PM Pashinyan’s meeting with ruling My Step faction kicks off

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 12:20,

YEREVAN, AUGUST 24, ARMENPRESS. The meeting of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan with the members of the ruling My Step faction of the Parliament kicked off at the headquarters of the Civil Contract party.

My Step faction head Lilit Makunts told reporters that there is no planned agenda for the meeting.

“This is the faction’s regular meeting with the Prime Minister. Each month the faction is holding such a meeting. There is no planned agenda, it will be formed on the spot”, she said.

 

Reporting by Norayr Shoghikyan; Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

ANN/Armenian News Conversation on Armenian News: Turkey (Part 1): Transformation and Continuity

Armenian News Network / Armenian News

Conversation on Armenian News: Turkey (Part 1)

ANN/Armenian News

Table of Contents

Introduction

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Guests This Week

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This Week’s Conversation on Armenian News:

Turkey: Transformation and Continuity

Overview

Hosts and Guests

Analysis and Discussion

Turkey’s Transformation in Historical Perspective from Kemalism to Islamism

Change and Continuity of Turkish Political Culture

Turkey’s Foreign Policy

The Middle East & the Mediterranean (Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Greece)

Wrap-up

Hello and welcome to Armenian News Network, Armenian News. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.

Before we begin, I’d like to thank you for listening and supporting our podcast. If you like what you hear, we’d appreciate your help in reaching a wider audience by subscribing to our channel, liking, and sharing our podcasts. We are available on most major media platforms, including Youtube, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, and More.

In this multi-part Conversation On Armenian News, Asbed Kotchikian explores Turkey’s transformation throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty first, and the underlying dynamics powering these changes.

Prof. Kotchikian is a senior lecturer of political science and international relations at Bentley University in Massachusetts where he teaches courses on the Middle East and former Soviet space.

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  • Asbed Kotchikian

  • Varuzhan Geghamyan

  • Ara Sanjian

  • Vahram Ter-Matevosyan

  • Diana Yayloyan

  • Hovik Manucharyan

  • Asbed Bedrossian

In 2002, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a sweeping victory in the country’s general elections, dominating and shaping domestic and foreign policies of Turkey for nearly two decades to this date. Outwardly, under Erdogan’s and AKP’s leadership, Turkey has transformed from a country with a stated and acclaimed foreign policy seeking “zero problems with neighbors” to one that is actively engaged in economic, political and military rivalry with its Middle East and other regional neighbors, as well as balancing global players. Armenia is deeply affected by the quality of relationships that Turkey conducts with each of its neighbors.

In this first part of our Conversation on Armenian News about Turkey, we explore Continuity and Change in Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Turkey covering transition from Kemalism to Islamism, as defined by the AKP. We look at how recent events fit together within the framework of continuous, yet changing, state policies. We also discuss Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

Joining us today are

  • Professor Ara Sanjian who is an Associate Professor of History and the Director of the Armenian Research Center at University of Michigan, Dearborn. His research interests focus on the post-World War I history of Armenia, Turkey and the Arab states of Western Asia. 

  • Prof. Varuzhan Geghamyan is assistant professor at Yerevan State University (Department of Oriental Studies) teaching courses on Turkey’s modern history, History of Azerbaijan; Sociocultural anthropology of Azerbaijan; Political ideologies and parties in Modern Turkey &  History of the Turkish Republic.

  • Diana Yayloyan is an Ankara-based Research Associate, working on Armenian-Turkish Normalisation Projects, supported by the EU. Diana is also a Ph.D. Candidate at the Middle East Technical University, focusing on Gender Theory and Peacebuilding.

  • Prof. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan who is associate Professor and Chair of the Political Science and International Affairs Program at AUA. His research interests focus on Turkish politics, Kemalism, Political Islam & Security in the South Caucasus

How have those changes influenced Turkey’s policies domestically (minorities, political parties, etc) as well as in its Foregin policy?

