AntiWar.com
Sept 15 2005
Has the UN Let a Blacklisted Islamic Charity Roam Free in Kosovo?
by Christopher Deliso
balkanalysis.com
When it comes to charities suspected of terrorist involvement, at
what point can a series of independent actions be said to indicate
coordinated and malevolent intent? And if they do in fact indicate
such intent, what should be done about it?
These are the questions that Thomas Gambill, a former security
officer with the OSCE, had to wrestle with during his time in Kosovo,
in regards to several Islamic NGOs and charities whose stated
activities seemed benign, but whose latent motives were more
suspicious.
According to Gambill, whose whistleblower testimony first came out on
Antiwar.com in August, the verdict is not good: in more than one
case, UN bosses of the occupied Serbian province “have turned a blind
eye” to dangerous charities – including a local branch of an Islamic
fundamentalist group that has been linked to terrorist attacks and/or
extremism in countries ranging from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan to Azerbaijan, Albania, and Bosnia – a group that has, in
fact, been partially blacklisted by both the Bush administration and
the UN since January 2002.
A Dangerous Disinterest
However, now that the group in question (the Revival of Islamic
Heritage Society, hereafter RIHS) has become more prominent for
trying to spread ultraconservative Saudi Wahhabism and for directly
sponsoring terrorist attacks, such as last month’s mass bombings in
Bangladesh, UNMIK’s apparent disinterest might be more than just
negligent; should the RIHS cement the Balkan foothold it established
over a decade ago in Albania, it could steer long-term social trends
away from the region’s so-called path of “Western integration.” More
important in the short term, by ignoring the group’s presence in
Kosovo, the international authorities continue to allow a key source
of terrorist funding and logistical organization to operate
unhindered.
Tom Gambill’s initial revelations were made public in this article,
in which the former security chief contended that the majority of his
colleagues were interested only in their paychecks, careers, and
desire to escape Kosovo unscathed, and thus shrank from confronting
any potential source of conflict, no matter how great a danger it
might have represented.
“I had this info [about the charities] all the way back in 2001,”
says Gambill. “But the State Department didn’t want to hear about it.
And I brought it up at every meeting I went to that included [the
U.S.] military, but nada. Many of the American KFOR [Kosovo Force]
guys were there for their six months – you know, get the ribbon, do a
few good deeds, and go home. And those who confided in me didn’t want
to rock the boat with their superiors… the thinking was, ‘hey, we’re
here for only six months – let’s get the job done as assigned and get
home.”
For the present investigation, Mr. Gambill has obliged by producing
official written and photographic testimony to support his case for
the RIHS’ presence in Kosovo. He also recalls the generally lukewarm
reaction he received from superiors. In fact, this former Marine
believes that the OSCE’s decision not to renew his contract last
spring owed to a face-saving desire to “bury” the stories he was
insisting on telling – something not very surprising, considering
that the brazenly irresponsible international administration has gone
to great lengths since day one to conceal its monumental failures, in
areas ranging from creating a viable economy to protecting vulnerable
minority groups.
One might ask, “So what? There are millions of these allegedly
‘dangerous’ Islamic charities out there.” That was my initial
reaction when I first heard of this case. However, after some
research, it became clear that far from being just another one of the
myriad Islamic NGOs operating in the Balkans, the RIHS was in fact a
major player with a distinguished track record and truly global
aspirations. If the UN has really allowed it to flourish in Kosovo,
this policy would seem to be very foolish, as the following should
indicate.
The RIHS: A Quick Overview
The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society is a Kuwait-based charity
with branch offices in numerous Muslim-inhabited countries. It was
founded in 1992 and, according to the International Journal of
Not-for-Profit Law in 2002, established international branches,
including even a British one (later registered with the Charity
Commission: registration no. 1014888). Quoting a now-defunct Web
site, the article stated that the RIHS’ purpose is “to improve the
condition of the Muslim community and develop an awareness and
understanding of Islam amongst the non-Muslim communities, by
concentrating on youth and education.”
