ANTELIAS: Press statement by His Holiness Aram I on Metn elections

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr.Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Officer
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:

PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon

Armenian version: nian.htm

"THE TIME HAS COME FOR INTER-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE AND UNITY"
SAYS HIS HOLINESS ARAM I

His Holiness Aram I, Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia, released the
following statement to the media on 6 August 2007 on the occasion of the
bi-elections in the Metn area in Lebanon.

"Sunday August 5 was a sad day for the Christian community. I followed the
elections in Metn with pain and anxiety, asking myself why this fury and
mutual accusations? Couldn’t we have avoided this tense situation? For sure
we could have. Patriarch Sfeir worked on bringing about an understanding. I
did my best especially during the last week. Others also made attempts.
However, the Christians of Metn went to the ballot with divided spirit,"
Catholicos Aram I said.

"The election’s results are secondary. What is worrying is the division
among Christians in Lebanon and the Metn area in particular and the
confessional and political consequences of that division," the Pontiff
continued.

His Holiness said: "Let no one celebrate his victory. There are no victors.
It is Christian unity that was defeated in the face of division.

Let no one look for people to blame. All the Christian political forces are
equally responsible for the current sad situation because they only pursued
their personal interests, disregarded the collective Christian interest,
used the people and incited them against each other.

Let no one allow himself to speak against the dignity of the Lebanese
Armenian community. I can understand the angry statements made during
elections on issues related to elections. However, I find unacceptable
incorrect attributions and baseless accusations made by some against the
Armenian community. The history of the Armenians of Lebanon and their
national position are well-known to everyone. The Armenians of Lebanon do
not need lessons in patriotism from anyone. The Lebanese Armenians are
themselves examples of patriotism."

Reaffirming the Armenian community’s full commitment to Christian unity and
Christian-Muslim coexistence, His Holiness said: "As an indivisible part of
the Lebanese family, Lebanese Armenian community will continue, with renewed
will, to actively participate in all the efforts aimed at securing
independence, sovereignty, integrity and unity in Lebanon. Through the
Catholicosate of Cilicia based in Antelias, the Armenian community of
Lebanon, which is the heart of the Armenian Diaspora, will continue working
for a strong Lebanon on an external front as well."

The Catholicos then called for "avoiding statements that incite provocation
and opening a new page in the life of the Christian community through
dialogue and mutual understanding. The church has an important role to play
in this respect. Internal Christian harmony is the base of Christian-Muslim
coexistence and the unity and strength of Lebanon."

##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates of
the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the history and
the mission of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer to the web page of
the Catholicosate, The Cilician
Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is located in
Antelias, Lebanon.

http://www.armenianorthodoxchurch.org/
http://www.armenianorthodoxchurch.org/v04/doc/Arme
http://www.armenianorthodoxchurch.org

TBILISI: Kavkaz-Poti Ferry Deal

KAVKAZ-POTI FERRY DEAL

The Messenger, Georgia
Aug 6 2007

Hakim Matchianov, Rezerv Capital Corporation chairman and owner of
the SMAT Kavkaz-Poti ferry, announced plans to sell 49 percent of
his stocks to Armenian companies on August 2.

He went on to emphasize the importance of the Kavkaz-Poti ferry route
for Armenian cargo. The Kavkaz port is in Russia; Armenia has had
difficulties getting its exports to the country since trade links
between Georgia and Russia were cut in late 2006.

Matchianov then outlined prospects for the recently established SMAT
ferry. Expressing regret that only three runs have been carried out
by SMAT since April 2007, Matchianov stated that from August onwards
four trips a month will be made.

He named some of the difficulties the company has recently faced,
including a lack of appropriate infrastructure for registering cargo
at Kavkaz, and acknowledged the stiff competition presented by the
seven other ferry companies operating the same route.

But he emphasized that SMAT offers a comparatively fast loading time
of one hour, and announced a USD 30 price reduction per train carriage.

The SMAT ferry was launched on April 10, 2007, with a capacity of 50
train cars, but has since been dogged with problems.

"The Armenian Weekly"; August 4, 2007; Commentary

The Armenian Weekly On-Line
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[email protected]
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The Armenian Weekly; Volume 73, No. 31; August 4, 2007

Commentary:

1. Armenians in Turkey Continue on Same Path
By Khajag Mgrditchian

2. An Unreasonable U.S. Concern: Armenian-Iranian Cooperation
By Michael G. Mensoian

3. Health Care in Armenia Yesterday and Today
By Inna Mkhitaryan

4. Taxi
By Simon Beugekian

5. Ayaan Hirsi Ali Reflects on Secularism and Islam in Turkey

6. Letters to the Editor

***

1. Armenians in Turkey Continue on Same Path
By Khajag Mgrditchian

ISTANBUL, Turkey (A.W.)-The Turkish general elections took place on Sunday,
July 22, and were concluded with the victory of Prime Minister Rejep Tayyip
Erdogan’s ruling AK (Justice and Progress) Party. This basically means that
Turkey has chosen to continue on the same path it has taken over the last
four years.

In the previous elections AK party gained 34 percent of the vote, and out of
the 550 seats in the parliament, it had 363, which was enough for the party
to create a government by itself. This time around, despite the fact that
the party received 47 percent of all votes, it actually lost some seats in
the parliament, and now has 340. This decrease in the number of seats that
is not congruent with the popular vote is the result of the Turkish
electoral laws, which put a quota of 10 percent of votes for parties to
enter the parliament.

The results, which don’t change the political landscape, were however not
alone in defining the latest Turkish elections. There were many other
phenomenon which make these elections unique.

One of these events was the setback suffered by the Republican Democratic
Party (CHP), lead by renown left-winger Deniz Baykal. Clearly, this party
has left behind its leftist principles and has lately been becoming more and
more Kemalist, acting as one of the extremely nationalist groups in Turkey.

The latest wave of nationalism in Turkey allowed another party to enter the
parliament: the National Movement Party (MHP), which does not even attempt
to disguise its extreme nationalist approach. The party has been able to
garner 71 seats in the Parliament. With the entry of this party-which
sponsors the nationalist "Grey Wolves" movement-into the parliament, a new
Turkish opposition emerges. In the past, the only opposition party was the
CHP. The popularity of the MHP is evidence of the latest wave of nationalism
that has spread as a backlash to Erdogan’s Islamist-leaning policies.

Thus, the progress recorded by nationalist movements is the second unique
event that distinguishes the Turkish elections. The rise of nationalism
compels friends of democracy to pick the less of two evils, in this case the
AK Party.

The same view was upheld by the Turkish-Armenian community, which, for the
first time, participated with relative zeal, expressed its views and
attempted to have some say in the government. Most of the renown
Turkish-Armenian figures openly preferred Erdogan and his party. "I think
that the other parties have very little chance of receiving our votes,
because, in my opinion, we have lost trust in them. They have all been put
to the test, and they have all come and gone without helping us, while AKP
has, and where it has failed to reach its goals, it is not to blame. We know
what kind of opposition they are facing, and groups both within and outside
of the government are doing whatever they can to impede its plans," said
Rober Haddejian, editor of the "Marmara" newspaper to Hairenik/Armenian
Weeklies adding that if the AK Party remains in leadership, then "our
expectations might be met, and the situation might improve."
In an interview with "Hairenik," Sarkis Seropian, an editor of the "Agos"
newspaper, expressed a very similar view, mentioning that the AK Party is
the less of evils and is acceptable by the Armenian community in Turkey,
"because the other, so-called democratic parties, do not follow their own
creeds. The Republican Democratic Party itself claims to be left wing, but
in my opinion, it is on the extreme right, it is even possible to call it a
jingoistic party. And the positions of the right-wing nationalist party are
well known. I believe it is almost impossible to distinguish these two
parties. There are other parties, but they unfortunately won’t be able to
pass the 10 percent mark."