Turkey has been pursuing a more active foreign policy. What are the driving forces behind this foreign policy? How can we explain Turkish expanding influence from its immediate neighborhood to the larger mediterranean?

That concludes this Conversation On Armenian News about Turkey. We hope it has helped your understanding of some of the issues involved. Be sure to tune in to our next episode where we will continue on this topic and explore Turkey’s foreign policy in the Caucasus.

We look forward to your feedback, including suggestions for future Conversation topics. Contact us on our website, at Armenian News.org, or on our Facebook PageANN – Armenian News”, or in our Facebook Group “Armenian News – Armenian News Network.

Special thanks to Laura Osborn for providing the music for our podcast. I’m Hovik Manucharyan, and on behalf of everyone in this episode, I wish you a good week. Thank you for listening and talk to you next week.

Introductory remarks by Third President of RA Serzh Sargsyan at the meeting of the National Assembly Investigative Commission

168.am
Aug 19 2020
Introductory remarks by Third President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the meeting of the National Assembly Investigative Commission, which investigates the circumstances of the 2016 April hostilities                       

Good afternoon,

Before answering the questions of interest to you, I would like to address the panel with a brief introductory speech. Also, I suggest attaching it to today’s meeting’s minutes.

First of all, I will explain why I decided to accept your invitation, come and answer any question that might be asked in here, although many of my supporters, members of the political team urged me to avail myself of my right to reject the invitation on the grounds that the Commission seemed to have been set up for political considerations, and its members had repeatedly expressed biased and incorrect opinions about the April events.

But I decided to come over, even if their concerns were relevant, since I wanted to look straight in your eyes trying to understand whether there is anyone to question the victory of the Armenian side in the Four-Day April War. Is there anyone who can professionally substantiate that Azerbaijan is on the winning side while it has lost most of its elite units? Can anyone tell me that the Armenian side which stopped a large-scale offensive with numerous examples of unspeakable courage suffered a defeat? Can anyone provide evidence of a war ever waged in the history of mankind where only soldiers fought and won without commanders?

The question may arise as to why I have so far failed to speak out about the April War and downplay the speculations on this topic. To be honest, at first there was no need for it, and then there was no expediency. That is why I proposed to hold a commission hearing with my participation at the end of the state of emergency, so that after the hearings I could have the opportunity to address the issue in the presence of media outlets and disclose all relevant information.

Let me now address some issues that have unfortunately become the subject of speculation.

Before arguing about whether we won or lost by repelling the April aggression unleashed by Azerbaijan, one ought to have a clear idea of what victory is, and what defeat is in a war.

It is obvious that wars are not an end in themselves, they always pursue political goals. War is the “continuation of politics” in other ways. It is a victory for the defending side when it succeeds in aborting the aggressor’s plans with minimal losses. No warfare can be deemed successful for the attacking side if it does not achieve at least part of its political goals.

Before answering the question of whether we won or lost the April War, let me briefly touch on whether we could prevent or avoid the war. Now I can confidently state that it was impossible.

Why? Because Azerbaijan was not ready to accept any compromise acceptable to us: I am convinced that they are not prepared to acknowledge the right of the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh to determine the status of their country by free will. Thus, there was only one way to avoid war: unilateral concessions, which, of course, was not even discussed as it was unacceptable for us.

As I said, victory comes when one’s political goals are materialized through war. What political goals were pursued by Azerbaijan? Those goals have been formulated in the findings of both domestic and foreign expert studies, in the comprehensive analyses carried out by competent authorities, as well as in the decisions and statements made by the leaders of foreign states, including the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

They pursued an ultimate goal of achieving a U-turn in the negotiations. They wanted to prove that the conflict might have a military solution as the negotiations were not in their favor. Ilham Aliyev demonstrated it best in 2016 during the October, 2007 cabinet meeting of the Government of Azerbaijan, when he acknowledged that behind closed doors the international community had been urging him to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence.

