IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM MODIFIES TURKISH STRATEGY AND POLICY
CENTRAL ASIA – CAUCASUS ANALYST
Wednesday / April 05, 2006
By Stephen Blank
Every analysis of the consequences of Iran’s nuclear and missile
projects has stressed that successful completion of those programs
would dramatically transform Eurasia’s security situation. We can
already begin to see this happening with Turkey which shares a border
with Iran and which has become increasingly nervous about Iran’s
nuclear and missile program. Turkey still seeks to join the EU, is
effecting a rapprochement with Russia, and is also simultaneously a
member of NATO. It also still has a substantive working relationship
with Israel, particularly among both states’ armed forces, and is
still insecure regarding Kurdish terrorism and aspirations to a
state. Iran’s activities threaten to transform the balance around
Turkey and have led to clear signs of new modifications in Turkish
policy.
BACKGROUND: Turkey has stated that it has sent messages to Iran asking
it to desist from building nuclear weapons. Indeed, as an aspirant to
membership in the EU it could do no less without enraging Brussels,
and the key members of the EU who are leading the negotiations with
Iran. But it has a delicately balanced relationship with Iran. Its
border with Iran has been quiet for centuries. Iran is also a major
source of Turkish energy imports, providing almost a fifth of Turkey’s
energy imports. Both Iran and Turkey also share common apprehensions
about Kurdish independence drives in their own states and in Iraq as
well as fears of re-emerging Kurdish terrorism in their two
states. And with a Muslim- led AKP government in power in Ankara,
Turkey undoubtedly is highly sensitive to charges about supporting
non-Muslim regimes against Iran.
Nevertheless, while it has made clear its apprehensions to Israel
about possible Israeli preemptive strikes against Iran through Turkish
air space, the Turkish government and military are clearly moving to
protect themselves against possible Iranian nuclearization. Turkey has
resumed bilateral military talks with Israel and is evidently
upgrading intelligence cooperation with Washington, not only to
counter Kurdish terrorism in Turkey but also to monitor developments
in Iraq. At the same time the Turkish government, acting on its
military’s urging, has now opened an international tender for anti-air
missiles which could also be used as anti-missile missiles to block or
deter potential Iranian attacks upon Turkey. Thus this tender has
stimulated competition among foreign suppliers to provide it with the
appropriate missiles and the main contenders appear to be America,
Israel and Russia. The Russian firm Almaz-Antey is gearing up to to
offer Turkey its S-300-PMU-2 missile known as Favorit, and Russia has
evidently approached Turkey about co-production of the S-300 missile,
perhaps in this variant. Such gestures are a part of the larger
Russo-Turkish rapprochement that has been effected since 2003 through
major gas sales, burgeoning trade and shared apprehensions about
American policy in Iraq and about the EU’s demands on both states for
reforms. Even if Moscow and Ankara claim to have also developed
common interests with regard to developments in the Caucasus, it
remains the case that for Ankara membership in the EU is the main
priority. Consequently it could not, even if it wanted to, go against
the EU on the sensitive Iranian issue. But this issue also clearly has
the potential to influence Ankara back toward collaboration with
Western powers like America and Israel.
IMPLICATIONS: Should Ankara gradually return to enhanced security and
defense cooperation with the West, the results would be seen in the
Black Sea and Caucasus areas as well as vis-à-vis Iran. Such an
outcome is by no means a certainty, but it is revealing just how
important Turkey is as a player in its various regions that Moscow is
again willing to raise Iranian ire by providing Turkey with these
missiles for after all, they would be intended primarily to deter
Iranian threats. This shows Turkey’s growing importance to Russia, if
not to other actors. In other words, should Iran continue with its
missile and nuclear programs, doing so would undoubtedly begin to
affect the postures and calculations of all the key players in
Eurasia. This means that the potential repercussions of an Iranian
program would be felt in Iraq, throughout the areas of Kurdish
habitation in Iran and Turkey as well, and in the greater Middle
East. But they would also resonate throughout the Caucasus and Black
Sea areas if not also throughout the Caspian and Central Asia. For
example, to the extent that Turkey can draw closer to the West and
possibly accelerate the negotiations over its entry into the EU, it is
also possible that some progress could be made with regard to the
Nagorno-Karabakh talks. Those deadlocked at the last bilateral meeting
of the principals in Rambouillet and at the meeting of the Minsk group
in Washington. But, as this author has argued elsewhere, Turkish entry
into the EU would obviously bring about a changed situation or place
pressure on Turkey to alter its posture vis-à-vis Armenia which could
then generate further movement toward resolving this war. Enhanced
cooperation with Russia, on the other hand, might result in less
financial support for Chechens coming from Turkey which would lead to
different possible outcomes in Eurasia. If Turkey is forced to
maintain a deterrent posture against a truculent Iran, this could also
force NATO to consider once again the question of defending Turkey, an
issue that generated a huge fiasco in 2003 and contributed to the
undermining of Turkish trust in its allies and in America. This time,
a more positive stance toward the issue of defending Turkey, not just
against missile attacks, but also against foreign-backed terrorism,
might go far to restore some of the previous warmth in Turco-Western
relations. Indeed, Prime Minister Erdogan alluded to this when stating
that NATO membership indicated Turkey need not worry of Iranian nukes.
CONCLUSIONS: Presently it is far to early to predict how Turkey’s
relationships with its most important interlocutors will evolve, and
it is in any case premature to make predictions as the way the Iranian
issue will unfold is unclear. Nevertheless it is important to realize
the issues involved and the stakes for all concerned with regard to
Turkish strategic options, because those will be crucially influenced
by the overall course of events with regard to Iran’s nuclear and
missile projects. Turkey is forced to balance its defense, energy,
trade, anti-terrorist and Kurdish concerns along with those of
relations among key players America, the EU, Russia, Israel, Iraq,
Iran, and the Caucasus as it tries to navigate among the potential
shoals of alternative solutions to the anxieties caused Iran’s
programs. Turkey’s answers to those issues, will in turn help define
the parameters of what is possible in all these volatile regions of
the world and its relationships with all these key actors. As the
Chinese ideogram puts it, crisis signifies both danger and
opportunity. The crisis generated by Iran’s missile and nuclear
programs constitutes both a crisis and an opportunity, not only for
Turkey, but also for all its partners.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The views expressed here
do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Dept. or the
U.S. Government.
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