Indeed, proselytizing among the young and the poor has served as the
group’s preliminary method of pushing a more conservative type of
worship based on the Saudi Salafi or Wahhabi form of Islam. This
invariably has been carried out through large-scale mosque-building,
financial incentives for converts, and attempts to alienate the young
from the established traditions and political processes of their home
countries. As with any cult, they do this in order to present their
solutions to complex social problems as the only “true” alternatives
– even if the execution of these solutions sometimes involves
terrorist activities.
The RIHS’ established pattern of activity indicates a special
interest in Islamic or partially Islamic states where a certain level
of turbulence prevails, where stagnant economies and governmental
corruption can be assailed from a broadly populist viewpoint – and,
notably, where there is no historical tradition of Arab Salafi
worship. In the wake of 9/11, European investigators found a clear
connection between Salafi propagandists and indigenous extremist
groups.
Yet despite the group’s presence in England, RIHS activities in
places like Azerbaijan and Bangladesh, as well as the Balkans, have
been much more important, strategically speaking, for their goal of
bringing developing states under their eventual ideological and,
ideally, political control.
Furthermore, the RIHS is a founding member of an infamous and now
largely disrupted Islamic charity network that includes the banned
al-Haramain, Global Relief, and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief
and Development, all of which shared the same strategic goals. As a
May 2005 report from the Naval Postgraduate School states, “since
1992, in addition to the local orders, the main supporters of Salafi
ideas [in Bosnia] were the following relief agencies – High Saudi
Committee, al-Haramain Foundation, and the Society for the Revival of
Islamic Heritage (Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turah al-Islami).”
The RIHS Blacklistings
On Jan. 9, 2002, RIHS operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan were
blacklisted by the U.S. government. The Bank of England
simultaneously followed suit, as did the UN two days later.
Announcing the action as part of a global effort to cut off the
terrorists’ access to “hard-money countries,” then-Secretary of the
Treasury Paul O’Neill also mentioned Canada, Luxembourg, and Hong
Kong as among the list of places that were enforcing the ban and
freezing the group’s assets.
According to the U.S. government, the Pakistani and Afghani branches
of the RIHS were run by some real bad apples – or “bad actors,” as
O’Neill called them – among whom were one Abd al-Mushin al-Libi and
Abu Bakr al-Jaziri, “formerly bin Laden’s chief fundraiser.”
Based in Peshawar, the latter was serving as the finance chief of the
Afghan Support Committee, an Islamic charity connected with al-Qaeda.
Al-Libi had been running the Pakistan office of the RIHS while also
managing the Afghan Support Committee’s office in Peshawar. Stated
O’Neill, these groups had been “stealing from widows and orphans to
fund al-Qaeda terrorism.”
The RIHS staffers in Kuwait are less well known, but even involve
enthusiastic female converts from the West. At some point between
2002 and 2004, it seems, the Kuwait headquarters was also
blacklisted, as is stated in this Oct. 19, 2004 report from O’Neill’s
replacement, John Snow. But this remains somewhat of a mystery, as
nothing else has been said about why or how the blacklisting came
about. After all, in January 2002, O’Neill had specifically said that
there was no evidence that the Kuwait RIHS was aware of the money
movements of their Afghan and Pakistani branches. So what happened
thereafter? Did evidence present itself? The situation remains murky.
Aside from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the RIHS has been active in
other countries, most notably working with Chechen émigré jihadis in
Azerbaijan and with indigenous terrorist groups in Bangladesh, in
both cases intending to establish a strictly Islamic government
through violent upheaval. When the pattern established by these
activities is revealed in its full dimensions, the allegations made
by investigators such as Tom Gambill regarding the threat to the
Balkans acquire a new urgency. We will consider some examples now
that illustrate the RIHS’ three-stage strategy for effecting change:
securing a presence, fomenting dissent, and finally, engaging in
spectacular terrorist attacks to set the stage for an Islamic
revolution.
