Author: Manouk Vasilian

PATRIARCH OF ARMENIANS OF CONSTANTINOPLE EXPRESSES ERDOGAN PROTEST IN
CONNECTION WITH NEW DRAFT LAW ON VAGYFS
ISTANBUL, December 6 (Noyan Tapan). Archbishop Mesrop Mutafian, the
Patriarch of the Armenians of Constantinople, sent a letter to Prime
Minister of Turkey Recep Tayipp Erdogan, in which he expressed protest
in connection with the fact that the government prepared a draft law on
Vagyfs (the local self-governmental bodies) without taking into account
the opinion of the national minorities. According to the Istanbul
“Marmara” newspaper, the Patriarch said that in accordance with the
preliminary agreement, the opinion of the national minorities should be
taken into account elaborating draft law “On Vagyfs”. Patriarch Mesrop
Mutafian attached a document to the letter including the suggestions
of the lawyers of the Patriarchate in connection with the draft law.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian Assembly of America
122 C Street, NW, Suite 350
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:
 
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 20, 2004
CONTACT: David Zenian
Email: [email protected]
CONGRESS AFFIRMS MILITARY ASSISTANCE PARITY FOR ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN
Assembly hails leadership of Congressman Knollenberg
Washington, DC – The House of Representatives today approved the
Omnibus Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, providing equal levels of military
assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The spending package, which
allocates $8.75 million in military financing to both countries,
thwarts the Administration’s attempt to provide Azerbaijan a $6
million increase over Armenia by placing the neighboring countries
on equal footing.
“We commend Armenian Caucus Co-Chair Joe Knollenberg (R-MI), for his
outstanding leadership on the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee
on Appropriations to reinstate U.S. balance and impartiality in
dealing with the Karabakh conflict,” said Assembly Board of Trustees
Chairman Hirair Hovnanian. “We are also very appreciative of Senator
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Majority Whip and the Chair of the Senate
Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations, for his efforts
to maintain security assistance parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan
in the Senate version as well.”
“The Assembly welcomes today’s vote and praises our friends in both
chambers for their steadfast support on issues of importance to
the Armenian-American community,” said Assembly Board of Directors
Chairman Anthony Barsamian. He added that had the requested disparity
in military assistance been enacted, U.S. credibility as an impartial
and leading mediator in the ongoing Karabakh peace process would
have been hampered. It would have also potentially undermined the
fragile ten-year cease-fire between the neighboring countries, which
is particularly worrisome given Baku’s recent threats against Armenia
and Nagorno Karabakh.
In September, NATO canceled its PfP exercise in Baku due to
Azerbaijan’s barring of Armenia, an active participant in the program.
Azerbaijan’s refusal to honor international commitments is part of an
escalating pattern throughout 2004 of its hostility towards all things
Armenian. By not properly condemning the murder of an Armenian officer
at a NATO event earlier this year, by periodically threatening Armenia
and Karabakh with another military offensive, and by not denouncing
the remarks of its Defense Ministry spokesperson predicting Armenia’s
conquest by Azerbaijan within 25 years, Azerbaijan’s senior leadership
has repeatedly shown their true colors to the international community.
This month, the government of Azerbaijan proposed an ill-conceived
and one-sided U.N. General Assembly resolution that could derail
the Nagoro Karabakh peace process spearheaded by the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Minsk Group
co-chaired by the United States, France and Russia. It is a hostile
declaration against the entire negotiating process, including progress
made in the recent Astana round of negotiations.
For its part, the government of Armenia has repeatedly indicated
its desire to peacefully resolve the conflict, and prior to a full
settlement being achieved, has also offered confidence-building
measures (CBM’s) to bring immediate benefit to all peoples. Azerbaijan
has chosen a different approach – blockade, rejection of CBM’s and
increasingly shrill war rhetoric.
An integral component of U.S.-Armenia relationship is the security
dimension, which has grown considerably since the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Since those seminal
events, the Armenian Government has undertaken a number of security
measures aimed at assisting the war on terrorism, measures which have
been praised by President Bush and other high-ranking U.S. officials.