In order to circumvent the above-mentioned minimum limit of votes to enter
into the parliament, some parties orchestrated their campaigns in a way that
would allow them to propose independent candidates; and the large number of
independent candidates who got elected was another feature of these
elections.

The Kurdish-leaning Democratic Party (DTP) made good use of this strategy.
Twenty-four delegates of this party, who were campaigning as independent
candidates, were elected to seats. In fact, this Kurdish party, by
circumventing the 10 percent requirement, can form its own grouping in the
parliament. This large presence of Kurdish delegates is yet another feature
of the elections.

There are some names among the independent delegates that are worth
mentioning, including the former leader of the "Our Homeland" party, former
Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mesut Yilmaz, as well as the
head of the "Grand Union" Party (BBP) Muhsin Yazicioglu and the head of the
"Freedom and Union Party" (ODP) Ufuk Uras.

Translated by Simon Beugekian
—————————————- ————————————————– —-

2. An Unreasonable U.S. Concern: Armenian-Iranian Cooperation
By Michael G. Mensoian

Recently, the United States Charge d’Affairs in Yerevan, Anthony Godfrey,
indicated that Washington had concerns regarding the degree and direction of
Armenian-Iranian cooperation, especially relating to energy resources. For
the past 30 years Iran has been the principal adversary of the United States
in the Middle East and its client state Israel. Its determination to develop
nuclear technology for peaceful or alleged non-peaceful purposes or, again,
its support of what is described in the Western media as radical Islamic
groups is beyond the purpose of this discussion. However, what is important
is that Armenia and Iran enjoy a symbiotic relationship that both nations
have assiduously nurtured since Armenia’s independence. It should be noted
that there are several hundred thousand Armenians in Iran; most having lived
there for generations.

Although the United States has a right to question Armenia’s relationship
with Iran, that concern must be evaluated within the context of the close
economic and military ties Washington maintains with Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Georgia. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan, which loom large in the strategic
interests of the United States, have adopted policies whose sole purpose is
to weaken Armenia. Georgia, a third recipient of United States military and
economic largess, maintains a cooperative stance in its relations with
Armenia, yet it does not hesitate to enter into agreements with Turkey and
Azerbaijan that are inimical to Armenia’s economic interests. Far out
weighing any economic and humanitarian aid Armenia receives from the United
States are the close ties that bind Ankara, Baku and Tbilisi to Washington’s
policy of challenging Russia and Iran for the energy resources of Central
Asia and the Caucasus. As a result, Armenia has been left, literally, to its
own devices. So much for that.

As one of 44 land-locked countries in the world, Armenia’s relationship with
its neighbors must be placed in a special category. Georgia’s interest in
Armenia is primarily pragmatic; the type and volume of trade, transit
concerns, the degree and purpose of Armenia’s military cooperation with
Russia and the political interaction between Yerevan and the Javakhk
Armenians. Its economic and political viability does not depend on Armenian
cooperation. Armenia, however, has a strategic interest in Georgia. That
country represents the only land route to the Black Sea ports of Batumi and
Poti through which most of Armenia’s imports and exports pass. Similarly the
pipeline that delivers gas from Russia to Armenia transits Georgian
territory. It is obvious that there is no parity in their relationship. This
lack of symmetry emboldens Georgia to participate in economic ventures
without regard for their adverse impact on Armenia. With Armenia excluded,
Georgia’s strategic importance to Turkey increases exponentially as the only
practical land connection to Azerbaijan and ultimately to Central Asia
across the Caspian Sea. One only need look at the route of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as well as the proposed Kars-Tbilisi-Baku
railroad which will replace the existing line that passes through Gyumri in
Armenia that Turkey boycotts. Both of these Turkish sponsored ventures were
meant to harm Armenia and exclude her from the potential economic benefits
that the region will experience.

Paradoxically, economic development in which all countries share is a goal
that the United States claims is vital to creating political stability
within the region. Yet the pipeline route was supported by the United States
knowing that it would have an adverse impact on Armenia. As for the
projected railroad, the United States again exerted no pressure on Turkey to
reopen the existing line through Gyumri. The tepid response from Washington
was that no financial aid would be provided if it by-passed Armenia. With
the wealth that Turkey and Azerbaijan have at their disposal, financial
support from the United States was never a determining issue.

The geostrategic interest of the United States in the Caucasus and Central
Asia not only benefits Turkey and Azerbaijan, but paradoxically has elevated
the importance and strategic role of Iran vis-à-vis Armenia’s national
objectives. In March of this year, ceremonies were held at Agarak, Armenia,
to inaugurate the opening of the gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia. From
Agarak the pipeline connects to the Armenian gas distribution net at
Kajaran. This is a major development that should have greater significance
in the future. Presently, any gas that is imported from Iran must be used to
generate electricity which will then be "sold" to Iran. An ancillary benefit
is that the villages in the southern Syunik district will have access to gas
for domestic purposes for the first time. In an emergency situation, should
deliveries from Russia via Georgia be cut-off, Armenia will be able to draw
on this new supply of gas.

On the main highway north from Megri in southern Armenia, any casual
observer will notice a steady stream of Iranian trucks which carry an
estimated 500,000 to 600,000 tons of goods annually. At an economic summit
in Yerevan this July, Armenian and Iranian officials met to discuss a wide
range of economic issues. As reported by Armenpress, Iran’s foreign minister
Manouchehr Mottaki indicated that several joint ventures were being
considered. These included building a hydropower facility on the Arax River,
a refinery in Armenia to process Iranian oil to gasoline for export to Iran,
and a new railroad link between the two countries. He reported that trade
between Armenia and Iran had reached $200 million annually with the
potential for reaching $1 billion annually.

Although it doesn’t have a contiguous border with Armenia, its fifth
neighbor is Russia. Both countries do depend upon each other, but Armenia is
the "junior partner" so to speak in this relationship. Presently, Armenia is
a "captive" of Russia’s Gazprom: a quasi-state run enterprise that supplies
a significant part of its energy needs at prices that are not set at "arms
length" negotiations. One can seriously question the desirability of join
ventures by the two countries or, especially, the ownership of any segment
of Armenia’s economic infrastructure by Russia. The Russian garrison in
Armenia does provide a stabilizing influence along the Turkish-Armenian
border. Armenia reciprocates by providing Russia with its last foothold
south of the Caucasus.

In the long term, Russia and Iran are adversaries both in the Caucasus as
well as in Central Asia. However, in the short term their objectives
coalesce to prevent Turkey from dominating the Caucasus and extending its
influence into Central Asia. Present United States policy seeks to exploit
the energy resources of Central Asia and control its movement into
international markets. For the present at least, Turkey and Azerbaijan are
willing partners.

Armenia has a crucial if passive role to play in thwarting this expansion of
Turkish influence. As mentioned earlier, Russian military units stationed in
Armenia represent a major deterrent to any ill-advised Turkish military
venture. The presence of Russian forces is a reminder that she has not
abdicated her historic interests in the region or her support of autonomy
for Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Additionally, Armenia represents
the only route for a potential pipeline for the delivery of Iranian gas to
Georgia-an important bargaining chip in future Georgian-Armenian
cooperation. An alternative source of gas would lessen Georgia’s future
dependence on Russia as well as on Azerbaijan, whose ability to meet her
increasing demands is questionable.
Present United States policy is a direct response to the disintegration of
the Soviet Union and the transformation of the several Soviet republics into
independent nations. To fill the resulting political vacuum, the U.S.
Congress passed the Freedom Support Act in 1992. Its underlying purpose,
shorn of its altruistic rhetoric, was to challenge Russia in the Caucasus
and to extend U.S. influence into Central Asia with its vast deposits of oil
and natural gas. Turkey was a key component of this strategy. However, the
official objective of the Freedom Support Act was to provide economic and
humanitarian aid and to promote democratic institutions in these recently
independent countries. This objective ran counter to Russia’s official
policy, which was to regain hegemony over its Near Abroad, the former soviet
republics.