Stage 1: Securing a Presence, Albania
On June 28, 1998, while war was raging between the Yugoslav army and
the Albanian paramilitary KLA in Kosovo, two Egyptians were arrested
for running a terrorist training camp in the central Albanian town of
Elbasan. They had been quietly recruiting young men from the north of
the country for the campaign against the Serbs. Citing the Albanian
ShIK intelligence service, the linked report claimed that the pair
(Maget Mustafa and Muhamed Houda) were seeking “to give a powerful
religious character” to the nascent Kosovo war that would end with
NATO bombing the following spring.
According to the article, the Egyptians had been active at Elbasan’s
el-Hagri Theological Institute. Suspicions of Salafi fundamentalists
in the midst had arisen locally “following the arrival of Sudani and
Pakistani people” four years earlier.
Indeed, while “rumors” had already been circulating locally regarding
the real interests of the detained Egyptians, “their declared
activity was of the humanitarian character to help poor families …
[they] held posts in [the] ‘Revival of Islamic Heritage’ association
operating in Albania.”
It is well known that Osama bin Laden sought to break in to
post-Communist Albania in 1994 by offering humanitarian assistance
through Islamic charities to the impoverished nation. Of course, this
was merely a front for importing Islamic radicals and terrorists.
Some seemed to have been reporting to Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of
Egyptian Islamic Jihad since 1991, and later bin Laden’s right-hand
man. In a short report of June 2, 2004, the U.S. Treasury claimed
that Osama bin Laden himself founded al-Haramain in Albania, and that
“in 1998, the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Albania was
reportedly also a financial official for AHF in Albania.”
Finally, “in late 2000, a close associate of a UBL operative moved to
Albania and was running an unnamed AHF subsidiary.” Which
“subsidiary” could it have been?
While this question is not answered in this fascinating July 2005
article from the Chicago Tribune on the CIA’s rather lavish 2003
kidnapping of Egyptian-born Imam Abu Omar in Italy, it does clarify
the Egyptian connection with the RIHS in Albania.
Several years before turning into an anti-American firebrand in late
2001, Abu Omar had been a valuable informant in Albania for the ShIK
and thus, ultimately, the CIA. The article recounts that on Aug. 27,
1995, the then-unknown Abu Omar was taken in for questioning by the
Albanian authorities, together with several known members of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and another Egyptian terrorist group, the Jamaat
al-Islamiya. The ShIK had received a tip from the CIA that this group
was planning to assassinate the visiting Egyptian foreign minister,
Amr Moussa. In fact, only two months earlier, Jamaat al-Islamiya had
tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. So given the circumstances, the CIA’s concerns were
understandable.
Under questioning, Abu Omar admitted having fled Egypt “because he
belonged to Jamaat al-Islamiya.” But he denied any assassination
plot, since “such a move would have cost Jamaat its [safe] haven. …
Abu Omar told the ShIK agents that, for Jamaat members like him,
Albania was a ‘safe hotel’ – a country where fundamentalist Muslims
believed they could live without fear of political repression.”
At the same time, Omar claimed that the Egyptian terrorist group “had
about 10 people working for three Islamic charities in Albania,
including al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Revival of Islamic
Heritage Society.”
Although Abu Omar vanished mysteriously weeks later, only to
resurface in Italy as a radical, he didn’t sever his ties to foreign
terrorist groups based in Albania. Indeed, as a conversation of June
6, 2002 taped by the Italian police makes clear, he was very much
aware of ongoing operations. The Chicago Tribune article transcribes
the relevant fragment:
“[A]bu Omar is overheard speaking with an unidentified South African
man who seems to be talking about car bombs.
“‘Who has made them?’ Abu Omar asks. ‘Who? Who?’