Over the past few years, Armenia has also strengthened its ties to NATO
by following through on its Partnership for Peace (PfP) commitments,
sent a peacekeeping unit to Kosovo as part of KFOR, and is preparing
to send an Armenian contingent to Iraq to assist in the stabilization
and reconstruction efforts in that country.
The Omnibus spending package also approved “not less than” $75
million in assistance to Armenia, an increase of $13 million over
the Administration’s FY 2005 budget request. An additional $3 million
in humanitarian assistance for Nagorno Karabakh was also allocated.
Under the guidance of Senator McConnell, the Senate, for the first
time, provided an earmark for Karabakh. The United States remains the
only nation in the world that allocates direct humanitarian assistance
to Karabakh.
This April, Armenian Caucus Co-Chair Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ) and
Caucus member John E. Sweeney (R-NY), along with over 40 of their
congressional colleagues, wrote to Chairman of the House Foreign
Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) urging that
the subcommittee maintain symmetry in levels of any military/security
assistance for Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, they requested
“not less than” $75 million in economic assistance for Armenia and
continuing humanitarian assistance for Nagorno Karabakh in FY 2005.
The Assembly strongly supported this initiative by urging Members to
sign on to this letter during its advocacy portion of its National
Conference and via a nationwide Action Alert.
The Senate plans to vote on the spending measure later today.
Once passed by the other chamber, the bill will be sent to President
Bush for his expected signature.
The Armenian Assembly of America is the largest Washington-based
nationwide organization promoting public understanding and awareness
of Armenian issues. It is a 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt membership
organization.
NR#2004-101
–Boundary_(ID_YCsFgaKE8nBHPOcbUEoxPg)–

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
October 22, 2004, Friday
KYRGYZSTAN NEEDS SECOND-HAND WEAPONS
SOURCE: Kommersant, October 20, 2004, p. 11
by Dmitry Glumskov, Konstantin Lantratov
NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer held negotiations with
President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and the speakers of both houses
of the parliament in Bishkek on October 19. (…)
Mr. Scheffer stated that NATO intends to intensify cooperation with
Kyrgyzstan. He stated at a meeting with the president of Kyrgyzstan:
“We’ll have to solve common tasks in combating international
terrorism and countering other challenges.” Mr. Scheffer said that
NATO intends to strengthen its influence in Western districts of
Afghanistan, and needs transport and telecommunication support in
Central-Asian republics. NATO intends to sign a transit agreement
with these republics. Kyrgyzstan let the US and European nations use
its airdromes for transit of military and humanitarian cargo to
Afghanistan in 2001. experts state that this decision brought in
around $250 million to the republican budget in 2002.
Askar Akayev promised that Kyrgyzstan will join NATO’s programs at a
higher level, which includes analysis and planning.
Mr. Akayev said that the main effort will be aimed at strengthening
the border and intensifying control. The president of Kyrgyzstan
said: “The center of Alpine rescue-workers, which we want to
transform into a center for training peacekeepers, is the main unit
in this program.”
Kyrgyzstan asked NATO to pass over weapons, which new members of the
alliance will write off as a result of modernization of their armies,
to the republic. This request was announced by Altai Borubayev,
speaker of the house of representatives of the parliament of
Kyrgyzstan. Mr. Borubayev noted that new members of the alliance
rearm their armies according to NATO’s standards, and have a lot of
weapons and military hardware, which could become a substantial
contribution to the combat against terrorism. Mr. Scheffer did not
comment on this proposal but did not rule out that NATO will discuss
this issue later.
It should be noted that Russia is the major supplier of weapons to
Kyrgyzstan. However, Bishkek also receives weapons from the US,
China, Turkey, France and India. At the same time, Bishkek exports
Soviet weapons. In particular, Kyrgyzstan supplied armored personnel
carriers, infantry weapons and ammunition to Afghanistan in October
2001. In addition, Kyrgyzstan was involved in supplying obsolete
weapons to conflict zones. In particular, Kyrgyzstan was rumored to
send weapons to Armenia during an armed conflict in Nagorny Karabakh.
In addition, experts of the UN Security Council stated in November
2001 that Kyrgyzstan violated UN sanctions and supplied aircraft
spare parts to Liberia. It’s not ruled out that if NATO considers the
prospects of supplying obsolete weapons to Kyrgyzstan it will demand
additional guarantees that Bishkek will not re-export them to other countries.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

SERGE SARGSSYAN HAS NO INTENTION TO RESIGN
A1 Plus | 21:43:09 | 14-10-2004 | Politics |
Armenian defense minister Serge Sargssyan refuted Thursday rumors
going around about his likely resignation.
