Europe and the China card
by Tony Barber
FT
September 26, 2008
The August war in Georgia, and Russia’s recognition of the breakaway
enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have plunged relations between
Moscow and the European Union into their iciest condition since the
Soviet Union’s demise in 1991. But if it plays its cards right, it is
the EU, rather than Russia, that in the long run will gain something
from the crisis.
One month after the Kremlin embarked on the path of dismembering
Georgia by recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent
states, what is most striking is how negatively the rest of the world
has reacted. As far as I can tell, only Nicaragua has followed Moscow’s
lead to the point of full recognition. Even Belarus, the former Soviet
republic closest to Moscow, has held back.
Elsewhere, sympathy for the Russian position has come from Azerbaijan’s
Armenian-controlled enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish-occupied
Northern Cyprus and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. All things considered,
not a very impressive collection of supporters.
The most important expression of displeasure at Russia’s action,
though carefully coded, came from China. For Beijing, the formal
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was an attack on the
principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in other
states’ domestic affairs that the Chinese regard as sacrosanct.
As B obo Lo, an expert at the Centre for European Reform think-tank,
puts it: "The analogy that matters is not Tibet or Xinjiang – long
under de facto as well as de jure control – but Taiwan… Moscow’s
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia establishes a dangerous
precedent, whereby de facto control supported by a dominant external
power can introduce new realities."
Russia has not merely isolated itself but left itself "more friendless
than at any time in the past 60 years", Bobo Lo argues.
This presents opportunities for the EU. European leaders worry about
their over-reliance on Russian energy supplies, and about Russia’s
meddling in its former sphere of control in eastern Europe. But doesn’t
China’s anger at Moscow’s attempted partition of Georgia create an
opening for the EU to develop a closer strategic relationship with
Beijing?
In a sense, such a move would replay Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger’s use of "the China card" in the early 1970s. Of course,
it would get nowhere without the support of the British, French and
German – the EU’s dominant foreign policy players. But, as it happens,
one or two European government ministers are already thinking along
these lines.
Who, I wonder, will be Europe’s Nixon?