“‘One of the Palestinian brothers,’ replies the South African.
“‘The Palestinian?’ Abu Omar asks.
“‘Yes,’ the man answers. ‘The one who is called the machine … the one
who is in Albania.'”
This is interesting, because there is scant information regarding
current activities of the RIHS and similar groups in Albania. They
seem to have dropped off the radar. But it is notable that the branch
has not been put on the U.S. blacklist, as were the Afghan and
Pakistani branches. Why? Have their activities been suspended,
voluntarily or involuntarily? Or has the U.S. been treading lightly
in the country for some reason? There is simply no way of knowing.
Essentially, however, what is important to note here is the RIHS’
attested means of infiltration and clandestine operations, which are
incontestably displayed in the Abu Omar case and other events
discussed above.
Stage 2: Transforming the State, Azerbaijan
With its substantial oil and gas deposits and headship of the new
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Azerbaijan is a strategically vital
country to the United States – as well as to Islamist “reformers”
such as the RIHS. The proximity of this Caucasus country to trouble
spots like Chechnya, Dagestan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, not to mention
its key relationships with neighbors such as Turkey and Iran, have
led American policymakers to watch developments in the country
closely. But have they been missing something?
A compelling July 2005 article from the Jamestown Foundation recounts
the post-USSR arrival of Salafi missionaries in Azerbaijan, a
phenomenon that accelerated with the first war in Chechnya in 1994.
In fact, the first Salafi missionaries arrived directly from this
bitterly contested war zone: “the majority of them came from Chechnya
and Dagestan where the Salafis had some influence, in large measure
due to the Russian-Chechen wars.”
A few years later, however, “missionaries from the Persian Gulf
countries dramatically increased their activities in Azerbaijan.”
According to the article, the current number of Salafi worshippers in
Baku alone numbers around 15,000, despite there having been no
tradition of this Saudi form of Islam before. This worries the Azeri
government, and perhaps with good reason: “alarmingly for the Azeri
establishment, Salafis do not make a secret of their aspirations to
acquire political power in Azerbaijan.”
Considering that some 65-70 percent of Azeris are Shi’ite Muslims,
the inroads Salafis are making also concerns neighboring Iran, the
perceived “archrival” of this Sunni Arab movement. This factor leads
the author to speculate that if the proselytizers make problems for
the Shi’ite majority, it could “provoke some form of Iranian
intervention,” and that ultimately, “the proliferation of Salafi
ideas among religious and ethnic minorities could create powerful
centrifugal forces that will in due course threaten the national
unity of Azerbaijan.”
Interestingly enough, the RIHS has been a key player in promoting the
ideas that could lead to such a destabilization. So why hasn’t the
U.S. blacklisted it here, as it did in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
States the article:
“[B]y 2003, 65 new Salafi-controlled mosques had been established in
Azerbaijan. One of the largest Salafi mosques in the country is the
Abu Bakr mosque. Built in 1997 in Baku by the Azeri branch of the
Kuwaiti society Revival of Islamic Heritage, Abu Bakr became one of
the most successful mosques in Azerbaijan.
“While on average the Shi’a or Sunni mosques are able to attract
approximately 300 people for Friday prayers, the number of people
visiting the Abu Bakr mosque typically reaches 5,000 to 7,000 people.
[2] The Imam of the Abu Bakr mosque is Gammet Suleymanov, a graduate
of the World Islamic University of Medina that is a leading center
for the study and export of Salafism.”