In recognition of Armenia’s position vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, Title 9, Section
907 of the Act stated that "United States assistance.may not be provided to
the government of Azerbaijan until the President determines and so reports
to Congress that the government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps
to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh."

In every year since its passage, President Bush has waived Section 907 which
lifted restrictions on U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan. According to the
Office of the Press Secretary, U.S. Department of State, the waiver was
necessary ".to support United States efforts to counter international
terrorism" [and] ".to support the operational readiness of the United States
Armed Forces.to counter international terrorism; [it] is important to
Azerbaijan border security; and will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts
to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used
for offensive purposes against Armenia."

Coupled with these annual waivers, it is instructive to look at President
Bush’s latest recommendations for the fiscal year 2007 budget as reported in
a press release by the ANCA. Contrary to an agreement struck with Congress
in 2001 to maintain parity in U.S. military aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan,
the President proposed ".cutting.economic aid to Armenia from.[the 2006]
appropriation of $74.4 million to $50 million, a nearly 33 per cent
reduction." For Azerbaijan, the figure was $28 million and $58 million for
Georgia. The Foreign Military Financing proposals were $3.5 million for
Armenia, $4.5 million for Azerbaijan and $10 million for Georgia.

With respect to the President’s recommendations for International Military
Education and Training the figures are $790,000 for Armenia, $885,000 for
Azerbaijan and $1,235,000 for Georgia. The President’s fiscal year 2008
budget seeks 20 percent more in military aid to Azerbaijan than to Armenia.
So much for parity.

The Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues formed in 1995 has been
instrumental in protecting Armenia’s interests. However, the role of the
present administration should indicate the importance it places on the
Turkish-Azerbaijan-Georgia triumvirate. United States influence within these
countries is the key objective in its attempt to counter Russian influence
and to achieve its goal to control the exploitation and movement of energy
resources to global markets. The $1.5 billion in humanitarian and technical
aid received by Armenia since 1992 from the United States masks the inequity
between the aid given to the "triumvirate" and Armenia when Armenia is added
to the equation.

During this same period, Armenia has endured the adverse economic effects
caused by the blockade imposed by Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan, contrary
to the requirement that the waiver will not be granted ".until the President
determines.that the government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to
cease all blockades.against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh." Failure to meet
this requirement has not dampened the President’s enthusiasm to waive this
prohibition each year.

For the United States to ignore the effect of its pro-Turkish policy begs
the question as to what should Armenia’s response be with respect to Iran? A
key component of Armenia’s economic and political viability depends on
maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship with its southern neighbor.
Its cooperation with Iran in no way affects United States interests. It
could well be that the ideological and strategic objectives of the United
States and Iran are so great as to defy any immediate meaningful
accommodation. However difficult that may be for the United States, Armenia
must be left to develop its relationship with Iran in a manner that enhances
its legitimate national objectives. Rather than question Armenian-Iranian
cooperation, the United States should reconsider the aid given to Azerbaijan
and Georgia and increase its support to Armenia if only because it is the
one emerging democratic nation in the Caucasus region, a key objective of
the Freedom Support Act.
——————————————— ———————————————

3. Health Care in Armenia Yesterday and Today
By Inna Mkhitaryan

According to statistics, Soviet Armenia had the highest life expectancy of
all the Soviet Republics and a more advanced health care system. After
independence, however, difficult economic and social conditions badly
affected the health care sector as well.

Among the organizations that have helped the sector recover are several
American ones:

USAID

The Armenia office of USAID was founded in 1992, and since then the agency
has helped the government in its efforts to provide high quality health care
and equity in health care.

USAID, in cooperation with the Armenia Ministry of Health, works to finance
and develop mechanisms to execute plans to improve primary healthcare (PHC)
services. According to USAID/Armenia, "The objective has a twofold approach:
(1) strengthen national institutional capacity for PHC reform; and (2)
reinvigorate provision of PHC services at the facility level."

Access to all communities is essential in order to take care of the medical
needs of the population. Given that people living in remote areas and under
harsh socio-economic realities have limited access to medical services,
USAID provides mobile medical teams. Attention is also given to providing
communities with awareness on health issues.

In the first half of 2006, the cooperation between the U.S. and the Armenian
governments in the health project that had begun in 2005 continued through
USAID. Observers periodically visit Armenia and prepare reports on the
registered progress in the project, which is worth $17 million.

The main partners of USAID in this project are the Armenian Ministry of
Health, provincial authorities, educational/medical institutions, as well as
some international and local organizations.

One of the important goals of the USAID is to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS in
Armenia; to educate youth about AIDS; to target sections of the population
that are particularly at risk (intravenous drug users, prostitutes,
homosexuals, prisoners); to improve the quality of the health services that
individuals with AIDS receive; to ensure that the disease does not pass from
pregnant women to their children; to lessen the social and psychological
effects of the AIDS epidemic; and to encourage the educational system to
help stop the spread of AIDS. In 2005, this project reached the Davoush and
Shirak provinces, and in 2006, it was being implemented in 90 percent of the
clinics in Kodayk and Keghakounik. In the next three years the project will
be implemented in five other provinces: Armavir, Arakatzodn, Ararat, Vayots
Tsor and Syunik.

FAR

For about a year, the Fund for Armenian Relief (FAR) and the "Jinishian
Memorial" Fund have financed and overseen the "Provincial Doctors
Re-training" project. The project has already re-certified and re-trained
about 60 doctors from different provinces in Armenia, Javakhk and Artsakh.
The training takes place in some of the most modern and advanced clinics of
Yerevan: "Arapgir," "Kanaker-Zeritoun," "Nork Marash," "Shenkavit,"
"Diagnostica," and "Erepuni" medical center and the mother and child health
center. The project also provides free medical equipment for doctors.

This project, jointly financed by the Jinishian Memorial Fund, also strives
to create a medical network, encouraging doctors with the same specialties
but from different areas to interact.

In one month, provincial doctors are not only instructed of the most recent
developments in international medicine, but they also learn English, receive
computer lessons and learn to use the Internet. This information later helps
them when they participate in international seminars.

Armenian-American Wellness Center (Mamography Center)

The Armenian-American Health Center was founded in 1997, thanks to
Armenian-American philantropist Rita Balian and member of the Armenian
National Assembly Hranoush Hakobyan.

The aim of the center is to preserve and improve women’s health by
preventing breast cancer, as well as to support family health by providing
yearly medical visits that focus on preventing diseases. The center has a
radiology section, a laboratory and a family health section.

The executive director of the center, Khatchanoush Hakobyan, informed us
that in 10 years, the center has served more than 80,000 individuals with
different health problems; 7,000 of those examined were diagnosed with
breast cancer. In more than 2,500 young women, breast cancer was found early
and thanks to that the women’s lives were saved. Sixty percent of all
patients of the center are treated for free. The number of yearly visits to
the center has reached 15,000.

Satenig Krekorian, who has visited the center twice, informed that about a
year ago, feeling some pain around her breasts, she came for an examination,
and her results were negative. As per expert advice, she gets a mammography
at least twice a year.

ARS

For years the ARS optic centers in Talin, Yerevan and Vanatsor have provided
optical services to the Armenian public. The center, cooperating with the
government and international organizations, provides 300-400 prescription
eyeglasses each year for free to pensioners, orphans and other socially
unstable individuals.