He said at Thursday’s news conference that such rumors had surrounded
him since he took office eleven years ago. He said he knew very well
where these rumors came from and who seeks advantage from them.
“I take it easy”, he added.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Philip Terzian: Knock on the door
Providence Journal 10-10-04
01:00 AM EDT on Sunday, October 10, 2004
WASHINGTON
TUCKED AWAY on the back pages of most newspapers was last week’s most
important story.
The executive branch of the European Union has proposed opening formal
negotiations over membership for Turkey.
It’s a big story, all right, but it’s just beginning. The European
Commission’s proposal needs to be endorsed by leaders of the E.U.’s
25 members, who meet in December. They are not likely to veto the
proposal. But the green light only signals forward motion. Many
obstacles remain for Turkish membership, and the process could well
take a decade or longer.
What are the obstacles? Let me count the ways. Everyone agrees that
Turkey has some distance to go before its penal code and human-rights
practices are in accordance with European standards. Turkey is much
poorer than most E.U. member nations, and its economy is straitjacketed
by government controls. Everybody admires the “secular” character
of this overwhelmingly Muslim republic — decreed by its founding
dictator, Kemal Ataturk — but it is not quite accurate to call Turkey
a democracy. There is self-rule, and the Turkish parliament enjoys a
certain independence, but real power resides in the councils of the
Turkish army. Nothing happens without the approval of the generals.
To its credit, Turkey has sought to reform itself by stages. It no
longer actively persecutes its Kurdish minority, it has instituted
judicial reform, and it has made significant changes in its notorious
prison system. The economy is being liberalized, and there have even
been legislative motions designed to limit the power of the army. A
recent measure to outlaw adultery was scuttled when the E.U. raised
objections.
But these are, so to speak, technical matters. The big question
is fundamental — Is Turkey part of Europe? — and the answer is
unsettled. Moreover, it is difficult to discuss the subject with
candor, since European identity has much to do with culture, ethnicity
and religion. The Turks have capitalized on this sensitive issue
by asserting that Europeans hostile to Turkish membership regard
Europe as a “Christian club,” and only a bigot would block their
entry. Our own State Department, which has lobbied vigorously for
Turkish accession, regards concerns about culture and religion as
“racism”: end of argument.
Yet the question cannot be ignored. A look at the map reveals that
Turkey is, by any definition, a crossroads nation, straddling Asia
and Europe. As a member of NATO since 1949, and an ally of the United
States and Israel, it has looked westward in the great game of power
politics.
There is a division, however, between the Turkey that the State
Department knows and the country that borders Iran. Not is it only
predominantly Muslim, but Islam is also far more actively enshrined
in national life than Turkey’s official “secular” posture would
suggest. Orthodox Christians, concentrated mostly in Istanbul,
are under siege and dwindling in numbers. Less than a century ago
the Turks were liquidating Christian Armenians by the hundreds of
thousands and ethnically cleansing Greeks who had inhabited the
eastern Mediterranean for millennia.
The challenge for the Europeans is not an easy one. Do three or four
years of legislative reforms constitute fundamental change, and is
Europe prepared to absorb a society of 70 million Muslims circulating
freely around the continent? The present Turkish government is headed
by an Islamist — albeit a “moderate” Islamist — party, and while
Turkish public opinion supports admission to the E.U., it is not
clear whether this reflects a desire to be European or aspirations
to join a lucrative job market.
In that sense, Turkish membership seems a genuine gamble for the
E.U., and it is obvious why some critics believe the United States
supports Turkey as a means of weakening European unity. Moreover, if
Turkey is admitted, how would that define, or redefine, the outlines
of Europe? On Turkey’s eastern border lies Armenia, a democratic
Christian nation where a European language is spoken and the economy
is considerably freer than Turkey’s. If Turkey is admitted to the E.U.,
it is difficult to see why Armenia should be excluded.