According to the article, a spring 2001 trial of aspiring mujahedin
for the Chechnya campaign led to the summoning of Suleymanov, since
the accused had been “frequent visitors” to his mosque and had in
fact been recruited there by Chechen leaders. In another trial,
Suleymanov’s Abu Bakr mosque was also singled out as a refuge for
members of the Pan-Islamic Hizb-ut Tahrir organization. Finally, in
May 2002, deputy minister of national security Tofiq Babayev attested
that
“[A] number of Arab countries were interested in spreading radical
Wahhabism in Azerbaijan. According to Babayev, over 300 Azeris had
been trained in Wahhabi centers in Dagestan. The deputy minister
identified three stages in the effort to make Wahhabism a grassroots
movement in Azerbaijan. First there is the spread of Wahhabi
literature and the provision of financial assistance to potential
activists. The second stage involves the efficient training of the
activists, and the final stage deals with the mobilization of active
members for acts of terrorism designed to destabilize the state. [5]”
All things considered, it seems surprising that the U.S. apparently
hasn’t moved to shut down the RIHS branch in Azerbaijan. As the above
testimony implies, things could eventually progress to the point
where national stability becomes a real concern; the third stage of
the extremist plan could then unfold.
Stage 3: Destabilization Through Terror, Bangladesh
On Aug. 17, a coordinated bombing campaign was conducted in 63 out of
64 districts of Bangladesh. Almost 500 small but nearly simultaneous
explosions killed three and injured at least 150. The attacks were
meant to be a show of force, to intimidate rather than kill – and to
show the country what the terrorists were capable of doing.
Last week, the government charged that the main suspect in the
attacks – local terrorist group, Jama’atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)
– had been heavily funded and assisted by the Revival of Islamic
Heritage Society, along with a mysterious imam from the UK and
several other organizations and front groups.
These groups had illegally employed foreign Islamists visiting
Bangladesh on tourist visas, as well as several veterans of the
notorious al-Haramain, reported the New Kerala on Sept. 8. Thus,
while it likes to present itself as having shattered the
terrorist-supporting Islamist charities, the Bush administration has
merely scattered them. They can and do easily regroup, under
different umbrella groups and names.
With the pressure on following the ensuing police crackdown, the RIHS
sought to lower its profile drastically. According to the article,
“the Heritage Society’s front organization, the Higher Islamic
Education Institute, in the capital was closed down last week. It has
started trimming manpower in other affiliated institutions as part of
the wrapping-up process.”
Only four days after the explosions, a high official of the RIHS from
Kuwait, Abdul Aziz Khalaf Malullah, cut short his month-long visit
and left Bangladesh. What really raises eyebrows about this sudden
departure was the fact that Malullah had apparently planned his trip
“with the express mission to ensure continuation of the RIHS
activities in the country,” according to South Asian Media Net on
Aug. 22. But since the Kuwaiti had arrived just days before the
blasts, was he not probably aware that they would take place – and
thus necessitate the immediate presence of someone to lobby the
government on the group’s behalf? And especially considering that the
preparations for the complex series of bombings began way back in
April, and required much coordination with the RIHS?
In any case, Malullah “failed to manage a positive response from the
government,” and left on Aug. 21. He is one of the only officials of
the RIHS known by name.
The RIHS, however, could not hog all the limelight. The New Kerala
article adds that “more than 100 foreigners … from different Middle
East and African countries” had been illegally employed in nine other
Islamic charities as well. In addition, four charity officials
suspected of terrorist involvement had been among the 14 who worked
for al-Haramain, but who left the country when the group was banned
in 2004. However, they “returned several months later and joined the
Heritage Society [RIHS] without the knowledge of intelligence
agencies.”
Further, local investigators following the money trail have arrived
at the RIHS’ door, says the article:
“[A]n intelligence report recently submitted to the government said
that the Kuwait-based organization used to channel funds for
[extremist group] Ahle Hadith Andolon’s leader, Asadullah al-Ghalib,
also a university professor, who was arrested last February for
exploding bombs at NGOs’ offices and cultural functions in the
northern part of the country.
“Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, blamed for the Aug. 17 chain of bomb
blasts, has been getting foreign funds for its militant activities
through Ghalib.”