The ARS Mother and Child Clinic in Akhourian

The clinic was opened in 1997 and is equipped with the most modern medical
equipment, a modern laboratory and a pharmacy. The center provides free
medical services to the population of the area. In the last nine years, the
highly qualified staff of the center has served more than 72,000 patients.

In 2005, a maternity ward was attached to the center. As of today, 1,185
babies have been born there.

The center regularly organizes lectures and lessons on health issues.

Armenian Bone Marrow Fund

The Fund was created in 1999 in Armenia. The President of the Fund is the
First Lady of Armenia Bella Kocharian. The president of the board is Frida
Jorday.
The Fund was created to help children suffering from leukemia or other forms
of cancer. The laboratory is unique not only in Armenia, but in the region
as a whole. Unfortunately, because Armenians have quite a unique genetic
structure, it is difficult for them to find matching, fitting donors in the
world. Due to genetic differences, Armenians suffering from bone marrow
issues die. Thus, it is essential that a database is created for all
Armenians in Armenia and the diaspora in order to help those of us suffering
from leukemia and other such cancers. The goal of the project is to organize
campaigns all over the world where Armenians can sign up and thus create a
large network. After all, the bigger the database, the bigger the chance of
finding fitting donors.

Rubina Ghazarian, who works for the fund, says that about 13,000 potential
donors have registered from Armenia, Artsakh, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Greece
and the United States. Eight hundred thirty-nine patients have applied to
the Fund, not only from Armenia but from across the world, and 623 have
found fitting donors. Six bone marrow transplants taken place in Armenia,
Europe and the U.S. Efforts are now being focused on creating a bone marrow
transplant center in Yerevan.

Vahe Vartanian, who lives in the city of Ardashad, gave some blood to the
Fund in 2003 and was listed on the database. When it was found that he was a
matching fit to a five-year-old Italian girl, Vahe flew to Cyprus and
underwent three months of medical exams. Vahe says he keeps in contact with
the girl through letters and that her health is improving.

‘Howard Karageuzian’ Center

The Howard Karageuzian Center has implemented several projects in Armenia,
especially related to children’s health and social issues. The cooperation
between the center, which has been active in Armenia for 10 years, and the
Armenian government is one of the best examples of cooperation between
Armenia and the diaspora. The clinic in the Yerevan Nork Marash community
was instrumental in providing healthcare to children, especially in
dentistry and ophthalmology, after independence. Children who are seven
years or older can benefit from the high quality dentisry and ophthalmology
services of the center. They receive yearly medical exams and other free
medical services until the age of 14.

According to Kohar Akhajanian, her 8-year-old son has received services from
the center for about two years. She praises the center for its services, and
little Aram is especially thankful for the warmth of the doctors.
—————————————– ————————————————– ——

4. Taxi
By Simon Beugekian

As August approaches in Armenia, taxi drivers are mobilizing, and a serious
controversy is brewing in Yerevan. The cause of the uproar is a list of
rules the government of Armenia passed last March to regulate the
transportation industry there.

For a few years now, the taxi business has been growing exponentially.
Anyone who has visited Yerevan in particular knows how common they are and
how essential they are for transportation, especially for tourists. The
industry has created thousands of jobs, ensuring the livelihood of thousands
of Armenians. In March, the government moved to regulate the industry; the
new rules state that all taxis must be cars that are less than 10 years old,
all drivers must install electronic fee meters in their cars, and they must
pay an annual tax of 200,000 AMD ($590) to the government. The new rules
were initially set to take effect August 1.

On Wednesday, July 25, about 60 mostly self-employed taxi drivers staged a
protest outside the main government buildings in Yerevan, on the city’s
Republic Square. They honked their horns and turned their headlights full on
in protest to what they described as unfair changes in the rules, which they
see as benefitting large corporations and undermining independent cab
drivers. The response from the government was pathetic. Reportedly, Arshak
Petrosian, head of the Public Transportation division of the Transportation
Ministry, came out to greet the protestors with the words, "By gathering
here you are interfering with the government’s day-to-day work." He later
met with five representatives of the drivers.

The drivers’ protests finally resonated, and on July 30, Prime Minister Serj
Sarkisian met with dozens of drivers protesting again outside his office. In
a rare moment where an Armenian leader shows sincere empathy with the
everyday man, he told the protestors, "The decision affects the livelihood
of thousands of people and we must give them more time." He said the law was
passed in haste, and announced that its enforcement would be postponed.
However, he still defended the government regulations, saying it is
important to make sure cab drivers pay necessary taxes and their cars meet
safety standards.

What is this controversy about? To me, at least, it seems like a clear case
of class struggle. The regulations passed by the government of Armenia
clearly benefit one group while harming another . Those who benefit are
those who can actually afford to abide by the regulations-oligarchs who are
at the helm of large taxi companies. It is a strange "coincidence" that many
oligarchs who own taxi businesses are either in the government or are allies
of government officials.

Those who stand to lose the most are independent taxi drivers, who are using
the cars they have to make an honest living. These people cannot afford to
pay $590 a year to the government, which would be a large chunk of their
income. Many of them drive cars that are older than 10 years old, and cannot
afford to buy newer cars. With the passage of these new laws, these cab
drivers will literally lose their livelihood and income, and thousands of
families will suffer.

The parties that are currently heading the government, including the ARF,
during the May 12 parliamentary elections, issued electoral platforms that
stipulated support for small businesses and assistance to the working class
in its struggles. All parties stated their goal to combat and put an end to
poverty. The controversy surrounding the new taxi regulations put the
authorities before the challenge of an issue that purely relates to their
electoral platforms. If they impose these laws strictly, they will be
stifling small and independent businesses, and will, unfortunately, increase
poverty. Armenians must expect their representatives to stand up to the
occasion and come to the aid of these taxi drivers whose livelihoods are in
jeopardy. The ARF, which states that it is the historic protector of the
Armenian worker, should be at the helm of a movement to resolve the issue.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that the taxi business in Armenia does not need
to change. Cars that are more than 10 years old can be environmentally
damaging and often lack the modern safety features that ensure the safety of
the driver and passenger alike. Electronic fee meters are obviously needed
for transparency of transactions, and taxes must be paid to the government
(currently, only a small percentage of taxes are actually collected by the
Armenian authorities).

However, an egg doesn’t hatch in a single day, nor can the whole
transportation system of Armenia be changed overnight. History shows that
when it comes to these issues, evolution is better than revolution-meaning,
you can’t just take a system that feeds thousands of families and turn it
upside down. Real people are affected, and families are left without income.
These changes must come over time in order to ensure that the government isn’t
actually harming its citizens-an ironic phenomenon that occurs way too often
in Armenia.

The government must do everything it can to reach a compromise, which would
ensure that no cab driver loses his income, and that he is given time and
incentives to comply with the new regulations. The most important thing to
remember is that Armenia cannot allow large taxi companies run by oligarchs
to take over the business at the expense of independent drivers who suddenly
find themselves without income.
—————————————— ————————————————– —-

5. Ayaan Hirsi Ali Reflects on Secularism and Islam in Turkey

WATERTOWN, Mass. (A.W.)-In the Summer 2007 issue (Vol. 24, No. 3) of the New
Perspectives Quarterly (), Somali immigrant, feminist and
former Dutch legislator Ayaan Hirsi Ali has an article titled "Don’t Disarm
Secularism," analyzing the current clash between secularism and Islam in
Turkey.

Hirsi Ali, who recently published her memoir Infidel, criticizes the leaders
of the AK Party in Turkey for wanting "to run state affairs on Islamic
principles." She notes, "The proponents of Islam in government such as Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and their Justice and Development Party have
been remarkably successful. They have understood and exploited the fact that
you can use democratic means to erode democracy."