Which, in a sense, may argue for Turkey’s eventual accession. One E.U.
member, Cyprus, currently suffers the illegal occupation of a third of
its land by Turkey. Ankara can hardly join the European Union when
its army squats on the sovereign territory of an E.U. member. And
the landlocked Armenians suffer from a petulant Turkish blockade of
its border — not to mention refusal to acknowledge the genocide of
Armenians by the Ottoman Turks.
Turkey’s weaker neighbors, Armenia and Cyprus, might well regard E.U.
membership as a civilizing influence, and hope for the best. But power
resides elsewhere — in Berlin and Paris — where the sound of Turkey
ringing the doorbell must set off a long and contentious debate.
Philip Terzian, The Journal’s associate editor, writes a column
from Washington.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

22 September, 2004
”Azerbaijan’s Precarious Balancing Act”
The geostrategic nerve center of the Caucasus is Azerbaijan with oil
reserves possibly totaling one-hundred billion barrels. The country is
coveted as an ally or at least a benevolent neutral by regional and
world powers: Iran, Russia, the Franco-German combination and the
United States. Each of those powers has its own interests, which
creates a complex pattern of convergence and divergence among them.
As the object of active interest by powers that are politically and
economically stronger than itself, Azerbaijan is threatened with
dependency if it falls into the hands of any one of them, but it also
has an opportunity for autonomy if it can successfully play them off
against one another and maintain a balance of power. With autonomy as
its goal, the government of President Ilham Aliyev has pursued a
“balanced” foreign policy, opening up diplomatic channels with all of
the interested states and giving each of them the hope of satisfying
some of its own aims, while Baku maneuvers to achieve its vital
interests.
As the Aliyev regime perceives them, the vital interests of Azerbaijan
are to settle jurisdictional issues over rights to Caspian Sea oil,
ensure security of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that will move the oil
west, secure investment from varied sources on the best terms to
develop its oil industry and the rest of its economy, avoid economic
or military dependence on any foreign power as it pursues development,
and resolve the issue of the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh by
regaining sovereignty over it. From Baku’s viewpoint, Azerbaijan’s
future is that of a rising power that will be able to maintain genuine
independence in the long term if it can manage the transition to
prosperity by skillfully performing its balancing act.
The Balanced Strategy
Baku has been able to pursue its balanced strategy because none of the
powers impinging on it poses a direct military threat to the
regime. The Franco-German combine by necessity is restricted to
economic and diplomatic influence, and neither Iran, Russia nor the
United States is currently interested in making any provocations that
would lead the others into a confrontation with it and risk
instability in the oil patch. Each of the impinging powers would like
to draw Azerbaijan into its orbit, but their room for action is
limited by the others, leaving Baku with a measure of freedom to make
deals with all of them and also to refuse their proposals.
>From the viewpoint of its vital interests, Baku counts on Washington
for help in settling Caspian Sea jurisdiction, since Iran and Russia
border Azerbaijan on the Sea and are competing interested
parties. Baku also expects Washington to make sure that the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is secure. In the sphere of economic development,
Baku wants investment from all of the interested parties, particularly
the Franco-German combination. It also wants help from any of them on
the Karabakh problem.
In return for its protection and in pursuit of its perceived vital
interests, Washington would like to establish a military presence in
Azerbaijan as part of its policy of securing oil supplies by
encircling and containing Russia and Iran. In response, Russia and
Iran want Azerbaijan to remain free of American bases. This
configuration of economic and strategic interests allows for a balance
of power in which Baku undertakes limited military cooperation with
Washington and Moscow, and maintains friendly relations with Iran,
satisfying each of them a little and antagonizing none of them. The
wild card is Karabakh, which destabilizes the balancing act.
Nagorno-Karabakh
After achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan
was faced with a rebellion in the Armenian-dominated region of
Nagorno-Karabakh, which occupies a significant portion of the
country’s southwest. Several years of war, ethnic cleansing, pogroms
and massacres led to the de facto independence of the breakaway region
under the protection of Armenia. In implementing its protective role,
Armenia also occupied areas of Azerbaijan bordering Karabakh, carving
out a corridor from the region to Armenia. The troubles created bitter
hostility between the dominant ethnic group in Azerbaijan — the
Azeris — and the Armenians, resulting in the unwillingness of either
group to compromise.