And, according to the Asia News Network on Sept. 3, “Bangladesh
intelligence agencies have recently recommended banning RIHS for
financing Islamist militants in the country … claiming that it seems
to be more concerned with promoting militancy rather than protecting
Islamic heritage, said an intelligence source.”
According to the report, the RIHS had provided funds to two related
organizations, the Tawhid Trust and the Hadith Foundation, both of
which had been “founded by militant kingpin Asadullah al-Galib.”
In a follow-up article which sought to explain the problem of Islamic
extremism in Bangladesh, the Christian Science Monitor reported that
the Bangladeshi government “is working with the country’s banks to
identify suspicious accounts and transactions, some possibly
originating abroad. ‘They’ve received monetary help from Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Pakistan,’ says a retired police investigator,
who spoke on condition of anonymity. ‘They first started in 1989
during the Afghan war.'”
This apparent show of diligence is no doubt meant to keep one
optimistic regarding the ability of international police to freeze
accounts and put terrorists in the poorhouse. However, as another
recent article which discusses huge foreign funding for Bangladesh’s
34 registered Islamic NGOs makes clear, we shouldn’t deceive
ourselves:
“[T]his money has no official records as it does not come through
official channels. The persons concerned themselves carry the money
or send it through unofficial channels like hundi. Some exporters and
importers in Dhaka and Chittagong also help transferring the money.
The foreign funds that are channeled through businessmen mainly come
via Bangkok and Singapore, the sources pointed out.
“This is one of the major sources of funds for the local Islamic NGOs
and Qawmi madrassas which do not have government recognition. The
income and expenditure of these madrassas are not accounted for
properly as they are not accountable to any government body.”
That said, the CSM does point out how the fundamentalists have used a
well-rehearsed plan – exploiting social and economic crises – to gain
influence, as was specified in the beginning of this article as being
a major strategy:
“[I]slamist militant groups have taken firm root here, demonstrating
a widespread, highly coordinated, and well-funded network … homegrown
militancy, invigorated by foreign funds and leadership radicalized in
Afghanistan, has flourished here because of growing economic
inequalities and acrimonious politics that have crippled the
functioning of democracy.”
Outlook India cited an intelligence source as claiming the “JMB
militants through Galib have utilized the facilities of some 700
mosques built across the country by the Revival of Islamic Heritage
Society (RIHS).” The CSM report states that altogether the RIHS has
funded 1,000 mosques in Bangladesh, as well as 10 new madrassas.
Finally, as retired Brigadier General Shahed Anam Khan told the
paper, “the organization behind Aug. 17 was extremely sophisticated
and networked. It’s clear that at least 500 people were used to place
the bombs; their strategy was classic – send in men who don’t know
the core group which had planned and assembled the bombs. This is
something which we never encountered in the past.”
A Shocking Disinterest
Taken cumulatively, shouldn’t all of the dubious partnerships and
destructive activities of the RIHS have set off alarm bells for
international authorities in Kosovo, where the charity’s presence was
evidenced long ago? According to Tom Gambill, even when confronted
with proof of the RHIS’ existence in the occupied province, UN and
American officials alike seemed rather unimpressed.
While there were some “motivated” American security officials who
“wanted a piece of the action,” says Gambill, “they were held back in
some cases by orders from those higher up in the pecking order. This
was much to the disgruntlement of the lower echelons – lieutenants,
captains, some majors … the same thing with the CivPol [UN Police].”
However, he adds, the authorities in Kosovo were generally
indifferent to the RIHS’ presence and what it could mean for the
future. When Gambill raised the issue at another Camp Bondsteel
meeting, showing photographic proof and citing the UN Mandate
outlawing the group, he got a somewhat “peeved” reaction from the
FBI’s representative in Kosovo: “It seemed like he knew nothing
[about the group] – go figure!”
Naysayers and Defenders in the UN and US Military
Yet the aspiring whistleblower was not just a nuisance; through his
arguments and frequent e-mails to UNMIK and U.S. security officials
in Kosovo, he was rocking the boat – essentially, the last thing the
“I’m OK, you’re OK” international administration wanted to see
happen. And this led certain individuals to get flustered unduly.