Second, Azerbaijan was striving to give to oblivion the fact that Artsakh was a party to the conflict as vividly evidenced by the tripartite ceasefire arrangement signed as early as in 1994.

Third, it was extremely important for Azerbaijan to root out the loser’s complex in the minds of its own people and in the army by representing themselves as winners. Instead, they were trying to get the winner’s psychology of our troops changed into the psychology of a loser. I can cite other goals as well, but let us stop on what was said.

Now let us see whether they achieved their goals or not?

First, the failures on the battlefield did not allow Azerbaijan to confront the Armenian side and the international community with “fait accompli” and force us to negotiate their own agenda. In the meantime, there was a breakthrough in the negotiations concerning the agenda that we had been insisting on ever since 2013 with a view to setting up an international mechanism for investigating ceasefire violations.

After the April War, Aliyev had to agree with this reality in Vienna and then in St. Petersburg. By the way, this was a key component in the legacy left by the former Armenian authorities. I will explain it in more detail, if necessary.

Thus, as a result of the April aggression, Azerbaijan suffered huge losses not only in military terms, but also in the diplomatic arena. It came to prove that Azerbaijan was unable to solve the problem through the use of force.

Second, having failed on the battlefield, Azerbaijan was forced to be back to the table of negotiations together with Russia. We were expected to agree to Azerbaijan’s proposal for signing a new ceasefire agreement. But we refused, insisting that the 1994 agreement was still standing as it was signed for an indefinite term. That is, we refused to sign a new ceasefire document, which in fact would push Artsakh out of the peace process as an equal party to the conflict. Later on, we received a clear-cut position on the part of the Co-Chairs, with the official statement spread in the OSCE, which reaffirmed the deadline-free nature of the tripartite ceasefire agreement of 1994.

Third, as I said, Aliyev wanted to raise the fighting spirit of his own people and army through war in order to create some myth of “victory.” They had even mobilized special groups to quickly publicize the expected success. But it did not work out thanks to our soldiers’ bravery.

Going a little further, I should say that I deeply regret to see that some forces have been serving this very goal inside our country over the past few years.

For four years now, myths and absolute lies have been fomented about our soldiers’ being left without food and fighting with shovels. To make things worse, some used to claim that our armored vehicles were filled with water instead of diesel fuel. This is just a shame, even from the point of view of achieving political goals.

After all, was the April War a victory or a defeat for the Armenian side? I have never questioned it, since I am convinced that this is our victory, the victory of all of us.
Did our military-political leadership work effectively? Despite some minor shortcomings, almost all military, political, state and civilian parties did their best during the hostilities. As for the shortfalls and lessons, there is the Top Secret Report drafted by the Armenian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces that I suppose is available for commission members’ reference.

Was it possible to reject the armistice and try to restore our initial positions? I think so. But it was very likely that we would have dozens of new victims, new mourning parents, new orphans, and new widows.

Could we reject the ceasefire in order to punish Azerbaijan by expanding the security zone with new territories? Without ruling out the possibility of success, I would say that it would be an adventure fraught with unpredictable consequences, up to the outbreak of a full-scale war, as a consequence of thousands, maybe tens of thousands of victims, destroyed towns and villages.

In view of the above and taking note of the opinions of the Minister of Defense, the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, the President of Artsakh and the Commanders of the Defense Army, and in my capacity of Commander-in-Chief, I decided to accept the proposal of ceasefire.

This perhaps a little long introductory speech was meant to foster a substantive discussion of issues arising from the Commission’s goals and mandate. I am prepared to answer your questions for the good of our state and people.

You yourself understand that the Four-Day War is a small part of the millennial history of the Armenian people who are fighting for their dignity, freedom and survival. Please remember that regretfully the war is not yet over.

Thank you.