According to Hirsi Ali, the Islamists will benefit if Turkey joins the
European Union, as the military will no longer be able to interfere in the
country’s political affairs. "[T]he army and the court in Turkey-besides
defending the country and the constitution-are also, and maybe even more
importantly, designed to protect Turkish democracy from Islam," she says.

In her concluding paragraphs, Hirsi Ali presents her concept of "true
secularism" in Turkey: "Bringing back true secularism to Turkey does not
mean just any secularism. It means secularism that protects individual
freedoms and rights, not the ultra-nationalist kind that breeds an
environment in which Hitler’s Mein Kampf is a bestseller, the Armenian
genocide is denied and minorities are persecuted. Hrant Dink, the Armenian
editor, was murdered by such a nationalist."

Benhabib Responds

Asked about Hirsi Ali’s article, Seyla Benhabib, professor of political
science and philosophy at Yale University, told Daniele Castellani Perelli
("Mosque and State," Dissent Magazine, Fall 2007) that "Miss Hirsi Ali’s
language is a language of confrontation that basically presents a
homogeneous, orthodox Islam as closed to reform and transformation. And it
is a language that presents a unified, uncritical and un-reflectively
positive view of liberal democracies-as if they didn’t have their own
problems and reasons to be criticized."

Benhabib says the AK party is "carrying out an incredible experiment and it
is unusual for some one who is a democratic socialist like myself to be
supporting, and watching very carefully, a party like them. But we are all
watching carefully because they also represent a kind of pluralism in civil
society, which is absolutely essential for Turkey."

Talking about the Turkish military, Benhabib charged, "The Turkish army has
been involved in Turkish politics for the last half century and anybody who
considers themselves a liberal democrat and who wants the return of the army
to power cannot know the history of repression caused by the army in
Turkey."
———————————— ————————————————– ———-

6.Letters to the Editor

Looking for Family Members

Dear Editor,

Senekerim (Seno) Tonoyan of Yerevan, grandson of a Senekerim Tonoyan who was
born in Constantinople and who fled in 1915 to Bdjni in Eastern Armenia, is
looking for his grandfather’s son and nephews in the United States.

While in Bdjni, the elder Senekerim married a woman named Srpuhi, and had a
family. He joined WWII in 1941 and was a POW somewhere in Europe before he
escaped to France. While in France he established another family and had
four sons, all of whom eventually moved to the United States.

Anyone with information about Senekerim Tonoyan or his sons and families,
please contact Andranik Michaelian at [email protected].

Andranik Mikaelian
Yerevan

***

Flying Colors

Dear Editor,

Regarding Tom Vartabedian’s column "Where Does Our Loyalty Rest?" (July 21),
loyalty has nothing to do with the positioning of the Tricolor. The rule for
flying the American flag states that no other flag may be flown above it on
the same flagpole. Tom was correct to fly the American flag above the
Armenian flag and I agree with everything else that he wrote.

Let there be no mistake. I, too, love to see the Tricolor flying. There was
a house on the beach at Wells, Maine, with a Tricolor on a flagpole. I used
to walk from Ogunquit Beach to Wells Beach just to see that flag and salute
it. Long may our Tricolor wave!

Ada Hamparian
Burlington, Mass.

http://www.ar
www.digitalnpq.org

Lecture On "Who Were The Young Turks"? August 8 at 7:30 PM Glendale

PRESS RELEASE
Defenders of Fatherland
1015 E. Wilson Street, #7,
Glendale, California 91206.
Contact: George Apelian
Tel: (818) 246-2099
E-mail: [email protected]

HISTORIAN CHRISTOPHER JON BJERKNESS TO SPEAK IN AN UNPRECEDENTED PUBLIC
LECTURE, ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 2007, at 7:30 PM ON THE TOPIC OF "WHO WERE
THE YOUNG TURKS, THEIR MOTIVES AND THEIR ETHNIC ORIGINS".

You are cordially invited to hear historian Christopher Jon Bjerkness (from
Chicago) to speak on the topic of " Who were the Young Turks " and the
subject of Turkish crime of the Armenian Genocide, on Wednesday, August 8,
2007 at 7:30 PM sharp at the United Comminity Church, Glendale, California.

Christopher Jon Bjerkness has written several books and articles on the
history of the theory of relativity. His research into Albert Einstein’s
rise to fame led him to study the causes of the First World War.
Discovering the true significance of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, he
began to investigate the history of the Armenian Genocide. He has published
his findings in a new book which identifies the ethnic origins and overall
agenda of the "Young Turks ", including their motives for committing
Genocide against the Armenians.

United Community Church is located at 333 E. Colorado St., in the City of
Glendale, California. Admission is free to the public at large.

Summary of the lecture:

· Prehistory of the 1915 Genocide
· Status of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire
· Genocidal Enemies of the Armenians
· The "Young Turks" Were Neither Young, Nor Turkish
· Armenian Traitors
· Politics Behind the Armenian Holocaust
· Those Who Benefited from the Armenian Holocaust
· Will History Repeat Itself?

Orhan Pamuk may stand new trial

PanARMENIAN.Net

Orhan Pamuk may stand new trial
04.08.2007 14:59 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The Supreme Court of Appeals on Thursday upheld an
Istanbul court’s earlier decision to dismiss the case of Nobel
Prize-winning Turkish author Orhan Pamuk, who was on trial on charges
of "denigrating Turkishness."

The Second Court of First Instance in Istanbul’s Sisli district had
earlier dismissed the charges on the grounds that the necessary
permission from the Justice Ministry to launch a probe into the author
had not been issued, a requirement under the former penal code, which
was being applied to Pamuk’s case.

The charges relate to a magazine interview in which Pamuk claimed that
30,000 Kurds and 1 million Ottoman Armenians were killed in Turkey.

The high-profile prosecution had caused a stir globally, raising
serious concerns about EU-hopeful Turkey’s commitment to the basic
democratic principle of free speech. A delegation of European
parliamentarians had traveled to Istanbul to observe the trial
alongside international human rights campaigners, Today’s Zaman
reports.

Ex-Ruling Party Questions Opposition’s Political Format

EX-RULING PARTY QUESTIONS OPPOSITION’S POLITICAL FORMAT

Panorama.am
17:44 03/08/2007

"The parliamentary elections and the post-election phase markedly
indicated that the problems of Armenia are connected not with the
authorities in power but first of all with the opposition," Davit
Shahnazaryan, member of Pan Armenia National Movement (HHSh), told
reporters today at National Press Club also saying "the opposition
must look for the reasons of defeat in itself." The accusations made
against the society are, at least, "wrong," Shahnazaryan said.

"If this situation continues and if the opposition does not come up
with obvious conclusions, the authorities in power may not have the
need even to fake the elections during the presidential elections,"
ex-ruling party member said. Shahnazaryan said the sooner the
opposition draws conclusions, the better are the chances that
the political system and the opposition will establish itself in
Armenia. He also said the opposition has changed the political combat
into "different unclear formats" by saying that ideology is of third
or fourth importance.

"I do not understand what a common candidate means without an
ideological grounding," Shahnazaryan said.

"If my friends and colleagues are going to decide on who the common
candidate should be around a table of 10-15 people, what are the
guarantees that the society will accept that?" Shahnazaryan questions.

BEIRUT: Aoun And Gemayel Stage Simultaneous Rallies, Drawing Thousan

AOUN AND GEMAYEL STAGE SIMULTANEOUS RALLIES, DRAWING THOUSANDS OF SUPPORTERS
By Hani M. Bathish

Daily Star, Lebanon

Aug 4 2007

Political rivals escalate war of words as campaigning reaches final
stage

BEIRUT: Thousands of orange-clad supporters of Free Patriotic Movement
leader MP Michel Aoun turned out in Dbayyeh for a huge campaign rally
Friday evening; while a separate rally was held simultaneously in
Antelias in support of Former President Amin Gemayel. Friday also
saw an escalation in the war of words and election rhetoric only
48 hours before tens of thousands are due to head to 348 polling
stations around Metn to fill the seat vacated by the assassinated
Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel.

