DEMOCRACY CONTESTED IN ARMENIA
By Armine Ishkanian
DeFacto Agency
March 5 2008
Armenia
A disputed election followed by mass protest has created a
political crisis in another post-Soviet state. But the arrival of
new technologies and a younger generation signal a new chapter rather
than a rerun, says Armine Ishkanian for openDemocracy.
Armenia’s presidential election of 19 February appeared to deliver
a clear victory to the candidate who had led in most opinion polls
throughout the campaign, Serge Sargisian. Sargisian, Armenia’s
current prime minister and close ally of President Robert Kocharian,
was declared the victor on 24 February with (according to official
results) 52 percent of the vote. But as so often in the region – and
in a pattern increasingly familiar around the world – the official
results were bitterly disputed.
The supporters of the leading defeated candidate (and former president)
Levon Ter-Petrossian responded to the declared outcome by organizing
a continuous mass protests in the centre of the capital, Yerevan. In
confrontations between demonstrators and security forces, eight people
have been killed.
The election crisis has thus become one of public order and
governance. But what is it "really" about, and where does it fit
the pattern of Armenia’s democratic development in the years since
independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991?
Since achieving independence, Armenia has held five presidential
elections (1991, 1996, 1998, 2003 and 2008). Of these only the 1991
election is considered to have been free and fair. All the others,
the most recent one included, have followed a pattern that has
unfortunately become all too familiar: a flawed process followed by
boisterous protests by the opposition.
In the aftermath of the 19 February 2008 elections, demonstrations
were convened in Yerevan’s Liberty Square. The atmosphere at the
tented encampment was celebratory rather than threatening, typified
by protestors’ singing and dancing around bonfires. Behind the
display of public defiance, political maneuvering also continued,
as Serge Sargisian began reaching out to other opposition candidates
(apart, that is, from his chief rival Levon Ter-Petrossian) to seek
collaborative deals. In quick succession, Artashes Geghamian and
Artur Baghdasarian agreed to cooperate.
The post-election standoff remained tense; across the 10 days until 29
February there were a number of arrests and detentions of individual
opposition party members, activists, and some state officials who
had defected to the opposition camp. But few expected what happened
in the early morning of Saturday, 1 March, when Interior Ministry
security forces moved in and forcibly dispersed the demonstration in
the square using tear-gas, truncheons, and electric-shock equipment. In
circumstances as disputed as the election itself, eight people lost
their lives; it appears that excessive force was used against the
demonstrators. The deaths have intensified the sense of emergency
in Armenia, adding urgency to efforts to resolve the crisis yet
embittering an already difficult situation still further.
The context The irreconcilable positions of Serge Sargisian and Levon
Ter-Petrossian are rooted in Armenia’s post-independence politics.
Ter-Petrossian came to prominence in the late 1980s as the leader of
the Karabakh Committee, which championed the interests and rights of
the ethnic-Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh (an enclave inside
Armenia’s neighbor Azerbaijan). He was elected Armenia’s president in
1991 and was re-elected in 1996, but resigned from office in February
1998 as a result of a coup that brought Robert Kocharian to power.
Ter-Petrossian then withdrew from public life and effectively entered
voluntary internal exile. It was only in September 2007 that he
re-entered politics with a vitriolic attack on what he saw as the
corruption of his successor and of Armenia’s system more generally;
soon after, he announced his candidacy in the February 2008 elections.
After his electoral effort resulted in defeat (with the official
results awarding him 21.4 percent of the vote), Ter-Petrossian
said that massive voting irregularities and violations had made
the declared outcome invalid. His next step was to appeal to the
Constitutional Court to schedule new elections (another disappointed
candidate, Tigran Karapetyan, has said he also intends to take this
route). But after the break-up of the protests, there are reports
that Ter-Petrossian has been placed under house-arrest.
A number of neutral local observers, and international organizations
such as Human Rights Watch, has highlighted voting irregularities and
intimidation at polling-stations across Armenia. But the authorities
insist the vote was fair and that Sargisian was legitimately elected,
and thus characterize the protests as part of an attempt to seize
power by illegal means.
The Armenian government and Sargisian’s camp defend their stance by
pointing out that a number of significant countries (including France,
Russia and Turkey) has recognized his victory, and that the finding
of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) is that the
vote met the required standards. The IEOM preliminary report indeed
declares that the election was "administered mostly in line with OSCE
and Council of Europe commitments and standards"; but it also says
that further improvements are needed to address remaining problems,
including "the absence of a clear separation between state and party
functions, the lack of public confidence in the electoral process and
ensuring equal treatment of election contestants." The report states:
"The conduct of the count did not contribute to reducing an existing
suspicion amongst election stakeholders."
