — including some NATO allies
and EU members — are “ruining the energy policy of the West” with
their disunity and inaction. Azerbaijan has not even been able to
discuss energy with the major European countries — France, UK, and
Germany. And Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, all Nabucco members, “are
killing Nabucco” with their engagement with South Stream and separate
deals with Gazprom. Although recent discussions with the Hungarian PM
had been more positive, what Bulgaria and Hungary say to Azerbaijan
and what they do doesn’t track, Aliyev said. Europe had not responded
to Azerbaijan’s proposal to hold an Energy Summit or Ministerial, in
Baku or in Brussels, with the Nabucco countries, Georgia and
Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan, he emphasized, cannot fix the problem with
Europe.
6. (C) Turkey, Aliyev said, is also a problem. “Geography can be a
disadvantage if it is misused.” There has been no agreement on transit
terms nor on a new sales price for Shah Deniz I gas, as required on
April 15. As a result, Turkey is still paying around $100 (while
prices in Europe are approaching $400) and is giving the impression it
wants to continue to do so as long as possible. Turkey’s
“unacceptable” behavior is not strategic, but that “of the bazaar.”
Aliyev said he told Turkish President Gul in Kars that if Turkey
insists on buying the major share of Shah Deniz II production it will
make it impossible for Nabucco to be sanctioned, and Azerbaijan will
have to look at other options if the situation continues.
7. (C) Aliyev said he advised Gul to concentrate on buying gas from
Turkmenistan, not Azerbaijan, utilizing Turkey’s 1998 gas purchase
agreement with Turkmenistan. “Gul had not thought about that before.”
Aliyev said this would be the best solution for Turkey’s gas needs,
and Azerbaijan can build the interconnector to join Azerbaijan’s and
Turkmenistan’s infrastructure to transport the gas. He said that “your
communication with Turkey — to help them understand — that this is
in accord with our common interests,” is key. Aliyev said he had not
proposed that Azerbaijan finance and build Nabucco itself (as we
understand President Saakashvili reported to DAS Brzya). COMMENT: We
assume from Aliyev’s comment that Saakashvili confused Aliyev’s
interest in building an Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan interconnector with
building Nabucco itself. END COMMENT
8. (C) Turkmenistan is “passive” and will not initiate a deal but “it
has the resources and we can persuade them to respond,” Aliyev said.
This will be easier for Azerbaijan to do than for western countries to
do. Turkmenistan needs “an excuse” for non-Russian gas sales vis a vis
Russia and can defend a sale to Turkey as a bilateral matter.
Berdimuhamedov, Aliyev noted, had offered to sell gas to Azerbaijan at
the border, and sells gas to Iran and Russia at the border now. He has
“no excuse” not to also sell to Turkey. But Berdimuhamedov does not
want to initiate the deal, Aliyev repeated. “If we had guaranteed
contracts with Nabucco we could purchase gas from Turkmenistan and
sell it on, if Nabucco or Turkey does not want to do it.” Gas purchase
and sales agreements are needed now, but “no one in the group (of
countries that should be interested in Nabucco) is doing anything,” to
advance them, Aliyev said. The failure to resolve transit terms with
Turkey is a key part of the problem.
9. (C) BP, Aliyev said with frustration, has reported it will reduce
Shah Deniz I production this year. This “may be for technical reasons,
maybe not,” Aliyev said. BP has big interests in Russia and “perhaps
has received a message from Russia.” Russia’s main objective in energy
is to block Caspian energy from going west. If BP cuts production,
this will mean less gas for Georgia, which Azerbaijan is currently
providing at less than half the market price to show support for
Georgia, he added.
10. (C) “We do not see a strong commitment to this (Southern
Corridor) project,” Aliyev repeated. “Even with US support, we cannot
do this on our own.” Azerbaijan does not need to develop gas for
Europe for economic reasons. Azerbaijan’s revenues from gas will never
parallel those it receives from oil. The 30-40 bcm it will soon have
has a ready market in Russia, Georgia and Turkey. Russia has offered
to buy all Azerbaijan’s gas for Southstream, with an offer that from a
purely commercial point of view is “acceptable.” However, “the gas
factor for us is not commercial.” 11. (C) Concluding that the picture
is “not very optimistic,” Aliyev urged again that “we need a plan.”