Aoun addressed the rally in Dbayyeh from behind a bullet proof shield
and dubbed his electoral opponents "windmills of lies" with nothing to
offer voters but lies and unfulfilled promises. "I will not call them
sons of snakes, but sons of rumors, and rumors are like a rootless
weed, once you pluck it out it dies," Aoun said of his opponents.

"They frighten you and tell you there will be trouble [Sunday],
we tell you have no fear, the army and security forces are there to
protect you and so are our [fists]," Aoun said, warning all those
who try to use violence, close roads or attack supporters Sunday,
adding that the Metn is a peaceful and civilized place.

"Our choice is that of peace for Lebanon, but not the peace of the
weak," Aoun said, adding that his electoral opponents thought the FPM
was weak when they tried to reach a consensus to avoid the electoral
battle. He said that not one of the government’s promises have been
met in the last two years.

At the rally in Antelias, Gemayel warned his opponents that "Metn
will never be a suburb of Damascus" building on anti-Syrian feelings
to warn the people of Metn that a vote for Aoun is a vote for the
return of Syrian tutelage.

"Ali Qanso pledged the support of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
for Aoun, so did [Lebanese] Baath Party leader Assem Qanso, who said
the Baath Party and Aoun have one struggle," Gemayel said.

"Who will be happy with the FPM’s victory, except Damascus that is
trying to achieve a victory in Metn?"

Gemayel said that the people of Metn know that Aoun is dragging
them to a battle they do not want, adding that Aoun has betrayed the
trust of the people in Metn and that he did not consult anyone when
he chose his political path. He said that instead of being "a show
of faithfulness for the blood of the martyr" the electoral battle in
Metn has turned to a battle of "dancing over the blood of martyrs."

Addressing the FPM rally Friday, Change and Reform bloc MP Michel Murr
warned of the marginalization of the Christians and the presidency:
"Whoever votes for the FPM rejects this marginalization … we were
ready to go ahead with reconciliation, the other side refused and
blamed the FPM for rejecting the initiative … answer their rejection
with a ballot box full of votes."

Armenian Tashnag Party MP Hagop Pakradounian, also addressing the
FPM rally, said voting for the FPM candidate Sunday is a vote against
marginalization and for democracy: "We are here because we are free,
because we are faithful and reject marginalization, oppression and
injustice."

Free Patriotic Movement candidate in the Metn, Dr. Camille Khoury,
rejected claims made by his electoral opponent that he is only a
"figurehead" while FPM leader Aoun is the one running for election
in Metn. "I am the FPM candidate and in their name I am running for
election and with them I struggled for years against Syrian dominance
and occupation," Khoury told Voice of Lebanon radio Friday.

As for opponents’ claims that voting for Khoury is like voting to
return Lebanon to Syria, Khoury said: "It is well known who struggled
against the Syrian line over the past 15 years … We not only faced
the Syrians but many Lebanese who today claim to defend sovereignty
and independence and are among the ranks of March 14 but who made
deals with the Syrians to return to Lebanon."

Responding to accusations that he was a member of the Syrian Social
Nationalist Party before joining the FPM, Khoury said that he never
had any party affiliation until 1989 when he joined the struggle with
Aoun because he was convinced of his political line.

The FPM media committee issued a statement accusing "well-known
media organizations" of ripping posters of Gemayel, filming them and
blaming the vandalism on FPM members with the purpose of tarnishing
their image.

In an interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation’s Kalam
an-Nass program on Thursday evening, Gemayel explained his reasons
for rejecting the latest initiative aimed at avoiding an electoral
battle in Metn.

"All the points in the initiative carry the spirit of the opposition,
since it focused on contesting the legitimacy of the government
and that the by-elections are illegal, thus postponing elections,"
Gemayel said.

The former president added that the latest attempt at reaching
consensus over the Metn by-election did not originate from Bkirki. He
said there is no specific initiative from Patriarch Nasrallah Butros
Sfeir, only ideas that reached the patriarch who wrote them down and
passed them along to Gemayel.

Gemayel continued to receive supporters and well wishers at his home
in Bekfaya Friday, including Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea,
who said the Metn electoral battle would decide Lebanon’s destiny.

"I call on the people in Metn to save all of Lebanon by voting on
Sunday," Geagea told reporters after his meeting. "This electoral
battle has to do with the destiny of Lebanon … it is not aimed at
General Aoun nor at the young men and women of the FPM."

http://www.dailystar.com.lb

Armenian Government Exceeds Projected Revenues Collection Target

ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT EXCEEDS PROJECTED REVENUES COLLECTION TARGET

ARMENPRESS
Aug 1, 2007

YEREVAN, AUGUST 1, ARMENPRESS: Armenian government collected a total
of 244.7 billion Drams in revenues in January-June and spent 228.2
billion Drams, exceeding the projected target of revenue collection
by 6. 4 percent, but failing to meet the projected spending target
by 15 percent.

According to finance and economy ministry, the amount of collected
revenues in January-June rose almost 27 percent from a year ago. In
terms of money the rise amounted to 51.6 billion Drams.

Almost 44 percent of revenues came as taxes and dues, 6.2 billion as
non-tax revenues and 4.7 billion Drams as transaction revenues.

The ministry said official transfers declined 2.6 billion drams less
from a year ago.

It said 82.2 percent of revenues were taxes, state dues constituted
3.7 percent and non-tax revenues made 9.6 percent.

The Geopolitics Of Turkey

THE GEOPOLITICS OF TURKEY
By George Friedman

Stratfor
icle.php?id=293204&selected=Analyses
July 31 2007

Rumors are floating in Washington and elsewhere that Turkey is
preparing to move against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an
anti-Turkish group seeking an independent Kurdistan in Turkey. One
report, by Robert Novak in the Washington Post, says the United
States is planning to collaborate with Turkey in suppressing the PKK
in northern Iraq, an area the PKK has used as a safe-haven and launch
pad to carry out attacks in Turkey.

The broader issue is not the PKK, but Kurdish independence. The Kurds
are a distinct ethnic group divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and,
to a small extent, Syria. The one thing all of these countries have
agreed on historically is they have no desire to see an independent
Kurdistan. Even though each has, on occasion, used Kurdish dissidents
in other countries as levers against those countries, there always
has been a regional consensus against a Kurdish state.

Therefore, the news that Turkey is considering targeting the PKK
is part of the broader issue. The evolution of events in Iraq has
created an area that is now under the effective governance of the
Iraqi Kurds. Under most scenarios, the Iraqi Kurds will retain a high
degree of autonomy. Under some scenarios, the Kurds in Iraq could
become formally independent, creating a Kurdish state. Besides facing
serious opposition from Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite factions, that state
would be a direct threat to Turkey and Iran, since it would become,
by definition, the nucleus of a Kurdish state that would lay claim
to other lands the Kurds regard as theirs.

This is one of the reasons Turkey was unwilling to participate in
the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Americans grew close to the Kurds in
Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, helping augment the power of an
independent militia, the peshmerga, that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to
carve out a surprising degree of independence within Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq. The Turks were never comfortable with this policy and sent
troops into Iraq in the 1990s to strike against the PKK and pre-empt
any moves toward more extensive autonomy. Before the war started
in 2003, however, the Turks turned down a U.S. offer to send troops
into northern Iraq in exchange for allowing the United States to use
Turkish territory to launch into Iraq. This refusal caused Turkey to
lose a great deal of its mobility in the region.