Several Armenian NGOs have criticized the IEOM report as being too
cautious. They released a joint statement arguing that "the apparent
discrepancy between the actual findings of the assessment with the
formative first two sentences of the report resulted in the government
only referring to this paragraph in the international observers’
assessment in order to legitimize the results of the election." Some
demonstrators picketed near the OSCE offices in Yerevan, shouting
"Shame!" to indicate their disappointment with the observers’ report
and what they consider its lending credibility to a flawed electoral
process.
The radically different interpretations of the election result have
dominated political debate inside Armenia (as well as among the
large Armenian diaspora). On 26 February, two days after Sargisian’s
victory was announced, a rally by his supporters – ostensibly to
"thank the voters" was organized in Yerevan’s Republic Square. People
were bussed into Yerevan from around the country, but many proceeded
to abandon the Sargisian rally and march up Northern Avenue to join
the demonstrators in Liberty Square – to be met with chants of "Unity!"
The differences I have observed and written about three of the four
past Armenian presidential elections (1996, 1998, 2003). With this
experience in mind, I find the 2008 elections and the post-election
developments to be significantly different from previous ones –
in three ways.
First, several officials, civil servants and diplomats have resigned
or been sacked from their posts for expressing their support for (or
for actively joining) the camp of Levon Ter-Petrossian. They include
the deputy prosecutor-general Gagik Jahangirian (who along with his
brother Vahan was arrested on charges of illegal arms possession and
assault on "state officials performing their duties"); a number of
officials from the foreign ministry (including deputy foreign minister
Armen Bayburtian, chief foreign-ministry spokesman Vladimir Karapetian,
ambassadors Ruben Shugarian and Levon Khachatrian); and civil servants
from the trade and economic-development ministries.
Several army generals have also backed Ter-Petrossian, including
Manvel Grigorian (who heads the Yerkrapah [Defenders of the Country]
faction) and Gagik Melkonian; neither has been stripped of his post.
Such an open breach by senior figures was not a feature in past
elections; then, individuals would switch sides only once the final
outcome had been declared – and when they did so, they would move
towards the ruling party rather than (as at present) the opposition.
Second, there has been a flourishing of new forms of media,
communication and information-sharing. During the election campaign
and in the post-election standoff, Armenian television coverage was
greatly skewed in favor of Serge Sargisian; opposition candidates were
either ignored or (in the case of Ter-Petrossian) negatively portrayed.
The absence of independent television channels and the strict loyalty
to the regime of the channels that survive – a situation that has
lasted since the closure of the independent television channel A1+
in 2002 – has meant that the reporting of the opposition protests
has been scarce to non-existent. The broadcasts have not reflected
the reality of what is happening in the streets and squares. This
has led civil-society activists to send an open letter criticizing
the H1 public-television channel’s biased presentation.
Such bias was a feature in previous elections as well. Armenians
have responded by transmitting news in a familiar, more trusted
and legitimate source: word of mouth. But in addition, what is
different this time is that individuals have begun using new forms
of communication technology – mobile-phones, email, blogs, and
video-sharing websites such as YouTube – to share and exchange
information and opinions about the latest developments. These
innovative means of sharing information, news, and comments have
circumvented the official television and radio channels’ information
blockade, and created a "virtual public sphere" for debate and
deliberation.
You Tube in particular has added a new dimension by hosting all sorts
of clips including demonstrations, arguments at polling stations,
and discussions with people on the street.
Third, the election itself and especially the demonstrations in
their aftermath have witnessed the emergence of a generation of young
Armenians as an active political constituency. The festive atmosphere
in Liberty Square has attracted increasing numbers of young people,
despite threats of expulsion or suspension against them (allegedly)
made by the deans and rectors of some universities. This, again, is
a contrast with previous elections, particularly in 1998 and 2003,
when protest rallies were composed mainly of older people whose
nostalgia for the good old Soviet days led them to support former
Armenian Communist Party leader Karen Demirchian (1998) and his son
Stepan Demirchian (2003).
There is a debate here between those who argue that many young people
support Ter-Petrossian because they do not remember how difficult
life was during the early years of his rule, and those who believe
they are attracted by his charisma and message of democratic reform.
But the fact of change in elite opinion, technology and generation
is striking.
The outcome After Armenia’s first four presidential elections, protests
either dwindled of their own accord or were violently suppressed
by the authorities. The option of force has been used too after the
fifth election, yet – so far – it does not appear that this is the
end of the story.
Whatever happens next, it is clear – and encouraging – that these
elections engendered heated public debate about Armenia’s future, the
past it has traversed since gaining independence in 1991, the nature
of its leadership, and the country’s political culture. However an
increasingly tense situation is resolved, the early weeks of 2008
will have a significant impact on political developments and the
future of democracy in Armenia.
Armine Ishkanian is a lecturer at the Centre for Civil Society,
London School of Economics. She is the author of Democracy-building
and Civil Society in post-Soviet Armenia (Routledge, 2008).