Armenian church left neglected, looted in Turkey

Public Radio of Armenia
Aug 13 2020

Turkish press: Turkey-France relations: Deepening cross-purposes

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and French President Emmanuel Macron talk after a meeting on bilateral relations at the Elysee Palace in Paris, Jan. 5, 2018. (AP Photo)

Acold wind is blowing between Paris and Ankara since last fall when the French government summoned the Turkish envoy in Paris after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron was suffering from “brain death.”

Erdoğan had repeated the same _expression_ Macron had used to describe NATO, to hit back at the French president over his criticism of fellow NATO member Turkey’s intervention against YPG/PKK terrorist elements in northeastern Syria. Macron has been one of Ankara’s most vocal critics since it intensified offensives against terror enclaves in the region.

Recently, the two countries faced each other in another crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. On June 10, a naval crisis erupted between the two off the Libyan coast. France accused Turkey, taking the case to NATO and calling on the EU Commission to impose sanctions.

Later, the French government condemned the decision of the Turkish authorities to revert Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia from a museum to a mosque. “France deplores the decision of the Turkish Supreme Court to modify the museum status of Saint Sophia and President Erdoğan’s presidential decree reverting Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque, under the authority of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, after Turkey’s highest administrative court decision,” French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said.

Quarrel in Libya

Beyond the maritime incident, “the bottom of the case is the repeated violations of the arms embargo by Turkey and history of falsifications and trafficking,” said French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly.

Paris indeed denounces the Turkish military intervention in Libya alongside the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli.

Before participating again in Operation Sea Guardian, France requested “that the allies solemnly reaffirm their attachment and their commitment of respect for the embargo.”

An investigation by the French newspaper Le Monde in February 2016 revealed that France had secretly deployed its special forces and the operational arm called “service action” of the French General Directorate of External Security (DGSE) for very precise strikes against targets, designated as affiliates of Daesh in Libya. Its “aim” was to contain the eventual development of the Daesh threat in Libya.

France’s realpolitik stance on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, before and during the Arab uprisings, was accused “hypocrisy” for collaborating with authoritarian and corrupted regimes, for instance, the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime in Tunisia.

However, despite former French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s relations with Libya’s late autocrat, Moammar Gadhafi, France adopted a leading role in the military intervention to Libya in 2011. France’s approach toward its regional allies was full of rhetorical and cautionary discourses, and never toward regime change despite the overwhelming lack of legitimacy and credibility of those regimes.

Human rights principals

The “moral-politik” discourses of France’s foreign policy is damaging the credibility of the country and its foreign policy principals. Paris’ independent foreign policy in the MENA region, notably in Libya and Tunisia, is questioned and Macron’s attempts to use the crises in Lebanon and Syria were seen as a move to damage Turkey’s regional influence. For example, his visit to the site of the Beirut blast and statements there proved the legitimacy of these critiques.

For Paris, it’s too late to revive Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union still-born project. The recent developments in Eastern Mediterranean Basin’s offshore natural gas prospects have roused tensions between the five countries that Paris sees as potential allies to contain Ankara’s exploration projects and role.

The strategic landscape is in such fast evolution that President Macron should take the future of the new Libya into consideration; however, the true evolution is driven by the Turks, who have put themselves in a very strong position with the Italians and the Germans, negotiating overtly, coordinating with the Americans and holding Russians back, while imposing new imperatives in NATO, applying the French adage. One must speak to his adversaries and not to his friends.

The relations between France and Turkey have gotten sour ever since the French Senate approved in January 2012 the vote of the Congress on the sour-sweet Armenian dish. This case goes back to 1915-1916 when the Ottoman act was falsely qualified by the French Congress as “genocide.”

In the past, whenever Turkey’s candidacy to the EU got closer to serious consideration, the rejectionist camp in the EU brought up the Armenian case, which without a doubt, successive Turkish governments preferred to leave it to their domestic and sub-regional objective policies.