Ever since the secession of Karabakh, Baku has been preoccupied with
regaining sovereignty over the region. Karabakh is an open wound for
the Azeri public and any regime in Baku has to reckon with deeply
irredentist and often revanchist public opinion that severely
restricts the ability to negotiate a solution. To surrender
Azerbaijanian sovereignty over Karabakh definitively would amount to a
political death sentence. As a result of intensely nationalistic
public opinion and the regime’s geostrategic interest in Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity, the Karabakh problem shadows and warps every
move that Baku makes in its relations with impinging powers. Trade
deals, military cooperation and attempts to attract investment always
have the added motive of securing aid in wresting Karabakh from
Armenian protection. Were it not for Karabakh, Baku would be in a much
stronger position to pursue its balancing strategy successfully,
because it would not be constrained to seek help from the impinging
powers.
Despite its economic potential and strategic importance relative to
Armenia, Azerbaijan has not received significant support for its aims
in Karabakh from interested powers. None of those powers wants any of
the others to have a dominant sphere of influence in Azerbaijan, but
they are also not interested in seeing the country become an
independent regional power in its own right. The United States, with
a large Armenian diaspora and comprehensive geostrategic interests in
the Caucasus, cannot support Baku wholeheartedly. Russia has a long
standing security relationship with Armenia that it is reluctant to
sever. France and Germany have no military influence and find it
difficult to support a turnover of Karabakh to Azerbaijan in light of
their rejection of Serbian claims to Kosovo. Iran, which has a vital
interest in limiting American presence in the Caspian region, recently
declared for the first time its support for restoration of
Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh, marking a minor breakthrough
for Baku.
Up until the present, the impinging powers have supported mediation
efforts by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(O.S.C.E.), carefully avoiding taking either side, which has
solidified the status quo to the advantage of Armenia and the Karabakh
mini-state. Another round of talks scheduled for mid-September in
Astana, Kazakhstan will bring together the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan with Russian and American facilitation.
There is no indication that the two sides are willing to compromise.
Baku insists that Armenia withdraw from all areas of Azerbaijan
outside Karabakh before it will negotiate on any other questions. It
also insists that it regain sovereignty over Karabakh in any final
agreement, though it is probably willing to concede a large degree of
autonomy to the region. Finally, Baku demands that Azeri refugees be
permitted to return to the homes that they fled in the troubles.
Yerevan refuses to withdraw from occupied areas of Azerbaijan before
negotiations on the status of Karabakh and the refugees proceed, and
is unwilling to concede Baku’s sovereignty over the region.
Baku’s response to the deadlock has been a mixture of frustration and
hope. Although it has had very limited success in moving interested
powers to its side, Baku expects that in the long run its growing
wealth will change the balance of power in the region, to the point
that it will be able to overmatch Armenia militarily and solve the
Karabakh problem to its satisfaction by force if necessary. In the
run-up to the Astana talks, Aliyev has stressed that if its aims are
not met by diplomatic means, Baku will eventually opt for a military
solution. There are reports that Azerbaijan is pursuing arms deals
with Ukraine and Pakistan.
Since it is not currently ready to take military action, Baku has
recently shifted its foreign policy to tilt toward Russia. In August,
the Aliyev regime put into effect a law on national security that bans
foreign military bases in the country. At the same time, it has
allowed Russia to have a radar station in Azerbaijan. Baku also did
not apply for N.A.T.O. membership at the Istanbul summit and has
dragged its feet on refreshing its troop commitment to the
American-led coalition in Iraq. Finally, Azerbaijan’s foreign
minister, Eldar Mamedjarov, expressed favorable opinions on Russia’s
design of a Single Economic Space within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (C.I.S.), of which Azerbaijan is a member.
Baku’s diplomatic offensive, which includes frequent discussions with
Germany and France, as well as with Russia and Iran, is aimed at
getting movement on the Karabakh problem in the face of American
inaction. Some analysts believe that Baku is trying to trade a promise
to curtail American military presence in Azerbaijan for Russian
cooperation on Karabakh.