States Gambill:
“In another case, I was verbally attacked via e-mail by an American
major. … He said that I was not qualified to make comments, and that
neither my information nor comments were accurate. However, the
comments he was making were erroneous … and completely unwarranted.
After forwarding his comments to my point of contact on the American
base, he (another major) was taken back at this kind of behavior.
“Later, in early 2003, one member, an American assigned to the OSCE
who was on my e-mail list, complained to my Division Head that I was
sending out information contained in OSCE classified reports, which
was incorrect. I got my information from non-classified sources and
correctly triangulated my information before writing anything and
distributing. In other words, I always obtained the same information
from at least three different sources that were unrelated but
consistent. This then qualified as reliable information. I also used
a disclaimer, just in case. So his complaint was inaccurate and made
for personal reasons, as I learned after I confronted my manager
about the report and source.”
But the biggest group of naysayers was not made up of hotheads, but
rather cynics who, Gambill claims, claimed to be experts – though
they visited Kosovo only once or twice a year:
“The ones who did not believe my reports were many internationals who
argued that these things [Salafi penetration, etc.] didn’t occur in
Bosnia, and that therefore the Islamic fundamentalists were not a
threat. They claimed that there were no organized efforts on the part
of the Islamic fundamentalists and that the [Albanian] rebel groups
causing trouble were not a significant concern. That line came from
many of the US military commanders who came through the region once
every six months. There was no continuity in the passing of
intelligence from one unit to another – ever.”
But all reactions were not hostile, says Gambill. Other security
officials more keen on fighting the “war on terror” were impressed by
his tenacity and commitment to rooting out hostile elements. He
recounts:
“In several meetings of the combined group (U.S. military, UN, and
CivPol), just as many commended me for the information that I brought
to the table. I was told that my sources and reports were 90 percent
accurate and were appreciated. In one case, a commander came to me
after a meeting and commended me on my participation in all his
meetings and gave me a unit coin for my contributions. It was done
quietly, of course.”
In fact, certain of the security officers who appreciated Gambill’s
input in turn provided him with further “accurate reports and bits of
info that helped to substantiate the info that I was putting out.”
RIHS in Kosovo: The Proof
Tom Gambill admits that having left Kosovo over a year ago, he can’t
state with certainty what is happening there now on a day-to-day
basis. However, he does provide compelling evidence that proves the
UN authorities in Kosovo, through mid-2004 at least, were tolerating
the presence of an Islamic group (the RIHS) that had been banned
elsewhere a year and a half earlier.
To buttress his claim, Gambill presents two internal UNMIK police
documents and a photo that attest to a RIHS presence in Kosovo – and
that disclose the same activity patterns demonstrated by the group in
the countries discussed above.
“In one security meeting at [U.S. military base Camp] Bondsteel,”
recounts Gambill, “a sympathetic American [agency deleted] officer
slipped me a photo of their vehicles, with ‘RHIS/P’ spray-painted on
the side in big bold black letters and parked on the street in
Malishevo [near the southwestern town of Prizren]. They ran around
freely; this picture was taken in 2003 or early 2004.”
As for the documents, the first (dated July 26, 2003) covers this
incident in Malishevo. UNMIK police there observed a white Toyota
with Tirana registration and the name RHIS/P printed along the side
panel. The vehicle was parked in the town for two hours, but when its
occupants returned, the police stopped them and learned that the
driver was a Kosovo Albanian, and the passenger, a Kuwaiti.
Both had UNMIK ID cards; the car was registered to a Tirana-based
NGO. When questioned, the pair stated that they were employees of the
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society:
“[A]ccording to them this is a humanitarian organization and they
have representative offices in many cities in Kosovo and they visited
an Islamic office in Malishevo. The purpose of this organization is
to take care [of] orphans in Kosovo.”