Sarkozy, who was described by the French media as a political kamikaze, had landed this time up against a vigorous Turkish wall. Today, Macron is playing a new diplomatic game called Tac-O-Tac. He is desperately looking for resurrection after his domestic political troubles and his poor crisis management of the health care pandemic brought by COVID-19.

There are also other challenges for him such as the yellow vest protest movement as well as other social and societal movement waves. The municipal elections outcomes were a political hurricane for President Macron who obliged him to fire his center-right premier and hire a conservative prime minister from the hardcore of the French right. He is unlike Erdoğan who came out stronger from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis nationally and internationally alike.

Rivalry foreign policy

What does France stand to gain or to achieve? Legally, it is deceitful. France is still chased by its own heavy-loaded colonial crimes. Politically, it is poor judgment, France needs Ankara in the entire MENA region turmoil, from the Iranian nuclear dossier to the Syrian civil war impasse, and recently for the Lebanese political and financial crisis to the Libyan war and power influence game. There is also the migrant issue at hand and Ankara has been doing a great job on the migrant crisis, serving as a robust gendarme protecting the EU countries of mass migrant influxes. Turkey’s success in the war on terror is also here to mention.

At the sub-regional level, in France’s courtyard in the Maghreb and the Sahel, its national and security interests are in jeopardy. The French should look at Ankara with tender eyes for help in Libya, Paris’ “surreal-politik” policy in Libya like in Syria has put Paris in panic alarm.

Besides, in the fight against armed groups like al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Din, and Boko Haram, all of which menace the stability of the Sahel and West African countries, Ankara could play a major role with the tribal Muslim leaders.

Economically, it is a lose-lose situation for Paris if the country sticks with the narrative of sourness; history has never been a good source of governing for politicians because its myths bite them and make them look foolish, alliances work better with a brain to restrain conflict, and maintain NATO member’s balance and entente over leaders’ cross-purpose. It sounds inevitable that President Macron’s foreign policy is better off with a cemented realpolitik, and will not let the whole past rivalry weigh on the present reality.

*North Africa expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM)

Armenian government announces relief program for tourism sector

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 12:10,

YEREVAN, AUGUST 13, ARMENPRESS. The Armenian government approved a new – the 23rd – relief program aimed at eliminating the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The measure concerns the tourism sector and is directed at helping businesses of the area keep their employees.

Miinster of Economy Tigran Khachatryan said at the Cabinet meeting the pandemic has caused nearly 70% drop in the tourism, accommodation and restaurant business turnovers.

Businesses meeting the requirements for the relief project will receive monthly grants from the government. Companies or entrepreneurs operating in the tourism and travel business, hotels and accommodation, booking, food and other services who launched their operations before March 31, 2020 and who have at least 3 employees at the time of application, are entitled to receive the aid.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

Prime Minister formally requests President to sack Deputy Chief of Police Hayk Mhryan

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 13:50, 5 August, 2020

YEREVAN, AUGUST 5, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has submitted a recommendation to President Armen Sarkissian requesting him to dismiss Deputy Chief of Police of Armenia Hayk Mhryan, Sarkissian’s aide Hasmik Poghosyan told ARMENPRESS.

“The President hasn’t signed the motion yet,” she said.

According to unconfirmed media reports, another Deputy Chief of Police, Tigran Yesayan, is also sacked.

Reporting by Lilit Demuryan; Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

Azerbaijani press: Bulgarian MP slams Armenia for endangering Azerbaijan’s int’l projects

BAKU, Azerbaijan, Aug.1

Trend:

Armenia obstructs negotiation process for peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by its recent provocative actions, Chairman of Azerbaijan-Bulgaria Friendship Group at the Bulgarian Parliament of the 44th convocation Hamid Hamid said.

Hamid made the remark in his letter addressed to Head of Azerbaijan-Bulgaria Inter-Parliamentary Working Group at Azerbaijan’s Parliament Rauf Aliyev, Trend reports on August 1.