The tilt toward Russia and Iran by the Aliyev regime has occasioned an
American reaction, signaled by an unscheduled visit by U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Baku in August. Washington is
particularly concerned about the increasing cordiality of relations
between Baku and Tehran, and growing military cooperation between Baku
and Moscow. During the Rumsfeld visit, Baku reportedly asked for help
on the Caspian Sea jurisdiction issue and did not yield to American
pressure to distance itself from Iran and Russia.
Washington is also concerned about Aliyev’s attempt to fill his
government with a new generation of officials who are loyal to him and
will replace the holdovers from his father’s regime. The direction of
the changeover is toward figures who have a pro-Russian bias. For
example, pro-American National Security Minister Namik Abbasov was
recently replaced by Elman Gambarov who is in favor of closer security
ties to Russia. Although there are internal political tensions within
the regime that motivate the new tilt, it is also conditioned by the
quest for help in Karabakh.
In tilting toward Russia and Iran, Baku is running against the
familiar pattern of resorting to an extra-regional power — here the
United States — to balance strong regional neighbors. The Aliyev
regime has made this move because it has become clear that Washington
will not go beyond its policy of supporting the O.S.C.E. process on
Karabakh. Whether Russia, which is the major third party in the
negotiations, will exert pressure on Armenia remains to be seen.
America’s Slippage in Azerbaijan
The Aliyev regime is not trying to marginalize the United States in
Azerbaijan or more broadly in the Caucasus region, but is simply
attempting to restructure the regional balance of power in its favor.
After the August announcement of American troop redeployment from
Europe to forward staging areas, Azerbaijan was prominently mentioned
as one of the prime sites for new bases. That possibility now seems to
be a dead issue after the announcement by U.S. Ambassador to
Azerbaijan Rino Harnish on September 11 that basing is not currently
under discussion. Instead, Baku and Washington will pursue more
restricted forms of military cooperation that do not jeopardize
Azerbaijan’s relations with its neighbors.
American slippage in Azerbaijan is part of an overall diminution of
Washington’s influence in the world after the failures of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Even if Karabakh were not an issue, Baku would be
constrained to improve relations with its powerful neighbors, because
it cannot count on the United States to be a reliable protector beyond
providing security for the pipeline. With the addition of Karabakh,
the American position is weakened even further.
In a setback to Washington, N.A.T.O. exercises that had been scheduled
to be held in Azerbaijan in late September were abruptly canceled
after the Aliyev regime, bowing to popular pressure, refused to allow
Armenian officers who were supposed to participate in the exercises to
enter the country. Hosting the exercises was a part of Baku’s balanced
strategy, offsetting its cooperation with Russia and the C.I.S. by
ties with the West. Karabakh got in the way.
Conclusion
In light of its strategic situation as a relatively weak power in a
sensitive region that is impinged upon by greater powers, and its
prospects of increasing strength, Baku’s balanced strategy of playing
all sides — sometimes against one another — is rational in terms of
serving perceived vital interests in autonomy and prosperity. In the
absence of the Karabakh issue, that strategy would have good chances
for success. The struggle over the breakaway region places stresses on
the delicate balancing act, threatening to push Baku too far in the
direction of Russia or the United States, both of which are eager to
establish a sphere of influence in Azerbaijan.
If either one of the two most important impinging powers threw its
support to Baku, the regime would be tempted to fall into its camp,
altering the balance of power in the region and impairing Azerbaijan’s
autonomy. At present, Baku is tilting toward Moscow, which has common
interests with Tehran in minimizing American influence. The tilt does
not signal a decisive shift from the balanced strategy, but reflects
the quest for support on the Karabakh issue. If Baku’s current
initiatives do not bear fruit, a tilt back to the United States is
possible.
Since none of the impinging powers seems ready to support Baku,
competition for influence by all parties is likely to continue within
the constraints of a common interest in avoiding significant
confrontation. As Azerbaijan’s sore point, Karabakh will intrude as a
factor in Baku’s decisions that will prevent it from taking full
advantage of the balanced strategy, which remains in its interest to
pursue. The impinging powers will continue to court Baku, but they
will feel no urgency to support its claims unless one of them disturbs
the consensus on avoiding provocation, setting off confrontation and
realignment. An Azerbaijan incapable of taking full advantage of its
position is currently in every impinging power’s interest.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azeri foreign minister returns from Moscow, says Karabakh topped agenda
Azad Azarbaycan TV, Baku
19 Aug 04

[Presenter] Russia would support any agreement reached between the
conflicting sides, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a
meeting with his Azerbaijani colleague Elmar Mammadyarov. Mr
Mammadyarov, who returned to Baku about an hour and a half ago, said
this to journalists at Heydar Aliyev airport.