The Turks, therefore, are tremendously concerned by the evolution
of events in Iraq. Whether northern Iraq simply evolves into an
autonomous region in a federal Iraq or becomes an independent state
as Iraq disintegrates is almost immaterial. It will become a Kurdish
homeland and it will exist on the Turkish border. And that, from the
Turkish point of view, represents a strategic threat to Turkey.

Turkey, then, is flexing its muscles along the Iraqi border. Given
that Turkey did not participate in the 2003 invasion, the American
attitude toward Ankara has been complex, to say the least. On one
hand, there was a sense of being let down by an old ally. On the other
hand, given events in Iraq and U.S. relations with Iran and Syria,
the United States was not in a position to completely alienate a
Muslim neighbor of Iraq.

As time passed and the situation in Iraq worsened, the Americans
became even less able to isolate Turkey. That is partly because
its neutrality was important and partly because the United States
was extremely concerned about Turkish reactions to growing Kurdish
autonomy. For the Turks, this was a fundamental national security
issue. If they felt the situation were getting out of hand in the
Kurdish regions, they might well intervene militarily. At a time
when the Kurds comprised the only group in Iraq that was generally
pro-American, the United States could hardly let the Turks mangle them.

On the other hand, the United States was hardly in a position
to stop the Turks. The last thing the United States wanted was a
confrontation with the Turks in the North, for military as well as
political reasons. Yet, the other last thing it wanted was for other
Iraqis to see that the United States would not protect them.

Stated differently, the United States had no solution to the
Turkish-Kurdish equation. So what the United States did was a tap
dance — by negotiating a series of very temporary solutions that
kept the Turks from crossing the line and kept the Kurds intact. The
current crisis is over the status of the PKK in northern Iraq and, to
a great degree, over Turkish concerns that Iraqi Kurds will gain too
much autonomy, not to mention over concerns about the future status
of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The United States may well be ready
to support the Turks in rooting out PKK separatists, but it is not
prepared to force the Iraqi Kurds to give them up. So it will try to
persuade them to give them up voluntarily. This negotiating process
will buy time, though at this point the American strategy in Iraq
generally has been reduced to buying time.

All of this goes beyond the question of Iraq or an independent
Kurdistan. The real question concerns the position of Turkey as a
regional power in the wake of the Iraq war. This is a vital question
because of Iran. The assumption we have consistently made is that,
absent the United States, Iran would become the dominant regional
power and would be in a position, in the long term, to dominate the
Arabian Peninsula, shifting not only the regional balance of power
but also potentially the global balance as well.

That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played
since World War I — an insular, defensive power that is cautious about
making alliances and then cautious within alliances. In that role,
Turkey is capable of limited assertiveness, as against the Greeks in
Cyprus, but is not inclined to become too deeply entangled in the chaos
of the Middle Eastern equation — and when it does become involved,
it is in the context of its alliance with the United States.

That is not Turkey’s traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans
at the end of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was
both the dominant Muslim power and a major power in North Africa,
Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a
multinational empire that as far back as the 15th century dominated
the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic pivot of three
continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of much
of the Eastern Hemisphere.

Turkey’s contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal
pattern in the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in
Turkey since the fall of the Ottomans, the emergence of French and
British power in the Middle East, followed by American power and the
Cold War, which locked Turkey into place. During the Cold War, Turkey
was trapped between the Americans and Soviets, and expansion of its
power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly emerging
as a key power.

One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the
Turkish economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic
product (GDP) in the world, and it has been growing at between 5
percent and 8 percent a year for more than five years. It ranks just
behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP. It has the largest economy
of any Muslim country — including Saudi Arabia. And it has done
this in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to
the European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that
measures weight in the international system. China, for example, is
109th in per capita GDP. Its international power rests on it being
fourth in total GDP.

Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as
well as the largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern
Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush,
Turkey is moving to regain its traditional position of primacy in the
region. Its growth is still fragile and can be disrupted, but there
is no question that it has become the leading regional economy, as
well as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey’s geographic
position greatly enables it to become Europe’s primary transit hub
for energy supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to
reduce its dependence on Russia.

This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans,
for example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power,
the Turks have again emerged as a major influence over the region’s
two Muslim states — and have managed to carve out for themselves a
prominent position as regards other countries in the region as well.

The country’s economic dynamism has helped reorient some of the region
away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish economic influence
can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a supplement to
its strategic relationship with Israel.

Turkey’s problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic
expansion is blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example,
its influence in the Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction
with Greece. In the Caucasus, its friction with Armenia limits its
ability to influence events. Tensions with Syria and Iraq block Syrian
influence to the south. To the east, a wary Iran that is ideologically
opposed to Turkey blocks Ankara’s influence.

As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability
of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey
decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very
real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy. As
important, Turkey’s willingness to accept its highly constrained
role indefinitely, while its economic — and therefore political —
influence grows, is limited. Turkey’s economic power, coupled with
its substantial regional military power, will over time change the
balance of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.

Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of regions,
but its economy also is the major one in each of those regions,
while Turkish military power usually is pre-eminent as well.

When Turkey develops economically, it develops militarily. It then
becomes the leading power — in many regions. That is what it means
to be a pivotal power.

In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the
final analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be indifferent.

The United States is now in the process of planning the post-Iraq war
era, and even if it does retain permanent bases in Iraq — dubious
for a number of reasons — it will have to have a regional power
to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware of and cautious
with Turkey, but never as much as now — while Turkey is growing
economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran does not
want to antagonize the Turks.

The United States and Iran have been talking — just recently engaging
in seven hours of formal discussions. But Iran, betting that the United
States will withdraw from Iraq, is not taking the talks as seriously as
it might. The United States has few levers to use against Iran. It is
therefore not surprising that it has reached out to the biggest lever.

In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States,
represents a counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also
specifically in Iraq. From the American point of view, a Turkish
invasion of northern Iraq would introduce a major force native to the
region that certainly would give Iran pause in its behavior in Iraq.

This would mean the destruction of Kurdish hopes for independence,
though the United States has on several past occasions raised and
then dashed Kurdish hopes. In this sense, Novak’s article makes a
great deal of sense. The PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for
a Turkish intervention in Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey.

Anything that blocks the Kurds will be acceptable to the Turkish
public, and even to Iran.

It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the
United States is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in
the region, then it is in Turkey’s interest to do so. It also is
increasingly within Turkey’s reach. But it must be understood that,
given geography, the growth of Turkish power will not be confined to
one direction. A powerful and self-confident Turkey has a geographical
position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around it.

For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now,
however, economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey’s
slow reclamation of that role. The rumors about Turkish action against
the PKK have much broader significance. They point to a changing role
for Turkey — and that will mean massive regional changes over time.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_art

Of mosque and state

Austin American-Statesman (Texas)
July 22, 2007 Sunday
Final Edition

Of mosque and state

by Margaret Coker INTERNATIONAL STAFF

IZMIR, Turkey – In the past few weeks of a hotly contested election
campaign, ads have popped up across Turkey with an ominous message.

A stark image shows a black ballot box and a Muslim woman in full
facial veil superimposed on it. "Do you know what’s coming?" the ads
ask.

Today, Turks go to the polls for a parliamentary vote that has become
a battle over Turkey’s strict separation of Islam and state, an
official secularism that has distinguished this Muslim republic since
its founding in 1923.

Turkey has long debated the role of Islam in society, but this
current round of soul-searching has increasingly high stakes. A
country of 71 million people, Turkey is a member of NATO, hosts a
significant American military presence and borders such trouble spots
as Iran, Iraq and Syria. If pollsters are correct, Turks will
re-elect by a large margin the ruling Justice and Development Party,
known by its Turkish acronym AKP, a political movement whose leader
has been jailed in the past for his connection to Islamic
fundamentalists and who vows to undo laws banning religion from
public life.