The chairman stressed that recently the international community has witnessed the growth of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this time on the border between the countries in the direction of Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district, strongly condemning the military provocation committed by the Armenian armed forces.

“The latest provocative actions of Armenia should be regarded as a threat to the projects of the East-West Transport Corridor and the Southern Gas Corridor being implemented by Azerbaijan and its European partners. These projects play an exceptional role in strengthening the energy security of Europe, including Bulgaria. This provocation is aimed to create a threat to energy security and economic benefits not only of the region, but of the whole Europe,” he said.

Hamid, guided by the fundamental norms and principles of international law, four UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874 and 884) and the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between Azerbaijan and Bulgaria from 2015, expressed full supports of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan, which is a reliable member of the UN, OSCE, European Council, as well as a respected partner of the EU and NATO.

“I would also like to remind the results related to the policy of the EU Foreign Ministers Council on the “Eastern Partnership” after 2020, which also enshrines the principle of “common obligations to create a space of universal democracy, prosperity and stability”. This provides for general obligations in connection with the rules based on international law, in particular, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter of Paris,” the MP said.

At the same time, he reminded that the four resolutions of the UN Security Council require the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

The European parliamentarian in his letter stressed that the international community must condemn in the harshest form the occupation policy of Armenia against Azerbaijan and the provocative actions committed by it on the border.

He noted that in order to prevent the transformation of the incident into a hotbed of war, the international community should soon intervene.

“I express my solidarity with Azerbaijan, looking forward to the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders. In addition, I express my condolences to the families of those killed during the incident, and wish the wounded a speedy recovery,” Hamid concluded.

Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict: Reasons, Probable Results of Tension at Front Line

Eurasian Times
July 17 2020

        

Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict – The attack of the Armenian army with heavy weapons on the Tovuz Rayon of Azerbaijan suddenly changed the world agenda and caused the regional war scenarios to be brought to the agenda once again. It was announced that both sides suffered serious losses, especially in the mutual attacks that began at noon on July 12 and appeared to be weakened by July 15.

For the first time, Azerbaijan lost a general in the hot conflict. The outposts belonging to Armenia, where attacks were carried out on the Azerbaijani side, were destroyed by the counter-fire of Azerbaijan. Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, convened the National Security Council, then the Council of Ministers, with a special agenda, one day apart, and gave important messages on the attacks of Armenia.

The harshest response to Armenia’s attacks came from Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu condemned the attacks of Armenia and urged the occupying state to respect the international law and leave the territory it has occupied.

Remarks of Erdogan and Cavusoglu — that Turkey with all means will be with Azerbaijan in whatever way Baku chooses to save its territory — should be seen as statements that could change the regional balances.

Russia has invited the parties to abide by the cease-fire and said it can mediate between the parties if necessary. The US, Britain, and other Western countries have called on the parties for restraint. Pakistan strongly condemned the attacks of Armenia and expressed its support for Azerbaijan.

Ukraine and Moldova called on the parties for moderation, urging for the implementation of UN Security Council decisions, numbered 822, 853, 874, and 884, to stop the Armenian occupation in the Azerbaijani territories for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Furthermore, besides the implementation of the decisions mentioned above, Ukraine and Moldova said the problem should be solved under the fundamental principles of international law, and in particular, the territorial integrity principle. Also, due to this attitude of Ukraine, the Armenian Foreign Ministry summoned the Ukrainian ambassador in Yerevan to express discomfort.

In its first statement, Iran expressed regret over the losses and invited the sides to a cease-fire. But also, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran in a phone call expressed their support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

The UN, EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), with Armenia among its members, expressed their discomfort at the cease-fire violations and the start of the hot conflict. Contrary to Armenia’s expectation, the CSTO did not give it clear support. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) condemned Armenia for its attacks and supported Azerbaijan.

