Eurasia Daily Monitor
June 16, 2009-Volume 6, Issue 115
UZBEKISTAN STALLING ON CSTO COLLECTIVE FORCES
by Vladimir Socor
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev clarified that Armenia signed
the documents without conditions, but it was Uzbekistan that registered
multiple objections and reservations at the Collective Security Treaty
Organization’s (CSTO) summit in Moscow on June 14 (see EDM, June 15).
The seven heads of state were scheduled to approve agreements on
enlarging the CSTO’s collective forces, the scope of their missions, and
the legal authority for their operations. But, with Belarus boycotting
the event and Uzbekistan dissenting on some major counts, the summit’s
documents are of questionable validity, despite their approval by
Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Policy
documents can only be adopted by consensus under the CSTO’s own rules.
The summit served at least to change the concept and title of the
CSTO collective forces, from "rapid response (bystroye reagirovanie)" to
"operational response (operativnoye reagirovanie)" forces. According to
Medvedev, the change is not simply one of terminology but reflects a
change in force planning (Interfax, March 14, 15). It stems from
Moscow’s recent ambition to create a larger group of forces including
conventional warfare capabilities.
This ambition goes beyond the initial goal of fielding a small
force geared to low-intensity conflicts and involving primarily
counter-terrorism missions. Meetings of the CSTO Council of Heads of
State (the top political decision-making authority in CSTO) in September
and December 2008 and February 2009 resolved at least on paper to
beef-up the rapid response forces into operational response ones. At the
February summit Medvedev indeed complained that the forces existed
merely "on paper" (see EDM, February 5).
At the June 14 summit, Medvedev again sounded almost scathing
about the slow pace of implementation thus far: "The collective [rapid
response] forces have never done anything, they never assembled, not
even for exercises." He urged that joint exercises be held as a matter
of priority (Interfax, June 14).
The rapid response forces continue to exist for the time being,
pending their enlargement into operational response forces. The existing
force consists of 10 battalions in Central Asia (five Russian ones
stationed in Tajikistan, two Kazakh, two Tajik, and one Kyrgyz
battalion) plus the Russian air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan (nominally a
CSTO base) with an estimated grand total of 7,000 troops. Notably,
Uzbekistan does not contribute troops to this collective force.
The operational response forces, however, are ambitiously planned
to include up to 20,000 troops, including armor and artillery units and
adding Russia’s Caspian Flotilla. The collective forces would
incorporate Spetsnaz-type, interior ministry, security service, and
emergency-situation units from the participant countries. A Russian
airborne division and air assault brigade (based in the Moscow region
and in Ulyanovsk, respectively) are earmarked to form the core of the
collective forces. The collective doctrine, armaments, uniforms and kit
are to be standardized along Russian lines. The collective force would
focus on missions in Central Asia.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov chose low-profile tactics to resist
Russian proposals at the Moscow summit. Karimov did not attempt to
emulate Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s vocal opposition and
boycott tactics. In the concluding press briefing, Karimov kept quiet
while Medvedev merely alluded to Uzbekistan’s objections and
reservations. These, however, can be gauged from the Uzbek position at
the February 4 CSTO summit and the June 3 Moscow sitting of the CSTO
Council of Defense Ministers, which ended inconclusively thanks mainly
to Uzbekistan’s stalling.
Six Uzbek "special positions" can be discerned between the lines
of official statements and in off-the-record official remarks. Tashkent
wants:
a) Uzbekistan to decide on its own whether to participate in CSTO
military operations and other activities, on a case-by-case basis.
b) Collective forces’ entry on the territory of a member country
to be authorized only if the move does not contradict that country’s
constitution and legislation.
c) CSTO decisions on force deployment in any theater to be made by
consensus, not by a majority of the member countries’ votes.
d) Collective forces are not to be deployed in conflict situations
hypothetically occurring between CSTO member countries.
e) The agreement on creating collective forces to require
parliamentary ratification by all member countries, and only then to
take legal effect.
f) Tashkent also registers objections, not specified publicly, to
Moscow-proposed command arrangements for the collective forces (EDM,
February 5, 6, June 4; Interfax, June 3, 4, 14).
Such objections and reservations are designed to: stay out of such
conflict situations as do not affect Uzbekistan’s interests; safeguard
against unwanted entry of Russian-led CSTO forces in Uzbekistan; avoid
being outvoted on Moscow-initiated force deployment decisions in the
CSTO; ensure that Russian-led CSTO forces do not intervene in conflict
situations between Uzbekistan and any of its neighbors; maintain
national command to the maximum possible extent over Uzbek troops in
collective operations; and slow down the collective forces’ legalization
pending seven national ratifications, whereas Moscow wants the agreement
on the collective forces to take legal effect before it is ratified by
national parliaments.
Given Uzbekistan’s pivotal location, unmatched value as
springboard for operations throughout Central Asia, and control of the
optimal access route into Afghanistan, it seems hardly possible for CSTO
collective forces to function effectively without Uzbekistan’s full
cooperation.
–Vladimir Socor