To many pillars of Turkish society, especially the military and
judges, the rise of the AKP is another example of Islamic radicals
trying to topple the established order in the Middle East. Others see
support for the party as a reflection of a deep transformation under
way in Turkish society, in which new classes of voters are
challenging the country’s dominant, and at times authoritarian,
elite. The AKP offers stability, they say, without giving up the
country’s commitment to democracy.

"People try to say that this election is about head scarves, but that
is wrong," said Nukhet Hoter Goksel, a female professor who is
running for re-election as an AKP deputy. "The issue is democracy.
The Turkish system is based on secularism and an elite that
discriminates against large portions of society. That is what we are
trying to change."

President Bush has called Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, the 53-year-old leader of the AKP, a force for moderation in
the Middle East. Erdogan’s free-market economic reforms and attempts
to integrate with Europe have been warmly received in Washington.

The relationship is important to American foreign policy goals.
Turkey is a key logistical link to the U.S. mission in Iraq – 75
percent of supplies are flown to American troops via the Incirik Air
Base in southern Turkey – and Turkish troops are part of the
multinational force based in Afghanistan.

But the opposition in Turkey argues that curbing the AKP’s political
influence is vital for national security.

"Those who say the AK Party is a moderate Islamic force are naive.
They want to send us back to the Middle Ages," said Oguz Oyan, a
deputy secretary general of the Republican People’s Party, which was
created by modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The party, known as the CHP, is expected to take second place in
today’s election.

Ataturk carved the Republic of Turkey from the tatters of the Ottoman
Empire after World War I. He declared religion to be a backward force
that contributed to the Turks’ defeat in the war and he changed the
country’s identity from Islamic to secular. Turkish law bans
students, teachers, judges and state employees from wearing head
scarves to work or class or exhibiting religious symbols in public
buildings.

That legacy has fostered a Turkish sense of nationalism divorced from
Islam, with Turkey’s military seeing itself as defender of the
secular order. The military has staged four coups in the past 40
years, suppressed political dissidents and, in 1982, imposed a new
constitution on the country.

In May, the military issued a veiled threat to overthrown Erdogan’s
government after the prime minister nominated Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul, a party member whom Erdogan described as a "religious
man," to become president. Opposition lawmakers boycotted the
parliamentary vote on the nomination, arguing that Gul’s election
would remove the last obstacle to an Islamic takeover of the
government.

Turkey’s top court, which is secular, then intervened and declared
the process invalid. The crisis, which prompted the Bush
administration to warn the military against staging a coup, ended
with Erdogan rescinding Gul’s nomination.

The Gul affair galvanized those opposed to the AKP and massive,
pro-secular rallies were held in major cities. Opposition lawmakers
accused Erdogan of slyly embracing democracy while secretly intending
to make Turkey the next Saudi Arabia.

Filling a vacuum

Turkey’s last military coup occurred in 1997 after the Welfare Party
– the Islamic movement in which Erdogan and Gul cut their political
teeth – won general elections.

The military outlawed Welfare. The party’s leaders were jailed and a
secular party won the next election that the military allowed to be
held.

These events marked the first major break between Turkey’s citizenry
and the state, according to analysts.

"The state proved itself unable to listen to the needs and voices of
the people," said Bulent Tanla, a political scientist and CHP member.
"The AK Party has not sprung out of nowhere. It is filling in the
vacuum."

Erdogan, after being released from jail, refashioned himself,
shifting away from his previous role as an Islamic visionary to
become a more pragmatic social modernizer.

A popular mayor of Istanbul for four years, he started the AKP in
2002 as a way back into national politics. That year, the party won
33 percent of the national vote, thanks largely to support from
working-class Turks and the urban poor, and he formed Turkey’s first
single-party government – one formed without the need of a coalition
– in decades.

In the current campaign, Erdogan has tried to sidestep the religion
question by sticking to talking points about his government’s
economic and social achievements, which include a doubling of per
capita income from $2,600 a year to more than $5,000, a reduction in
interest rates and an overhaul of the national health insurance
system.

The AKP’s contentious relationship with the military, however, has
left it open to attacks from smaller right-wing parties that it is
soft on terrorism. Turkish soldiers, although not fighting in Iraq,
are dying almost daily along the Turkish-Iraqi border in ambushes set
by Kurdish separatists who are hoping to create their own state on
Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian territory.

It is a message that plays well in places such as Izmir, Turkey’s
third-largest city and a shipping hub known for famous naval battles
won by Ataturk.

In the 2002 elections, the CHP won 16 parliamentary seats from Izmir.
The AKP won eight, one of its worst showings in Turkey’s 81
provinces. This year, the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, is also
expected to do well in Izmir, a result that pollsters say could be
repeated in other large metropolitan areas and will offer a measure
of how well Erdogan and his party are received across society’s
spectrum.

Women’s rights

In Izmir, Hotar Goksel, a self-described secular Turk who favors
linen pantsuits and diamond earrings, and wears her light-brown hair
straight down her back, heads the AKP’s list of candidates. She spent
20 years teaching social policy at Izmir’s leading university before
accepting Erdogan’s offer to join his team.

Elected to parliament in 2002, she is a member of the party’s
executive committee, which meets weekly with Erdogan to shape
legislative policy.

Erdogan’s government has become known for furthering women’s rights
more than any other after Ataturk pushed for a woman’s right to vote
in 1925. Husbands are no longer officially heads of households, and
wives do not need their consent to work. Laws that used to dismiss
rape charges if the man married his victim have been rewritten.

Goksel says supporting religion is not anti-Turkish. If re-elected
today, she plans to push for an end to the head scarf ban in
universities. Such a move, she said, will increase the number of
women seeking higher education, especially from rural areas.

"We represent all faces in Turkey," she told voters gathered at a
recent campaign meeting.

In a way, the AKP’s biggest problem could come if it is too
successful. If the party wins two-thirds or more of the 550
parliamentary seats, it will have the power to select a new president
and amend the constitution. Then, Turkey might find itself back in
the same standoff with the military that it saw in May.

For many Turks, tanks in the street pose a bigger threat than head
scarves on college students.

"The army is a bully that can take sides when it wants, bend the
rules whenever it suits them," said Tarhan Erden, the head of
Istanbul’s Konya research center who has studied each of Turkey’s 15
elections. "What we have missing in society is the will to rein them
in."

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Turkey in facts and figures
Geography: 297,200 square miles (slightly larger than Texas) in
southeastern Europe and southwestern Asia. Bordered by Bulgaria and
Greece to west; Georgia, Armenia and Iran to east; Iraq and Syria to
south.
Population: 71 million.
Culture: Predominantly Muslim. Turkish is official language;
Kurdish, Arabic, Armenian and Greek are also spoken.
History: Modern republic created in 1923 after collapse of Ottoman
Empire following World War I. Strongly secular foundations laid by
national leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Military sees itself as
guardian of secularism.
Politics: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamic-rooted party
came to power in 2002. In today’s election for the 550-seat
parliament, secular parties will attempt to wrest power from Erdogan,
whom they accuse of trying to impose religion on society. Turkish
democracy has been interrupted several times by military coups.
Insurgents from minority Kurdish population are fighting for autonomy
in the southeast.
Economy: Recovering from an economic slump in late 2000, the country
has enjoyed a growth rate of about 7 percent in the past several
years and a rise in per capita income. Unemployment, however, remains
high.
Foreign relations: Turkey, the only Muslim member of NATO, began
European Union membership negotiations in 2005. Has territorial
disputes with Greece in Aegean Sea; divided island of Cyprus also is
source of tension.

Source: Associated Press, CIA World Factbook