– Fire never ceases at front line

Differing views are being raised on the causes of the border clashes. In fact, for those who know in detail the history of the problem, especially the current situation, the cease-fire, and the subsequent “peace process”, this conflict was no surprise.

As is known, Armenia, which was better prepared in the first phase of the war (having experienced cadres of the ASALA terrorist organization, as well as having very serious external support from a military, economic and diplomatic perspective), occupied about 20% of the Azerbaijani territory.

The UN Security Council and other international organizations had adopted resolutions condemning the occupation and calling for an immediate and unconditional end to the occupation. However, Armenia did not follow these resolutions nor the cease-fire agreement signed in May 1994.

Armenia believed that it would keep Azerbaijan under pressure with the possibility of a large-scale invasion and a new attack and that it could prevent the attempts to liberate Azerbaijan’s territory with Russian military support. Nearly all important forces in the region that have interests and influence on the problem have tried to take advantage of the lack of resolution and negotiate with the parties over the occupation problem.

For this reason, the problem of the occupation of the Azerbaijani territory by Armenia — shortly and commonly known as the Upper Karabakh problem — was described as a “frozen problem” like many problems in the former Soviet geography.

On the other hand, it was especially clear that after the intervention of Russia in Georgia in August 2008, the “frozen problems” were not actually frozen, and this was a great danger, and it was claimed that attempts to resolve the problem would intensify.

In fact, the agreement signed at Mein Dorf Castle near Moscow on Nov. 2, 2008, with Russian mediation, was expected to significantly guarantee a cease-fire. Because for the first time, the parties said they would stick to peaceful methods in solving the problem with a document signed by Russia. But interestingly, the cease-fire violations, which have caused huge losses in recent years, happened at the time or immediately after talks were held between the sides.

For example, in June 2010, August 2014, November 2014, December 2015 and in other periods, whenever the high-level talks were at issue, cease-fire violations caused significant losses from both sides and made the war scenarios take part in the agenda.

However, within a few days of each of these tensions, the previous order was restored. The most extensive clashes to date following the 1994 cease-fire agreement occurred in April 2016. Azerbaijan, which responded to the provocations of Armenia during those conflicts, saved part of its territory from the occupation of Armenia by inflicting great losses on the other side and took psychological advantage for the first time in the 30-year war. This seriously disturbed Armenia and its supporters.

Therefore, the fire never actually ceased after the 1994 cease-fire. The cease-fire violations are more likely to be the subject of the accusations from the opposing sides and an attempt to turn the balance in their favor in May 1994. As such, Azerbaijan was much stronger militarily, economically, and diplomatically than in the early 1990s. The figures also support this data.

For Azerbaijan, the fact that its territory (the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and the seven Rayons surrounding it) is under Armenian occupation is both against the international law and not in line with the existing military, diplomatic, economic, and other capacities of the two countries.

In other words, Azerbaijan, at the time it deems appropriate, has signed Article 51 of the UN Convention. It has the right and capacity to liberate its territory from the occupation of Armenia within the framework of its right to self-defence based on its article.

Armenia considers this course too risky for itself and is trying to provoke Azerbaijan (as in the case of Georgia and Ukraine) to limit the growing capacity of Azerbaijan to a war involving Russia. This may be one of the main aims of the attack of Armenia this time from a different region on the border of the two countries.

The reasons for the cease-fire violations in general and the recent clashes, in particular, can be listed as follows: the opportunity for Armenia to eliminate the consequences of the April 2016 war and the psychological oppression, a reflection of the internal political struggle in Armenia, the purpose of the power to divert attention from social and economic problems, a reflection of the domestic military struggle, a reflection of the problems in foreign policy, the seclusion of Azerbaijan into a large-scale war (in which Russia will take side with Armenia in terms of the military), and making sure that its potential would receive a blow, etc.

Although Russia is not the only culprit in the emergence of the Upper Karabakh conflict, it is not wrong to emphasize the role of the support of this country to Armenia in the emergence of the current landscape and the failure of the solution process.