This is a very interesting admission because, if true, it reaffirms
the RIHS’ time-honored preliminary tactic of “educating” the youth.
And indeed, what easier youth are there to educate than those without
parents? Such activities have already been used by (secular enough)
Kosovo Albanians in creating “front lines” protesters who can be
easily indoctrinated toward a militant “liberation” cause. Numerous
sources in Kosovo stated last year that a special group of war
orphans, whose families had been killed in the 1999 war, were
cynically being located at the front at various protests (including
the early stages of the March 2004 riots), specifically because of
the bad PR that would be generated were children to be harmed or
killed by UN police.
The other major strategy employed by RIHS during stage one –
mosque-building – is attested in the second document shared by
Gambill. In an “assessment” report of Sept. 20, 2003, also from the
Malishevo UN police, it is stated that another RIHS vehicle (this one
a Kosovo-registered, dark green Opel Frontera) had been spotted twice
in the nearby town of Orahovac, driven by a bearded Arab. More
importantly, the police report states that the RIHS had “asked” an
Emirates-based NGO, Human Appeal International, to fund and build a
mosque in the town – “the third mosque they [HAI] have constructed in
Kosovo.” The HAI, it turns out, is also heavily involved with orphan
services in countries including Kosovo.
This tactic of keeping beneath the radar by working indirectly
through an Islamic NGO (so far) untainted by terrorist links shows
that the RIHS is prepared to work slowly and in stages to attain its
key goal of increasing the Salafi head count in Kosovo. It is
frequently declared by Kosovo Albanian leaders and KLA war veterans
that theirs is a secular, pro-Western society that can never fall
under the influence of foreign Islamists, and that the KLA has always
refused their help. While this is no doubt true for a large section
of the former KLA, the splintering of the organization that began
after the war has led different factions to explore new partnerships.
Thus, adds Gambill, “right now, I have evidence from good sources who
are reporting that a branch of the AKSH [an Albanian nationalist
militant group] has hooked up with the fundies [Islamic
fundamentalists] in the southern tip of Kosovo, the Dragash area
between Albania and Macedonia.”
Moreover, leaving this argument aside for the moment, we should also
remember that terrorists never require a majority to operate in any
given country; indeed, it would be almost antithetical to their
purposes. In the absence of a majority population sympathetic to
their cause, all that groups like the RIHS need is a place to take
cover while they quietly plan – a “safe hotel,” as Abu Omar memorably
dubbed Albania back in 1995.
This vehicle, belonging to the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society,
was monitored by UN police in Kosovo.
The Balkan Black Hole – and Beyond
Unfortunately, Albania remains such a place today, as do Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Macedonia. Riddled with Islamist sympathizers, Bosnia is
the most amenable of the four, a place where “fitting in” is not
difficult (especially in the Zenica area). In Kosovo, the UN’s fear
and feebleness, as well as its intelligence shortcomings, have made
it impossible to really crack down on groups that are transient,
resilient, and well-funded. And in the last, poor Macedonia, the
complete lack of a government agency or even individual to regulate
the activities and finances of the NGO sector makes the motives and
finances of suspicious charities almost impossible to ascertain,
while the preponderance of heavily guarded militant villages make it
very dangerous for police to investigate what’s going on in local
Islamic communities and isolated mountains.
Of course, as Tom Gambill concedes, “It’s always true that more
[counter-terrorist investigative work] might be going on behind the
scenes than we know about.” The U.S. and its allies might simply be
playing a waiting game with the Islamists, or working with a very
select staff, or both.
Nevertheless, real concerns remain. Indeed, given the absence of any
visible proactive and public governmental actions when it comes to
cracking down on groups like the RIHS (and not only in the Balkans)
how can one not conclude that the U.S. and its allies are
demonstrating a dangerous negligence in the face of a clearly
demonstrated threat to Western security?
http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=7269