This should include persuading Turkey or Nabucco to negotiate with
Turkmenistan for gas supply, urging Turkey to see the bigger picture
and “not block” Nabucco, securing Turkmenistan’s agreement to sign a
deal with Azerbaijan to build an interconnector, urging BP to act only
as a commercial entity, and convincing the EU to “pay more attention
to the Caspian — displaying less skepticism and more unity.”
Iran
11. (S) Aliyev noted that bilateral cooperation on Iran is “much
broader than what is seen,” as it is on “all issues of the
neighborhood.” He said that it would be “very important to hear from
you your expectations of us. We’ll wait to hear from you.”
Democratic Reform
12. (C) Aliyev confirmed that the OSCE would observe Azerbaijan’s
October elections and “can send as many observers as they want.” The
election campaign has begun and is proceeding “normally.” Some
opposition parties have announced a boycott; “this is just an excuse
not to participate.”
13. (C) Highlighting the number of media outlets and publications in
Azerbaijan as evidence that Azerbaijan “does not have restrictions on
the media,” Aliyev said information in the US on this issue “is not
right.” He said he was surprised to hear that at the recent Helsinki
Commission hearings in Washington, it was reported that if someone in
Azerbaijan criticized him, that person would be arrested. “This is
provocation and disinformation … I am criticized daily, and in ways
that go beyond ethical rules.” Those who criticize “are still walking”
around Baku. Aliyev said he is trying to install the Internet in every
school, and has no plans to limit it. A recent monitoring of Radio
Liberty broadcasts, he maintained, showed 90 percent of the coverage
was “critical of me” with limited opportunities for “our party” to
respond. Radio Liberty’s activity shows the level of media freedom.
“They can reflect what they see, but we ask that they be objective,”
Aliyev said.
14. (C) “Insulting me personally is not fair or friendly,” Aliyev
said. Moreover, “we do not believe that the level of democracy in
Azerbaijan is lower than that of any other country of the region.” The
“assumption” that democratic reform is weaker in Azerbaijan than in
Georgia or Armenia “was always in the air in Washington, and the
Secretary of State made it public recently,” Aliyev noted. “It is a
classification of democratic development we do not agree with and we
cannot accept,” especially in light of the crackdowns in Georgia and
Armenia, including killings of protesters, closure of media outlets,
arrests of oppositionists, and the declaration of state of emergency.
“We never did anything like that and we are considered less
democratic.”
15. (C) Aliyev also paraphrased Secretary Rice’s recent comments in
Prague about “oil rich dictatorships with 18th century systems
enjoying only temporary success,” which he said were made in response
to a question about Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. “These kinds of
statements are not helpful; we do not understand why they are
happening. They are not in line with our relations and they do not
reflect Azerbaijan’s realities.” Major events in Georgia or Armenia
draw little US criticism, while minor events in Azerbaijan draw major
USG reactions, Aliyev said. Such statements also create a negative
image of Azerbaijan. “CNN called me a dictator, but not Sargisian or
Kocharian, and they killed people.” People in Azerbaijan watch these
reports and they raise questions. When they come from CNN or Radio
Liberty people think they reflect the USG’s views. It is one thing for
NGO’s to criticize, another thing for the State Department to do so,
Aliyev said.
COMMENT:
16. (C) Although clearly pleased at the prospect of the visit, Aliyev
was frustrated in his comments on energy, NK, and Azerbaijan’s
democratic development, all difficult issues at present for him. His
direct “request and expectation” that the USG push Armenia for a
solution on Nagorno Karabakh consistent with international norms and
standards reflects the hard line he has taken publicly and privately
since the March UNGA vote that any solution on NK must preserve
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. On energy/Nabucco, he remains very
unhappy with what he sees as European and BP foot-dragging and
duplicity, and Turkish intransigence. Clearly at a loss as to what
more Azerbaijan can do, he continues to seek greater support from the
USG to secure cooperation from Turkey, the EU and BP. Finally, Aliyev
continues to seek an explanation for public comments contrasting
Azerbaijan unfavorably with its neighbors on democratic reform. DERSE
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