The Upper Karabakh conflict is an important tool for Russia to continue its activity in the Caucasus. So Russia does not want it to be fully resolved, that is, the disappearance of an intermediary. Until recently, despite Russia, it was always seen as a poor prospect for a serious conflict to begin and for one of the sides to gain a serious upper hand over the other.

The fact that Azerbaijan does not desire a war in which Russia will be involved at this stage, and that Russia does not wish to experience new problems because of Azerbaijan while it is dealing with so many problems, are the factors undermining the possibility of the growth of the conflict.

On the other hand, with the active involvement of Turkey in the process, the situation of “neither peace nor war” is beginning to become a source of risk for everyone, but especially for the occupying Armenia and the foreign powers that support this country militarily and hope for a solution.

As it will be remembered, Cavusoglu, in his statement on June 20, had put forward a different perspective on the attitude of Turkey on this issue by saying that we would be on its side in the same way that Azerbaijan wants a solution to the Karabakh conflict. After the clashes, which began on July 12, this stance was emphasized more clearly and persistently at the level of President Erdogan and various ministers.

Therefore, on the one hand, the balance between the military, diplomatic and economic opportunities of Azerbaijan and Armenia changed very much in favour of Azerbaijan compared to the beginning of the 1990s, on the other hand, Turkey’s active military policy and the official statements changed the balance.

The problem of the occupation of the Azerbaijani territory by Armenia was once an opportunity for the powers that had interests in the region and influence over the countries of the region, but it is now beginning to be a source of risk.

As a result of this, the situation of “neither war nor peace” in terms of the Upper Karabakh conflict is no longer as healthy for the forces trying to profit from the lack of resolution of the problems in the South Caucasus. A large-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, unlike the Syrian and Libyan problems, could further drain the possibilities of the major powers in the region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran), and these forces may have to lose important interests elsewhere.

This scenario would be better suited to the interests of the major powers outside the region. Important powers in the region need to take these into account and act quickly on the solution of the Upper Karabakh conflict. This could speed up the solution process of the Upper Karabakh conflict.

By Araz Aslanli. Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of The EurAsian Times


High school graduates, parents protest outside education ministry in Yerevan

Panorama, Armenia

Armenian high school graduates, who have received high scores as a result of joint exams but have not been admitted into a university, as well as their parents are rallying outside the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport in Yerevan. They demand a meeting with Minister Arayik Harutyunyan.

The participants of the rally are holding posters reading, “We demand education”, “The voice of young people shall be heard”, and the like.

One of the parents who organized the rally asked the participants to practice social distancing to avoid police warnings. The organizer next entered the ministry building to inform the staff about the protest action and their demand to meet with the minister.

Ofelia Kamavosyan, a public relations officer at the ministry, stepped in to talk to the protesters and, asking them to meet with Deputy Minister Grisha Tamrazyan, however the latter turned down her offer.

“We have stated that we want to meet only with the minister. The applicants’ right to education has been trampled and violated, which must be restored,” a parent said.

Referring to Arayik Harutyunyan’s statement on Sunday that the applicants had been duly notified of the changes in the procedure for filling out the applications before the exams, the protesting parent insisted that the minister had no idea what a proper notice meant.

“A document has not been handed to the applicants, neither has it been sent by post or e-mail. The Assessment and Testing Center has also failed to notify [the applicants]. What proper notification is the minister talking about? He says 57,000 people are following his page, I am sorry but there may be no applicants among those 57,000,” the protester stated. 

The parent claims the issue failed to be resolved after their meeting with the deputy minister, adding Harutyunyan avoids meeting with them, because he does not know the legal acts.

“Yesterday he went live from his office, if he thinks he is right, let him come out to meet us, we will ask each other questions and you will see that he is not right,” he said.

The education minister has called on those school graduates who have not been admitted to a university to apply to a distance learning program, an offer strongly rejected by them.