He said that Moscow promised to be more active in settling the
Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.
[Correspondent over video of Mammadyarov] Russia will be more active
in settling the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, Mammadyarov told a
briefing devoted to the results of his visit to Moscow. Moscow sees a
settlement of the Karabakh conflict within the framework of
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
[Mammadyarov] Above all, we discussed the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict. Russia supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
Sergey Lavrov told a news conference openly that both as a co-chairman
[of the OSCE Minsk Group] and as a neighbouring country, the Russian
Federation is ready to render assistance to ensure a speedy settlement
to the conflict.
[Correspondent] As for a meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
foreign ministers to be held in Prague [29-30 August], Mr Mammadyarov
said that there has been no change in Baku’s position.
[Mammadyarov] I think that we should continue our work. The
co-chairmen have already expressed their stance. An exchange of views
should be held and a new way should be found to resolve this problem
peacefully. The issue is that forced migrants should definitely go
back.
[Correspondent] At the meeting with Sergey Lavrov, they also discussed
the development of bilateral economic relations. Moscow proposed that
Azerbaijan increase the amount of oil transported through the
Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline.
[Mammadyarov] The Russian side wants Azerbaijan to increase the use of
the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. We discussed this issue. If this
proposal is commercially viable, we are ready to consider this.
[Correspondent] Moreover, they discussed regional security, the fight
against terrorism and problems of Azerbaijanis living in Russia.
Farida Agaverdiyeva and Emil Aliyarli, “Son Xabar”.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ArmenPress
Aug 10 2004
FM PRESS SECRETARY SAYS AZERBAIJAN SHOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN PEACE
YEREVAN, AUGUST 10, ARMENPRESS: Armenian foreign ministry press
secretary Hamlet Gasparian commented on Mamediaor’v recent statement
saying that Azerbaiajan will consider its determination to be
involved in negotiation process unless OSCE Minks Group comes up with
a statement condemning Armenian actions (in relation to August 8
municipality elections and military exercises in Nagorno Karabakh).
Gasparian said Azerbaijan is trying to make a trick out of its
involvement in negotiation process and uses it as a means to make
pressures on international community, particularly OSCE Minsk Group.
This does not speak about Azerbaijan’s seriousness in its efforts to
reach peace.
Imagine that Armenia also rises issues as a precondition for its
continued involvement in negotiation process, for example, demanding
that the mediators greet the elections in Nagorno Karabakh, Gasparian
continued. After all, not only Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh but
Azerbaijan should also be interested in peace. Otherwise, fruitless
are negotiations with a partner who serves them as a means for
blackmail and manipulations, Gasparian said.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ArmenPress
June 25 2004
CONSTRUCTION OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE MUSEUM AND MEMORIAL IN WASHINGTON
REQUIRES BIG MONEY
YEREVAN, JUNE 25, ARMENPRESS: Armenian ambassador to the USA,
Arman Kirakosian, said today that the repair of a building in
downtown Washington, purchased by the Armenian Assembly of America to
rebuild it into the Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial to detail
the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians by the Turkish government from
1915-23, may take years, “as the project requires huge financial
support.”
According to Rouben Adalian, director of the Armenian National
Institute in D.C. ,a research organization created by the Armenian
Assembly of America, the museum project likely will cost about $100
million. Two years ago, the Armenian Assembly of America bought the
30,000-square-foot National Bank of Washington building at 14th and G
streets NW for $7.25 million to house the museum.
The Museum and Memorial will have 90,000 square feet of space,
consisting of approximately 60,000 square feet of newly constructed
space, and 32,000 square feet in the historical former National Bank
of Washington building. The museum and memorial will combine the
power of architecture, art and contemporary technologies with
artifacts, archival texts and photographs to communicate the
historical experience of the Armenian people, the trauma and legacy
of the Armenian genocide, and the role of American and international
philanthropy in rescuing the survivors.